




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THE HISTORY
OF THE
PELOPONNESIAN WAR,
BY THUCYDIDES.

VOL. I.

CHARACTER OF THE WORK.

THE public is here presented with a translation of one of the best histories of antiquity ; a history full of important instruction. The pernicious consequences of faction in states, the tendency that power rigorously or wantonly exercised has to make men desperate, and that liberty, when abused, has to make them insolent ; is no where more strongly represented, than in the grave and judicious THUCYDIDES. In him too we see false patriots and venal orators dressed out in genuine colours, and those who employ their eloquence and abilities to promote the public interest, and exert themselves to the utmost of their power in the support of liberty, drawn at full length and in just proportions.

With regard to the translation now before us, we shall only say, that its merit is superior to any praises we can bestow, and that it will, we are persuaded, approve itself to the judgment of such (and such only are proper judges) as have an *Attic* taste, and are well acquainted with the turn and manner of the original. That our readers may see, in some measure, how our ingenious translator has succeeded, both in the *oratorial* and *narrative* part, we shall present them with the celebrated oration of *Pericles*, made at the public funeral of the *Athenians*, and the account of the plague at *Athens*, both in the second book of the history of THUCYDIDES.

Vide Monthly Review, vol. 8.—Old Series.

THE HISTORY
OF THE
PELOPONNESIAN WAR,

TRANSLATED FROM THE GREEK OF

THUCYDIDES.

TO WHICH ARE ANNEXED,

THREE PRELIMINARY DISCOURSES.

- I. On the Life of Thucydides.
- II. On his Qualifications as a Historian.
- III. A Survey of the History.

BY WILLIAM SMITH, D. D.

DEAN OF CHESTER,

TRANSLATOR OF LONGINUS ON THE SUBLIME, XENOPHON'S AFFAIRS
OF GREECE, &c.

TO WHICH IS PREFIXED THE

LIFE AND CHARACTER OF THE TRANSLATOR.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

PHILADELPHIA:

PUBLISHED BY EDWARD EARLE.

T. H. Palmer, printer.

1818.

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TO HIS

ROYAL HIGHNESS

THE

PRINCE OF WALES.

SIR,

THE History of Thucydides hath been studiously read and admired by the greatest Princes, and may therefore presume to lay some claim to the Protection of YOUR ROYAL HIGHNESS. Great Britain, of all the States now existing in the world, most nearly resembleth what Athens was at the time when the War, which is the Subject of it, broke out in Greece. A love of Liberty, which hath erroneously been supposed to thrive and flourish best in a democratical Government, was then warm and active in every Athenian. Athens, it is true, had thus been raised to a great height of maritime power, and was become a very formidable State; But Faction disjointed a noble Plan, and at length brought on the loss of her Sovereignty at Sea. The Athenians soon ceased to be great, when they deviated from those salutary maxims, which their worthiest Patriots and most consummate Statesmen had recommended to their constant observance.

The Maritime power of Great Britain is more substantially founded, and hath ever been more steadily supported than was that of Athens. The most complete and most lasting Form of Government, that man can invent, happily subsists in this Realm under Your ROYAL GRANDFATHER. The British Constitution hath long been, and may it long continue to be the envy of other Nations! For the future support of it, the public hopes and expectations are fixed upon Your ROYAL HIGHNESS. Long may HIS MAJESTY Your ROYAL GRANDFATHER live to secure the freedom and happiness of his People, that Your ROYAL HIGHNESS may become equal, in every respect, to the same great and glorious Charge!

I have a heart duly sensible of the great honour conferred upon me, by being thus permitted to profess myself,

Your ROYAL HIGHNESS's

most devoted and

most humble Servant,

WILLIAM SMITH.

London, 1753.

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PREFACE.

IT was not from a private choice, but from deference to what was judged a public call, that the following translation of Thucydides was first undertaken. To explain the motive more largely, might perhaps incur the imputation of impertinence or vanity. The performance, upon the whole, must justify the undertaking. In what manner it is done, and not why it was done, will be the point of public arbitration.

It will be also needless to tell the English Reader, how many versions have been made of Thucydides into Latin. Their design was to bring the author more under the observation of what is generally styled the *learned* world; as the translations of him into modern languages have aimed at introducing him into general acquaintance, as a historian capable of innocently amusing most ranks of men, but of usefully instructing the persons, who from duty and from passion would guard the rights or secure the welfare of public communities. The grand business of History is to make men wiser in themselves and better members of society. For this purpose it recalls past ages to their view; and thus opens a more extensive scope to reflection than any personal experience can offer. To be well versed in a similarity of cases prepares men better for counsel or action on present contingencies. The statesman, the patriot, the friend to liberty and reason will be better enabled to plan and to regulate his *own* measures, when he can see the tendency and consequence of such as were followed on parallel occasions, and adjust the degrees, in which they were either prejudicial or serviceable to public good.

All men have neither the turn of mind, nor the leisure, to make themselves proficient in the dead and learned languages. Such as have are certainly honestly, perhaps beneficently, employed, in holding out light to others. The Greek historians, as they take a precedency in time, lay further a strong claim to precedency in merit. Thucydides is the most instructive of these; and, since the restoration of letters in the western world, each nation, that hath piqued itself at all about humanity or politeness, as his manner was soon found to be excellent, have given thanks to those who have endeavoured to investigate his matter and lay it open to public view.

It is to the honour of the French, that they took the lead. The first translation of Thucydides into French, published at Paris in 1527, was that of Claude de Seyssel, bishop of Marseilles. However performed, it went, within the space of little more than thirty years, through four impressions. It is said to have been done at the command of Francis I. king of France; and, to have been carried about with him in his wars, and diligently studied by the Emperor Charles V. The Germans had also a translation of him soon afterwards in the year 1533. In 1545, Francis di Soldo Strozzi published an Italian translation dedicated to Cosmo di Medicis. The first English translation made its appearance in London in 1550; but, in fact, was only the translation of a translation, since it was intitled a version from the French of Claude de Seyssel. In 1564, he was published in Spanish. A second French translation by Louis Jonsaud d'Usez was published at Geneva in 1600. The second into English, by the famous Mr. Hobbes of Malmsbury, was first published in the year 1628, about which it will be necessary immediately to enlarge. A third French translation, by the Sieur d'Ablancourt, was published at Paris in 1662, and hath since gone through four editions. There is a Danish translation, which closeth the list given of them in the *Bibliotheca Græca* of Fabricius.

Mr. Hobbes declares in his Preface, that “the virtues of
 “this author so took his affection, that they begot in him a
 “desire to communicate him further.” He considered also,
 that “he was exceedingly esteemed of the Italian and French
 “in their own tongues, notwithstanding that he be not very
 “much beholding for it to his interpreters.” He says after-
 wards, that, by the first translation of Nicholls from the
 French of Seyssel, “he became at length traduced rather
 “than translated into our language ;” alluding perhaps to the
 Italian sarcasm on translators, *Traduttore traditore*. He then
 resolved himself “to take him immediately from the Greek
 “—knowing, that when with diligence and leisure I should
 “have done it, though some errors might remain, yet they
 “would be errors but of one descent ; of which nevertheless
 “(says he) I can discover none, and hope they be not
 “many.

Mr. Hobbes, however sorry and mischievous a philoso-
 pher, was undoubtedly a very learned man. He hath shewn
 it beyond dispute in his translation of Thucydides. He is
 an excellent help, for any one who consults him, to find out
 the meaning and adjust the sense. But, though his transla-
 tion hath now passed through three editions, and hath pro-
 fitably been read by many, yet (I speak not from my own
 private judgment) he cannot now be read with any compe-
 tent degree of pleasure. He is faithful, but most servilely
 so, to the letter of his author. Even in the *orations*, he mere-
 ly acts the interpreter, and hath quite forgot the orator. He
 translates literally throughout, and numbers rather than
 weighs the words of Thucydides. By this means the con-
 struction is very often intricate and confused, the thoughts
 pregnant with sense are not sufficiently opened, nor the glow-
 ing ideas of the author or his orators transfused with proper
 degrees of warmth and light. Too scrupulous an attachment
 to the letter of the original hath made the copy quite flat and
 heavy, the spirit is evaporated, the lofty and majestic air hath
 intirely disappeared. Too many low and vulgar expressions

are used, which Thucydides ever studiously avoided. Such frequently occur in the midst of some grand circumstance, which they throw into a kind of burlesque, and may excite a reader's laughter. The English language has gone through a great variation, hath been highly polished, since Mr. Hobbes wrote. Hence, though his terms be in general very intelligible, yet they have not that neatness, precision, and dignity, to which the polite and refined writers within the last century have habituated our ears. And, after all, I am inclined to think, that Mr. Hobbes either executed in great haste, or performed his revisals in a very cursory and negligent manner. I am inclined to think so from the very many passages, necessary and emphatical periods, nay sometimes in the very speeches, which to my great surprise I have found omitted in his translation. A particle, an epithet, or even a comma, may with the greatest attention sometimes be dropped in a long work. But the omissions in Mr. Hobbes are too numerous and important, to be excused in any tolerable consistence with repeated care and circumspection.

Monsieur Bayle hath ascribed the translation of Thucydides by Mr. Hobbes to a motive of which he hath not left the least hint himself in his preface ;—" in order to shew the " English, in the history of the Athenians, the disorders and " confusions of a democratical government." Mr. Hobbes could not possibly, so long before they happened, foresee the strange revolutions, that were soon to take place in the government of his country. The very actors in them could not possibly discern the consequences of their own embroilments. Some violent incroachments had indeed been made on the liberty and property of Englishmen, and a spirit of discontent began to spread throughout the nation. But it cannot be supposed, that the plan of a commonwealth was formed at that time, or for several years after. The history of Thucydides abundantly shews, how dangerous and destructive is faction in a State ; that severe or wanton power may make men desperate ; and that liberty abused may make

them insolent and mutinous. It detects and exposeth venal orators and false patriots ; but it exhibits men, who are studious and eloquent in behalf of public welfare, and active in support of liberty and honest power, in full beauty and proportion. And his lessons lie not so apposite and ready for the application of any State now existing in the world, as for that of Great Britain.

The reader may by this time have caught a glimpse of several reasons, for which the present translation of Thucydides was finished and is now made public. No care hath been omitted to make it as correct as possible. It hath been attentively reviewed ; the *narrative* part, more than once ; the *oratorical* part, with repeated endeavours to reach the spirit and energy of the original. In the former, the Author hath been followed step by step : Bold deviations here might imperceptibly have misrepresented or distorted the facts, and quite banished the peculiar stile and manner of the author. In the latter, it hath been often judged necessary to dilate the expression in order fully to include the primary idea ; though, where it seemed possible, the studied conciseness of the author hath been imitated, provided the thought could be clearly expressed, and the sententious maxim adequately conveyed. The turns and figures of expression have been every where diligently noted, and an endeavour constantly made at imitation. This was judged a point of duty ; or a point at least, where though something may be permitted to a translator's discretion or to the genius of a modern language, yet he must not indulge himself in too wide a scope, lest, when what ought to be a copy is exhibited, the prime distinctions of the original be lost, and little or no resemblance be left behind.

It is very just and true what Mr. Hobbes hath observed, that " this author so carrieth with him his own light through-
" out, that the reader may continually see his way before him,
" and by that which goeth before expect what is to follow."
And he, who applies to any commentator but Thucydides

himself for an explanation of his own meaning, must exceedingly often get quite wide of the sense. The writers of *Scholia* and the *notes* of verbal critics put us frequently on a wrong scent, and more frequently leave us utterly in the dark. But, if we will be patient at a dead lift, something will soon occur in the author himself to help us out, the obscurity will vanish, and light beam in upon us. Though sometimes we may be forced to divine his meaning, since in many cases it is vain to apply to the aids of Grammar to develope the construction, yet the context at length will shew whether we have succeeded, or help us to ascertain the sense. This however demands repeated and attentive revisals. The present translator hath not been frugal of his time or labour in these points. And whether he hath generally succeeded in ascertaining the thought and properly expressing it in another language, must be left to the decision, not of men of no learning nor of mere learning, but to that class of judges, who are well acquainted with the state of Athens at the time of the history, and are really *Attic* both in taste and judgment. This class, it may be thought, will be but small: It is larger however, and higher seated in this our community, than the generality have either opportunity enough to discover or good nature enough to own.

The complaints so often made by the most able translators are indeed alarming. Their performances (they say) may very much disgrace, but can never commend them. The praise of all that is clear, and bright, and pleasing, and instructive, is reflected back upon the original author; but every appearance of a different nature is laid with severity of censure at the door of the translator. If it be so, we know the terms beforehand on which, either able or unable, we engage, and must patiently acquiesce in the issue. But candor is always expected, nay ever will be had from persons of good sense and sound judgment. Few but such may be pleased with Thucydides either in his old native Greek, or in a modern English garb; and, if such confer the honour of

their applause, the clamour of some will not terrify, nor the silence of others mortify at all. The bookseller, it is true, forms his own judgment, and then dictates to the judgment of others from the sale. And it must be owned, that every original writer as well as every copyist is heartily glad to receive that mark of public approbation.

The present translation of Thucydides is accompanied with a few *notes*, and three preliminary *Discourses*. Concerning each of these something must be added.

The *notes* are only designed for the English reader, to give him light into that *antiquity*, with which he may be little acquainted: And therefore the first time that any thing relating to the constitution or forms of the Athenian republic, or peculiar to their fleets and land armies occurs, I have endeavoured in a *note* to give him a competent perception of it. I have done the same in regard to the characters of the chief personages in the history, which seemed to need a farther opening than what Thucydides hath given them. The persons were well known when he wrote: But a modern reader may not be displeased to be regularly introduced, and early to be made acquainted with the characters of the principal agents in these busy and important scenes. In *notes* of verbal criticism or mere learning I have been very sparing, judging they would never be read with patience.

Of the preliminary *Discourses*, the two *first* were due, by the rules of decorum observed by editors and translators, to the author. In the *last*, I have thrown into one continued discourse what might have been broke into pieces, and interspersed occasionally by way of *notes*. The method observed appeared most eligible, as it will give the reader a clear prospect of the whole history; preparing him for or inciting him to a close and attentive perusal of it; or enabling him, after he hath perused it, to recollect the most instructive passages and most material occurrences. By this means also, a more lively and succinct account could be given of the speakers and

the speeches, than could have been done by way of set and formal arguments.

I think the English reader can want nothing more, to enable him to read Thucydides with pleasure and profit ; especially if he be at all acquainted with the Grecian history, of which few that ever read can now be ignorant, since Mr. Stanyan's *History* of Greece and the *Universal History* are in so many hands. I dismiss the work with some hope, but more terror about its success. That hope is encouraged and supported by the list of my *Subscribers*. There are NAMES that do me honour indeed ; and which, whether the work may suit the generality or not, will preserve me from ever repenting that I have bestowed so much time on translating THUCYDIDES.

SOME ACCOUNT
OF
THE LIFE AND WRITINGS
OF
DR. SMITH,

BY THE REV. THOMAS CRANE, OF CHESTER.

WILLIAM SMITH, son of the Rev. Richard Smith, Rector of the Church of All Saints, and Minister of St. Andrews, in the city of Worcester, was born in the Parish of St. Peter's Church in that city, on the 30th day of May, in the year 1711. He was educated in grammar-learning at the College-School in his native city, where he made great proficiency in his studies. In January 1725-6, it pleased God to deprive him of his father. On the 27th day of November, 1728, he was matriculated at New College in Oxford; where he took the degree of Bachelor of Arts in June, 1732; and that of Master in July, 1737.

Soon after he had taken his Bachelor's degree, his merit caused him to be recommended to the Right Hon. James Earl of **DERBY**, that great Patron of Arts and Sciences: and he was retained three years in his lordship's house, in the office of Reader to his lordship. His connections with my Lord of Derby introduced him to the honour of being known to several other persons of fortune and quality; which was of singular service to him in his progress through life.

A gentleman by birth, blessed with an excellent capacity and education, and having ready and easy intercourse with the great and good, it is no wonder that he was adorned with manners most polite, with literary accomplishments most splendid and solid, and with morals becoming a faithful servant of the holy Jesus. Well qualified for the work of the

ministry, he took Deacon's orders at Grosvenor Chapel in Westminster, on Sunday, the first of June, 1735, from Benjamin Bishop of Winchester. On the 10th of September following, he was presented by his Patron, James Earl of DERBY, to the Rectory of Trinity Church in Chester. On the 14th of the same month he took Priest's orders in the Cathedral Church of Chester, from Samuel the Bishop of that See: was instituted the same day, and inducted the next.

Mr. Smith's first publication was* "*DIONYSIUS LONGINUS* on the *SUBLIME*, translated from the Greek, with Notes and Observations, and some Account of the Life, Writings, and Character of the Author:" in one volume 8vo. inscribed to the Right Hon. the Earl of MACCLESFIELD. The anonymous Author of "the History of the Works of the Learned," for May, 1739, says of this work:—"The Translation of "*Longinus* is, according to the most impartial judgment I "can frame of it, after a comparison with others, the most "elegant version that has been made of that Author into the "English tongue. The preliminary Discourse excels that of "the celebrated Boileau, which he has prefixed to his edition." Father Philips, in "A Letter to a Student at a Foreign University," published 1756, recommending, among other books, *Longinus* on the *Sublime*, says:—"A late English Translation "of the Greek Critic, with Notes and Observations by Mr. "Smith, is a credit to the Author, and reflects a lustre on "*Longinus* himself. As conversant as you are in the original "language, you cannot but be highly pleased with this performance." In the "*Weekly Miscellany*," by Richard Hooker, of the Temple, Esq. No. 363, dated Saturday, Decem-

* The fourth is the best edition of *Longinus*. The Dean corrected two copies of the third edition: the one for the Printer to follow, the other for himself to keep; the Dean's copy I possess. I shewed the Dean Mr. Troup's criticism of his Translation. The Dean knowing Troup to be in the wrong, thought him not worth answering; he said, "I followed Pearce, and Pearce is the best. I shall take no notice of Troup." The frontispiece to *Longinus* describes the power of eloquence. It was delineated, not by a professed limner, but by Dr. Wall of Worcester, an eminent physician.

ber 8, 1739, we read:—Mr. Smith, Rector of Trinity in Chester, “justly deserves the notice and thanks of the public for “his version of *Longinus* on the *Sublime*. Though the learned “will not be satisfied without tasting the beauties of the original, which cannot be translated in all their perfection, yet “they may reap benefit and pleasure from the judicious sentiments and ingenuity of the Translator, in his account of “his Author, and from the notes which help to illustrate the “text, and discover the excellency of the rules. To the unlearned also it may be of use, and give pleasure. It will “enable him to read with more satisfaction, when he can “read with more judgment and distinguish the perfections “and faults of a writer. He will be the better able to bear “his part in a rational conversation, and appear with credit, “when his observations are just and natural. Such compositions, while they form the understanding to a true taste, “kindle an inclination to literature, and excite an emulation “in mankind to distinguish themselves by such excellencies “as distinguish men from brutes. Athens and Rome were “even the glory of the whole world, when they were the “universities of the whole world; and those were reckoned “the most accomplished gentlemen, who were the greatest “scholars, the deepest philosophers, the most eloquent orators, and the best moralists. In England—would I could “go on without reproaching my country.” Mr. Hooker sent a copy of this Miscellany to Mr. Smith, with the following letter:

“REV. SIR,

“THOUGH I have not the happiness of being known “to you, yet as I perceive by your public writings, that you “are a gentleman of learning and parts, I take the liberty of “desiring your assistance in the public design* committed to “my care. Though it is the common concern of every one “who wishes well to Religion and the Church of England,

* Mr. Smith did not comply with this request respecting the Weekly Miscellany.

“ yet I find the observation strictly verified, that what is every body’s business is nobody’s business ; and whilst it is generally presumed that I have a great deal of help, I have in fact little or none, though I stand much in need of it. I hope you will excuse the notice I have taken of you in my paper. In hopes of your correspondence, I am, Sir, with respect, your very humble servant,

“ R. HOOKER.”

On a state fast, the 4th of February, 1740, our Author preached in Trinity Church on Prov. xiv. 34. “ Righteousness exalteth a nation, but sin is a reproach to any people.” This Sermon was printed at the request of his parishioners, and inscribed to them. The Right Hon. Edward Earl of Derby had succeeded that nobleman who presented Mr. Smith to Trinity Church: but Mr. Smith still continued to be esteemed at Knowsley, notwithstanding Knowsley had changed its master. He, who had been long considered as the Earl of Derby’s Chaplain, was constituted in form, by letters patent, the 2d day of August, 1743. On the 31st of July, 1746, our Author preached an Assize-Sermon at Lancaster, on St. John viii. 32. “ Ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free.” This Sermon is inscribed to the High Sheriff and Grand Jury, being “ published at their command.”

In the year 1748, the Grammar-School of Brentwood, in the parish of South Weald, in the county of Essex, being vacant, was suffered by Lord and Lady Strange to lapse to the Bishop of London, who, at their recommendation, appointed Mr. Smith Schoolmaster there for life, by letters patent bearing date the 15th day of February, and by licence dated the 17th of the same month. He held this school only one year, as he did in no wise relish the laborious life of a schoolmaster. On the 8th of June, 1753, he was licenced as one of the Ministers of St. George’s Church in Liverpool, on the nomination of the Corporation there,

In the year 1753, Mr Smith published, in two volumes, 4to. dedicated to his Royal Highness the Prince of Wales,

“The History of the PELOPONNESIAN WAR, translated from “the Greek of THUCYDIDES.” The Translator has added three preliminary Discourses; on the *Life of Thucydides*; on his *Qualifications as a Historian*; and a *Survey of his History*. In these Discourses, as well as in the *Life of Longinus*, he has abundantly proved his own excellence in original composition. This work has been several times reprinted in 8vo. and was highly recommended by the Reviewers and others on its first publication, and since that period.

In January, 1758, the Deanry of Chester became vacant by the decease of the Rev. Thomas Brooke, LL. D. There were many candidates for this dignity: but Mr. Smith was so well supported by several of his illustrious friends, especially by his noble patron the earl of Derby, whose interest was powerful at Court, and who prevailed on the Right Hon. Earl Granville, then Lord President of the Council, and on his Grace the Duke of Newcastle, to unite with him in recommending Mr. Smith; that his Majesty King George the Second presented him to the Deanry. He now took the Degree of Doctor in Divinity. On the 28th of July, Doctor Smith received institution, and was installed the same day by that learned and accomplished preacher, the Rev. Mr. Mapletoft, Vicedean. On the 30th day of April, 1766, the Dean was instituted to the Rectory of Handley near Chester, on the presentation of the Dean and Chapter.

Doctor Smith had, since he left the University, if we except short excursions, chiefly resided first with my Lord of Derby, afterwards at the Rectory of Trinity in Chester, then one year in Essex, and of late at St. George's in Liverpool, from whence he went occasionally to Chester Cathedral. But about the beginning of the year 1767, he resolved to resign St. George's Church, and wrote a letter to that effect to the body corporate: which letter produced the following resolution.

“*At a Council held this fourth day of February, 1767.*

“On Mr. Dean Smith's Letter this day to the Council, intimating his desire of resigning his Chaplainship of St. George's

“ Church into the hands of the Common Council ; therefore it
 “ is ordered, that this Council do immediately after such his re-
 “ signation make him a compliment of one hundred and fifty
 “ guineas, for his eminent and good services in the said Church.”

In July the same year, he came to the Deanry-house in Chester, with intent to pass the rest of his days there. The favourable reception of his *THUCYDIDES* induced the Dean, in this healthy and pleasant retreat, to finish his Translation of “ *XENOPHON’S HISTORY OF THE AFFAIRS OF GREECE* :” which he published in one volume 4to. in the year 1770 : this Translation appeared without any dedication. To form a judgment of its merit we may only quote the words of the title page, that it is “ *BY THE TRANSLATOR OF THUCYDIDES.*”

When the Dean retired within the precincts of his Cathedral, he had resigned St. George’s and held with the Deanry the parish churches of Handley and Trinity only : till the Rectory of West Kirkby, in the hundred of Wirrall in Cheshire, became vacant by the decease of that excellent magistrate and persuasive preacher, the Rev. Mr. Mainwaring, Prebendary of Chester. The Dean was instituted to this Rectory on the 4th of October, 1780. This is a valuable living in the patronage of the Dean and Chapter. At this time the Dean resigned the Rectory of Trinity.

Doctor Smith was now Dean of Chester, Rector of Handley, and West Kirkby ; but his best parochial preferment happened late in life ; he was advanced into his seventieth year, and began to feel the infirmities ever attendant on age and a delicate constitution. He had hitherto been a constant and powerful preacher : he began now to preach less frequently, as every exertion fatigued him exceedingly. But when he could no longer preach from the pulpit, he preached from the press, by publishing in 8vo. “ *NINE DISCOURSES ON THE BEATITUDES,*” in the year 1782*.

* The good and learned Doctor Lowth, late Bishop of London, highly commends these sermons in a letter to the Dean, dated at Fulham, July 8th, 1782. Bishop Lowth and Dean Smith were contemporaries at Oxford : where an intimate friendship commenced between them, which continued till that year in which these two luminaries of the Church of Christ were “ snatched—so Heaven decreed !—away.”

From this time the Dean's friends saw, with infinite concern, his health gradually declining. In the year 1786, he was exceedingly indisposed. In November, he was confined to his room ; in December, to his—bed.

About eight, on Friday morning, the 12th of January, 1787, the Dean meekly resigned his spirit into the hands of a merciful Redeemer. On the Friday following, the funeral procession passed the nearest way to the Cathedral: the Bishop and five Prebendaries were pall-bearers. The body reposed on the south side of the holy table. The Dean's name appears over his grave.

In the broad aisle, at the great pillar on your right hand, as you retire from the choir, an elegant and costly Monument* is erected to his memory by Mrs. Smith, who was a Miss Heber of Essex. He only once married.

The Dean never was a stipendiary curate. The moment he was ordained a Priest, he became a Rector ; and enjoyed ever after an income which far exceeded his expenses. An enemy to ostentatious legacies, he bequeathed the chief of his fortune, which was very considerable, to his widow and his nephew, for he had no children. He gave one hundred pounds to the Chester Infirmary, and one hundred pounds to the fund for widows of clergymen in the archdeaconry of Chester: these he esteemed useful charities.

The Dean was tall and genteel: his voice was strong, clear, and melodious. He spoke Latin fluently, and was complete master not only of the Greek, but Hebrew language. His mind was so replete with knowledge, that he was a living library. His manner of address was graceful, engaging, delightful. His sermons were pleasing, informing, convincing. His memory, even in age, was wonderfully retentive: and his conversation was polite, affable, and in the highest degree improving.

* See the next page.

SACRED TO THE MEMORY OF
WILLIAM SMITH, D.D.

DEAN OF THIS CATHEDRAL, AND

RECTOR OF WEST KIRKBY AND HANDLEY IN THIS COUNTY,
WHO DIED THE XIIth. OF JANVARY M,DCC,LXXXVII,

IN THE LXXVIth. YEAR OF HIS AGE.

AS A SCHOLAR, HIS REPUTATION IS PERPETVATED
BY HIS VALUABLE PUBLICATIONS,

PARTICVLARLY HIS CORRECT AND ELEGANT
TRANSLATIONS OF LONGINVS, THUCYDIDES AND XENOPHON.


AS A PREACHER, HE WAS ADMIRERD AND
ESTEEMED BY HIS RESPECTIVE AVDITORIES.
AND AS A MAN, HIS MEMORY REMAINS INSCRIBED
ON THE HEARTS OF HIS FRIENDS.

THIS MONVMENT WAS ERECTED
BY HIS AFFECTIONATE WIDOW.

THREE PRELIMINARY DISCOURSES.



- I. On the LIFE of THUCYDIDES.
- II. On his Qualifications as a HISTORIAN.
- III. A Survey of his HISTORY.



DISCOURSE I.

ON THE

LIFE OF THUCYDIDES.

IT is a natural piece of curiosity, either when we have read a book we like, or hear one commended, to enquire after the author. We acquiesce not in his bare name ; we immediately seek farther informations. The stranger shews an inclination to form some acquaintance with him ; the reader to improve what he already hath. We at length grow inquisitive about all that concerns him, and are eager to be let into the particulars.

Some claim of this kind will no doubt be made in regard to Thucydides. He who endeavours to introduce him to general notice, ought at least to have something to say about him, and something rather tending perhaps to give favourable impressions. All his editors and translators have reckoned this a point of duty incumbent upon them : But, it hath been generally performed in a very imperfect and slovenly manner. His *life* wrote by Marcellinus, a crude incoherent morsel, hath been prefixed to all the Greek editions. *That* by Suidas is an unsatisfactory mere dictionary-account. A *third* in Greek by an *anonymous* author is also but a very slight and shapeless sketch, and seems the work of a grammarian, who hath read indeed but very superficially read his history. Some incidental escapes from his own pen are the marks, which should be always kept in view by him, who would give any tolerable account of Thucydides. Writers of a better age and class will contribute now and then a little

assistance. And the laborious care of a late* author, in adjusting the chronology and clearing away rubbish, will enable one now to give at least a coherent, though by no means an accurate, account of him.

THUCYDIDES, an Athenian, by borough an Halymusian, was born in the year before Christ, four hundred seventy-one: twenty-five years after Hellanicus, thirteen after Herodotus, according to Aulus Gellius; and about three years before Socrates, as the birth of the latter is settled by Laertius. He was descended of a very splendid and noble family, though perhaps not so honourable as many others, since it was not purely Attic. Its splendour can no longer be doubted, when it is known to be the family of Miltiades. Miltiades the *elder*, born a citizen of Athens, had reigned over the Dolonci, a people in Thrace; and left vast possessions in that country to his descendents: And Miltiades the *younger* had married Hegesipyle the daughter of Olorus a Thracian king†. Yet foreign blood, though royal, was always thought to debase the Athenian. The firm republicans of Athens, had a hereditary aversion to every circumstance of royalty; and the polite inhabitants of it abhorred all connexion with *Barbarians*, the scornful *title* they gave to all the rest of the world, except their countrymen of Greece. Iphicrates, a famous Athenian in later times, was the son of an Athenian shoemaker and a Thracian princess. Yet, being asked to which of his parents he thought himself most obliged? he replied haughtily—"To my mother. She did all she could "to make me an Athenian; my father would have made me "a Barbarian." The younger Miltiades, whom wars had obliged to quit his hold in Thrace, commanded the troops of Athens in the famous field of Marathon. He died afterwards in a jail, unable to pay a large fine set upon him by the *people* of Athens. His son Cimon contrived afterwards to pay it. The family for a time had been in poverty and

* *Vitæ Thucydidis Synopsis chronologica*, ab Henrico Dodwell.

† Herodotus in Erato.

distress, but emerged again in Cimon. Cimon the same day gained a victory both by land and sea over the Persians at Mycale. By his conduct he very much enlarged the power of Athens, and put it in a train of much greater advancements. In civil affairs he clashed with Pericles, who was leader of the *popular* party; Cimon always sided with the *noble* or the *few*; as were the party-distinctions in vogue at Athens.

The proofs that Thucydides was of this family are strong and convincing. Plutarch directly asserts it in the *life* of *Cimon*. His father, in grateful at least if not honourable remembrance of the Thracian king, whose daughter Miltiades had married, bore the name of Olorus. His mother also was another Hegesipyle. He inherited rich possessions in Thrace; particularly some mines of gold. A monument of him was to be seen for many ages after, in the Cœle at Athens, amongst the Cimonian, or those belonging to the family of Cimon; and stood next, according to Plutarch, to that of Elpinice, Cimon's own sister. His father's name in the inscription on this monument, at least some later grammarians have averred it, was *Orolus*. Thucydides himself, in the fourth book of his history, calls it *Olorus*. Can we want stronger authority? Whether any stress ought to be laid on the variation, or whence the mistake, though a very minute one, might proceed, are points too obscure and trifling to take up any attention.

Such was the family of which Thucydides was descended. His pedigree might be fetched from the Gods; since that of Miltiades is traced down from Æacus. But, like my author, I should choose to keep as clear of the *fabulous* as possible. Cicero says of him, "Though he had never written a history, his name would still have been extant, he was so honourable and noble*." I quote this, merely as a testimony to the splendor of his birth, since it may be questioned whether the *historian*, in the present instance,

* In the Orator.

hath not intirely preserved his memory, and been solely instrumental in ennobling and perpetuating the *man*.

His education no doubt was such, as might be expected from the splendor of his birth, the opulence of his family, and the good taste then prevailing in Athens, the politest city that then existed, or ever yet existed in the world. It is impossible however to give any detail of it. The very little to be found about it in writers of any class whatever, seems merely of a presumptive though probable kind. It is said Anaxagoras was his preceptor in philosophy, because the name of Anaxagoras was great at this period of time. Anaxagoras, the preceptor of Euripides, of Pericles, and of Socrates, is named also by Marcellinus for the preceptor of Thucydides. And he adds, quoting Antyllus for an evidence, that "it was whispered about that Thucydides was "atheistical, because he was so fond of the theory of Anaxagoras, who was generally reputed and stiled an atheist." The solution of an eclipse from natural causes, accounting for appearances from the laws of motion, and investigating the course of nature, were sufficient proofs of atheism amongst a people so superstitious as the Athenians. Thucydides, possibly, might be well acquainted with the philosophy of Anaxagoras, without having personally attended his lectures. However that be, his own history abundantly shews that he was no *atheist*; it may be added, and no *polytheist*. By his manner of speaking of the oracles and predictions tossed about in his own time, it is plain he looked upon them as equivocal, or rather insinuates them to be mere forgeries. "And yet, says Mr. Hobbes*, he confirms an assertion of his own, touching the time this war "lasted, by the oracle's prediction." The passage occurs in the fifth book of this history. But whoever considers it, will find it only an *argumentum ad hominem*, to stop the mouths of such as believed in oracles, from contesting his own computation of the whole time the Peloponnesian war lasted.

* Of the Life and History of Thucydides.

I can only say that he was undoubtedly a serious man, and of a large fund of solid sense, which deriving originally from the bounty of nature, he had most certainly improved by a regular and sound education.

For a reason of much less weight, Antipho is assigned for his master in rhetoric—because he speaks handsomely of him in the eighth book. He there indeed pays due acknowledgment to the merit of Antipho as a speaker; but it cannot be inferred from hence, that he had ever any connexion with him. Others have made Antipho a scholar of Thucydides*, with full as little reason. Thucydides certainly was never a teacher by profession. It is pity to waste so much time on uncertainties. It is certain Thucydides had a liberal education, though the particular progress of it cannot now be traced.

But, to shew the peculiar bent of his genius, and a remarkable prognostic what sort of person he would prove, the following story is recorded by several authors, and dated by Mr. Dodwell in the fifteenth year of his age.—His father carried him to the Olympic games. He there heard Herodotus read his history to the great crowd of Grecians assembled at that solemnity. He heard him with fixed attention; and, at length, burst out into tears. “Tears childish indeed!” it hath been remarked: But however such as few children would have shed, and highly expressive of his inward spirit. The active aspiring mind of Themistocles was not stronger shewn, when the trophy of Miltiades would not let him be at rest; nor the genius of the lad at Westminster-school, when he could not sleep for the colours in Wesminster-hall. Herodotus is said to have observed it, and to have complimented Olorus on his having a son, that had so violent a bent to letters. A similar passage in any person’s life would always be called to mind, when he was the subject of conversation.

In about two years more, Thucydides was obliged by

* Plutarch’s Lives of the ten Orators.

the laws to take his exercise in the study of arms, and to begin to share in the defence of his country. Every citizen of Athens was also a soldier. They served at first within the walls, or on great emergencies marched, though to no great distance from home. As years and skill advanced, they were called upon to join in more distant and foreign expeditions. We are quite in the dark about the particular services, in which he might thus be employed. We are sure at least he much improved in the theory of arms. He qualified himself for the great trust of heading the forces of the *State*; and, in the sequel, we shall see him invested with a command.

The *anonymous* author of his *life* relates, that Thucydides was one of the number, whom the Athenians sent to found a colony at Thuria in Italy. Lampo and Xenocritus were the leaders of this colony, and Herodotus is said to have been associated in it. If Thucydides went the voyage, (and the strange inconsistencies of him who relates it render his whole account suspicious,) he must have been about twenty-seven years of age. One thing is pretty certain; his stay at Thuria could have been of no very long continuance. This is not to be inferred from the *ostracism*, which the same writer says he soon after suffered; a mistake incurred, it is highly probable, by confounding him with Thucydides the son of Milesias, who was of the same family, and being a leader in the oligarchical-party at Athens, had the *ostracism* thrown upon him by the interest and popularity of Pericles. But, the quarrel between the Corcyréans and Corinthians about Epidamnus broke out soon after this. The enemies of Athens were now scheming the demolition of its growing power. Thucydides writes all the preparatory transactions, marks all the defensive measures of the Athenians, as a person who was privy to every one of them. And there should be very strong and very positive proofs of the contrary, before any reader of his history doubts of his having been all the time at Athens.

His own *Introduction*, of itself, in a great measure establisheth the fact. He perceived the storm was gathering; he knew the jealousies of the *States* which composed the Lacedæmonian league; he also knew the real strength of Athens, and heard all the preventive measures recommended by Pericles to put his countrymen in a proper posture of defence. He himself seems to have been alert for the contention, and ready both with lance and pen, not only to bear his share in the events, but also to perpetuate the memory of them. His own words (ἐλπίσας and τεκμαιρομένου) seem to denote the great earnestness and attention of his mind to the wide field of matter, which was now going to be opened. He longed to become a historian; he saw a fine subject for history fast approaching; he immediately set about noting all occurrences, began at once to collect materials; and was resolved to write the History of *The Peloponnesian War* before it was actually on foot.

Can we doubt then of his residence during this portion of time at Athens? He was arrived, at the breaking out of this war, to the full vigour and ripeness of his years and understanding, according to his chronologist (Mr. Dodwell) was just forty years old. We learn from himself*, that he knew personally the whole series of things; he was ever present at the transactions of one or other of the contending parties; more, after his exile, at those of the Peloponnesians; and consequently, before his exile, at those of the Athenians. He speaks of Pericles, as one who was an eye-witness of his conduct; as one who heard him harangue in the assembly of the people, convincing that a war there would necessarily be, and for that reason they ought not to weaken themselves by ill-judged concessions, but gallantly to exert that naval power, which had made Athens envied and dreaded, and which alone, as it had made, could keep her great. He must regularly have taken his post upon the walls, and seen the Peloponnesians, in the first year of the

* Book the fifth.

war, lay all the adjacent country waste. He must have marched under Pericles to retaliate on the territories of Megara, since the whole force of the *State* was obliged to take the field on this occasion. He must have assisted at the public funeral solemnized in the winter for the first victims of this war, and heard Pericles speak in honour of the dead and the living, and make his countrymen enamoured of their own laws and constitution. The *plague* broke out immediately after this; we are absolutely certain he was then in Athens. He himself assures us of it. He was an eyewitness to all that horrid scene. He had the plague himself; and hath given a circumstantial detail of it.

The war proceeds with vigor, and through a great variety of events. Thucydides must have borne his share in the service; the particulars he hath not recorded. No man was ever less guilty of *egotism*; he never mentions himself but when it is absolutely necessary. His next six years were certainly employed in fighting and in writing; the latter was his passion, and the former his duty. In the forty-seventh year of his age, he was joined in the command of an Athenian squadron and land-force on the coasts of Thrace. He might be assigned to this particular station, on account of his possessions and interest in this part of the world. It was judged at Athens, that he was best qualified to serve his country in this department. The Lacedæmonian commander in Thrace dreaded his opposition. Let us wait a little for the event: It is the most important passage in the *Life of THUCYDIDES.*

It was intirely on the authority of Plutarch, that Thucydides was asserted above to be a descendant from Miltiades, and in the *mode* of consanguinity to have inherited his fine estate in this part of the world. Marcellinus, who is for ever jumbling and confounding facts, hath also made him marry a Thracian lady, who brought him his gold-mines for her fortune. Mr. Hobbes is willing to reconcile the facts, and solves all the difficulty in a very plausible manner.

“In Thrace, says he, lay also the possessions of Thucydides and his wealthy mines of gold, as he himself professeth in his fourth book. And although those riches might come to him by a wife (as is also by some affirmed) which he married in Scape-Hyle, a city of Thrace; yet even by that marriage it appeareth, that his affairs had a relation to that country, and that his nobility was not there unknown.” I cannot believe, that Thucydides ever married a lady that was not purely Attic. He seems to have been high-spirited in this respect, and proud of his country. Miltiades indeed had married a Thracian princess; and nothing, but the vast estate brought into the family by this match, could have made his descendants easy with such a blemish in their pedigree: For a blemish undoubtedly it must have been thought at Athens. Let us see how Thucydides himself drops his sentiment of such another match. The passage I have in view occurs in the sixth book. He is speaking of Hippias the son of Pisistratus, tyrant of Athens. “To Æantidas the son of Hippoclus tyrant of Lampsacus—to a Lampsacene, though he himself was an Athenian—he married his daughter Archedice.” I cannot think, that he, who let such a sarcasm fall from his own serious pen, could ever condescend to marry a Barbarian, let her fortune be never so great. The reader, if it be worth his while to think at all about it, may determine for himself.—This digression was caused by the express mention Thucydides hath made of his mines, the very moment he is going to enter the lists against the most gallant and active commander at this time in the armies of the Lacedæmonian league.

It was Brasidas, the Spartan, who was now at the head of the Peloponnesian troops in Thrace. He had made a forced march thither through Thessaly and Macedonia. By his fine deportment and his persuasive address, joined to uncommon vigilance and activity, he had hitherto carried all before him. He at length endeavoured to get possession

by surprise of the important city of Amphipolis: He had very nearly succeeded. Eucles commanded there for the Athenians. Thucydides was at this time in the isle of Thasus, about half a day's sail from Amphipolis. A messenger was dispatched to him, to hasten him up for the defence of that city. He put to sea immediately with a small squadron of seven ships. Brasidas, knowing he was coming, opened a negotiation with the Amphipolitans, and gained admission for his troops. Thucydides stood up the Strymon in the evening, but too late, since Brasidas had got fast possession of Amphipolis. The city of Eïon is situated also upon the river Strymon lower down, and about two miles and a half from Amphipolis. Thucydides put in here, and secured the place. "Brasidas (in his own words*) had designed that very night to seize Eïon also. And, unless this squadron had come in thus critically to its defence, at break of day it had been lost." Thucydides, without losing a moment, provided for its defence. Brasidas, with armed boats, fell down the river from Amphipolis, and made two attempts upon it, but was repulsed in both: Upon which, he gave up the scheme, and returned back.

One would imagine that Thucydides had done all that could be done on this occasion, and deserved to be thanked instead of punished. The people of Athens made a different determination. Cleon was now the demagogue of greatest influence there, and is generally supposed to have exasperated them against the man, who had not wrought impossibilities in saving their valuable town of Amphipolis. It is certain their fury rose so high against him, that they stripped Thucydides of his command, and passed the sentence of banishment upon him. It is himself who tells us†, "It was his lot to suffer a twenty years exile from his country after the affair of Amphipolis."

We have thus lost Thucydides the *commander* to secure more fast Thucydides the *historian*. Though sadly treated,

* Book the fourth.

† Book the fifth.

he scorned to be angry with his country. His complexion was not at all choleric or resentful ; there appears not the least sign of any gall in his constitution. Discharged of all duties, and free from all public avocations, he was left without any attachments but to simple truth, and proceeded to qualify himself for commemorating exploits, in which he could have no share. He was now eight and forty years old, and intirely at leisure to attend to the grand point of his ambition, that of writing the history of the present war ; a calm spectator of facts, and dispassionate observer of the events he was determined to record.

To judge of him from his history, (and we have no other help to form our opinion about him,) he was so nobly complexioned as to be all judgment and no passion. No murmur or complaint hath escaped him upon account of his severe undeserved treatment from his country. Great souls are congenial ; their thoughts are always of a similar cast.

Sweet are the uses of adversity,
Which, like the toad, ugly and venomous,
Wears yet a precious jewel in his head.

Shakespeare hath thus expressed what Thucydides, as it is highly probable, must have thought. “ Exile, according to Plutarch*, was a blessing which the Muses bestowed upon their favourites. By this means they enabled them to compleat their most beautiful and noble compositions.” He then quotes our author for the first proof of his observation—“ Thucydides the Athenian compiled his History of the *Peloponnesian War* at Scaptesytle in Thrace.” At that place he fixed his residence. It lay convenient for taking care of his private affairs, and overlooking his mines : They lay not within the dominions of Athens ; for then they would have been forfeited to the *State*. Hence he made excursions

* Of Banishment.

at proper seasons to observe transactions, and pick up intelligence. He was now more conversant in person on the Peloponnesian side. Some private correspondences he might still carry on with Athenians. And he had money to purchase all proper materials, was ready, and knew how to lay it out. This was his employment until the very end of the war; and it is certain he had collected materials for carrying down his history to that period of time "when (in his own words*) the Lacedæmonians and their allies put an end to "to the empire of Athens, and became masters of the Long-walls and the Piræus." But whoever reads it, will be inclined to think, that he drew it not up in that accurate and elaborate manner in which it now appears, until the war was finished. He might keep every thing by him in the form of annals; he might go on altering or correcting, as he saw better reason or gained more light. His compleat well-connected history, though the first thing in his intention, was the last in execution.

His exile lasted twenty years. It commenced in the eighth year of the war, in the year before Christ four hundred twenty-three. Consequently, he was restored the year before Christ four hundred and three, being at that time sixty-eight years old. In that very year an *amnesty* was published at Athens, in the archonship of Euclides, after the demolition of the thirty tyrants by Thrasybulus.

Thucydides was now at liberty, if he pleased, to return and pass the remainder of his days at Athens. Whether he did so or not is left quite in the dark. He lived twelve years after, and died in the year before Christ three hundred ninety-one, being then about fourscore years old. He was constantly employed in giving coherence and dignity to this *History*;—with what accuracy, what severity, what toil, the reader may judge, since he will find that after all he left it imperfect. The first seven books are indeed fully and exactly

* Book the fifth.

finished. The eighth, though moulded into due form, hath plainly not had a final revisal, and breaks off abruptly. The whole work is said to have fallen into Xenophon's possession, who, at the time of the death of Thucydides, was exiled from Athens: And Xenophon is also said to have made it public. This carries a great air of probability with it, since Xenophon became the continuator of Thucydides, not in so lofty and majestic, but in a sweeter and more popular style. There is a chasm indeed between the time the *History* of Thucydides breaks off, and the *Grecian History* of Xenophon begins. There is no accounting for this but by conjecture. May I venture to offer one, I believe entirely new, but which, for that reason, I shall readily give up to the first person of judgment, who thinks it hath no foundation? It is this—That Thucydides left somewhat more behind him than now appears. How it came to be suppressed or lost, I will not pretend to guess. It is natural to imagine, that his acknowledged continuator resumed the subject at the very spot where his predecessor had left off. Nearly two years are however wanting, in which several important incidents took place. It is pity, but we have no redress. General historians are by other means enabled to supply the deficiency; but the loss of any thing from so masterly a hand is still to be regretted.

The place of the death and interment of Thucydides was most probably Scaptesyale in Thrace. Long habitude might have made him fond of a spot, where he had passed so many years in studious and calm retirement. The hurry and bustle and engagements of Athens could not have been much to the relish of so grave, and now so old a man. His monument there among the Cimonian confirms this opinion, since most writers agree, it had the mark upon it which shewed it to be a cenotaph, and the words, *Here lieth*, were not in the inscription*. I have nothing to add about his family. It is

* Marcellinus.

said he left a son, but the very name of that son is merely conjectural. I have collected every thing that carries any consistency with it about the *Man*; I shall proceed with more pleasure to view him in a clearer and more steady light, and mark the character, in which it was his ambition to be distinguished, that of a *Historian*.

DISCOURSE II.

ON HIS QUALIFICATIONS AS A

HISTORIAN.

IT is now to be considered, how well qualified Thucydides was, to undertake that nice and arduous task of writing History. No one certainly was ever better fitted for it by outward circumstances; and very few so enabled to perform it well by the inward abilities of genius and understanding.

Lucian, in his celebrated treatise "How a History ought to be written," is generally supposed to have had his eye fixed on Thucydides. And every person of judgment, who loves a sincere relation of things, would be glad, if it were possible, to have the writer of them abstracted from all kind of *connection* with persons or things that are the subject-matter; to be of no *country*, no *party*; clear of all *passions*; *independent* in every light; intirely *unconcerned* who is pleased or displeased with what he writes; the servant only of *reason* and *truth*.

Sift Thucydides carefully, and we shall find his qualifications in all these respects very nearly, if not quite, complete.

No *connection* with, no favouring or malevolent bias towards any one *person* in the world can be fixed upon him. Never man so intirely detached, or proceeded so far (if I may use the expression) in annihilating himself. He had a father indeed, whose name was Olorus; he was an Athenian born;—But, who are his relations? who were his associates? what rival or competitor doth he sneer? what

friend doth he commend? or, what enemy doth he reproach?—Brasidas was the immediate occasion of his disgrace and exile. Yet, how doth he describe him? He makes the most candid acknowledgments of his personal merit, and doth justice to all his shining and superior abilities. Cleon is generally supposed to have irritated the people against him, and to have got him most severely punished, when he merited much better returns from his country. Doth he shew the least grudge or resentment against this Cleon? He represents him indeed in his real character of a factious demagogue, an incendiary, a bully, and of course an arrant coward. And how do all other writers? how doth Aristophanes paint this worthless man, this false bellowing patriot? I would never call Aristophanes for an evidence to character, but in cases where every other writer accorded fully with him, on the same foundation of truth, though not with the same superstructure of bitterness and abuse. He should not be a voucher in regard to Socrates, or Pericles; but certainly may be heard about a Hyperbolus or a Cleon. Thucydides never mentions himself as opposed to any man but Brasidas; and never so much as drops an insinuation that he was hurt by Cleon. And thus, by general consent, he had gained immortal honour by giving fair and true representations of men, whom he never *felt* to be such, but whom succeeding writers have assured us to have actually been his *enemies*.—As to *things*; though in the first seven years of the war he must in some measure have had employment, yet he was soon disentangled from all business whatever, in a manner which bore hard upon his reputation. He hath stated the fact; and then with the greatest calmness and unconcern, he hath left the decision to posterity.

He was henceforth of no *country* at all. Cut off from the republic of Athens, he never sought after or desired a naturalization in any other *State* of Greece. He was now only to choose out and fix a proper spot of observation, from whence, like a person securely posted on a promontory, he

could look calmly on the storm that was raging, or the battle that was fighting below, could note every incident, distinguish every turn, and with a philosophical tranquillity enjoy it all. In short, he now was, and continued all the rest of the *Peloponnesian War*, a citizen of the world at large, as much as any man ever actually was.

But, before this separation from the community, whilst yet he continued at Athens, where liberty opened the field to all passionate chaces after power, where consequently competitions were ever fermenting, and *party* was always alive and active,—can we find him associated with any particular set of men? can we find him dabbling in political intrigue? a leader of, or led by any party? or, can we assuredly find out his principles? or even guess at his real thoughts about the form of government under which he had lived? His *biographers* indeed, though ever parading his candour and impartiality, are often tracing out signs and marks of party-zeal and personal prejudices from the very characters in his history. Marcellinus says, “he described Cleon as a madman because he hated him;” forgetful, what Cleon really was, and of the concurrent testimonies to the truth of the character. The *anonymous* writer says, “he opposed Pericles at Athens, got the better of him, and became the first man in the republic.” A ridiculous story! void of all manner of support. According to this writer’s way of arguing in other places, who says, “he cajoled the Lacedæmonians, and inveighed against the tyrannic all-grasping temper of the Athenians, in his history, because he had no opportunity to rail at them in any other shape,”—he should have left a far different character of Pericles behind him, than he hath actually left. But these are strange compilers of patch-work, and deserve no regard. From what the former hath said about him, a reader might be tempted to judge him of the *oligarchical*: from what the latter hath said of him, of the *democratical* principle. Mr. Hobbes imagines he hath dived to the bottom of his real

principles, and avers him a tight and sound *royalist*. He is sure, that he least of all liked the *democracy*; as sure, he was not at all fond of an *oligarchy*. He founds this assurance on a passage in the eighth book—"They decreed the supreme power, to be vested in the *five thousand*, which number to consist of all such citizens as were enrolled for the heavy armour, and that no one should receive a salary."—Thucydides just after pronounceth this, in his own opinion, "a good modelling of their government, a fine temper between the *few* and the *many*, and which enabled Athens from the low state into which her affairs were plunged to re-erect her head." If this passage proves any thing of the author's principles, it certainly proves them in a pretty strong degree *republican*. Mr. Hobbes however sets out from hence to prove him a *royalist*. "For (says he) he commendeth the government of Athens more, both when Pisistratus reigned (saving that it was an usurped power), and when in the beginning of this war it was democratical in name, but in effect monarchical under Pericles." He praiseth, it is true, the administration at both these periods; and he also praiseth the good effects resulting from an administration lodged in the hands of five thousand men. Under Pericles it was lodged in more, but the extraordinary abilities and influence of the man had taught all their voices to follow the dictates of his heart. Yet, Pericles was all the time a strong republican, and owned his masters. Plutarch says, he never harangued them without praying beforehand, that, "not a word might slip out of his mouth, that was not pertinent to the business in hand;" and that he never put on his armour to lead them out into the field without saying to himself—"Remember, Pericles, you are going to command free men and Grecians." I leave it to the reader, whether the principles of Thucydides can thus be discovered. It appears only, that he was always candid to a good administration, and might possibly think of government, as Mr. Pope hath wrote :

For modes of government let fools contest,
That which is best administered is best.

That studied obscurity, in which he hath veiled himself, will not let us discover, whether on instant and critical occasions he ever suffered himself to be actuated by any of the darker passions, or too fondly indulged those of a brighter cast. But it cannot be found from what he writes, that he hath praised any man from fondness, or even from gratitude, degraded any one through envy, or reproached any one with malice and ill-nature. The same will hold in regard to *States* or whole communities. Doth he ever censure the Athenians in the wrong place? or commend the Lacedæmonians but in the right? Were his name expunged from the beginning of the whole work, and the conclusions of the years, could any one guess to what *State* he had ever belonged, whether he was a Lacedæmonian, a Corinthian, an Athenian, or a Sicilian, except from the purity of the Attic dialect in which he writes? In that dialect he was cradled; he could not possibly swerve from it; without it he could neither write nor speak. Could he have thought, that this might yield suspicion of an impassioned or prejudiced spirit, he might perhaps have endeavoured to write in the Doric or Ionic idiom.

Independent, further, he certainly must have been, since he had no great man to cajole, and no prince to dread or flatter. The powers of Greece or the monarch of Persia could affect him no more, than the Germanic body or the grand monarch of France the quiet and contented refugee, who lives on the sunny side of a hill in Switzerland. The circumjacent powers had no more, perhaps not so much, influence at Scaptesylen, than the neighbouring kingdoms can have at Lausanne. The *States* of Greece had garrisons on the coasts, but were not masters of Thrace. Thrace was full of little communities and petty principalities. Thucydides had credit enough amongst them to insure his personal safety and guard his retirement. He could disoblige those about

whom he wrote, without fear of their resentment, and could praise without being in the reach of a requital. Human nature will not admit of a stricter *independence*.

His *unconcern* about the opinions of a present generation, is strong and clear. It looks as if he thought they would scarce give him a reading, so little care had he taken to sooth or to amuse them. He had a greater aim than to be the author in vogue for a year. He hated contention, and scorned short-lived temporary applause. He threw himself on posterity. He appealed to the future world for the value of the present he had made them. The judgment of succeeding ages hath approved the compliment he thus made to their understandings. So long as there are truly great princes, able statesmen, sound politicians, politicians that do not rend asunder politics from good order and the general happiness, he will meet with candid and grateful acknowledgments of his merit.

Other historians have sooner pleased, have more diffusively entertained. They have aimed more directly at the passions, have more artificially and successfully struck at the imagination. *Truth* in its severity, and *Reason* in its robust and manly state, are all the Muses and Graces to which Thucydides hath done obeisance. Can we wonder, that he hath not been more generally read and admired? or, could we wonder, if he had not been so much? A great work planned under such circumstances and with such qualifications as I have been describing, cool serious judgment will always commend as a noble *design*, even though *executed* it may prove too cheerless to the more lively passions, its relish not sufficiently quick for the popular taste, or piquant enough to keep the appetite sharp and eager.

But to proceed. Thucydides hath been censured in regard to the *choice* of his subject. It hath occasioned the solidity of his judgment and excellence of his taste to be called in question. Dionysius of Halicarnassus hath exerted himself much on this account; hath tried him by laws,

which have *poetry* rather than *history* for their object; and censures him for not *delighting*, when his profession was only to *instruct*. Mr. Hobbes hath gallantly defended his author, and shewn all the arguments of Dionysius to be impertinent, and to proceed from partiality and envy. I shall not repeat, it will suffice to refer the curious reader to what Mr. Hobbes hath written upon this topic. Homer had celebrated the Trojan war, and intermingled in his poems all the historic strokes of that and of preceding ages, enlivening and exalting every thing he touched. That splendid part of the Grecian history, in which his countrymen resisted and triumphed over the very formidable arms of the Persian monarch, had already been recorded by Herodotus. Should Thucydides plunge back into dark and fabulous ages, and turn a mere legendary and romantic writer? He had, he could have no subject equal to his ambition and his abilities, but the war, which broke out in his own days, which he foresaw would prove extensive and important, when the efforts of her enemies would be vigorously exerted to pull down the power of Athens, to demolish that naval strength which gave her the sovereignty of the sea, and made her the dread and envy of her neighbours. Coolly therefore with my reason as an examiner of things, and warmly with my passion as an Englishman, I cannot but applaud his choice, who hath projected the soundest and best system of English politics, so long before the constitution had existence; and hath left us fine lessons, such as his factious countrymen would not observe, how to support that dominion of the sea, on which our glory is built, and on which our welfare intirely depends. In this light it is a most instructive and interesting history, and we may felicitate ourselves on the choice of Thucydides. I must not anticipate: Thucydides would have his readers pick out their own instructions. I can only add, that Thucydides is a favourite historian with the statesmen, and patriots of Great-Britain: This fits him also to be a Historian for the people. Other nations have ad-

mired him, and I hope will continue to admire him *gratis*: We are bound to thank him, and never to lose sight of that grand political scheme, formed by a Themistocles, and warmly and successfully pursued by an Aristides, a Cimon, and a Pericles; the swerving from which at Athens drew after it the loss of the sovereignty at sea, then sunk her into a petty *State*, and made her end at last in a mere academy, though most excellent in its kind.

From such considerations it will also follow, that the history of Thucydides is more useful than that of Livy; at least, that *we* have more reason to applaud the choice of the former. I design no comparison between these two historians. The performance of the Jesuit *Rapin* on that point is in general reading. Livy's history is certainly more august, more splendid, more amazing: I only insist that it is not more useful. And, though Livy be happier in his subject, this ought not to degrade Thucydides, who seized the only fine subject that could offer itself to him: In regard to *him*, it was either this or none at all. The parallel should be only drawn in regard to *execution*, where much hath been said on both sides, and the superiority still remains undecided.

This brings me to the inward abilities of genius and understanding, which capacitated my author to execute his work. His *genius* was certainly of the highest order: It was truly sublime. Here the critics unanimously applaud. In the arrangement of his matter he emulated Homer. In the grandeur of his thoughts and loftiness of his sense he copied Pindar. He is ever stately and majestic; his stateliness perhaps too formal, his majesty too severe. He wrote, as he thought, far beyond an ordinary person. He thinks faster than he can utter: His sentences are full-stored with meaning: And his very words are sentences. Hence comes his obscurity. Where pure thought is the object, he connects too fast, nor is enough dilated for common apprehension. But this is not the case with the *narrative* part of his his-

tory, which is pithy, nervous, and succinct, yet plain, striking, and manly. He never flourisheth, never plays upon words, never sinks into puerilities, never swells into bombast. It is a relation from the mouth of a very great man, whose chief characteristic is gravity. Others talk more ingenuously; others utter themselves with a more cheerful air; yet, every one must attend to Thucydides, must hearken with serious and fixed attention, lest they lose a word, a weighty and important word, by which the whole story would be spoiled. It is in his *Orations* that he is most remarkably obscure. He might not be so in so high a degree to the apprehensions of mankind, when his history was first made public. The world was then used to hear continual harangues: No business of a public nature could be carried on without them. In his time, the speakers aimed intirely at strength and brevity. If they were not exceeding quick, the apprehensions of the Athenians would outstrip, or at least affect to outstrip, their utterance. They must think much, and yet leave much of what they had thought to the ready conception of the audience. An orator in the following history* calls them "Spectators of speeches." They affected to discern at the first glance, and without waiting for formal deduction and solemn inference, to be masters of the point as it were by intuition. The more copious and diffusive eloquence was the improvement of the next generation. But the most forcible orator, that even Athens ever boasted, improved, if he did not quite learn, his peculiar manner from Thucydides. It was Demosthenes, who copied him in the close energy of his sentences, and the abrupt rapidity of his thoughts. Demosthenes is said to have transcribed him eight times over with his own hand: so diligently did he persevere to form an intimate acquaintance with him, and habituate himself to his quick manner of conception, and to his close and rapid delivery. Cicero says however†, that "no rhetorician of Greece ever drew any thing from

* Cleon's speech in book the third.

† In the Orator.

“Thucydides. He hath indeed been praised by all; I own it; but, as a man, who was an explainer of facts with prudence, severity, and gravity: Not as a speaker at the bar, but a historical relater of wars. And therefore he was never numbered amongst the orators.” Cicero learned nothing from him: He could not, neither, in his own words, “would he if he could.” His talents were different; he was quite in all respects accomplished; he was eloquence itself. But Demosthenes—and can there be higher praise?—Demosthenes certainly loved, and studied Thucydides; for whose perfection I am not arguing; I would only establish his character of loftiness and sublimity. Longinus* proposeth him as the model of true grandeur and exaltation in writing history.

And now I have mentioned this princely and most judicious critic, let us call Thucydides to take a trial at his bar, and see whether he hath all the genuine constituents of the true sublime.—For *elevation* of thought, for his power in alarming and interesting the *passions*, for his bold and frequent use of *figures*, his character will soon be established. Even Dionysius of Halicarnassus bears testimony here, who loved him not, and would have been glad to degrade him. Plutarch calls him the most pathetic, and a writer of the greatest energy and variety that ever was. The scenes in his history are strong, most expressive paintings. He makes the past to be present; he makes hearing sight. In the very words of Plutarch†—“His readers are thrown into the same astonishment and hurry of passion, as the eye-witnesses to every scene must have felt. Demosthenes drawing up his men on the craggy shore of Pylus—Brasidas calling out on his pilot to run the vessel ashore, getting himself on the stairs, then wounded, fainting, falling down on the gunnel; here, the Spartans fighting a land-battle from the water, the Athenians a naval-battle from the shore;—and again, in the Sicilian war, the land-

* On the Sublime. Section 14. † De Gloria Atheniensium.

“armies of both parties on the beach, whilst a naval engagement is yet under decision on the water, sympathising in all the contest, adjusting themselves to all the various turns of battle, by new attitudes, quick contorsions of the body;—All these things are set before the readers in actual representation, in all the disposition, all the expression and perspicuity of picture.” Through the whole course of the history, a battle either at land or sea is an object clear and distinct. The writer is never confounded himself, nor throws confusion on his reader. That reader sees the whole, from the pæan of attack to the erecting of the trophy; he discerns the whole train of fight, and beholds exactly the loss or gain of the victory. He further assists at the assemblies of the people and all important consultations. He learns the state of affairs from the managers themselves; he hears the debates, is let into the tempers of the assembly, pries into all the politics, and preconceives the resolution. Where the politics are bad, he will own no other could be expected from those who recommend them. Where they are sound and good, nor wilfully severed from duty to their country, and in moral consistence with the welfare of their fellow-creatures, the reader will applaud, and think he hath been himself discovering the fine maxims which the author hath been teaching, who never appears in person, never puffs his own integrity and discernment, and without digressing into comments or setting up for a *politician*, is found upon reflexion the best of the kind that ever wrote.

To quote passages for the proof of his *sublime* thought or his *pathetic* address, would be to transcribe the greater part of the following history. They will be observed in the *orations* of these two different casts, and the incidents of the work. His *figures* are thick set; the figures, that regard both the sentiment and the diction. His *metaphors* are strong and uncommon; his *hyperboles* far but not over-stretched, the tone is still preserved, they flow out from a

warm pathetic in the midst of some grand circumstance. The figures in which he most delights, are the *Interrogation*; the *Change* of number and time; the *Hyperbaton*, or transposing and inverting the order of things which seem naturally united and inseparable; and above all, the *Antithesis*. This last he hath fondly used, almost to satiety. *Term* is not only opposed to *term*, but thought to thought, sentence to sentence, and sometimes whole *orations* to one another, even where the latter speaker cannot possibly be supposed to have heard the former. A constant adherence to this method carries with it the danger of glutting the reader. I am sensible there should have been more variety to make the whole quite beautiful and graceful.

As to the fourth constituent of sublimity, which, according to Longinus, is noble and graceful *expression*, our author's claim cannot be so well established. *Noble* undoubtedly he is, but as for the *graceful*—the reader may wish he had been more careful in this particular, and I am sure his *translator* wishes it from his heart. For fear of being vulgar he is too set and solemn; and from the passion to be always great, he hath lost the air of ease and genteelness. Dionysius of Halicarnassus says he studiously affected hard and obsolete words. But yet the same writer sets him up as the standard of Attic purity; nay, hath frequently strengthened his own style by using the hard and obsolete words of Thucydides. However this be, it is certain Thucydides hath in this respect fallen half-way short: And more so, in the fifth constituent of sublimity, *composition* or *structure* of his periods. He hath no harmony, hath given little or no proof of having a *good ear*. He is rough, austere; his periods are sometimes a mile long, in which he labours himself both out of tune and time. I acknowledge his *imperfections*, and beg the reader would weigh them and set them in the balance with his *excellencies*: He may then judge if the latter do not greatly preponderate. He thinks nobly; affects surprisingly; his expression is noble, but not

graceful ; his final colouring is neither bright nor cheerful. But, though his pieces are not so completely finished as to stand every test, yet they are certainly high-wrought in his own peculiar *style*, and for greatness of design and strength of expression are beyond every other *hand*.

I think no fair comparison can be made of him, except with the historians who are his countrymen, who like himself are original in their own way, and the first in their *manner*. These are only two, Herodotus and Xenophon. In point of life, Thucydides was junior a little to the former, and senior to the latter. In stateliness, grandeur, and majesty, he far surpasseth them both. The manner of Herodotus is graceful and manly ; his address is engaging ; he loves to tell a story ; and, however fabulous or trifling that story, he will be heard with pleasure. The course of his History is clear and smooth, and yields a most cheerful prospect : That of Thucydides is deep, rapid, impetuous, and therefore very apt to be rough and muddy. You may clearly perceive the bottom of the one : But it is very hard to dive to the bottom of the other. Herodotus, like a master on the horn, can wind a lofty air, and without any harshness sink down into the lowest and mellowest notes. Thucydides sounds the trumpet ; his blasts are sonorous and piercing, and they are all of the martial strain*. Xenophon never pretends to grandeur ; his character is a beautiful simplicity ; he is sweeter than honey ; he charms every ear ; the Muses themselves could not sing sweeter than he hath wrote. Each beats and is beaten by the others in some particular points. Each hath his particular excellence : That of Herodotus is gracefulness ; that of Thucydides, grandeur ; that of Xenophon, sweetness itself. If generals and admirals and statesmen were to award the first rank, it would undoubtedly be given for Thucydides ; if the calmer and more polite gentry, it would go for Herodotus ; if all in general who can read or hear, Xenophon hath it all to nothing.

* *Carat quodammodo bellicum.* Cicero in the Orator.

As to the Roman Historians, who saw what these mighty *originals* had done before them, I cannot judge it fair to form decisive parallels. Time had enabled them to judge maturely about the defects and excellencies of their Greek predecessors. Yet every Roman historian shews plainly he is a *Roman* himself; he stood not so aloof from his subject as Thucydides. The loss of a Peloponnesian writer is never regretted in regard to the latter; the loss of Carthaginian and historians of other nations is highly regretted in regard to the former. National *impartiality* will admit no comparison here; though excellence of *composition* may admit a great deal. Salust is the only one, who seems to have had our author ever in his eye, and to have been his professed imitator. Salust frequently translates his political maxims, copies him exactly in the conciseness and laboured energy of his phrase; and Salust, for that reason, is like him very often obscure. It is entirely in *his* manner, that he draws up his orations, contrasts his speakers, and fights his battles. Salust hath many, hath deservedly many admirers: And I hope, if I am so fortunate as to bring Thucydides into more general acquaintance, that the admirers of the one will bestow regard upon the other, and pay due honour to his historic progenitor.

I shall wind up this essay on Thucydides as a *Historian* with a passage from the Critic on the Sublime*, only desiring the reader to keep Thucydides in remembrance, as Longinus extended his view to writers both in poetry and prose—

“ I readily allow, that writers of a lofty and towering genius are by no means pure and correct, since whatever is neat and accurate throughout, must be exceedingly liable to flatness. In the Sublime, as in great affluence of fortune, some minuter articles will unavoidably escape observation. But it is impossible for a low and grovelling genius to be guilty of error, since he never endangers himself by soaring on high, or aiming at eminence, but still goes on in the same uniform secure track, whilst its very height and grandeur

* Longinus, Section 33.

“exposes the Sublime to sudden falls. Nor am I ignorant
“indeed of another thing, which will no doubt be urged, that
“in passing our judgment upon the works of an author, we
“always muster his imperfections, so that the remembrance
“of his faults sticks indelibly fast in the mind, whereas that
“of his excellencies is quickly worn out. For my part, I
“have taken notice of no inconsiderable number of faults in
“Homer, and some other of the greatest authors, and cannot
“by any means be blind or partial to them ; however, I judge
“them not to be voluntary faults, so much as accidental slips
“incurred through inadvertence ; such as, when the mind is
“intent upon things of a higher nature, will creep insensibly
“into compositions. And for this reason I give it as my real
“opinion, that the great and noble flights, though they cannot
“every where boast an equality of perfection, yet ought to
“carry off the prize by the sole merit of their own intrinsic
“grandeur.”

DISCOURSE III.

A SURVEY

OF THE HISTORY.

IN the preceding discourse we have examined into the capacity and qualifications of our author for writing history, and settled his character. Let us now take a view of the *work* itself; first casting our eyes upon and noting the general disposition of the *whole*; and then surveying it more distinctly in its *parts*.

The *disposition* of the whole is most elaborately exact. Order is scrupulously observed; and every incident so faithfully arranged in its proper time, that some have doubted whether *annals* were not a more proper title for it than *history*. If we should call it *annals*, it must be owned at the same time that annals were never composed with so much majesty and spirit; and never was *history* more accurately distinguished by the punctuality of dates so nicely interwove. Thucydides states every occurrence in just place and time. But he is forced for this purpose to make frequent transitions, and to drop a particular narration, perhaps the very moment a reader's attention may be most fixed upon and most eager for the event. If they cannot bear a disappointment here, the remedy is ready at hand. By turning over a few leaves, they will find it regularly resumed in due place and time: and they at once may satisfy their own curiosity, without disarranging the author's scheme, or perplexing that work which he was determined to keep quite clear and unembarrassed. They will afterwards for-

give, perhaps applaud him, for his great care to prevent confusion, and to give a neat and precise conception of all that passeth. He constantly gives notice, when he is necessitated, by the method he laid down for himself, to make such transitions: And, when we have been amused with what looks like a ramble from an engaging part of history, but is really a coincidence of events not to pass unheeded; when we have been so long at it, that we are convinced it lies in the road, and is no excursion at all; yet we are glad to see him re-connect, and land us on a spot, where we are already well acquainted. He shews a steady and inviolable attachment to *chronology*, a necessary attendant upon history. But the chronology of Thucydides is like a herald, that exactly marshals a long stately procession, adjusts the rank, clears the way, and preserves every step distinct and unincumbered.

No writer had done this before him. No settled *Æra* was yet in use, not even the famous one of the *Olympiad*. The several States of Greece computed time by a method of their own. It was not easy to make those methods coincide with one another. The Athenians reckoned by their annual *archons*; the Lacedæmonians by their *ephori*; the Argives by the years of the *priestess* of Juno. The seasons of the year, when the two former entered on their offices, were fixed, but did not suit together in point of time; the beginning of the years of the latter was variable, since it depended on the death or removal of a predecessor. Thucydides, to avoid confusion, left all these artificial jarring rules, and adhered to the course of nature. He divided the natural year into two halves, into a summer and winter. His *summer* includes the spring, and reacheth from the vernal to the autumnal equinox; the other half-year is comprehended in his *winter*. He always records *eclipses*, as strange events, and proper concomitants for the horrors of this war. I must not be so sanguine as to imagine, that he supposed such appearances might some time or other be reduced to

exact calculation, and *astronomy* be made the faithful guide of *chronology*.

BOOK I. The First Book of Thucydides is introductory to the rest. It is a comprehensive elaborate work of itself. It clears away rubbish, opens a view from the earliest ages, strikes out light from obscurity, and truth from fable, that the reader may enter upon the *Peloponnesian war* with a perfect insight into the state of Greece, and the schemes, interest, and strength of the contending parties. The author unfolds his design in writing, magnifies his subject, complains of the ignorance and credulity of mankind, rectifies their mistakes, removes all prejudice, and furnishes us with the knowledge of every thing proper to be known, to enable us to look at the contention with judgment and discernment, when the point contended for is no less than the sovereignty of the sea, which that of the land must necessarily follow.

He begins at the source, and traces the original of the Greek communities from certain and indisputable facts; and the growth of Attica in particular, from the natural barrenness of the soil, which tempted no invasions; and from the shelter its inhabitants gave to all, who would settle amongst them, and share their polity.—He shews the invention of *shipping* to have been exceedingly mischievous at first. It filled the sea with pirates, to whom it gave a ready conveyance from coast to coast, enabling them suddenly to seize, and at leisure to carry off and secure their booty. No considerable commerce, or rather none at all, could be carried on, till the shore was cleared of such annoyance. And when few durst venture to settle on the coasts, no marts could be opened for traffic, and no ports were yet secure. A ship was merely the instrument of ready conveyance from place to place: It was not yet become an engine of attack and defence on the water. Minos king of Crete made the first attempt with success to obtain a naval strength*, by

* Years before Christ 1006.

which he cleared the isles of the pirates, who had settled upon them to set out readier from thence on their plundering excursions.—The grand fleet, that carried such a numerous army to Troy, was a mere collection of transports. Thucydides gives us a just and clear idea of that famous expedition. After this celebrated æra*, the Corinthians were the first people of Greece, who became in reality a maritime power. Their peculiar situation gave them an inclination and opportunity for commerce; and commerce must have strength to guard and support it. They first improved a vessel of burden into a ship of war†, and set power afloat as well as wealth.

Their neighbours in the isle of Corcyra soon followed their example, and, though originally a colony of their own, became a rival power at sea. They fought on their own darling element for superiority‡. This was the most ancient sea-fight, but it was not decisive. They continued for two centuries more to be rival and jarring powers; till a third, that of Athens grew up, which politically joined with one to gain the ascendant over them both, and to assert the empire of the sea for itself.

The claim both of Corcyra and Corinth to the town of Epidamnus had occasioned their most recent embroilment§, and a hot war, in which the Corcyræans applied for the alliance and aid of Athens. On this was afterwards grounded the *first* pretext for the Peloponnesian war, and therefore our Author opens the affair at large. Athens held the balance of power in her hands: *How* she came to be possessed of it will soon give room for as pertinent a digression as Thucydides could have wished. Ambassadors from both parties are soon at Athens; one, to negotiate alliance and aid; the other, to traverse their negotiation. The *people* of Athens, in whom the supreme power was vested, admit them both to audience, and *orations* of course must follow.

* Before Christ 904.

† Before Christ 697.

‡ Before Christ 657.

§ Before Christ 438.

Our grave Historian is now retired, to make way for statesmen and orators to mount the stage, who are very well worth hearing.

The Corcyréans, who take the lead, recognize “the necessity of *alliances*, which, though sometimes intanglements, are generally security and defence. Wronged as they now are, they sue for alliance as the means of redress. In granting it to them, the Athenians would shew honour and virtue, and at the same time promote their own private interest. The accession of the naval strength of Corcyræ to their own was very well worth the gaining; in the end, it might preserve their State.—They open the nature of *colonies*, shew the original contract between them and the mother-country; obedience and protection are reciprocal, and imply one another.—They prove that Athens may grant them alliance, in consistence with all other engagements; by doing it, may secure herself in time against the envy and attack of the Peloponnesians; since the naval strength of Corinth, joined to all the efforts of the latter in a future war, will be weak and ineffectual against the combined fleets of Corcyræ and Athens.”

The Corinthians, in their answer, inveigh highly against the Corcyréans. “They describe them as a very designing, iniquitous set of men, and a colony in the highest degree undutiful to its mother-state. “They endeavour to prove it unjust, and ungrateful too, in the Athenians, to take them into alliance, and abet their criminal behaviour. They maintain, that true honour points out another conduct; and schemes of interest should never supersede the laws of equity and good-faith. What *may* happen should be less regarded, than what on present occasions *is* strictly right. They intreat at last, though with a menacing air; and close, with warmly adjuring the Athenians, to stand *neutral* in the quarrel.”

The Athenians however resolve to enter into a defen-

sive alliance with Corcyra. The war is renewed ; and the Athenians send the Corcyréans a petty aid, which they afterwards reinforce. Corcyra is secured, and all the projects of the Corinthians are baffled, who are highly exasperated against the Athenians, and never will forgive them.

Another affair soon happens, to embroil them more, and to make the *second* pretext for a general war. Potidæa, a town in the Isthmus of the Pallene, was a Corinthian colony, but at this time tributary to the Athenians. Its situation between two bays, and amongst the Athenian colonies on the coast of Thrace and Macedonia, would enable it to gall the Athenians sorely in case of a rupture. They order it therefore to be dismantled. The Potidæans refuse obedience, and revolt. A war ensues. The Athenians attempt to reduce Potidæa ; and the Corinthians to support the revolt. It is at length besieged by the former. The siege runs out into a great length of time, and at last becomes one of the considerable events of the Peloponnesian war.

The Corinthians, after this repeated provocation, are full of resentments, and leave no stone unturned to stir up a general war in Greece. They were parties themselves in the Peloponnesian league, of which the Lacedæmonians were the head. The Corinthians never set up for a leading *State*. They were ever content with the secondary rank, though the *first* in that rank. Their turn was always more to commerce than war. Commerce had long since made them rich ; riches had made them luxurious ; and, though they often produced great and excellent soldiers, yet they never piqued themselves on being a martial or formidable people. Athens indeed they hated : Athens had rivalled them in trade, and very much abridged the extent of their commerce. One of the gulfs on which Corinth is seated, that of Sarone, was now intirely in the jurisdiction of the Athenians, who had also begun to curb and straiten them much in the gulf of Crissa. They were consequently bent on the demolition

of this all-grasping rival, but were unable to effect it by their own strength. They solicit all the confederates to repair to Lacedæmon, all full of complaint and remonstrance against the Athenians. The Corinthians reserve themselves for the finishing charge ; and our author repeats (or makes for them) their most inveigling and alarming speech on this occasion.

“ They address the Lacedæmonians with an artful mixture of commendation and reproach ; of commendation, for their strict adherence to good faith ; of reproach, for their indolence and sloth. *They* had suffered the *State* of Athens to grow too mighty for their neighbours. Though the acknowledged deliverers of Greece, *they* had now for a length of time taken no notice of the incroachments of the Athenians ; but, through wilful ignorance and habitual supineness, had let them grow too big, and able now to enslave them all.—They do all they can to irritate and provoke them. They draw an admirable parallel between *them* and the Athenians ; invidious and reproachful, but directly tending to exasperate those whom they want to exasperate. —Then, they warmly renew their applications to the pride of the Lacedæmonians ; they alarm their fears ; they flatter and reproach their foibles. They even threaten to abandon *their* league, unless they exert themselves in defence of their friends ; they endeavour to prove the necessity of active and vigorous measures ; and end with a very artful stroke of insinuating and persuasive address.”

An Athenian embassy, now residing at Lacedæmon, being informed of these loud and bitter outcries against their masters, beg an immediate audience. Accordingly, they are admitted ; not indeed to plead before Lacedæmonians, as their judges or superiors—Athenians scorn such self-debasement ; but, to vindicate their *State* from misrepresentations, to clear her reputation, and justify her power.

“ With this view, they run over the great services they had done to Greece, in the time of the Persian invasions :

“ They had ever been the most strenuous, most disinterested, and most gallant champions for liberty. They pompously detail their battles of Marathon and Salamis ; their evacuating Athens on the last occasion : and, when they had no polity of their own subsisting, fighting ardently and successfully for the other communities of Greece. Their power had been nobly earned ; and, must they forego it, because it was envied ? They had honourably gained and justly used it ; much more justly, than the Lacedæmonians had it either in will or ability to have done. They are calumniated merely from that spite and discontent so common to mankind, who ever hate and abuse their superiors, and ever repine at subjection though to the most gentle masters.— Lacedæmonians have neither skill nor judgment for large command, and though most eagerly grasping at it, are unable to manage it with any measure of dexterity and address. *They* should reflect again and again, before they ventured upon war : It might last longer, and involve them in more calamities, than they seemed willing to apprehend. *They* had better submit their complaints to fair arbitration : If not, the Athenians invoke the Gods to witness their readiness to defend themselves, whenever and however their enemies shall attack them.”

All parties now withdraw ; and the Lacedæmonians go to council amongst themselves. Exasperated by the Corinthians, and mortified by the speech of the Athenians, the majority are for an immediate declaration of war. Archidamus, one of their kings, rose up to temper their fury. And the speech of his Spartan majesty on this occasion, carries all the marks of a good king, an able statesman, and a thorough patriot : It does honour both to his heart and head. A Spartan king never made a royal figure but at the head of an army : *Then* he reigned indeed. And yet, Archidamus retains no selfish considerations ; they are lost in his regard for the public welfare.

He tells them, “ he is not fond of war himself ; raw un-

“experienced youth alone is liable to such weakness. The
“war *now* under consideration is a most important point.
“It may run out into a great length of time. It is against
“Athenians—a remote people—a naval power—abounding
“in wealth—excellently provided in all respects. He de-
“mands, in every single article, whether they can presume
“to become a match for such antagonists? They should re-
“member the high spirit, the habits of activity and perse-
“verance so natural to these Athenians, who are not to be
“dejected at the first loss, nor frightened at big words or
“haughty threats. *Insults* indeed must not be brooked;
“but, adequate preparations should be made to avenge
“them, and time be gained to make such preparations.
“It would be most prudent to begin a negotiation, to spin it
“out into length. If affairs can be amicably adjusted, it
“would deserve their choice;—If not, when they are com-
“petently enabled, it will be soon enough to act offensively.
“He dreads not war himself, yet, war cannot be carried on
“without money. Ample funds must be provided, a work
“of time and deliberation. Circumspection is no real re-
“proach; precipitation draws positive mischiefs after it.
“Lacedæmonians are used to be calm and considerate;
“they should not now be cajoled or exasperated out of their
“judgment. The Athenians are a wise and dextrous people.
“The Lacedæmonians should keep *that* in remembrance,
“and support their own characters of calmness of spirit and
“true manly resolution: They should begin with caution,
“proceed with temper, end all things amicably if they can;
“if not, when duly prepared and adequately provided, they
“might trust the decision to arms.”

The *Kings* of Sparta were ever justled on their thrones by the haughty overbearing *Ephori*. Sthenelaïdas, one of that college, answers Archidamus in a short, blunt, properly laconic speech. “He is severe upon the Athenians, sneers
“Archidamus, and avers that Lacedæmonians should not
“deliberate upon, but instantly take the field and avenge

“their wrongs.” He then put the question—Whether the peace was broke?—divided the council; told the votes; and declared, in the English style, that the *Ayes* had it.

The confederates were now called in, and acquainted with the resolution. Yet it seems the advice of Archidamus had carried some weight, and actual war was to be deferred, till all the parties in the Lacedæmonian league had ripened their measures, and were ready to act with unanimity and vigor.

Here the author again makes his appearance, and assures us the true motive of the determination for a war at Sparta, was a JEALOUSY of the Athenian power now very great, and a dread of its more extensive growth; the latter of which they were determined to prevent, and to reduce the former within less distasteful and terrific bounds.

Then follows a most pertinent *digression*, in which Thucydides points out the steps, by which the Athenians had so highly exalted their *State*. In a close and succinct manner he runs over the history of Athens for fifty years, from the invasion of Xerxes to the breaking out of the Peloponnesian war. He arranges all the incidents in due place and time. Herodotus hath related the splendid passages of the Grecian history during that invasion; hath exhibited Themistocles in all the lustre of his command at the battle of Salamis, where the Athenians, who had abandoned their all, fought, and through the address of Themistocles obliged all parties to fight, for liberty against Xerxes. On this day they earned a greater title than that of *citizens* of Athens; they were afterwards acknowledged the *sovereigns* of the sea. The Lacedæmonians became mortified at it; but the Athenians had gloriously deserved it. Themistocles was the very life and soul of Greece on this occasion. In the midst of difficulties he formed a most extensive plan for his beloved Athens, which he began to execute at once. Thucydides describes his address and foresight. He soon sets the city beyond the reach of envy and jealousy. And

though soon after he lost his country, through the malice of his personal enemies and the enemies of his country in conjunction with them, yet the statesmen and patriots left behind pursued his plan of naval power: And the steps of its progress and advancement are minutely traced out by our Historian.

Themistocles had made all safe and secure at home. The *Long-walls* were built; the *Piræus*, a spacious harbour, opened and fortified, a magazine for traffic, and an arsenal for war. Aristides, as true a patriot as ever lived, made all secure abroad. Through his honest management, all Greece submitted to an annual tax, for the guard of their common liberty against future invasions; and the *leaders* at sea were made *collectors* and *treasurers* of this naval fund. The isle of Delos was the place, at first, of lodging this fund; but it was soon after removed to Athens;—a shrewd political step, yet capable however of an ample if not full justification. The war is briskly carried on against the Persian monarch; the isles and seas are cleared of the common enemy; the cities on the coast are regained or conquered. Cimon also performs his part nobly; he earns two victories the same day, by sea and land, on the coast of Ionia, from the Persians. He completed a negociation with the petty maritime *States*, confederate with Athens, who were tired of incessant warfare, for accepting sums of money instead of ships and personal attendance. By this means the shipping of those *States* soon mouldered away, and their money was by their own agreement sent thither, to increase and strengthen the maritime power of Athens. In spite of all the opposition, which the Corinthians and Bœotians gave them at home, whose rancour to them was never to be appeased, in the course of no large number of years, they had established a very extensive and formidable empire indeed. The isles and coasts of the *Ægæan* sea were mostly their own. The bay of Sarone was intirely in their own jurisdiction: And, by being masters of Naupactus, they considerably awed the

bay of Crissa. Their squadrons cruized round and quite awed the coasts of Peloponnesus. Their interest at Cephallene, and the new alliance which gained them the accession of the naval strength of Corcyra, rendered them masters of the Ionian, and they had colonies to extend their traffic and influence both in Italy and Sicily.

These points are opened step by step in this *digression* by Thucydides, till jealousy in the Lacedæmonians and malice in the Corinthians irritated all the Peloponnesian *States* and their allies against them, and ended in the *determination* for war. The Corinthians had now carried their point, and soon hoped to gratify all their resentments. Accordingly, at the second grand congress at Sparta, when all the rest of the *States* had declared their minds, they warmly encourage them to enter at once upon an offensive war, in a very studied and elaborate speech.

“They set out with handsome compliments to the Lacedæmonians. They animate the landed *States* of Peloponnesus to join effectually with those on the coasts. A firm and lasting peace can only be obtained by a vigorous war; and the power of Athens must needs be reduced.—They open a plan—for establishing funds—for weakening the marine of Athens, and consequently for improving and strengthening the marine of her enemies—for effectuating the revolts of her dependents—and raising fortifications in Attica itself. Independence can never be earned at too great a price; it costs as much to be voluntary and obedient slaves. A single *State* should never be suffered to play the tyrant in Greece. Their own reputation, their dignity, their liberty, their welfare, a most righteous cause, nay the very Gods themselves summon them to action. They close with a very warm and pathetic recapitulation, sounding as it were the alarm for the destruction of Athens.”

Now war is a second time resolved upon by ballot. All are ordered to get ready, with the utmost dispatch, to be-

gin its operations. In the mean time, the Athenians are to be amused with embassies and negotiations merely to gain time and save appearances. Frivolous they really are, but our author minutely details them, as they give him an opportunity of introducing some notable passages relating to Cylon, Pausanias, and Themistocles. He then shifts the scene to Athens; and introduces Pericles, the most commanding orator, the greatest general, the most consummate statesman, and at this time prime minister of the republic—introduces Pericles, I say, in the assembly of the people, to give them an insight into the schemes of their enemies, and a plan for their own conduct; to encourage them to a brave and steady resistance, in strict adherence to such methods, as in the end will infallibly not barely secure but aggrandize their *State*.

The thoughts in this speech of Pericles are so grand, so nervous, so emphatically and concisely just, that if the reader be not immediately struck into an adequate conception of them, I know no method of opening his eyes or enlarging his understanding. He says but little, but says every thing in that little. He demolisheth all the assertions of the Corinthians in their last speech at Sparta, as if he had heard them speak. Perhaps Thucydides *here* hath not sufficiently concealed his art in writing. But the speech is intirely in character, compleatly suited to the heart and head and mouth of Pericles. Pericles, I observe it with pleasure, is an Englishman both in heart and judgment. England hath adhered and will adhere to the lessons which Athens neglected and forgot—"Of vast consequence indeed," (says this enlightened statesman,) "is the dominion of the sea. But, "consider it with attention. For, were we seated on an "island," (as the force of his argument evidently implies,) "we could never be subdued. And now you ought to think, "that our present situation is nearly as possible the same, "and so to evacuate your houses and lands in Attica, and "to confine your defence to the sea." If this can need a

comment, Xenophon will give it in his *Polity of the Athenians*.—"In one point (says he) the Athenians are deficient. "For if, beside their being sovereigns of the sea, they were "seated on an island, it would be ever in their power to ravage others at pleasure, and yet they could not be ravaged "themselves so long as they held the mastery at sea; their "lands could never be laid waste, no enemy could post "themselves upon them. But now the occupiers of lands "and the wealthy Athenians fly before invaders; whilst the "people in general, conscious they have nothing to be burnt "and nothing to be plundered, live exempt from fear nor "fly before an invader. The expedient used on such occasions is, that the former deposit their most valuable effects in the isles, and trusting to their superiority at sea, "slight all the devastations an enemy can make in Attica." England is complete where Athens was deficient. And how fond must both Pericles and Xenophon have been of the island and maritime power of Great Britain? I will not pretend to anticipate the reader's pleasure by descending into more particularities. It may suffice to add, that the final answer of the Athenians is drawn up by the advice of Pericles, that "they will do nothing by command; they had "already offered to refer all disputes to a fair judicial decision; so far only, but no farther, compliance must be expected from Athens."—Here all negotiation comes to an end; and the war will very soon commence.

Thus I have endeavoured to give some idea of the first book of Thucydides. It is a grand piece of work beyond all denial. But Rapin thinks our author hath overdone it "out "of a desire of prefixing a too stately portal to his history." Could the portal have been thought too stately, if the whole fabric had been compleatly finished? To form a right judgment here, we should examine the *design* and not the *execution*: The latter is imperfect, is broke off. So, look at it from the park, the Banqueting-house at Whitehall is too big and towering for what stands near it. But hath

it that appearance in the original plan of Inigo Jones for the magnificent palace once designed to be erected? Something of this nature may justly be pleaded in favour of Thucydides, and teach us not to judge too hastily of a *whole*, when we cannot survey all the *parts*, because they never were finished. Moved by decorum, I would gladly justify my author, but I by no means pretend to decide the point.

BOOK II. The Second Book opens with the first act of hostility. The Thebans march by night, and enter by surprize the city of Platæa. This city and petty *State*, though just within Bæotia, was not comprised in the *union*, of which all the other cities of Bæotia were constituents with Thebes at their head, but had ever been firmly attached, even in the worst of times, to the common liberty of Greece, and was under the protection of and in fast alliance with Athens. This surprize of Platæa our author describes in all its turns, till its enemies are driven out or slaughtered, and a place is secured for the Athenians.

A rupture hath now been made, and the war is going to be general. Thucydides sounds the charge in all the disposition and spirit of Homer. He catalogues the allies on both sides. He awakens our expectation; and fast engages our attention. All mankind are concerned in the important point now going to be decided. Endeavours are made to disclose futurity. Heaven itself is interested in the dispute. The earth totters, and nature seems to labour with the great event. This is *his* solemn and sublime manner of setting out. Thus he *magnifies* a war between two, as Rapin styles them, *petty States*; and thus artfully he supports a little subject by treating it in a great and noble method.

Writers who have been long contemplating the vast gigantic size of the Roman Empire, if they cast their eyes on the State of Athens even at the present juncture, are apt to form a low idea of it. Athens, it is true, was at this time in the highest meridian of her power. Yet, why ever to be pitching upon the most disadvantageous and incongruous parallels?

His subject was certainly the greatest that to this day had occurred in the world: And, ought Thucydides to be degraded, or even lessened at all, because he was not born in the same age with Livy? As much amusement at least accompanies, and as much instruction flows from reading carefully the history of Athens, as from that of Rome. Wonder may be more raised by the latter, and the wonder may end in detestation of a people, who became enormously great by the miseries and destruction of their fellow-creatures. The Romans were but brute-like men: They were not tolerably humanised, till they had conquered Greece. Greece reconquered them, and established a better, more lasting triumph over mind, than the others over body.

Græcia capta ferum victorem cepit.—Hor.

Who then best deserve the applause of the heart, the citizens of Athens, or the citizens of Rome? I am not at all in doubt, how men of a calm and considerate spirit will decide the question. Or, let such as judge only by numbers, consider a little more sedately, whether Athens at this time was that diminutive and petty *State*, which could be magnified and enobled only by artifice. The first army, that invaded her territories in this war, consisted (according to Plutarch) of sixty thousand men. This is an object big enough to fill the eye. The state of her revenue, when the value of money is adjusted, will turn out by no means trifling. They were possessed, at the breaking out of the war, of three hundred triremes fit for sea. Two hundred and fifty of them were at one time in commission, in the fourth year of the war: Consequently at two hundred men a ship, the number of seamen employed must have been fifty thousand. If the reader be not yet convinced, that Athens was not a *petty State*, nothing can get the better of his prejudice. It would be pity, any one should sit down to Thucydides with such low prepossessions against his subject.

The confederate army of Peloponnesians is now assem-

bled, and ready to march into Attica, under the command of Archidamus. Like an able and cautious general he harangues his troops, “ encourages them with a sight of their own numbers, but guards them from catching at that sight a contempt of their foes. The strict observation of discipline is always necessary to armies, be they never so large. No enemy ought ever to be despised, much less Athenians. Though an enemy, he speaks in high commendation of the latter, and establishes the dignity of their characters. He ends with an exhortation to his troops, to observe rules, conform to discipline, and bravely to execute orders; and Spartan-like, concludes with an encomium on the beauty and strength of strict military obedience.”

He then sends a messenger to Athens, to try if a war were yet to be avoided. The Athenians are as determined as ever to make no submissions. The messenger is conducted out of their territories, and parts from his escort with a pathetic prediction of the miseries in which all Greece is going to be involved. Attica soon after is invaded. The mischief done by the invaders is described; and the sense at Athens of their sufferings and distresses represented at large. The reader, on this occasion, will be let into the form and constitution of the Athenian polity. He will see, how they began to be moulded into one community by the prudence of Theseus one of their earliest kings. Other historians expatiate on the method, by which from being under a *regal* they had varied gradually into a purely *republican* form. I shall only mention an observation*, that, contrary to most other nations, they had abolished the regal government, not from distate but reverence to kings. Codrus, the last of their kings, had devoted himself for his country, and was so worthy a man, that they resolved no mortal should afterwards wear that title amongst them. They declared *Jupiter* king of Athens, about the same time that

* Tourreil's Preface Historique.

the Jews rebelled against *theocracy*, and would have a man to reign over them, *Archons* for life succeeded, whose term was afterwards abridged to ten years ; then, to a single year. All general histories point out the variations, till they came to the *popular* form which now prevailed.

The enemy, after heavy depredations, at length evacuated Attica ; and the Athenians take the field to retaliate upon them. Their squadron had been all the time at sea, cruizing upon and infesting the coasts of Peloponnesus. But, in the winter, we are called to Athens to see the public funeral of those, who were killed in the first campaign. Here, the first time it occurs, our author describes this solemnity, and Pericles makes the Funeral-oration.

I shall make no reflections on *this* celebrated performance. Should the reader not think it deserving of its high reputation, I fear the *translator* will be sadly to blame. It is hard to give such noble ideas their proper energy, and such refined ones their due exactness. The great orators of Athens were always glad to display their abilities on the same occasion. Plato hath entered the lists with a high spirit of emulation, and with a high degree of success: And a great master* this way hath lately made him *English*. If Thucydides suffers by a comparison, which now the unlearned but judicious reader is impowered to make, the latter must be intreated to observe, that the eloquence of Plato was beyond dispute more smooth and fluent, more accomplished in all that is beautiful and sweet than the eloquence of Thucydides, but an adjudged inferiority in any other respect must be laid at the door of his *translator*.

After such an exhilarating and enlivening piece, for such it must have been to all who heard it, and must have determined every Athenian to suffer any thing with intrepidity and patience in the cause of his country, a very mournful scene immediately succeeds, which lays them under such a load of affliction and distress, as no arguments, no philoso-

* Mr. West.

phy can alleviate. The plague breaks out at Athens; and the reader must be ready to feel very sharp emotions in behalf of his fellow-creatures, and in behalf of morality and virtue too. Amidst their accumulated distresses, Pericles is the only support of the community; and, like the greatest benefactors to ungrateful men, is cursed for being their support, and reproached for being steadily wise and in the right. At last he convenes them, and addresses them with such an air of ingenuity, such spirit, and conscious dignity, and firm reliance on a good cause; as only two orators that I know of have ever equalled on parallel occasions. Those I mean are Demosthenes and St. Paul. All the world of letters and good taste are well acquainted with the *oration* of the former against Æschines about the *crown*; and every class of readers is surely well versed in the *Second Epistle of Paul to the Corinthians*. I can but hint these resemblances, since now I must attend on Pericles, who sooths or thunders his countrymen out of all their discontent and malice, and sends them home convinced and ashamed. But domestic distress soon effaceth any other impressions; their passions are again inflamed by inwardly corroding anguish, and Pericles after all must be fined, and turned out of his employments. Yet people are not always mad; good sense and conviction return upon them; and he is begged, because most worthy, again to accept the sole administration. He enjoys it but a little time, before he is carried off by the plague. Athens then lost her ablest, honestest statesman. He was able to have sat at the helm of government, to have steered the *republic* safe through every storm, and to have insured her not bare security but open triumph. His successors were very alert at catching hold of that helm; but, none of them could hold it long; and the vessel, through their mutual quarrels, must needs run aground or founder at last.

But the next remarkable passage in the history, is the march of the Peloponnesians to invest Plataea, and the so-

lemn parley held at their approach. Archidamus is at the head of this ungenerous enterprise. The malice of the Thebans must be gratified, since the alliance of Bœotia in this war is of mighty consequence, and to be purchased at any rate. Archidamus indeed struggles hard for the Platæans; he would fain spare them, could he persuade them to a neutrality. But the Platæans have too much honour and gratitude to be neutral, when Athens, their faithful guardian and ally, is principally struck at. They remonstrate in vain from the topics of honour, justice, gratitude, the glory and sanction of the great progenitors on either side. The siege is formed, and strenuously plied, though without success. Our author always shines in exact description: No method of annoyance or defence is omitted. It is at length turned into a blockade, and a sufficient body of troops left behind to carry it on, when the main army marcheth off.

The war grows warm in more remote quarters; in Thrace, and in Acarnania. An Athenian squadron, stationed at Naupactus in the bay of Crissa, awed all the motions of the Corinthians and allies on their own coasts; and it was determined, to clear away this annoyance. Accordingly, they launch out against it with more than double the number of vessels. The Athenians, at one exertion of skill, drive them all on a heap, defeat them, and make prizes of twelve. The Lacedæmonians, excellent land-men but very awkward seamen, think this an unaccountable event. They send down their most active commanders to refit and reinforce the fleet, and to try their fortune again at sea. Much artifice is employed on both sides. The short harangues of the admirals let us into all the views and designs of either party. Phormio at length is snared; the enemy blunders; then Phormio extricates himself, and gives them a second defeat. The reader sees every tack, and the motion of every vessel.

Disconcerted here, they form a bold project indeed to surprise the Piræus by night, and to finish the war in a mo-

ment. The project is described, and the probability of success established. But the very grandeur of the attempt deters the undertakers. Athens indeed is alarmed, and thrown into a great consternation; but, the project totally miscarries, and the Piræus is better secured for the future.

All Thrace is now arming under Sitalces against Perdiccas king of Macedonia. A vast army of Barbarians is assembled, marches over a great length of country, strikes a general panic, effectuates no real service, and soon disperses or moulders away. Such bulky unwieldy armies make an awkward figure, compared with the regularity, exact discipline, and personal bravery of the diminutive armies of Greece.

Thucydides gives us once more a sight of Phorcio and his gallant squadron; and then closeth the *book*, and the history of the third year of the war. "Never history (says Rapin) comprised so much matter in so little room, nor so much action in so few words. If any thing can be found fault with, it is that the exploits are too closely crowded with one another, so that the coherence seems somewhat intricate and confused, and the multiplying of objects tends only to dissipate the attention of the reader." An *historian* however is to take his incidents in their natural order, as they subsist in fact. He is not so much to dispose, as to describe them. If he does the latter pertinently, accurately, and with a due attention to their importance, he hath acquitted himself of his duty. The *poet* or writer of *fiction* must pick out and heighten his incidents, with a view to fill up properly, and give to every distinct object its needful splendor: He is to exert his choice, and by exerting it judiciously to gain applause. The *historian* is not to pick but to make the best use of his materials. He may give them indeed all possible lustre; but, if they crowd too thick upon one another, the reader may be embarrassed with the number, yet nobody can be justly blamed.

BOOK III. The Third Book is no less full of matter than

the preceding. The incidents crowd fast upon one another, and politics and oratory are in full employ. The revolt of Lesbos is the first occurrence of importance. The people of that isle had been long in the Athenian league: But the number of this league were *dependents* rather than *confederates*. Thucydides always employs the same Greek word (συμμάχοι) for the members of either league: The idea it gives is that of *companions* in war. But there is great difference between such as accompany, because they chuse it; and such as accompany, because they are summoned and cannot help it. The former was in general the case of those who sided with Sparta; the latter, of those who sided with Athens. The least thought of compulsion is grating to any *State*, which thinks it ought, and is able, to be quite independent. This was the case with the Lesbians, a people considerable in many respects, but especially for their naval strength. It was well worth the while of the Lacedæmonians to gain such *confederates*; it must be a sad blow to the Athenians to lose such *dependents*. The fact was; all the cities of Lesbos, except Methymne, declare a revolt. The Athenians lose no time, but are at once with a powerful squadron before Mitylene, and block it up. The Mitylæans had sent ambassadors to beg immediate aid from the Lacedæmonians. They had an audience from them and the rest of their league at Olympia, so soon as the games were ended. The *speech* they make on this occasion is very artful, very insinuating, and nicely adapted to carry their point.

“ They open the nature of a *revolt*, and the cases in
 “ which it merits protection and succour from others. They
 “ have been ill used by the Athenians; have been made
 “ their tools in enslaving their compatriots of Greece; have
 “ been long caressed indeed, but are well assured what their
 “ own fate would soon have been. Every *State* hath a na-
 “ tural right to take preventive measures against the loss of
 “ their liberty, and to stand on their defence. They had

“revolted sooner, would the Lacedæmonians have countenanced the measure: They had declared it on the first invitation of the Bæotians. It was a noble revolt; it had disengaged them from a combination to enslave the rest of Greece; it had associated them in the cause of honour and liberty. It had been made indeed with too much precipitation; but this should make others more zealous and active in their protection, who would reap a great accession of strength by it; an accession of maritime strength; whilst the Athenians would be weakened in point of shipping, and in point of revenue. It would be a signal of revolt to others, and assurance to them that they might do it safely. It would reflect abundant honour on the Lacedæmonians to succour the distressed, to save men whose preservation would give them glory and strength, and prove them those hearty friends to liberty, which all Greece with united praises acknowledged them to be.”

Interest without rhetoric was strong enough to insure their success. But the latter helped to gain them a prompt reception from the Lacedæmonians, who resolve on sending them a succour, and making diversions on the Athenians, in order to oblige them to raise the siege of Mitylene.

The blockade of Plataea by the Peloponnesians still continuing, our author relates the bold project, and bold execution of the project, of a party of Plataeans, in making their escape over all the works of the besiegers. It is a most circumstantial, and a most clear and intelligible relation.

Mitylene is now forced to surrender at discretion. The principal agents in the late revolt are sent prisoners to Athens, where the *people* vote that “not they only but all the Mitylenéans in general be put to death;” and an order is immediately dispatched to their commander at Mitylene to execute his part of the sentence. This bloody decree was carried by Cleon, a furious demagogue. It was he, who worked up the

people of Athens to such a pitch of inhumanity ; which, however, instantly subsided. They are struck with horror at their own *resolution*, and will have it again debated. We shall hear the two speakers on each side of the question, Cleon and Diodotus.

“ Cleon sets out with all the fury and fire of a man, who hath a bad heart. He hath abjured humanity to shew himself a most zealous patriot. Eloquent he is acknowledged to have been, and so appears in his invectives against his own masters and his own tools, the *people*, for their foolish commiseration, for their being the eternal dupes of orators, of subtle and venal speakers. For his own part, he loves his country and hates her enemies. Guilt shall never find an advocate in him ; he calls out for vengeance on the Mityleneans ; none but their pensioners, none but men who are bribed and corrupted can offer a plea in their behalf. He bids his audience throw away all foolish pity, all womanish forbearance, to fix their attention on the crimes of the guilty, and not on the horrors of their punishment ; and give this proof to their dependents, that death shall inevitably be the portion of all revolters, that their arms may be henceforth employed in opposing their public enemies, and not in chastising their own subjects.”

Diodotus replies in a *speech* that shews him a real patriot, and a man who thought good-manners, a calm considerate temper, and a regard to humanity to be very consistent with the true patriot-spirit. “ He therefore defends the *re-committing* of their former *resolution*, since repeated consultations cannot be prejudicial to the public welfare. It is a base and odious method to lavish the charge of ignorance and venality on men who differ in sentiment ; it robs the public of its ablest counsellors and sincerest friends. Strict justice, in the present instance, may be with Cleon ; but the future and lasting welfare of their country is the object now to be kept in view. The punish-

“ment of death hath never effectually awed the tempers of
“mankind. To make men desperate is very impolitic ; to
“extirpatè their dependents is lopping off their own limbs,
“and ruining their own revenue. Men should be retained
“in their duty by mild discretionary precautions ; severe
“and sanguinary proceedings never answer the purpose.
“And, what cruelty to doom a whole people to destruc-
“tion ! to involve the innocent with the guilty ! to murder
“even such as had been their friends and benefactors ! He
“advises them not to give too large a scope to mercy, but
“to punish the guilty, and the guilty alone. This will suf-
“ficiently intimidate others ; will secure their interest in
“Lesbos better for the future ; and convince the world
“how soundly Athenians can deliberate upon all their con-
“cerns.”

Diodotus carries his point. The Athenians, cruel only in the fit of choler, but habitually humane, repeal the bloody sentence ; and dispatch a vessel with all haste to stop execution, which arrives at Mitylene but just time enough to prevent the massacre.

The next event of importance contrasts the Lacedæmonian character with that of the Athenians. The author takes no pains to point it out ; but it lies too ready and obvious to pass unobserved.—Platæa, after a tedious blockade, is obliged by famine to surrender. They surrender however to the Lacedæmonians, on condition of being brought to a judicial trial, and only, if found guilty of unjust behaviour to be put to death. Some delegates arrive from Sparta to preside in this court of mere inquisition, since the whole process is confined to a single question—“Whether they
“had done any positive service to the Lacedæmonians and
“allies”—that is, to their declared and determined enemies—
“in the present war ?” The question plainly manifested a deliberate resolution to put them all to death. And all the favour they obtain is, to be suffered to make a kind of dying speech before men, who were styled indeed judges, but in

fact were butchers. It was a case of great commiseration, and the speaker lays it open with all that natural eloquence which flows from an inward and keen sensibility. If men were not deaf to persuasion, it must have persuaded. The cause was most alarming, and a more pathetic *plea* hath never been exhibited.

“ They insist that on a fair and explicit condition they
“ had surrendered to the Lacedæmonians; whereas now they
“ were prejudged and precondemned to gratify their unre-
“ lenting foes the Thebans. The insidious *question* left them
“ no plea at all. They could not answer it, and must not
“ be silent. Since life is at stake, something must be said,
“ even by men who despair of persuading. Their quarrel
“ with the Thebans had been just and honourable; quarrel
“ with the Lacedæmonians they never had any. Nay,
“ merely at the desire of the latter had they cultivated
“ Athenian friendship, that unpardonable crime, for which
“ they were now doomed to destruction. They expatiate
“ with truth and energy on the great services they had done
“ to the liberty of Greece. All Greece was bound in ho-
“ nour, in gratitude, in deference to positive and solemn
“ oaths, to preserve the Platæans. Ought every tie to be
“ rent asunder, generosity to be quite expunged, and all be-
“ nevolence thrown aside, to serve a private turn? Ought
“ Platæans to be thus basely reduced, as they really had
“ been, either to be starved or to be butchered? The Lace-
“ dæmonians should intreat the Thebans for them, should
“ beg them to save the lives of friends and benefactors; at
“ least should replace them within their walls, and leave
“ them to the fate of war. They apply to their generosity,
“ to their humanity; they strive to give them some emotions
“ of pity; they represent the liableness of mankind to cala-
“ mity; how brutal it is to be deliberately hard-hearted;
“ how sinful it is to be resolutely ungrateful! They call upon
“ heaven and earth to interpose in their behalf; they run
“ over every pathetic and persuasive topic; until they can

“add no more, and yet dare not end; and again intreat
“the Lacedæmonians to save those worthy patriots, to
“whom all Greece is indebted for her liberty and indepen-
“dence.”

The Thebans, who were afraid the Lacedæmonians had a higher sense of honour and gratitude than they really had, demand also to be heard.

In the *speech* they make on this occasion, “they first
“accuse the Platæans of slander and invective. They en-
“deavour to palliate the reproach on themselves, for desert-
“ing the cause of liberty and joining the arms of Persia.
“The Platæans had been active ever since to betray it to
“the Athenians; that wicked scheme, which with all their
“power the Thebans had ever opposed. By such iniqui-
“tous conduct the Platæans had extinguished their former
“glory, had effaced all their former merits. Nobody was
“bound to redress or pity them, but their friends the Athe-
“nians. Their temper had been always bad; always bent
“on violence and mischief; always addicted to set up ty-
“ranny in Greece, provided Athenians were the tyrants.
“They then endeavour to throw an *anti-pathetic* into their
“own representations. They paint the death of their coun-
“trymen slain at the surprise of Platea in a mournful light,
“as put to death contrary to every law, and murdered in
“the very act of stretching out their hands and pleading
“a promise of life. The lives therefore of such butchers
“are forfeited to justice; and they insist the forfeit shall
“be taken: The Lacedæmonians are bound in honour to
“take it. They beg them therefore to be deaf to vain com-
“plaints and intreaties, to revenge the injured, and to punish
“the guilty; to regard what bad men have done, and not
“what they have said; to defy eloquence, and heed only
“simple unsophisticated truth; by which alone men, who
“preside in judgment, can satisfy their conscience and their
“duty.”

An alliance with Thebes is necessary in this war to the

Lacedæmonians, and they purchase it at a mighty price indeed. The wretched Platæans, *by all mankind abandoned*, are butchered one after another, to the number of two hundred; their wives are sold for slaves; their city is rooted up from its foundations.

Thucydides soon after describes the sedition of Corcyra, the horrors of which are scarcely to be paralleled in story. He paints all the dreadful consequences of faction in a community. And what pity it is, that a warm, generous, and innate love of liberty, when carried to excess, should be the source of so much misery to reasonable creatures! Our author, contrary to his custom, runs out here into many grave and judicious reflexions, in the interest of no party, a champion for no particular form, but as a friend to man, and a friend to virtue. It is the lust of power, that throws embroilments and confusions into all communities. In governments strictly *republican*, the ambitious are eager to obtain more than an equal share. In an *oligarchical* form, the few in power want ever to retain and often to enlarge their share; and the cry of liberty is shouted loudest by those who want most to overthrow it. But yet, was the matter ever mended, or the miseries of mankind prevented by setting up a single tyrant? Communities have suffered more, for the caprice, for the support of the nominal glory of such a *head*, than they have done by a number of popular seditions. The reader will certainly all along reflect on the fine model of government established in his own country; and own, that a community may be governed and yet be happy, that the power of the *one* and of the *few* and of the *many* may be tempered into an apt and lasting consistence; and, as it hath been for ages in a train of improvement, keep it but unhurt by intestine faction, may last to the dissolution of this great globe itself.

After this tragical business of Corcyra, Thucydides enters upon the affairs of Sicily. The seeds of war are sowing in that island, which will afterwards grow into a mighty

harvest.—He relates other incidents, until he comes to a remarkable scene of war in Ætolia, where Demosthenes the Athenian commander is totally defeated.—He describes the purification of the isle of Delos by the Athenians ; and hath found the art to make it a cheerful and entertaining piece, for the relief of the reader, after he hath been engaged in so many scenes of horror and destruction, and is soon going to be engaged in more.—The battles of Olpe and Idomene are sufficiently stored with slaughter, to glut any reader who delights in blood. The armies in this history have been often thought not to be sufficiently numerous. They make no havoc ; they do not knock one another on the head fast enough to preserve attention. But these old Greeks were men and not brutes. And it is pity, that the history of men should be so much a history of the destruction of the human species.

BOOK IV. In the Fourth Book, the Athenians and Lacedæmonians, principals in the war, are matched directly against one another. Demosthenes, a wise and brave commander, had seized and fortified Pylus in the territories of the latter, had placed such a garrison in it as annoyed the whole country, and in the end might wound the very vitals of that *State*. The Lacedæmonians slight it at first, as if their bare appearance would remedy all. But upon trial, their land-armies and their squadrons are unable to dislodge the enemy. It is with the true martial spirit of an experienced and gallant commander, that Demosthenes harangues his small body of Athenians, when he draws them up on the beach of the sea, to beat off the ships of the enemy. Thucydides shines on these occasions ; in him the addresses are always made, and pertinently made, to the soldiers who are present ; they interest and animate, but never run out into declamation and common-place.—The turns of war at Pylus are sudden, and engage attention. They fight by land, and fight by sea ; nay, what is more, land-battles are fought from the water, and naval battles fought from off the shore. The eye

will distinctly view these strange occurrences ; they are painted strong ; the groupes are not mere heaps of confusion, and the principal figures are eminently distinguished. The body of *Spartans* intercepted in the isle of *Sphacteria*, who must either starve, or, what to *Lacedæmonians* is full as bad, must surrender their persons and their arms, is a point that exceedingly alarms that martial community. Things had long since gone against them ; but now, their hereditary honour and military glory, on which and which alone they piqued themselves, are in danger of being miserably tarnished. Their proud spirits condescend to beg a *truce*, that they may send an embassy to Athens to solicit an *accommodation*.

It must have afforded a high degree of spiteful joy at Athens, to find the *Lacedæmonians* lengthening their monosyllables and petitioning for peace. It is curious to hear in what manner they solicit, when admitted to audience. They declare themselves sent, “ in behalf of their country-
“ men, to propose an *expedient* very much for the honour
“ of Athens, and which would extricate themselves from
“ difficulties that now bore hard upon them. Athens never
“ had so fine an opportunity of raising her credit, securing
“ her acquisitions, and carrying her glory to the highest
“ pitch. They should not be puffed up, but reflect on the
“ strange vicissitude of human affairs. Who could expect,
“ the *Lacedæmonians* should ever be sunk so low, as to sue
“ for peace ? Yet what was the lot of Sparta might possibly
“ become, some time or other, the lot of Athens. The lat-
“ ter should be moderate now, should accept of offered
“ friendship, should chearfully receive a submission, made
“ only to prevent desperation in great and gallant souls, and
“ open a field for mutual benevolence. The rival States
“ may now be reconciled ; and only now, before things are
“ brought to extremities, and disgrace hath rendered one
“ party desperate. At this crisis, the Athenians may con-
“ fer on Greece the blessing of a firm and lasting peace.

“ and reap all the honour and advantage of it, since all the
“ credit of it will be their own. Lacedæmonians may be
“ *obliged*, but will not be *compelled*. At length, they propose
“ their *expedient*, not explicitly, but with a shrewd insinuation,
“ that would the Athenians strike up a bargain with them,
“ they might jointly lord it over Greece for the future,
“ beyond controul.”

Had Pericles been now alive, we may easily guess, how readily he would have laid hold on this opportunity to end a burthensome and distressful war, which on the side of Athens had at first been necessitated and merely defensive. But success had elevated Athens quite too high ; and no real friend to the *State* had at present so much influence as Cleon, that loud and boisterous demagogue. Hence it comes, that such terms are insisted upon as the Lacedæmonians cannot in honour accept. The truce expires ; and all the attention of Greece is fixed on the important scene of contention at Pylus.

The author here interposeth an account of what was now doing in Sicily, and then returns to Pylus. The *Spartans* in the isle seem as far off a surrender as ever. The people of Athens murmur at the slowness of their troops, and begin to think that after all they shall not carry the point. Cleon amuses them with lies, and exasperates them by slanders : In short, though quite undesigning it, he bullies himself into the command ; and, at the head of a reinforcement, joins Demosthenes at Pylus. The author describes the event with so much state and dignity, that he raises it into another Thermopylæ. There three hundred Spartans stopped for a long time the whole numerous army of Xerxes, and perished in the service. About the same number of them struggle *here* as long as they can against the troops of Athens ; but, to the disappointment of all Greece, they at last surrender prisoners of war, and are carried, nay are carried by Cleon, in triumph to Athens.

The territories of Corinth are invaded soon after by the

Athenians under Nicias, the consequence of which is the battle of Solygia. We are then recalled to view the last acts of the tragical sedition at Corcyra, quite of a piece with, or rather in cruelty and horror transcending the preceding.

In the eighth year of the war, the Athenians proceed with success. The conquest of the isle of Cythera by Nicias is another sad blow to the Lacedæmonians. They are quite dispirited; and dare no longer face in the field these active and lively, and now more so because successful, enemies.

Our author repasseth to Sicily. The Athenians had been hovering with a squadron on that coast, on pretence of aiding the Egéstéans, but in fact to excite a war and embroil the *States* of that island. Syracuse, the leading *State*, perceived all their schemes, and endeavoured to prevent them. They first obtain a suspension of arms amongst all the parties at war; and prevail on the Sicilians to hold a general congress at Gela, for the amicable adjustment of all their quarrels, and a perfect re-union against foreign enemies. Hermocrates, the plenipotentiary from Syracuse, opens the true interest of Sicily on this occasion. The warrior must now give place to the politician, who shews himself a master in the business.

“He is here (he tells them) as representative of the
“greatest of the Sicilian *States*. As such, he cannot speak
“from pusillanimity or a sense of fear, though he declares
“himself averse to war. It is difficult to enlighten ignorance, and difficult to check ambition. But there is a prudence, which all ought to learn; a prudence, which points
“out the proper season for every pursuit. It was separate
“interest, that first kindled the flames of war in Sicily; but
“separate interests should always be hushed, when the general welfare is at stake. The Athenians have been busy
“amongst them, to inflame their mutual resentments, to
“note their indiscretions, and turn them to their own ad-

“vantage; that, when the Sicilians have warred one another down, they may seize the whole island for themselves. The great passion of these Athenians is conquest; they regard no ties of consanguinity; they aim at acquiring vassals, no matter who. He blames them not; he can never blame men, who are desirous of command; but he must blame such as are ready and willing to put on their chains. The Athenians have no strength in Sicily, but in the division of its *States*. Let those *States* but once re-unite, and Athenians must get them gone; and may depart with a face of success, as if they had united whom they really wanted to disunite, and had effectually re-settled peace, when their latent design was war.”—He toucheth every topic in a succinct but masterly manner. He hath recourse often to *figures*; renders his addresses emphatical by making his own community speak from his mouth. He applies the *first person* and the *singular number* with great energy and weight. He useth those *figures* in the same manner as Saint Paul does in the *Epistle* to the *Romans*. He presseth harmony and cordial re-union amongst them in a manner best fitted to persuade. The whole speech, in a word, is a very interesting and persuasive piece of oratory.

The consequence is, a peace is settled in Sicily to general satisfaction; and the Athenian commanders are obliged to return to Athens with their squadron, to be punished there for what they could not possibly prevent.

The war continues hot through the remainder of this book. The Athenians take their turn in being checked and vanquished. Their attempt on Megara is related at large; and this piece of narration, is by far the most intricate of the kind to be met with in Thucydides. The matter is quite too much crowded, when he endeavours to comprehend in a few terms the various incidents of this struggle for Megara, the fluctuation of events, the views and motives of the parties engaged. Brasidas at last secures the city, and quite

disconcerts the main project of the Athenians.—The latter also had another great scheme in agitation for a total revolution in Bæotia. Arms and intrigues were at once to act, both without and within. The whole force of Athens takes the field on this occasion, under the command of Hippocrates. The famous battle of Delium ensues, before which the generals harangue their troops. Pagondas the Theban is an excellent speaker on this occasion. The Bæotians are not represented in this history, as that gross and stupid people, which was their character from the succeeding wits of Athens. The Athenian general begins also to harangue his troops, but is cut short by the attack of the enemy. The battle is finely described, and the dispute afterwards about the dead. The Athenians have received a dreadful blow, which will soon make them begin to accuse their own judgments, in refusing the accommodation lately offered from Sparta.

In other quarters also, the balance of war begins to incline in favour of the enemy. Brasidas, that active and accomplished Spartan, had now compleated a march, at the head of a small army, through Thessaly and Macedonia into Chalcidic Thrace. His bravery prevails much, but his conduct more. He disjoins Perdiccas king of Macedonia from the Athenian league. Whenever he fights, he conquers; and whenever he harangues, he effectually persuades. His speech to the Acanthians is strong, pertinent, laconic. He says all that can be said in favour of his countrymen, in recommendation of the cause of liberty. There is that air of sincerity and good-faith in it, which were constantly approved and verified by his personal deportment. The towns revolt to him as fast he hath opportunities to address them. The reader will follow him with pleasure through his many and great exploits, and acknowledge he wears his laurels deservedly, and with peculiar grace.

Book V. In Book the Fifth, Cleon appears again upon the stage, to stop the rapid conquests of Brasidas. The for-

mer had been laughed into a general, and is now grown so conceited that he wants to enter the lists against that truly heroic Spartan. He accordingly arrives in Thrace, at the head of a squadron and a fine body of land-forces. He retakes a town or two: is confident he shall soon recover the important city of Amphipolis; and, though contemned by his own soldiers, he endeavours to brave the enemy. Brasidas, having harangued his men with his usual spirit, throws open the gates, sallies out of Amphipolis, and routs him in an instant. Cleon falls a victim to his own cowardice, and Brasidas also drops a victim to his own valour. The latter lives long enough to know his own side had conquered, and then expires, admired by all that knew him, and most highly regretted by the allies of his country.

Their riddance from Cleon diminished the loss of Athens in this defeat, and the Lacedæmonians had dearly purchased the victory with the loss of their hero. As the principal *States* were now pretty nearly balanced, and sadly tired of the war, a truce is concluded for a year, and a peace soon after settled by the management chiefly of Nicias. Thucydides hath given us the forms of negotiating and drawing up *treaties*. They are curious morsels of antiquity, and the reader will see with admiration, how solemn, how concise, and yet how guarded they are. The peace turns out to be merely nominal. The Corinthians, who cannot relish it at all, set their invention to work in order to embroil Greece afresh, and to re-kindle a general war. Several wars break out, in which the Athenians and Lacedæmonians are concerned as auxiliaries. And another *State* in Greece, which hitherto had been neutral and saving its strength entire, endeavours now to seize the primacy of Greece for itself. We shall be made privy to all her negotiations for carrying on the plan, and see it all blasted by one battle at Mantinea. This *State* was the republic of Argos in Peloponnesus, which had been in long alliance with but in no dependence at all upon Athens, and had been for a long time also

at peace with Sparta, by means of truces for thirty years. Young Alcibiades doth all he can to promote the quarrel, till at length the troops of Sparta and Argos come to an engagement near the city of Mantinéa. Thucydides introduceth the battle with all the spirit and precision of Homer. The auxiliaries are marshalled, and animated by such exhortations, as are best suited to the peculiar circumstances of each. The Spartans are exhibited at last in all their glory. Trained up for a camp and the day of battle, we shall view them in their discipline and actual exertion of their personal bravery. They were excellent combatants indeed; and the reader will judge, whether Thucydides did not love good soldiers, and take a pleasure in doing them justice. It was the greatest battle, which for many years had been fought in Greece. The Spartans, on this occasion, wiped off all the imputations that had lately been thrown on their bravery, because they had not been always successful: And the aspiring *State* of Argos is compelled to acquiesce in her usual rank, and still leave the contention for supremacy to the leading *States* of Athens and Sparta.

This Book affords but one incident more, of consequence enough to be particularly distinguished; and that is the conquest of the isle of Melos by the Athenians, which fell out in the sixteenth year of the war. When the Athenians were landed and encamped on that island, they summon the Melians to a *conference*, of which Thucydides hath drawn out the particulars. It is really an uncommon one, and had sadly puzzled the critics, whether they should praise or condemn it. But, is there any thing more unnatural in reciting what was said at it, than in holding a *conference*? It is my business only to look at the management of it, and not draw a veil over the Athenian politics, as they are avowed on this occasion, since my author was too impartial to do it. Nothing could tempt him to make palliating representations, or to suppress the truth.

“The Athenians, on this occasion, avow without a blush

“that principle on which conquerors and tyrants have al-
 “ways acted, and yet have been ashamed to own: They are
 “ever hunting for colourings and pretexts, and would fain
 “give to greedy power a little of the air of equity: But here,
 “without the least shame or remorse, the Athenians assert
 “their right to enslave another community, because it suits
 “their own interest, and because they have power to do it.
 “This is the principle from which they argue; and, how
 “scandalous soever it be, they argue strongly from it. They
 “represent the politics of their own *State*, of the *Lacedæ-*
 “*monian State*, nay of all mankind, as incroaching, oppres-
 “sive, rapacious, and totally estranged from humanity, good-
 “faith, and the least tincture of morality. The whole con-
 “ference yields perhaps a just representation of human na-
 “ture in the gross; but then, the representation is distaste-
 “ful to a mind, that is cool and disengaged. Such a mind
 “must interest itself on the side of the Melians; and be
 “sorry, that the Athenians have not more equity and hon-
 “our to qualify their power; or, that the Melians, with the
 “regard they show to honour and justice, should not have
 “had more power, or been able to interest at least one ally
 “in defence of their liberties and rights. In short, through
 “the whole course of this History, the Athenians never
 “make so scandalous a figure as on this occasion.”

BOOK VI. In the Sixth Book, a spacious theatre is
 opened for a renewal of the war. The scene is going to
 shift from Greece to Sicily. The Athenians, who have so
 bravely resisted all their enemies in Greece, are now going
 to do for those enemies what they could not do themselves.
 No patriot, no statesman, no orator is able to dissuade them
 from lavishing their strength on the projects of sanguine am-
 bition and foreign conquests. Their enemies, in the mean
 time, are at leisure to note their indiscretions, and improve
 them all to their own advantage, till the great name of
 Athens is quite eclipsed, and an end is put to that empire of
 the sea, which she had maintained for seventy years with
 great lustre and reputation.

The Sicilian war, which some critics* are inclined to think hath no connection with the subject of Thucydides, and to be mere digression, whatever it may appear at first, the reader will at length be satisfied was an essential part of the Peloponnesian war, and hastened its decision. But, supposing it remote from the principal subject, it must however be acknowledged, that it is the history of a war nobly related, well connected, very closely followed, and full of incidents to engage attention, to alarm and interest the passions. Thucydides, in the course of it, which takes up the two following books, which display the excellencies of the *poet* and the *painter* as well as of the *historian*. Let his merit be regulated from this portion of his work, it is presumed that, without a negative, he will be allowed the *master* of History.

He begins with describing the theatre on which two mighty *States* are going to enter the lists.—The *geography* and *antiquities* of Sicily could not in their nature be very entertaining, and therefore they are drawn up in the concisest manner.—The soaring enterprising genius of Alcibiades hath formed a superb plan for the aggrandizement of himself and his country. Alcibiades could plan with all the magnificence and wild ambition of an Alexander; but a citizen of Athens could not have the means of executing in so imperial a manner as the Monarch of Macedonia and Captain-General of Greece. He was able soon to convince the younger and more numerous part of the Athenian community, that the enterprise was most inviting, and carried with it such a probability of success as over-balanced all expence and hazard. It was long the subject of general conversation; it gradually inflamed the public ardour; and at length ingrossed all their hopes and wishes. In a word, the expedition to Sicily is formally proposed and decreed in the assembly of the people. A second assembly is convened on *ways* and *means*. On this occasion a grand debate ensued, the managers of which are Nicias and Alcibiades.

* See Rapin's comparison of Thucydides and Livy.

Nicias declares himself “totally averse to the expedition, “but doth it with that diffidence, which was a principal foible in his character. The honour conferred upon himself, “in his nomination to the command, shall not suppress his “real sentiments. He is neither fond, nor prodigal of his “life: But he loves his country, and would advise them to “give up the expedition.—He next runs over the political “*topics*, and shews it to be in every light an undesirable and “ill-judged project. And then, without naming him, strikes “at Alcibiades; proves him not qualified in any respect for “so important a command; he reflects with some severity on “his life and behaviour; and, though owning himself afraid “he shall be out-voted, yet would fain have the question put “again, whether the expedition shall proceed?”

Beside all the natural vivacity and fire of his temper, Alcibiades was now provoked by the personalities that Nicias had thrown out against him. He had been a constant opposer of the latter, who was beloved at Athens for his amiable qualities. For, though Nicias had not spirit enough to lead the people, yet he had influence enough oftentimes to check and restrain the aspiring busy Alcibiades. The reply he makes on this occasion strongly marks the character and complexion of Alcibiades; and delivered with that life and grace, and pretty lisp for which he was remarkable, must have engaged all the attention of his hearers, and drawn their approbation perhaps in spite of their judgment.

“Censured and provoked by Nicias, he begins with a vindication of himself. He maintains his right to the command. He hints at the splendor of his birth, his public “spirit, the generosity of his heart. He recites with a haughty “and exulting air, his victories at the Olympic games, his “magnificence at home, and his capacity for political intrigue “already and successfully exerted. He then justifies the “wisdom of the decree for the Sicilian expedition. He shews “all the political *topics* in a different light from Nicias. He “insinuates the advice of the latter to proceed from indo-

“lence and a desire to sow dissensions amongst them. He
“exhorts to union, and to the observation of *order*. So
“Athens rose ; so Athens may yet be much higher exalted.
“The fire of youth, the temper of the middle-aged, and
“the experience of the old should ever duly accord and act
“together. Sloth ruins a community ; practice enables it
“to go through every conflict, and to triumph over all oppo-
“sition.”

Such an address could not but affect, such arguments could not but be persuasive with the people of Athens : The expedition must go forwards. But Nicias makes a second effort, if possible, to divert them from it.

He begins with “a prayer for its success ; and a desire, “that the preparations may be adequate to the ends proposed. He states the nature, the power, and strength of “the people they are going to invade. He then, in general terms, gives in a bulky roll of necessary articles for “those who invade them. He hopes to frighten and deter “his audience by the vast expence, which he shews must “necessarily be incurred on this occasion. The Athenians “must provide every thing themselves, and trust for nothing “to the care and fidelity of Sicilian allies. The public welfare, and the safety of all, who are to be employed in this “expedition, demand all manner of previous foresight and “care.”

This speech had a different effect to what Nicias designed. Instead of discouraging, it animated his countrymen more than ever for execution. Accordingly, a decree was soon passed, investing himself and his colleagues, who were Alcibiades and Lamachus, with full power to provide every thing needful for the service.

All hands now were soon at work. The quotas from the dependents were demanded ; the fleet was equipped and manned ; the levies went on briskly, since all men came into the service with alacrity ; and every thing was soon ready for the expedition.

At this juncture, some drunken frolics, in which Alcibiades was engaged, threw Athens into consternation. They were soon construed by his enemies into a plot to bring about a revolution in the government. Informers came in, and he was directly accused of being a party. He avowed his innocence, insisted on an immediate trial, which he was sure would end in his justification. The plot, which in fact was a plot against Alcibiades, was not yet ripe enough to ruin him; and therefore, by a strange preposterous stroke of cunning, he is ordered to proceed in the expedition, and take his trial at his return.

Our author next describes the departure of the grand armament in all its solemnity, and with all the medley of hopes and fears shown by the whole people of Athens on this occasion. He lays open to our view the very hearts of the spectators. The prime flower of their strength, nay Athens itself, is now sailing out of the Piræus, never again to return. They make the best of their way to Corcyra, where they are left for a time, that we may be made privy to the consultations and defensive measures of Sicily. The scene is now removed to Syracuse, the most powerful state in that island, inhabited by Grecians, and if indeed inferior, yet second at this time to no other State in Greece but Athens alone. It had frequently been harassed by seditions, had often been plagued with tyrants, but was at present under a *democratic* constitution.

Advice had been received there of the intended invasion. The *people* are convened about it. Harangues are made; and the temper of mankind, when party is fermenting, justly exemplified. Some are incredulous; others magisterially pronounce it all a falsehood. At length Hermocrates riseth up, and gives them his own sense of the affair.

He assures them "his country is eminently indangered, "and neither incredulity nor ridicule shall awe him into silence. To his certain knowledge, the Athenians are already "at sea, fully bent on the conquest of Sicily. The Syracusans

“ought to believe it, and to prepare for their defence. Fear
“will unite all Sicily against the invaders. Athens will only
“reap disgrace, but Syracuse abundant glory on this occasion.
“Large armaments are seldom successful; they moulder
“away for want of supplies, or are ruined for want of con-
“duct. They should therefore prepare for gallant resistance,
“by getting every thing in readiness at home, and strength-
“ening themselves by foreign alliances. They should do
“more; they should at once put out to sea, and dispute their
“very passage with the enemy. A defeat, or even delay
“thus given them, might oblige them to give up the pro-
“ject. He supports his advice by many strong and judi-
“cious arguments; and ends with warm exhortations to his
“countrymen to be lively and active, by no means to de-
“spise the enemy except in action, but vigorously and with
“all their foresight to prepare for resistance, since their ene-
“mies are undoubtedly at sea, and only not arrived on their
“coasts.”

Such advice was now given to the people of Syracuse by Hermocrates. That community, it is evident, was full of cabal and faction, since this worthy patriot was regarded as a party-tool and a public incendiary. Athenagoras, the blustering demagogue who replies, treats him in this light. His virulence shews, that he regarded Hermocrates, as one who wanted by any means whatever to force himself into employment. He seems more alarmed for the lucrative posts of the State than for the welfare of his country. He throws out a deal of good-sense, but in a very impertinent and scurrilous manner. Such are the persons, who study popularity more than duty, and sacrifice all their talents to ambition or private lucre.

He affirms, that “none but cowards and traitors wish
“the Athenians might not invade them, and so infallibly
“meet their destruction: But the whole account is a glaring
“falsehood, the forgery of a factious cabal. He appeals to
“his audience whether it carries the least probability with

“ it. Athenians invade them? The Athenians esteem themselves happy they are not invaded by the Syracusans. Yet, supposing them so mad, nothing but their own disgrace and ruin can be the consequence. But it is all a fiction; a scheme to dishearten the friends of the *people*, and seize the government of the State. Some men have ever been, and ever will be dabbling in such vile machinations. But let them not hope to escape detection. The intention is plain already, and ought to be punished like open treason. He then exhorts the *people* or the *many* to support their friends, and intirely to disarm the malice of their domestic foes; and inveighs severely against the *few*, or the party whom he supposeth to be bent on the overthrow of the *democracy* at Syracuse.”

The speech of Athenagoras was so full of ill-timed choler and party-animosity, that had the debate proceeded, dissensions might have run very high at a season when unanimity was so needful in all the members of that community. A General of great eminence and weight thinks it high time to interpose; who, in a short speech, reprimands Athenagoras, recalls the general attention to their own preservation from the imminent danger, and adjourns the assembly.

The grand fleet of Athens is now putting to sea from Corcyra. The Historian takes a review of the whole, and gives a short account of its numbers and strength. They arrive on the coast of Italy, where they are refused a reception. Every thing yields them a discouraging and gloomy aspect. They soon find, they had been grossly deluded by their Sicilian friends, who instigated them chiefly to the expedition. The trick, which the Egéstéans had put on their ambassadors, is particularly recited. The commanders, at a council of war, differ highly in opinion, and at last come to no sound resolution. They hover about the coast of Sicily, and parade in sight of Syracuse. Alcibiades endeavours to persuade the Catanans to join with and receive them, but a

mere accident accomplishes what his eloquence could not. The command of Alcibiades came here to an end. One of the State-vessels arrives, and summons him to Athens to take his trial for the late frolics and irregularities committed there. That city, ever since the departure of the fleet, had been filled with confusion and horror. A plot there was, or rather a plot it was determined there must be, to set up a *tyrant*, that most odious sound to Attic ears. Recollection of the dismal things they had heard about the tyranny of the Pisistratidæ increased their fears, and drove them into furious and desperate proceedings. Thucydides here digresseth to settle some facts relating to that set of tyrants, and their demolition; particularly the affair of Harmodius and Aristogiton, one of the most famous incidents in the annals of Athens. He differs indeed from most other writers, and the moderns have not thought proper to rest the point upon his authority, great as it is; or though no man ever traced out facts, or made his enquiries with more sedateness and impartiality.

But to return to Alcibiades: He was obliged to quit the command, and he seemed quietly to submit to the orders of the State. But, determined not to face his countrymen in their present mood, nor to hazard a trial, he gave them who were sent for him the slip, and sheltered himself in Peloponnesus. He became instantly a most violent and dangerous enemy to his country. He is gone to pave the way for the ruin of Athens; of Athens, which he loved better than any thing, except the parade of his own personal importance, and the gratification of his private caprice.

Nicias and Lamachus, who now remained in the command of the fleet, by help of a stratagem, land at Syracuse without opposition, and seize a strong post for their encampment. The Syracusans determine on a battle to dislodge them. Both sides form in order. Nicias encourages his men by a short, but spirited and forcible, harangue. Thucydides paints the battle with the exactness, perspicuity,

and ardor of Homer. The Athenians had the better ; yet not so decisively, as to think proper to continue in their post, since they re-embark, and sail back to Catana.

The winter, it is true, was approaching, which both sides spend in negociations for the acquisition of allies. That at Camarina, where ambassadors from both the warring parties are at the same time admitted to an audience, is particularly recited. Hermocrates, in behalf of Syracuse, makes the first address. “ It is masterly, like all that Hermocrates performs. It is designed to convince the Camarinéans, how “ insidious and how vile the schemes of the Athenians had “ ever been, and still continue to be. He arraigns all their “ politics and all their conduct since the Persian invasion ; “ and gives that artful turn to his remarks, which might “ well deter others from entering into any connexion or alliance with them. His strokes are severe and cutting. He “ makes use of the *figures*, which give force and energy to “ discourse. No person better understood the common welfare of Sicily ; and no person could better explain it. He “ unfolds the political scheme at present in agitation ; declares the consequence in case the Athenians prevail, to “ alarm the concern of the Camarinéans for their country, “ and further to alarm their fears for themselves. He even “ threatens them with a severe revenge, in case the Syracusans, without their aid, get the better of the invaders.” In short, if the Camarinéans had been good Sicilians, his arguments must have prevailed.

Euphemes, who is the mouth of the Athenian embassy on this occasion, makes a bold and spirited defence for his country. “ He at once briskly attacks Hermocrates for the “ bitter imputations he had cast upon Athens. He asserts “ her fair reputation, and justifies her series of politics ever “ since the invasion of Xerxes. Liberty had been the object of all her care and all her conduct. The Athenians “ had guarded, had established it in Greece ; and were “ come to support and secure it in Sicily. He throws back

“the charge of enslaving projects on the Syracusans, who
“now are eager to deprive the rest of Sicily of their best
“defence, by raising distaste towards the Athenians. He
“spares no artifice, omits no topic that is likely to affect.
“He proves a notable advocate for his Athens, pompously
“celebrates her passion and her care for liberty, and most
“ingeniously strives to conceal her present ambition under a
“veil of most generous and disinterested principles.”

The issue is, that the orators have just counterpoised one another's arguments, and the Camarinéans declare a neutrality.

The embassies from Syracuse succeed much better in Peloponnesus. The Corinthians are zealous and active in their behalf; and they have now got an advocate to rouse up and inflame the phlegmatic Spartans, who was born to be of every party, and to be the best support of whatever party he by times espoused. It is the exiled Alcibiades, who pleads most effectually in their behalf at a grand consultation at Sparta. His speech on this occasion is a masterpiece. “He insinuates himself into the favour and confidence of men who had feared and hated him. Whilst he is making his own personal justification, he praiseth and magnifieth himself. He betrays all the schemes of Athens, discloseth all her plan, points out her weak and unguarded parts, directs towards them the attack of her foes; and, full as he is of resentment against, and skilful to annoy her, she totters whilst he speaks.” Syracuse and Sparta are now to grow famous by the debasement of this mighty and imperial Republic. Her glory hath reached its summit: It immediately will begin to sink, and her laurels will fade away apace.

In the summer of the eighteenth year of this war, the Athenians stand away from Catana, and land by night at Syracuse. They instantly march, and seize Epipolæ, a strong post that commanded the city. The Syracusans fight, but without success, to beat them from it. The siege now com-

menceth in form. It is clearly represented in the whole of its progress, in all its forms. Every skirmish is a distinct and lively picture. In one of them old Lamachus is killed, and Nicias of course left singly in the whole command. He carries on the siege with vigor and success for a short space of time ; but Gylippus from Sparta, and the Peloponnesian aids are now only not arrived.

BOOK VII. "If you would read truly great things," said a Spartan to Augustus Cæsar, "read the Seventh Book of Thucydides." Thither we have now brought this cursory survey. The reader of it will undoubtedly own, that no Historian ever executed so closely, so strongly, so clearly, and so pathetically as Thucydides. "No fleet but that of the Athenians," it is the observation of Cicero*, "was ever able to enter the harbour of Syracuse. The fleet was only able to atchieve it by the mighty force and number of three hundred ships. But here first was the power of Athens defeated, lessened, depressed. In this harbour the fame, the empire, the glory of Athens are judged to have suffered a total wreck." Schemes projected and actions conducted by Hermocrates and Gylippus the Spartan prove too hard for Nicias, whose phlegm and natural diffidence are no match against such vigilance and activity. The besieging party soon becomes as it were the besieged. The *Letter* of Nicias to the people of Athens represents all the difficulties to which he finds himself reduced. No man ever wrote so precisely and perspicuously about military affairs. The reader of it wants no light, no dictionary of arts, or an adept in war to explain the terms ; and can judge, as could the meanest citizen of Athens to whom it was read, what was proper to be done. Secure in the consciousness of his own integrity, he neatly reprimands his countrymen for the great foible in their behaviour, justifies his own conduct, and begs to be recalled. In short, Nicias is finely characterized by his own pen in this epistle.

* Orat. quinta in Verrem.

The Athenians are too high-spirited to recal their troops, and have too good an opinion of Nicias to dismiss him from the command. Though Attica was now invaded by the Peloponnesians, and a fortress raised by them within sight of Athens itself for their lasting annoyance, they send a powerful reinforcement to Nicias under the command of Demosthenes. They empty Athens of the residue of her strength, so highly wanted for domestic support. The Syracusans, when advised of this reinforcement, redouble their alacrity, and hope to finish the war before it could arrive. They had had a career of success against Nicias, had just beat him both by land and sea, when Demosthenes steered into the harbour of Syracuse. The sight caused a strange alternative of elevating hope and dreadful apprehensions in the contending parties. The Syracusans again become the besieged; and Demosthenes is intent to put an end to the siege, if possible, by vigorous and daring measures.

His attempt to re-take Epipolæ is, in our author's description of it, as fine a night-piece as can possibly be drawn, and no pencil could express it stronger. The moon shines just bright enough to shew us the Athenians gaining the ascent, and to give a glimpse of the approaches of the armies and their first struggles with one another. The whole soon becomes gloomy confusion and horrid tumult. What a medley of singing their pæans, of conflict, of flight, of pursuit! friends and countrymen routing one another, till numbers come tumbling down the precipices, and perish in the fall! The hope of the Athenians is blasted: Syracuse erects her trophies fast.

Demosthenes is now convinced the most prudent step they could take is to raise the siege, and Nicias at last complies. The very moment they are going to embark their troops, the moon is eclipsed. Who but must pity the weakness of Nicias at so dangerous a crisis? who but be sorry indeed, that so good and amiable a man should stop an army from a principle of superstition, and detain them for so long

a time on a spot of ground, where nothing but ruin and destruction could befall them? Men so dispirited can make but faint opposition against an always high-spirited and now successful enemy. They soon lose another battle, and the decisive engagement is fast approaching.

But before it is fought, Thucydides, animated with more than historic spirit, emulates his admired Homer, reviews the parties concerned, and catalogues the troops now warring against and in defence of Syracuse. This catalogue is far from being a mere muster-roll of names. It is full of such strokes as must imprint many useful and moral reflections in the mind. His little incidental sketches represent mankind in a true light, as Homer's do the world of nature. Homer paints the soil, and Thucydides the people.

The mouth of the harbour is now barred up by the enemy. The Athenians must fight their way out; or, burn all their ships and march off by land. It is determined to attempt the former: and the consequence is the battle within the harbour of Syracuse. A more striking, more astonishing battle-piece was never exhibited; and a masterly pencil, though none but a masterly one, might exactly delineate it from this description. The present temper of the combatants on both sides is strongly marked in the *harangues* before the engagement. Nicias then said *all*, and the Athenians in action did their *best*; but all was unavailing. I shall say no more about it, since the reader hath nothing to do but to turn his eye towards it, and distinctly view it through the whole of its process, till the Syracusans sail in triumph to their city, and raise the most glorious of all their trophies.

The wretched perplexities of the Athenians, the raising of the siege, the mournful decampment, the good heart of Nicias sympathising in all their distress, and endeavouring to cheer a little their desponding minds, their laborious marches whilst the enemy is harassing them both in front and in rear and on all sides, the surrender of the column

under Demosthenes, the carnage in the river Asinarus of the troops under Nicias, his surrender too, the butchery of the generals, and the miseries of the captivated residue of once so flourishing and gallant an army.—These are the several incidents of this book, for which an attentive reader will give the highest commendation to the Historian, when he hath read them through: He will have no leisure until then to think of Thucydides.

BOOK VIII. The *catastrophe* hath now taken place in this history, and the reader is assured how all will end. The wings of this soaring republic of Athens are clipped, never to reach their full growth again: Yet, like an eagle in the same situation, she will struggle hard a long time (as it were) with beak and talons, and would yet repulse her assailants, did she not grow sick at heart. Intestine faction will assist her enemies to finish her ruin, as a State *imperial* and *commercial*. A regular deduction of such incidents as these is the subject of the Eighth and last book of Thucydides. As a writer he now performs in a more faint and less engaging manner, compared with what hath gone before. He hath but drawn his lines, but just sketched his pieces: But the drawings and sketches will still manifest the master's hand. We will give them a cursory view: The reader will give them a more exact and deliberate perusal.

He sets out in his usual grave and solemn manner, to describe the people of Athens, dispirited and distressed as they are by the overthrow in Sicily. All the passions and emotions of the human nature take their turn. They are incredulous; they are angry; they are convinced; and then, they despond; they pluck up their spirits again, and are resolved to stand it out, nor abandon their own preservation. They now cast their thoughts towards every resource, and prepare again for war with spirit and resolution. All the rest of Greece is ready to concur with the victorious party; all are eagerly running in to share the glory and the spoil. Their own dependents are meditating revolts, and some make them

at once without premeditation. The Lacedæmonians, amidst the many applications made to them, are puzzled which of the revolving States they shall first countenance and assist. Alcibiades is busy at Sparta, advising proper measures, and guiding their counsels. Even the Persian monarch, by his lieutenants, enters into league against them; and some of their finest islands are immediately rent asunder from subjection to the Athenians.

The various turns of war at Chios, and on the coast of Ionia, are distinctly but concisely related, until Alcibiades appears in action, and exerts his busy and intriguing genius. Suspected at length and hated by the Lacedæmonians, he became again their enemy, and turned all his projects on accomplishing his return to Athens, and saving his country from impending ruin. His partizans, in the fleet and troops of Athens now lying at Samos, cabal in his favour. A change of government is judged a necessary measure to bring about his recalment. It is the scheme of Alcibiades himself; but it is opposed, and disconcerted by Phrynichus; by Phrynichus, who soon after turns out a violent enemy to the *democracy*, whilst Alcibiadés is active and zealous in its support.

None but our author's pen could have so clearly unfolded that series of caballings, that fluctuation both in principle and conduct, and that horrid embroilment of the leading members of the Athenian State amongst themselves, which brought on seditions amongst the troops abroad, and a revolution of government in the city of Athens. The *democracy* is at length overturned: and an *oligarchy*, consisting of four hundred persons, erected in its stead. The Athenians at Samos, where the project was first laid, declare against the Athenians at Athens. Alcibiades is grown again a hearty republican; and Thrasybulus alone manifests throughout a sincere love and regard for his country. Parties newly formed are broke again into divisions; and Athens was indebted to nothing but the indolence of the Lacedæmonians, that she did

not fall immediately into their hands, through the violence of her own intestine seditions. But the new administration proved of short continuance; the *democracy*, though on a model somewhat varied, is again established; and Athens thus obtains a respite.

Full of matter as this part of the history is, Thucydides hath kept his narration clear and unembarrassed. But then, it is a simple, unadorned narration, and never received the finishing hand. There are scattered occasionally throughout it some short accounts, in what manner the principal agents delivered their sentiments at important junctures. They seem to have been memorials, laid down as the groundwork, for regular and full orations. The reader will be sorry the author was hindered, by what accidents can only be guessed, from drawing out some of them at least into full proportion; particularly *that* of the *deputation* from the army at Samos to Athens, in which “the people are persuaded to part with their darling *democracy*,” of Thrasybulus to the troops at Samos, when they mutiny in favour of the *democracy*, in which, “he must pathetically have expatiated on the revolt of Athens from liberty and her choicest patriots, who might now form another Athens at Samos, and preserve her empire, though they had lost the city;” *that* of Alcibiades further, when on his recalcement he harangues the army at Samos which recalled him, where “he deplores the malignity of his fate, magnifies his ability yet to serve his country, and again shines in the character of an able statesman, a subtle politician, and a zealous patriot.”

Upon the whole. One point more must be particularly distinguished in honour of the Athenians. The characters of them and of the Lacedæmonians are strongly contrasted through the whole course of this History, and highly to the credit of the former. Their spirits rise with difficulties, and patriotism starts out of mutiny and faction. The Lacedæmonians are indolent in success, and shew neither alacrity

nor address in promoting that cause of liberty, which was the grand pretext for engaging in this destructive war. They seem at last more intent on pocketing the *royal* subsidies, than doing their duty as leaders and champions of Greece. They have not yet learned to make a figure at sea. The last view we have of them is at the battle of Cynos-sema, where they receive a signal defeat from those very men, whose ruin they judged was well nigh compleated. When Athens is totally to be vanquished, as her doom is fast approaching, she must aid her own conquerors and tyrants, in demolishing her own trophies, and trampling under foot her liberties and rights. Her own factions will help to accomplish, what without them no foreign enemy could have done. Whatever is human must decay. The best-constituted State in the world may be undermined by its own members, when they could not be conquered, and at length be rendered an easy prey to foreign powers. May GREAT-BRITAIN prove an exception to this affecting but just observation !

THE
PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

BOOK I.

INTRODUCTION.

THUCYDIDES, an Athenian, hath compiled the history of the war between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians, as managed by each of the contending parties. He began to write upon its first breaking out, from an expectation that it would prove important, and the most deserving regard of any that had ever happened. He grounded his conjecture on the earnestness of both the flourishing parties to make all necessary preparations for it; and he saw that all the rest of Greece was engaged on one side or the other, some joining immediately, and others intending soon to do it; for this was the greatest commotion that ever happened amongst the Grecians, since in it some Barbarians, and it may be said the greatest part of mankind were concerned. The actions of an earlier date, and those still more ancient, cannot possibly, through length of time, be adequately known; yet, from all the lights which a search into the remotest times hath afforded me, I cannot think they were of any great importance, either in regard to the wars themselves, or any other considerations.

It is certain that the region now known by the name of Greece was not formerly possessed by any fixed inhabitants, but was subject to frequent transmigrations, as constantly every distinct people easily yielded up their seats to the violence of a larger supervening number. For, as to commerce there was none, and mutual fear prevented intercourse both

by sea and land, as then the only view of culture was to earn a penurious subsistence, and superfluous wealth was a thing unknown, as planting was not their employment, it being uncertain how soon an invader might come and dislodge them from their unfortified habitations, and as they thought they might every where find their daily necessary support, they hesitated but little about shifting their seats: And for this reason they never flourished in the greatness of their cities or any other circumstance of power. But the richest tracts of country ever were more particularly liable to this frequent change of inhabitants, such as that which is now called Thessaly, and Bœotia, and Peloponnesus mostly except Arcadia, and in general every the most fertile part of Greece. For the natural wealth of their soil increasing the power of some amongst them, that power raised civil dissensions, which ended in their ruin, and at the same time exposed them more to foreign attacks. It was only the barrenness of the soil that preserved Attica through the longest space of time quiet and undisturbed, in one uninterrupted series of possessors. One, and not the least convincing, proof of this is, that other parts of Greece, because of the fluctuating condition of the inhabitants, could by no means in their growth keep pace with Attica. The most powerful of those, who were driven from the other parts of Greece by war or sedition, betook themselves to the Athenians for secure refuge, and as they obtained the privileges of citizens*, have constantly, from remotest time, continued to enlarge that city with fresh accessions of inhabitants, in-

* They were admitted to the same privileges with free born Athenians. But this was practised only in the infancy and early growth of that state. It was afterwards an honour very seldom and with difficulty granted. Those who came from other places to settle at Athens are distinguished from *ωλῖται* citizens, by the name of *μετοῖκοι* sojourners, who had taken up their residence and cohabited with them. They performed several duties as subjects to the state which gave them protection, but never became Athenians, or citizens of Athens, in the emphatical sense of those terms. The English reader will please to remember this, as the distinction often occurs in the sequel of our history.

somuch that at last, Attica being insufficient to support the number, they sent over colonies into Ionia.

There is another, and to me a most convincing proof of the weakness of the ancients. Before the affairs of Troy, it doth not appear that Greece (or Hellas) was ever united in one common undertaking; nor had the whole country that *one* general appellation: nor indeed did the same subsist at all before the time of Hellen, the son of Deucalion; the several nations taking their distinguishing names from their own selves, and Pelasgicum being that of the greatest tract. But when Hellen and his sons had acquired power in Pthiotis, and led out their dependants by way of aid to other cities, conversation made the use of *this* name become much more frequent among the several people, though it was long before it so prevailed as to become the general appellation of them all. For this Homer is my principal authority, who, though born a long time after the Trojan war, hath no where mentioned them all in *this* general stile, but hath appropriated it to those who came with Achilles from Pthiotis, and were the first that bore *this* name of Grecians (or Hellenes). In his poems Danäans, and Argives and Achæans are their distinguishing titles. Nor hath he farther once mentioned the *Barbarians*, for this plain reason in my opinion, because *Grecians* were not yet distinguished by *this* one comprehensive name in contra-distinction to *that* other. These Grecians, therefore whatever, whether so apart in their different cities, or united by mutual converse, or at length comprehended in *one* general name, for want of strength and correspondence, never acted together in joint confederacy before the war of Troy: nor was it till the use of the sea had opened free communication amongst them that they engaged together in that expedition.

For Minos is the earliest person whom we know from tradition to have been master of a navy, and to have been chiefly lord of the sea which is called the Grecian. To him were the isles of the Cyclades subject; nay, most of them he

planted himself with colonies, having expelled the Carians, and substituted his own sons in their different commands. And then of course he exerted his utmost power to clear that sea of pirates, for the more secure conveyance of his own tributes.

The Grecians formerly, as well as those Barbarians who, though seated on the continent, lived upon the coast, and all the islanders, when once they had learned the method of passing to and fro in their vessels, soon took up the business of piracy under the command of persons of the greatest ability amongst them, for the sake of enriching such adventurers and subsisting their poor. They landed, and plundered by surprise unfortified places and scattered villages, and from hence they principally gained a subsistence. This was by no means at that time an employment of reproach, but rather an instrument of glory. Some people of the continent are even to this day a proof of *this*, who still attribute honour to such exploits if genteelly* performed: so also are the ancient poets, in whom those that sail along the coasts are every where equally accosted with this question, *Whether they are pirates?* as if neither they to whom the question was put would disown their employment, nor they who are desirous to be informed would reproach them with it. The people of the continent also exercised robberies upon one another, and to this very day many people of Greece are supported by the same practices; for instance, the Ozolian Locrians, and Ætolians, and Acarnanians, and their neighbours on the continent: and the custom of wearing their weapons, introduced by this old life of rapine, is still retained amongst them.

The custom of wearing weapons once prevailed all over Greece, as their houses had no manner of defence, as travelling was full of hazard, and their whole lives were passed

* "With due respect, with humanity," as the scholiast explains it. For then they never made booty of, or carried away by stealth the labouring cattle: They never made their attacks by night, nor committed any murder.

in armour, like Barbarians. A proof of this is the continuance still in some parts of Greece of those manners, which were once with uniformity general to all. The Athenians were the first who discontinued the custom of wearing their swords, and who passed from the dissolute life into more polite and elegant manners. And it is not a long time since those amongst the rich, who were advanced in years and studied their ease, left off wearing their linen garments and fastening the hair of their head behind with grasshoppers* of gold; though the aged amongst the Ionians have constantly persevered in the use of these ornaments as marks of their affinity. That modest uniformity of dress, which is still in vogue, was first introduced by the Lacedæmonians; amongst whom in other points also there was the greatest equality of dress and diet observed, both in the highest and the meanest ranks. They also were the first who performed their exercises naked, stripping themselves in public and anointing with oil before they entered the lists; though, before, the custom had prevailed at the Olympic games for the champions to wear scarfs about their loins; and it is only a few years since these were quite disused†. But even yet, amongst some Barbarians, more especially those of Asia, where the matches of boxing and wrestling are in repute, the combatants engage with scarfs round their loins. Many other arguments might with ease be alleged to prove that ancient Greece had forms and modes of living quite similar to those of the present Barbarian world.

As for cities, so many as are of a later foundation, and better placed for the increase of wealth, since the improvement of naval skill; all these have been built on the sea shore, and walled about, and are situated upon necks of land jutting out into the sea, for the sake of traffic and greater

* To intimate their being the original possessors and pure natives of the soil, as much as the very grasshoppers, which they supposed to be a natural and spontaneous production of the earth. They regarded themselves as cotemporary with the insects.

† See Mr. West's Dissertation on the Olympic Games, p. 50.

security from the insults of neighbouring people. But those of an earlier date, having been more subject to piratical depredations, are situated at a great distance from the sea, not only on islands but also upon the main. For even those who lived upon the coast, though inexpert at sea, were used to make excursions up into the country for the sake of plunder: And such inland settlements are discernible to this very day.

But the people of the islands, that is the Carians and the Phœnicians, were by much the most expert at these piratical adventures: For by them the greatest part of the isles was inhabited. *This* is proved from the expiation solemnized at Delos in the course of this war; on which occasion all the sepulchres of the dead in that island being broke open, more than half of the number appeared to be Carians, known to be such from the weapons found in their graves, and a particularity of interment* still used amongst them. It was not till after the equipment of fleets by Minos, that a communication was opened at sea. For by him the mischievous banditti was ejected from the islands, and many colonies of his own planted there in their stead. And from this period it was that the maritime people, grown more intent on the acquisition of wealth, became also more fond of settled habitations; And such of them as then surpassed in wealth strengthened their settlements by walling them about. And this their passion for gain continuing to increase, the poorer hired out their services to those who had affluence; and the great, who had all needful supplies at hand, reduced less powerful cities into their own subjection. And their power by these methods gradually advancing, they were enabled in process of time to undertake the Trojan expedition.

* The Carians first invented the boss of shields and the crest of helmets. In remembrance of this, a small shield and a crest were always buried with them. By this means were the Carians known. The Phœnicians were distinguished by the manner of their interment. For, whereas other nations laid the faces of their dead towards the east, the Phœnicians reversed the posture, and laid them to the west. *Scholiast.*

It is farther my opinion, that the assemblage of that armament by Agamemnon was not owing so much to the attendance of the suitors of Helen in pursuance of the oaths they had sworn to Tyndarus, as to his own superior power. It is related by those who received from their ancestors the most certain memorials of the Peloponnesian affairs, that Pelops, arriving there from Asia with abundance of wealth, soon gained so great an influence over those needy people, that, though a foreigner, he had the honour to have the country called after his own name; and that the power thus gained by him was successively enlarged by his posterity. Eurystheus indeed, whose mother was the sister of Atreus, perished in Attica by means of the Heraclidæ; and Eurystheus, when he departed on that expedition, left the government of Mycenæ and his kingdom, because of his affinity, in the care of Atreus, who then resided with him, having fled from his father upon the murder of Chrysippus. When therefore the return of Eurystheus was prevented by death, and the Myceneans from a dread of the Heraclidæ were well inclined to Atreus, as a person of great abilities and deep in the affections of the people, he easily obtained the kingdom of Mycenæ and all the territories which had belonged to Eurystheus; and from hence the family of Pelops quite overpowered the family of Perseus. To these enlargements of power Agamemnon succeeding, and being also superior to the rest of his countrymen in naval strength, he was enabled in my opinion to form that expedition more from awe than favour. It is plain that he equipped out the largest number of ships himself, besides those he lent to the Arcadians. Homer is my witness here, if his testimony have any force; who hath farther at the delivery of the sceptre, styled him,

“Of many isles, and of all Argos king.”

And a king who lived upon the continent could not possibly be lord of islands, except such as were adjacent, the number of which must needs be small, unless he had a competent

strength at sea : But, from this armament we have good light afforded to guess at the preceding.

What though Mycenæ was a small city, or though any place at that time remarkable appear at present inconsiderable to us ; yet, no one ought on these motives prematurely to imagine that armament to have been less considerable than it is described by the poets and reported by tradition. Supposing the city of Lacedæmon to be now in a ruined condition, nothing left but the temples and the pavements of the mass, I fancy, in process of time, posterity could not easily be induced to believe that their power had ever been proportioned to their glory. Of the five divisions* of Peloponnesus they are actually possessed of two, have the command of the whole, and of many confederate states *without* ; yet, as the city is neither closely built, as the temples and public edifices are by no means sumptuous, and the houses detached from one another after the old mode of Greece, it would suffer disparagement from such a view. If we farther suppose the Athenians in the same reverse of fortune, from the view the city then would afford, it might be guessed that once it had double the strength which it really hath. We ought not therefore to be incredulous, nor so much to regard the appearance of cities as their power ; and of course, to conclude the armament against Troy to have been greater than ever was known before, but inferior to those of our age. And whatever credit be given to the poetry of Homer in this respect, who no doubt as a poet hath set it off with all possible enlargement, yet even according to his account it appeareth inferior. For he hath made it to consist of twelve hundred ships ; those of the Bæotians carrying each one hundred and twenty men, those of Philoctetes fifty ; pointing out, as I imagine, the largest and the smallest rates ; for of the rate of other ships he hath not made the least mention in his *catalogue*, though he hath

* These were Laconia, Arcadia, Argolica, Messenia, and Elis. The Lacedæmonians were possessed of Laconia and Messenia. *Scholiast.*

expressly informed us, that every person of the crews belonging to the ships of Philoctetes were both mariners and soldiers, since he hath made all who plied at the oar to be expert at the bow. It is not probable that any ships carried supernumeraries, excepting kings or persons in command, especially as their point was a mere transportation with all the necessary habiliments of war, and as their ships were not decked, but built entirely in the fashion of the old piratical cruizers. If therefore a *mean* be taken between the largest and smallest rates, the number of the whole will turn out* of small account for quotas sent in general from the whole of Greece. The reason of this was not so much a scarcity of men as want of money. They adjusted the number of men to the slender store of provisions they already had, and the probability of procuring a competent subsistence in the course of the war. On their first landing they got the better in fight; the proof is, that they could not otherwise have fortified their camp with a wall. Neither doth it appear that they exerted all their strength at once, numbers being detached for supplies of provisions, to till the Chersonesus, and to forage at large. Thus divided as they were, the Trojans were better able to make a ten years resistance, being equal in force to those who were at any time left to carry on the siege. For had the stores of provision at the first landing been ample enough for the whole number of men they brought, and had they been able to prosecute the war free from the avocations of foraging and tillage, their superiority in the field must have given them an easy and expeditious conquest. But in fact they did not ply the work with all their number, but only with a part constantly reserved for the purpose: Had they formed the siege with their whole force, in less time and with less difficulty they must have taken Troy. Through want of money it was that expedi-

* Thucydides makes it of small account, in regard to the war which is his subject. But the number of men employed in the expedition against Troy was 102000. For the mean between 120 and 50 is 85, and $85 \times$ by 1200 = 102000.

tions *prior* to this, and even *this*, the most celebrated of all that ever happened, are plainly found to have been less in reality than they are in fame or current estimation at present through poetical assistance.

Nor did the prosperous event of the Trojan expedition put an end to the unsettled and fluctuating state of Greece, or secure that tranquillity so necessary to advancement. The return of the Grecians from Ilium, after so long an absence, gave rise to many innovations. Seditions were excited in almost every city; and those who were forced to withdraw, built cities for themselves in other places. The present Bœotians, for instance, being driven out of Arne by the Thessalians, sixty years after the taking of Troy, planted themselves in the country *now* called Bœotia, though *before* that time Cadmëis: But a body of them had already seated themselves there, of whom were those who went in the expedition against Troy: And eighty years after it, the Dorians with the Heraclidæ took possession of Peloponnesus. It was not without much ado and length of time, that Greece quiet and settled at home had opportunity to send colonies abroad. Then the Athenians planted Ionia and most of the islands; the Peloponnesians the greatest part of Italy and Sicily, and even some colonies in the different tracts of Greece. But all these transactions are of a later date than the Trojan war.

But when once the state of Greece was grown more robust, and increase of wealth became their study more than ever before, as the public revenues grew apace, in many places *tyrannies* started up: For before this kingdoms were hereditary and with limited authority. Now Greece throughout was employed in building navies, and became addicted to naval affairs with unusual application. The Corinthians are said to have been the first, who by varying the make of their ships, brought them to that model which is now in use, and Corinth to be the first place of Greece where *triremes**

* The triremes were the ships of war, of the galley kind, and take their name from the three banks of oars with which they were furnished. They

were built. It is a known fact, that Aminocles, a ship-carpenter from Corinth, built four ships for the Samians: Now, from the arrival of Aminocles at Samos to the conclusion of the *war* which is now my subject, there passed at most but three hundred years. The oldest sea-fight we know any thing of, was that of the Corinthians against the Corcyreans: But the distance between *that* and the same period is not more than two hundred and sixty. For the city of the Corinthians, being seated on the Isthmus, hath ever been a place of trade, as formerly the Grecians both within and without Peloponnesus, more accustomed to land than sea, could have no traffic with one another without passing through *their* territory. *They* were also remarkable for wealth, as clearly appeareth from the ancient poets, who have given that city the epithet of *rich*. And, when once navigation was practised in Greece, they lost no time in their own equipments; they cleared the sea of pirates; and, opening their town as a public mart, both by land and sea, made Corinth powerful by the increase of its revenue. The Ionians had no naval force till a long time after this, in the reign of Cyrus, first king of the Persians, and his son Cambyses: And, waging war with Cyrus, they were for a time masters of the sea which lieth upon their own coasts. Polycrates also, who was tyrant of Samos, in the reign of Cambyses, having a powerful navy, subdued many of the islands, and among the rest Rhenea, which as soon as conquered he consecrated to Delian Apollo. The Phocéans also, when planting their colony at Marseilles, had a successful engagement at sea against the Carthaginians.

These were the most remarkable equipments of a naval force; and these, though beyond contest many generations later than the war of Troy, had a very small number of tri-

were also masted and carried sails; but they generally lowered the sails when they came to action, and relied chiefly on their oars, that they might be more able to tack about, or to run down upon the enemy with more force and steadiness. See Petter's *Archæologia*, vol. ii. c. 14.

remes, but consisted chiefly of vessels of fifty oars and barges of the more ancient model. And it was but a little while before the Median war and the death of Darius who succeeded Cambyses in the kingdom of Persia, that the tyrants of Sicily and the Corcyræans became masters of any considerable number of triremes. For these last were the only instances of a naval strength in Greece, before the invasion of it by Xerxes, that deserve particular mention. The vessels of the Æginetæ, of the Athenians, and some others, were few in number, and most of them but of fifty oars. It was not till later times, when the Athenians had war with the Æginetæ and also expected the approach of Xerxes, that at the persuasion of Themistocles they built those *ships* with which they fought successfully against the *Barbarians*; and even these were not yet compleatly decked over.

Such therefore were the navies of Greece, both of an earlier and later date. And the *states* to which they belonged gained by them considerable strength, through an increase of their revenue and the enlargement of their dominions. Embarkations grown more frequent, especially to those who were pent up in a narrow soil, occasioned the reduction of the isles: but for a *land war*, and in consequence of *that*, an accession of power, *none* such was at that time known. All conflicts of that sort, which ever happened, were disputes of boundaries between contiguous states. The Grecians had not yet launched forth into distant expeditions, nor aimed ambitiously at foreign conquests. There were no dependent cities, which furnished quotas at the will of others who gave them law; nor did those who were upon equality concur in any joint undertaking; each petty *state* took up arms occasionally in its own defence against the incroachments of its neighbours. At most, the greatest division of Greece that ever happened was in the old rupture between the Chalcideans and Eretrians, when leagues were formed in favour of both.

By these means was the growth of many states prevented, and that of the Ionians by a different cause—the great and

surprising growth of the Persian power. For Cyrus, after he had compleated the conquest of Cræsus and all the country which lieth between the river Halys and the sea, invaded them and inslaved their towns upon the continent: And Darius afterwards, victorious by the strength of a Phœnician fleet, did the same by the islands.

As for those tyrants, who had any where usurped the government of Grecian cities,—their whole application being confined to their own private concerns, to the guard of their persons or aggrandizement of their families—they resided in their own cities so far as was consistent with their own security. Nothing worthy of remembrance was atchieved by them, unless we take into account the frequent broils between them and their neighbours: Not but that the tyrants of Sicily had advanced their power to a great height. But Greece in general was *thus* withheld for a long course of time from performing any remarkable exploit, by the strength of her united or the adventurous efforts of her separate *states*.

But after that the tyrants of Athens, and all the tyrants of other parts of Greece, generally and of old subject to these violent incroachments, notwithstanding their number and the fresh vigour of the last, were all (except those of Sicily) demolished by the Lacedæmonians:—For Lacedæmon, ever since it came into the hands of the Dorians, in whose possession it still continueth though harassed with seditions the longest of any place we know, yet hath ever been happy in a well-regulated government, and hath always been exempt from tyrants: For, reckoning to the conclusion of this present war, it is somewhat more than four hundred years that the Lacedæmonians have enjoyed the same polity: On this basis was their power at home founded, and this enabled them to exert it in regulating other *states*.—But, after that the tyrants were by them extirpated from Greece, not many years intervened before the battle of Marathon was fought by the Medes against the Athenians: And in the

tenth year after that, the *Barbarian* (Xerxes) again with a vast armament invaded Greece in order to inslave it. Hanging then on the very brink of ruin, the Lacedæmonians, on account of their pre-eminent power, took the command of all the Greeks combined together in their own defence ; whilst the Athenians, on the approach of the Medes, having already determined to abandon their city and laid in their necessary stores, went on board their ships, and made head against *him* by sea. Having thus by their common efforts repulsed the *Barbarian*, the Grecians, not only those who revolted from *the king*, but those also who had combined together against him, were soon after divided among themselves, siding either in the Athenian, or in the Lacedæmonian league : For the mastery appeared plainly to be in their hands, since *these* were the most powerful by land and *those* by sea. The agreement between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians was but of short continuance ; variance ensued ; and they entered the lists of war one against another, each with the additional strength of their own respective allies : And hence, if any other Grecians quarreled, they went over in parties to these as their *principals*. Insomuch that from the invasion of the Medes quite down to the breaking out of this war, one while striking up truces, another while at open war either with one another or the confederates revolting from either league, they had provided themselves with all military stores, and much improved their skill by constant practice exercised in dangers.

As for the Lacedæmonians, they gave law to their confederates without the heavy imposition of tributes. Their study was only to keep them well-affected to themselves, by introducing the *oligarchy* among them. But the Athenians lorded it over theirs, having got in course of time the ships of all those who might oppose them into their own hands excepting the Chians and the Lesbians, and imposed on them a certain payment of tribute. And their own particular preparations for the present war were more ample than

former times had known, even during the greatest vigour of their *state*, and the most perfect harmony between them and their allies.

Such are the discoveries I have made concerning the ancient state of Greece; which, though drawn from a regular series of proofs, will not easily be credited: For it is the custom of mankind, nay even where their own country is concerned, to acquiesce with ready credulity in the traditions of former ages, without subjecting them to the test of sedate examination. Thus, for instance, it is yet a received opinion amongst the bulk of the Athenian People, that Hipparchus was the tyrant, and therefore slain by Harmodius and Aristogiton; and they have not yet discovered, that Hippias then governed by virtue of his being the eldest of the sons of Pisistratus, and that Hipparchus and Thessalus were his brothers. Harmodius and Aristogiton, on the very day appointed, and just at the crisis, suspecting that information had been given to Hippias by some who were privy to the design, made no attempt upon *him* as put already on his guard. Yet willing, before they were apprehended, to shew their resolution and contempt of danger, they accidentally found Hipparchus at the Leocorium superintending the Panathenæal procession*, and immediately slew him. There are many other things of a more recent date, and of memory not yet invalidated by time, about which the other Grecians are very wrong in their notions; such as, that the Lacedæmonian kings had each of them a double and not a single vote in public questions; and, that amongst them the Pittanate was a military band, which *never yet existed*. So easy a task to numbers is the search of truth; so eager are they to catch at whatever lieth next at hand!

* This procession was made at the great Panathenæa, which festival was celebrated once in five years in commemoration of the union of all the people of Attica by Theseus. The lesser Panathenæa was celebrated every third year, some say every year, and was lengthened out by public games: These were also used at the great Panathenæa, in which the greatest splendour and magnificence were employed, and the procession added, here mentioned by Thucydides, and of which the curious reader may see a particular account in Potter's *Archæologia*, vol. i. p. 421.

But, from the testimonies alleged in support of what I have hitherto advanced, any one may depend on my account of things, without danger of false opinions. Let him withhold his credit from the songs of poets, whose profession it is to give all possible enlargements to their subjects: Let him do so farther, by the writers of prose*, who study more that artful composition which captivateth the ear than the plain and simple recital of truth, where proper attestations are never to be found, and many things through length of time have incredibly sallied out into mere fable: and then he will be convinced upon the plainest proofs, that the state of ancient Greece was very nearly the same as I have described it. And this present war, when considered in all its operations, notwithstanding the propensity of mankind to imagine that war in which they are personally engaged, to be the greatest that ever happened, and so soon as it is over to replace their admiration upon others more ancient, will easily be owned to have been the most important of all.

As to the *speeches* of particular persons either at the commencement or in the prosecution of the war, whether such as I heard myself or such as were repeated to me by others, I will not pretend to recite them in all their exactness. It hath been my method to consider principally what might be pertinently said upon every occasion to the points in debate, and to keep as near as possible to what would pass for genuine by universal consent. And as for the *actions* performed in the course of this war, I have not presumed to describe them from casual narratives or my own conjectures, but either from certainty, where I myself was a spectator, or from the most exact informations I have been able to collect from others. This indeed was a work of no little difficulty, because even such as were present at those actions disagreed in their accounts about them, according as affection to either side or memory prevailed.

My relation, because quite clear of *fable*, may prove less

* Thucydides is here supposed to glance at Herodotus; and again a little after he justly thinks, that *fiction* and *fable* ought to have no place in history.

delightful to the ears. But it will afford sufficient scope to those who love a sincere account of past transactions, of such as in the ordinary vicissitude of human affairs may fully occur, at least be resembled again. I give it to the public as an EVERLASTING POSSESSION, and not as a contentious instrument of temporary applause.

Of former transactions, the greatest was that against the Medes, which however, by two engagements at sea and as many at land, was brought to a speedy conclusion. But the continuance of this war ran out into a much greater length; and Greece in the course of it was plunged into such calamities as were never known before in an equal space. Never had so many cities been made desolate by victories, some by *Barbarians* and some by the violence of intestine feuds; to say nothing of those where captivity made room for new possessors: Never so many instances of banishment; never so many scenes of slaughter either in battles or seditions. Such calamities farther, as were known only by report, but had rarely been felt in fact, now gained credit from experience: Earthquakes, for instance, which affected the largest part of the habitable globe, and shook it with the utmost violence; Eclipses of the sun, which happened more frequently than former times had remembered; Great droughts in some places, the consequence of which was famine: And, what made not the least ravage, but did its share of destruction, the noisome pestilence. For all these things ensued in the sequel of this war, which was carried on between the Athenians and Peloponnesians, after breaking the thirty years truce concluded between them upon the reduction of Eubœa.

The reasons for which this truce was broke, and their *course* of variance, I have in the *first* place thought proper to write, that none may be at a loss about the origin of so momentous a war among the Grecians. The growth of the Athenian power I conceive to have been the truest occasion of it, though never openly avowed: The jealousy struck by

it into the Lacedæmonians made the contest necessary. But the pretences, publicly alleged on either side for breaking the truce and declaring open war, shall now be related.

EPIDAMNUS is a city on the right hand as you sail into the Ionian gulf: Adjoining to it live the Barbarian Taulantii, a people of Illyria. The Corcyræans settled a colony *here*, the leader of which was Phalius the son of Heratocles, a Corinthian by birth, of the lineage of Hercules, invited to the office out of the mother-city, according to the custom of ancient times: and besides this, some Corinthians and others of Doric descent joined themselves to this colony. In process of time, the city of the Epidamnians became great and populous. Yet, having been afterwards harassed with seditions of many years continuance, they were brought very low (according to report) by a war waged against them by the neighbouring Barbarians, and were deprived of the greatest share of their power. But the most recent event at Epidamnus before the present war was, that the *people* there had driven the *nobles* out of the city. These sheltering themselves amongst the Barbarians, began depredations on those who remained behind, both by land and sea. The Epidamnians of the place, suffering vastly from these depredations, dispatched ambassadors to Corcyra as their mother-city, beseeching them, "Not to behold their destruction with eyes unconcerned, but to reconcile their exiles to them, and to deliver them from this Barbarian war." The ambassadors, sitting down submissively in the temple of Juno, offered these supplications. But the Corcyræans, refusing to receive them, sent them home again without effect. The Epidamnians, thus convinced that no redress could be had from Corcyra, and ignorant how to proceed in their present perplexities, sent to Delphos to enquire of the God, "Whether they should surrender their city to the Corinthians as their founders, and should seek security from their protection?" He answered, that "they should surrender and take *them* for their leaders." The Epidamnians, in pursuance of this oracle, arriving at

Corinth, make there a tender of the colony, representing that "the leader of it had been at Corinth," and communicating the oracle; and farther intreated them "not to look on with eyes of unconcern till their destruction was completed, but to undertake their redress." The Corinthians granted them their protection from a regard to justice, imagining themselves to be no less interested in this colony than the Corcyréans. But they were also actuated by a hatred of the Corcyréans, from whom, though a colony of their own, they had received some contemptuous treatment: For they neither paid them the usual honour on their public solemnities, nor began with a Corinthian in the distribution of the sacrifices, which is always done by other colonies. This their contempt was founded as well on the sufficiency of their own wealth, in which at that time they equalled the richest of the Greeks, as on the superiority of their military force. Their insolence became greater, in time, with the enlargement of their navy, and they assumed glory to themselves in a naval character as succeeding the Phæacians in the possession of Corcyra. This was their chief incentive to furnish themselves with a naval strength, and in it they were by no means inconsiderable: For they were masters of an hundred and twenty triremes, when they began this war. Upon all these reasons the resentments of the Corinthians rising high against them, they undertook with pleasure the relief of Epidamnus; encouraging all who were so disposed, to go and settle *there*, and sending thither a garrison of Ambraciots and Leucanians and their own people. These marched by land to Apollonia, which is a colony of the Corinthians, from a dread of the Corcyréans, lest they should have hindered their passage had they attempted it by sea.

As soon as the Corcyréans heard that the new inhabitants and garrison were got to Epidamnus, and that the colony was delivered into the hands of the Corinthians, they grew hot with indignation: and putting out immediately with

twenty-five ships, which were soon followed by another equipment, they command them "at their peril to receive their exiles;"—"For those who had been driven out of Epidamnus had already been at Corcyra, where pointing to the sepulchres, and claiming the rights of consanguinity, they had intreated them to undertake their restoration:—"and to send away the garrison and new inhabitants which they had received from Corinth." The Epidamnians were quite deaf to these haughty commands. And upon this the Corcyréans, with a squadron of forty ships accompanied by the exiles whom they pretended to restore, and an aid of Illyrians, began hostilities. Having blocked up the city, they made proclamation, "That all Epidamnians who were willing and the strangers might depart without molestation, or otherwise they should be treated as enemies." But this having no effect, the Corcyréans beset the place, which is situated upon an isthmus, on all sides, in regular siege.

The Corinthians upon the arrival of messengers from Epidamnus with an account of the siege, draw their forces together. They also gave public notice, "That a new colony was going to Epidamnus, into which all that would enter should have equal and like privileges with their predecessors; that, if any one was unwilling to set out immediately, and yet chose to have the benefit of the colony, he might deposit fifty Corinthian drachmas, and be excused his personal attendance." The number of those who entered for immediate transportation, and of these who deposited their money, was large. They sent farther to the Megaréans, requesting a number of ships to enlarge their convoy, that their passage might not be obstructed by the Corcyréans, from whom they received a supply of eight, and four more from Pale of the Cephallenians. The same request was made to the Epidaurians, who sent five. A single ship joined them from Hermione; two from Træzene; ten from the Leucadians; and eight from the Ambraciots. Of the Thebans and Phliasians they requested money: of the

Eléans, empty ships and money. And the number of ships fitted out by themselves amounted to thirty and three thousand *heavy armed*.

When the Corcyréans were informed of these preparations, they went to Corinth, purposely accompanied by ambassadors from Lacedæmon and Sicyon. There they charged the Corinthians "to fetch away their garrison and new settlement from Epidamnus, as having no manner of pretensions *there*: That, if they had any thing to allege to the contrary, they were willing to submit to a fair trial in Peloponnesus before such *states* as both sides should approve; and to whichever party the colony should be adjudged, by them it should be held." They also intimated "their readiness to refer the point in dispute to the oracle at Delphos;—war, in their own inclinations, they were quite against: But if it must be so, on their sides (they said) mere necessity would prescribe the measure; and if thus compelled to do it, they should for assistance have recourse to friends, not eligible indeed, but better able to serve them than such as they already had." The Corinthians answered, that "if they would withdraw their fleet and their Barbarians from before Epidamnus, they would then treat of an accommodation: but, till this was done, their honour would not suffer them to submit to a reference, whilst their friends were undergoing the miseries of a siege." The Corcyréans replied, that "if *they* would recall their people from Epidamnus, themselves also would do the like; but were ready further to agree, that both parties should remain in their present situation, under a suspension of arms, till the affair could be judicially determined."

The Corinthians were not only deaf to every proposal, but so soon as ever they had manned their ships and their allies were come up, dispatching a herald before-hand to declare war against the Corcyréans, and then weighing anchor with a force of seventy-five ships and two thousand *heavy-armed*, they stretched away for Epidamnus to make head against the Corcyréans. The commanders of this fleet were Aris-

teus the son of Pellicas, Callicrates the son of Callias, and Timanor the son of Timanthes: Those of the land forces were Archetimus, the son of Eurytimus, and Isarchidas the son of Isarchus.

When they were come up as far as Actium, in the district of Anactorium, where standeth the temple of Apollo, in the mouth of the gulf of Ambracia, they were met by a herald, dispatched expressly in a row-boat by the Corcyréans, forbidding them "at their peril to proceed." But at the same time the Corcyréans were busied at home in manning their own ships, repairing such as were old, to make them fit for service, and equipping the rest with the utmost expedition. When the herald brought back nothing pacific from the Corinthians, and their squadron was now compleated to eighty ships (for they had forty employed in the siege of Epidamnus), they sailed in quest of the enemy, and drawing up against them, came to an engagement. The victory fell beyond dispute to the side of the Corcyréans, and fifteen ships of the Corinthians were utterly destroyed.

Their good fortune was such, that on the very same day Epidamnus was surrendered to the besiegers upon a capitulation, by which "all the strangers in the place were to be sold for slaves, but the Corinthians to be detained prisoners at discretion."

After the engagement at sea, the Corcyréans having erected a trophy* upon Leucimna, a promontory of Cor-

* This was constantly done by the Grecians upon a victory. Nay, when the victory was claimed on both sides, both sides erected trophies, of which several instances occur in Thucydides. The trophies for a victory at land were decked out with the arms they had taken: Those for a victory at sea, with arms also, and the shatters of the enemy's ships. "To demolish a trophy was looked on as unlawful, and a kind of sacrilege, because they were all consecrated to some deity: Nor was it less a crime to pay divine adoration before them, or to repair them when decayed, as may be likewise observed of the Roman triumphal arches: This being the means to revive the memory of forgotten quarrels, and engage posterity to revenge the disgrace of their ancestors: For the same reason, those Grecians, who first introduced the custom of erecting pillars for trophies, incurred a severe censure from the ages they lived in." *Potter's Archaeologia*, vol. ii. c. 12.

cyra, put to death all the prisoners they had taken, except the Corinthians, whom they kept in chains. And after this, as the Corinthians and allies having been vanquished in fight were forced to retire within their own harbours, they were quite masters of all the adjacent sea; and, sailing first to Leucas a colony of the Corinthians, they laid its territory waste; and then burnt Cyllene a dock of the Eléans, because they had supplied the Corinthians with ships and money. In this manner they continued masters of the sea a long time after their naval victory, and in their cruises very much annoyed the allies of the Corinthians. It was not till the beginning of the summer, that a check was given them by a fleet and land army, who were commissioned, in order to relieve their harrassed allies, to station themselves at Actium and round the Chimerium of Thesprotis. There they lay, to cover Leucas and other places which were in friendship with them from the ravage of the enemy. The Corcyréans, upon this, with a naval and land-force stationed themselves over-against them at Leucimna. But, neither party venturing out to attack the other, they lay quiet in their opposite stations the whole summer; and on the approach of winter, both sides withdrew to their respective homes.

During the remainder of the year, after the engagement at sea, and all the following, the Corinthians, whose indignation was raised in this their war against the Corcyréans, were building new ships, and sparing neither labour nor cost to get a strong armament ready for sea, and sent throughout Peloponnesus and the other parts of Greece to hire mariners into their service. The Corcyréans, hearing of these great preparations, were terribly alarmed, and with reason: For at that time they were in no alliance with any of the Grecians, nor comprehended either in the Athenian or Lacedæmonian league. And hence they thought it quite expedient to go and sue for the alliance of the Athenians, and endeavour to obtain some succour from them. The Corinthians gaining intelligence of their design, dispatched an

embassy at the same time also to Athens, *instructed* by any means to prevent the junction of the Athenian to the naval strength of the Corcyreans, which might hinder them from bringing this war to a successful issue. The Athenians being met in general assembly*, both embassies rose up to plead their own cause; and the Corcyrean spoke as followeth:

* The *ἐκκλησία* or assembly of the people. In this the sovereignty was vested; and it is proper the *English* reader should grow acquainted with this particular form in the Athenian democracy.

The people of Athens were divided into ten tribes, which presided by rotation. The year was divided into ten courses, and each tribe presided about five weeks. The tribe in course elected fifty persons to manage by their authority and in their name: These were called *Prytanes*. This being too large a number for business, they were subdivided into tens, each of these divisions presiding for a week: and these were called *Proedri*. One of the *Proedri* presided or was in the chair for a day, and was stiled *Epistates*. For that day, and he never enjoyed this pre-eminence a second time in his life, he was invested with the highest trust in the government. He kept the public seal and the keys of the citadel and treasury. In the assembly of the people he ordered all the proclamations, regulated proceedings, put the question, and declared the majority.

The assemblies of the people were of two kinds, *ordinary* and *extraordinary*. Of the first kind, four were regularly held during each presidency of the tribes, and at the third of them ambassadors from foreign states had public audience. The latter were occasionally convened by the *presidents* in course, or by the *generals* of the state. Some days before-hand, notice was publicly given by the senate or council of five hundred upon what subjects they were to deliberate; but this could not be observed upon sudden emergencies.

They met early in the morning, generally in the Pnyx, at the summons of the public *crier*. At the second summons they were obliged to attend at their peril. For then the proper officers ran along the forum with a rope stretched across, and rubbed over with vermillion, and all upon whom a mark was found were fined; but those who attended early and regularly, received half a drachma each for attendance. The number which attended generally amounted to five or six thousand.

The assembly opened with the sacrifice of a young pig to Ceres, and the blood was sprinkled round by way of purification. Then a prayer was pronounced aloud by the *crier* for the prosperity of the commonwealth of Athens; which ended, a curse was next pronounced on every citizen who did any thing to the prejudice of his country. Then the presidents of the week opened the points upon which they were convened, and the assembly proceeded to business.

“ IT is quite proper, Athenians, that those who address themselves to a neighbouring power imploring their succour, which is now our case, without being able to plead the merit of prior good-services or an old alliance in their own behalf, should previously convince them, *chiefly*, that a compliance with such requests must turn to their advantage ; at *least*, that it will cause no manner of inconvenience ; and *then*, that the favour will be returned with effectual gratitude. If they are unable to give satisfactory conviction in any of these particulars, they can have no reason to be angry if their suit be rejected. The Corcyreans, confident that they can clear up these points beyond the reach of scruple, have sent us hither to request your alliance.

“ The method, indeed, which hitherto we have fondly observed, hath proved in fact absurd towards you in this our exigency, and prejudicial to our own affairs in our present situation. In preceding times, we never chose to grant our alliance to any, yet now are we come to sue for alliance from others, being through our own maxims quite destitute of friends in this our war against the Corinthians : and *that* which before appeared the conduct of refined prudence, to keep clear of danger by shunning the intanglements of a foreign alliance, we now find by the event to have been both impolitic and weak.

“ Once already we have engaged the Corinthians at sea, and repulsed them merely by our own strength. But, since with a greater force collected from Peloponnesus and the rest of Greece they are again preparing to attack us ; since we perceive ourselves unable to resist them merely with our own domestic strength ; since further with our subjection the danger will spread abroad ; we are necessitated to apply to you and every where else for succour ; and though now emboldened to act in opposition to our former inactive maxims, yet we deserve your pardon, as they were not the result of bad designs, but of mistaken judgments : and could we but obtain redress from you, this incidental necessity of

“ours will turn out highly to your honour upon several
“accounts.

“In the first place, you will favour those with your assist-
“ance who have felt but never committed injustice. In the
“next place, by protecting those whose lives and liberties are
“at stake, you will confer so vast an obligation that the memo-
“ry of it can never be abolished. We are now masters of
“the greatest naval force except your own. Consider there-
“fore how fair an occasion, very seldom to be met with, of
“the greatest advantage to yourselves, of the greatest vexation
“to your enemies, now lieth before you; when that very
“power, the accession of which you would readily have pur-
“chased with ample sums of money and a weight of obliga-
“tion, cometh here to invite your acceptance and make a ten-
“der of itself without any danger or expence to you; nay,
“what is more, enabling you to gain the praise of the world,
“the grateful acknowledgments of those you defend, and an
“increase of power to yourselves. Few people, in pre-
“ceding ages, have ever had at any one time so many fine op-
“portunities within their reach. And few there are, who,
“suing for alliance, do it not rather from a view of receiving
“than conferring security and reputation by their suit.

“If there be any one amongst you, who imagineth *that* war
“will never happen in which we may do you service, in such
“imagination he is quite mistaken. He doth not penetrate
“the designs of the Lacedæmonians, who, alarmed at your
“power, are intent on war; nor those of the Corinthians,
“who, powerful of themselves, and your enemies, have begun
“with us to open the way for attacking you; that, united by
“common resentments, we might not stand up in our mutual
“defence against their violence: nor they be disappointed at
“least in one of their views, either effectually to humble us,
“or securely to establish their own power. It is your in-
“terest to prevent them, by accepting that alliance which we
“offer, and rather to anticipate their designs than counter-
“plot them when ripening into act.

“ If, farther, they tax with a breach of justice your presuming to interfere with their colonies ; let them learn, that every colony, whilst used in the proper manner, payeth honour and regard to its mother-state, but, when treated with injury and violence, is become an alien. They are not sent out to be the slaves, but to be the equals of those who remain behind. *Their* violence and injustice require no proofs. For, invited by us to submit the business of Epidamnus to a judicial trial, they chose rather to prosecute their claims at war than at equity. And let such behaviour towards *us*, their relations, put *you* timely on your guard, that you may not be over-reached by their collusions, nor hesitate one moment to grant our petitions. For he who findeth the least room to repent of having gratified his enemies, is most likely to persevere in uninterrupted security.

“ You will not break your treaty with the Lacedæmonians by our admission, who are allied to *neither* of you. By that treaty it is expressly stipulated, that—“ If any of the *states* of Greece be not at present in alliance with either of the contracting parties, permission is given them to go into either league, at their own discretion.”—And terrible indeed it is, if they must be at liberty to man their fleets out of places in their alliance, nay more than that out of Greece at large, and to no small amount, even out of your dependents : and we must be debarred not only your most inviting alliance, but every possible expedient of succour : then, after all they must raise a cry of injustice, if we offer our requests to you and have them granted. But much greater reasons of complaint will lie with us, if we cannot prevail upon you. For then you will throw at a distance those who are beset with dangers and never were your enemies ; you will not only not restrain the incroachments of enemies and invaders, but will behold them through your negligence assuming strength out of your dominions, which you ought never to endure. You ought either to hinder them from seducing your subjects into their pay, or send an immediate succour

“to us, in what manner you may be persuaded is the most
“expedient: but the course you ought principally to take
“is, to form with us a defensive alliance, and to act imme-
“diately.

“The advantage of such a measure, as we premised at
“first, we are clearly proving. But that which carrieth the
“greatest weight is this, that our enemies are enemies also
“to you (a point too clear to require proof), and enemies
“by no means despicable, but able to make revolvers feel
“their vengeance. The bad consequences of rejecting a
“*land* cannot be equal to those of rejecting a *naval* alliance,
“especially to you, who should exert your utmost efforts to
“let none be masters of a fleet beside yourselves; or, if that
“be not feasible, to make the most powerful in that respect
“your fast allies. And whosoever, allowing the plain ad-
“vantage of these our arguments, may yet dread a rupture
“if their influence prevail,—let such a one know, that
“the event he feareth, accompanied by strength, will strike
“greater dread into all your enemies, but that the zeal of
“him who would have us now rejected, since it is founded
“on a weak presumption of their strength, must the sooner
“encourage those enemies to attack you. The present con-
“sultation is not confined to Corcyra, but very nearly con-
“cerneth Athens also:—Let him therefore be assured,
“that he doth not provide the best for the welfare of Athens,
“when, directly foreseeing a war fast approaching and only
“not on foot, he hesitateth the least about gaining a people
“provided with all the necessary means of being a most ser-
“viceable friend or a most prejudicial foe;—a people op-
“portunely situated in the course to Italy and Sicily, so ca-
“pable to hinder the accession of any naval force from
“thence to the Peloponnesians, and to secure a passage from
“hence to any of those coasts, not to mention the commodi-
“ousness of it in many other respects.

“To reduce the whole to one short point, wherein all and
“every individual of you is concerned, learn from *hence* that

“ we are not to be abandoned : There are but three naval
“ powers amongst the Grecians of any consideration, your
“ own, our own, and that of the Corinthians. If you indolently suffer two of these to be incorporated, by leaving us
“ a prey to the Corinthians, you must for the future make
“ head against the Corcyréans and Peloponnesians both :
“ But, if you grant your alliance to us, the contest will lie
“ against them alone, and your own naval strength be considerably augmented.”

In this manner the Corcyréans spoke ; and when they had concluded, the Corinthians took their turn as followeth——

“ SINCE these Corcyréans have not confined their discourse merely to solicit the favour of your alliance, but
“ have enlarged it with invectives against our injustice in
“ making war upon them, we also lie under a necessity to
“ make some previous observations on both of those points,
“ before we proceed to other matters. By this means you
“ will perceive your own great security in complying with
“ our demands, and what weighty reasons you have to reject
“ their importunate solicitations.

“ They allege it as a maxim of prudence that they have
“ been hitherto averse to any foreign alliance : But their
“ motives in this were founded upon malice, and not upon
“ virtue. They would have no ally to be a witness of the
“ wrongs they do ; they declined the society of such as
“ might put them to the blush. Their very island farther,
“ which is finely situated for such arbitrary tempers, suffereth them alone to judge those outrages they themselves
“ commit: exempting them from fair and equitable trials,
“ because they seldom go abroad to visit their neighbours,
“ as their harbours are the constant and necessary resort of
“ others. Here then lieth the modesty of their unassociating
“ maxim : It was designed to prevent their having any partners in violence, that they might have it all to themselves ;
“ that, when they were superior, they might oppress without

“ controul, when there were none to watch them they might
“ engross the spoil, and might enjoy their rapine without
“ danger of a blush. Had they been those virtuous souls they
“ proclaim themselves, then, clear of every bad imputation
“ from their neighbours, they had a fine opportunity to
“ manifest their integrity to the world, by doing and by sub-
“ mitting to justice.

“ But *such* neither we nor any other people have in fact
“ experienced them. For, though planted by us, they have
“ ever disowned their allegiance to us, and now wage open
“ war against us, pleading that they were not sent abroad to
“ be maltreated and oppressed. We also aver in our own
“ behalf, that neither did we send them to receive their in-
“ jurious requitals, but to retain them in lawful dependence,
“ and to be honoured and revered by them. Such duti-
“ ful returns the rest of our colonies punctually make us, and
“ by such no other people are so well respected as ourselves.
“ From the great satisfaction therefore we give to all the
“ rest, it plainly appeareth, that we afford no reasonable dis-
“ gust to these alone, and that without some glaring injury,
“ we should have had no inclination to declare war against
“ them. But, though we had actually transgressed, it would
“ have been quite decent on their part to have shewn con-
“ descension when we were angry; and then it would have
“ been base in us to have pressed too far on such moderation.
“ To their pride and the insolence of wealth their many
“ transgressions against us are justly to be ascribed. Hence
“ it was, that they laid no claim to Epidamnus, which be-
“ longeth to us, whilst harrassed with intestine feuds; but when
“ we came to its redress, then by force they seize and detain
“ it. And now they pretend that previous to that they were
“ willing to have submitted to a fair arbitration.—Such pleas
“ are not to be regarded, when offered by men who are
“ already masters in possession, and on that security make ap-
“ peal to justice: They are only of weight, when facts and
“ words are equitably to be judged, before the point hath

“been decided by arms. And it was not before they had
“besieged that city, but when they thought that we were in-
“tent on saving it, that they had recourse to the specious
“pretence of a fair arbitration. And *here* they are at pre-
“sent, by no means content with the wrongs they have *there*
“committed, presuming to ask conjunction from you, not
“in league but in violence, and on the merit of being rebels
“against us to beg your protection. Then was the proper
“time for such an address to you, when their affairs securely
“flourished ; not now when we have been outraged by them,
“and they are beset with dangers ; not when you, who have
“shared no benefit from their former power, are to relieve
“their distress, and by no means their accomplices in crimes,
“are to come in for an equality of censure from us. A
“prior conjunction of force justly entitleth to a share of what
“may be the event: But those who had no participation in
“the guilt ought to be exempted from the consequences of
“it.—And thus we have clearly shewn, that we have ad-
“dressed ourselves before you with all the requisites of a
“rightful cause, and that their proceedings are violent and
“rapacious.

“It is now incumbent upon us to convince you, that you
“cannot with justice receive them into alliance. For, grant-
“ing it to be expressly stipulated in the treaty, that *any of*
“*the states not particularly mentioned may go into either*
“*league at their own discretion*, yet the intent of the stipu-
“lation reacheth not to those who join one party to the pre-
“judice of another, but to such as having withdrawn from
“neither side are in need of protection—to such as bring not
“war instead of peace to *those* who receive them,—if *they*
“know their interest. And yet the latter must be your por-
“tion, if our arguments lose their influence: For you will
“not only become auxiliaries to *them*, but enemies also to
“*us* who are your allies by treaty. Of necessity, if you join
“with them, our vengeance must be levelled at them without
“separating you. Right above all things it would be for you
“to keep yourselves at a distance from us both ;—if that will

“ not please, to reverse your proceedings, and join with us in
“ opposition to them—For, to the Corinthians you are bound
“ by firm and lasting treaties, with the Corcyræans you have
“ never yet transacted even for a truce, and by no means to
“ establish a new law for receiving revoltors from the other
“ league. We ourselves did not, upon the Samian revolt,
“ give our suffrage against you, when the rest of the Pelo-
“ ponnesians were divided upon the question—whether they
“ ought to be supported: But we openly maintained, that
“ every *state* had a right to proceed against its own depend-
“ ents. For if you receive and undertake the defence of
“ those who have behaved amiss, the event will shew that
“ the greater number will come over to our side, and that
“ you establish a law prejudicial to yourselves much more
“ than to us.

“ The points of justice we have thus sufficiently cleared
“ up to you, according to the general laws of Greece. We
“ have only to add a word of advice and the claim of a fa-
“ vour, such a one as we now affirm upon a principle of grati-
“ tude ought not to be denied us who are neither your ene-
“ mies so far as to hurt you, nor ever were your friends so
“ far as to burden you. When formerly, before the invasion
“ of the Medes, you were in want of long ships in your war
“ against the Æginetæ, you were supplied by the Corinthians
“ with twenty. The service which we then did you, and
“ that other more recent about the Samians, when we pre-
“ vented their receiving any support from the Peloponnesi-
“ ans, enabled you in their turns to vanish the Æginetæ and
“ to chastise the Samians. And these services were done you
“ at a season when the human attention, fixed intirely on war,
“ regardeth nothing but what tendeth to victory. Whoever
“ forwardeth this, men esteem their friend, though he was be-
“ fore their foe; and him who checketh it their foe, though
“ perhaps he may be their real friend. For even domestic
“ affairs are sorrily conducted at a time when the mind is in-
“ flamed by contention.

“ Recollect these things. Let the young man learn the

“ truth of them from his elders, and acknowledge that we
“ ought to be properly requited. Let him not entertain the
“ thought, that what we say is agreeable to equity, but that in
“ case of a war interest inclineth another way : For interest is
“ most surely to be found there where the least injustice is
“ committed. The contingency of that war, from the dread
“ of which the Corcyréans encourage you to act unjustly, lieth
“ yet in obscurity, and ought not to inflame you into open and
“ immediate hostilities against the Corinthians. It would be
“ prudent, farther, to lessen that jealousy we have already con-
“ ceived from the proceedings at Megara. For a latter obli-
“ gation, by the favour of time, though of less weight in itself,
“ is able to cancel a charge of greater moment. Neither suf-
“ fer yourselves to be allured with the promise of a powerful
“ conjunction of naval force : For never to act unjustly against
“ equals is a firmer security of power than to be elevated upon
“ present plausibilities, and enlarge it through a series of dan-
“ gers. Our present circumstances resemble those concerning
“ which we expressly declared at Lacedæmon, that every *state*
“ had a right to proceed against its own dependents : And now
“ we beg that liberty from you ; and that you, who have reaped
“ the benefit of such a suffrage from us, would not prejudice us
“ by yours. Render us for it the just requital ; remembering
“ that this is the critical season, in which he who aideth is the
“ best of friends, and he that opposeth the greatest foe. And,
“ as for these Corcyréans, take them not into your alliance in
“ despite of us, nor abet them in the injuries they have done
“ us. By acting in this manner you will discharge the obli-
“ gations incumbent upon you, and will take those measures
“ which are most for your own advantage.”

This is the substance of what was said by the Corinthians.

The Athenians having heard both parties*, met twice in full *assembly* on this occasion. At the first meeting they thought

* Here the English reader should be informed in what manner business went on when difficulties, diversities of opinion, and consequently debates ensued.

there was validity in the arguments of the Corinthians ; but, at the second, they came to a different resolution—not indeed to form such an alliance with the Corcyréans as to have the same enemies and the same friends (for then, if the Corcyréans should summon them to join in an expedition against Corinth, their treaty with the Peloponnesians would be broke); but an alliance merely defensive, for the reciprocal succour of one another, if either Corcyra or Athens or any of their respective allies should be assaulted. A war with the Peloponnesians seemed to them unavoidable ; and they had no mind to leave Corcyra, which had so great a naval force, for a prey to the Corinthians ; but, to break them to the utmost of their power against one another, that upon occasion they might be the better able to war with the Corinthians, thus weakened to their hands, though joined by other *states* of Greece which had power at sea. At the same time that island appeared to them most conveniently situated in the passage to Italy and Sicily. Upon these motives the Athenians received the Corcyréans into their alliance: And, not long after the departure of the Corinthians, sent ten ships to their aid under the command of Lacedæmonius.

When it appeared that the point proposed would not pass unanimously, the crier, at the command of the president in the chair, proclaimed aloud, “ What citizen above fifty years of age hath a mind to speak ? ” When such had been heard, the crier made a second proclamation, that “ any Athenian “ whatever had liberty to speak.” The debate being ended, the president in the chair bade the crier put the question. It was decided by holding up of hands. The chairman distinguished the numbers in the affirmative and negative, and declared the majority. Then the resolution or decree was drawn up in form : and the Archon’s name who gave title to the year, the day of the month, and the name of the presiding tribe were prefixed.

The public decorum of the Athenians is worthy observation. The sentiments of age and experience were first to be heard, and then the spirit and resolution of the younger were called in to assist at the public consultation. Nay, they carried it farther ; no person convicted of profaneness, debauchery, cowardice, or public misdemeanor, was suffered to speak in this assembly. From them they expected no sound instruction, no disinterested advice. If any such offered to speak, the *presidents* of the assembly immediately enjoined them silence ; or, if they were refractory, ordered their officers to pull them down and turn them out of the assembly.

the son of Cimon, Diotimus the son of Strombichus, and Proteas the son of Epicles. Their orders were "by no means to engage the Corinthians, unless they stood against and endeavoured to make a descent at Corcyra, or any of its dependent places; if they did so, to resist them with all their efforts." These orders were given with a view of not infringing the treaty: And this their aid of shipping arriveth at Corcyra.

The Corinthians, when they had compleated their preparations, set sail for Corcyra with a fleet of one hundred and fifty ships. Of these, ten belonged to the Eléans, twelve to the Megaréans, ten to the Leucadians, twenty-seven to the Ambraciots, one to the Anactorians, and the other ninety were their own. The quotas from the allied cities had each of them their respective commanders; but the Corinthian squadron was commanded by Xenocles, the son of Euthycles, with four colleagues. So soon as they were all assembled at that part of the continent which looks towards Corcyra, they set sail from Leucas, and arrive at the Chimerium in Thesprotis. A harbour openeth itself here, and above it is the city of Ephyre, at a distance from the sea, in Eleatis, a district of Thesprotis: Near it is the outlet into the sea of the lake of Acherusia, into which the river Acheron, having run through Thesprotis, is at last received; from which it also deriveth its name. The river Thyamis also runneth here, dividing Thesprotis from Cestrine, and between these two rivers ariseth the cape of Chimerium. The Corinthians therefore arrive at this part of the continent, and fix their station there. But the Corcyréans, so soon as ever advised of their sailing, having manned a hundred and ten ships under the command of Miciades, Æsimides, and Eurybatus, took their station at one of those isles which are called *the sybota*, accompanied by the ten Athenian ships. Their land force was left at the promontory of Leucimna, with an aid of a thousand heavy-armed Zacynthians. The Corinthians had also ready upon the continent a numerous aid.

of Barbarians: For the people on that coast have ever continued their friends. When every thing was in order among the Corinthians, taking in provisions for three days, they weigh by night from Chimerium with a design to fight; and having sailed along till break of day, they discover the ships of the Corcyréans already out at sea, and advancing against them. When thus they had got a view of each other, both sides form into the order of battle. In the right wing of the Corcyréans were the Athenian ships; the rest of the fleet was all their own, ranged into three squadrons, each of which were respectively under the orders of the three commanders: In this manner was the order of the Corcyréans formed. In the right of the Corinthians were the ships of the Megaréans and Ambraciots; in the centre the other allies in their several arrangements: The Corinthians formed the left wing themselves, as their ships were the best sailers, to oppose the Athenians and the right of the Corcyréans. When* the signal-flags were hoisted on both sides, they ran together and began the engagement; both sides having stowed their decks with bodies of heavy-armed, with many further that drew the bow or tossed the javelin. Their preparations still retained something of the awkward manner of antiquity. The engagement was sharp^y carried on, yet

* To give the *English* reader, once for all, a *plain* light into their method of beginning an engagement, I shall quote the following paragraph from archbishop *Potter's Archaeologia*, vol. ii. c. 21.

"Before they joined battle, both parties invoked the Gods to their assistance by prayers and sacrifices; and the admirals going from ship to ship in some of the lighter vessels, exhorted their soldiers in a set oration to behave themselves like men: Then all things being in readiness, the signal was given by hanging out of the admiral's galley a gilded shield, as we read in *Plutarch*, or a red garment or banner, which was termed ἀίρεν σημεῖα. During the elevation of this the fight continued, and by its depression or inclination towards the right or left, the rest of the ships were directed in what manner to attack their enemies, or retreat from them. To this was added the sound of trumpets, which was begun in the admiral's galley, and continued round the whole navy; it was likewise usual for the soldiers, before the fight, to sing a *pæan* or hymn to *Mars*, and, after the fight, another to *Apollo*."

without exertions of skill, and very much resembling a battle upon land. When they had laid one another close, they were not easily separated again, because of the number and hurry of the vessels. The greatest hope of victory was placed in the heavy-armed fighting on the decks, who, fixed to their post, engaged hand to hand, whilst their ships continued without any motion. They had no opportunity to make their charges and tacks, but fought it out by dint of strength and courage without any dexterity. The tumult was great on all sides, and the whole action full of disorder: In which the Athenian ships relieved the Corcyrean wherever they were pressed too hard, and did what they could to intimidate the enemy; but their commanders refrained from any direct attack, remembering with awe the orders of *the Athenians*. The right wing of the Corinthians suffered the most: For the Corcyreans, with twenty ships, having put them to flight, chased them, when dispersed, to the continent; and continuing the pursuit to their very camp, land immediately, where they set fire to their abandoned tents, and carried off all the baggage: In this part, therefore, the Corinthians and their allies were vanquished, and the Corcyreans plainly superior. But in the left, where the Corinthians personally engaged, they easily prevailed, as twenty ships of the Corcyreans, and those too from a number at first inferior, were gone off in the pursuit. But the Athenians, seeing the Corcyreans thus distressed, now came up to their support more openly than before, having hitherto refrained from any direct attack. And when the chace was clearly begun, and the Corinthians followed their success, then every one amongst them applied himself to action. There was no longer any time for discretion: Corinthians and Athenians were forced by absolute necessity to engage one another.

The chace being thus begun, the Corinthians towed not after them the hulks of the vessels they had sunk, but turned all their attention to the men *who were floating about*, and cruize at large more to slaughter than take alive. And,

having not yet discovered the defeat of their *right*, they slaughtered through ignorance their own friends. For the number of ships being large on either side, and covering a wide extent of sea, after the first confusion of the engagement they were not able easily to distinguish which were the victors or which the vanquished: Since Grecians against Grecians had never at any time before engaged at sea with so large a number of vessels. But after the Corinthians had pursued the Corcyréans to land, they returned to look after their shattered vessels and their own dead. And most of these they took up and carried to Sybota, where also lay the land force of their Barbarian auxiliaries: *This Sybota is a desert haven in Thesprotis.* Having performed this duty, they gathered together again into a body and went in quest of the Corcyréans, who, with those damaged vessels that yet could swim, and with all that had no damage, together with the Athenians, came out to meet them, fearing lest they might attempt to land upon their shore. It was now late in the day, and they had sung their *pæan* as going to attack, when on a sudden the Corinthians slackened* their course, having descried a reinforcement of twenty sail coming up from Athens. This second squadron the Athenians had sent away to support the former ten, fearing (what really happened) lest the Corcyréans might be vanquished, and their own ten ships be too few for their support. The Corinthians, therefore, having got a view of them, and suspecting they came from Athens, and in a larger number than they yet discovered, began gradually to fall away. They were not yet descried by the Corcyréans (for the course kept them more out of their ken) who were surprized to see the Corinthians thus slacken their course, till some, who had gained a view, informed them that such ships are coming

* The original is *πρὸ μῆναν ἐκτρέποντο*, they knocked the hind-deck, a phrase elegantly applied by Thucydides to those that retreat fighting, and still facing their enemies. It was done by running their ships backwards upon their hind decks in order to tack about. See *Potter's Archaeologia*, vol. ii. c. 20.

up, and then they also fell back themselves: For now it began to be dark, and the Corinthians being turned about, had dissolved their order. In this manner were they separated from one another: And the naval engagement ended with the night.

The Corcyréans having recovered their station at Leucymna, those twenty ships from Athens, under the command of Glauco the son of Leager, and Andocides the son of Leogoras, having passed through floating carcasses and wrecks, came up to the station not long after they had been descried. Yet the Corcyréans (for now it was night) were in great consternation lest they should be enemies: But they were soon known, and then came to anchor.

Next morning the thirty Athenian ships, accompanied by such of the Corcyréans as were fit for sea, weighed away and made over for the haven at Sybota where the Corinthians lay, designing to try whether or no they would engage again. The Corinthians, putting their ships from off the shore, and drawing up into order in the deeper water, remained there without advancing. They had no design or inclination to begin another engagement, as they were sensible of the junction of the fresh Athenian ships, and of the numerous difficulties with which they were beset, about the custody of the prisoners whom they had on board, and the want of necessary materials to repair their ships upon this desert coast. Their thoughts were more employed upon their return home, and the method to accomplish it, from the apprehension lest the Athenians, judging the league to be broke as they had come to blows, might obstruct their passage. For this reason they determined beforehand to dispatch a boat with proper persons, though without the solemn protection of a herald, and so to sound their intentions. The message to be delivered was this:

“YOU are guilty of injustice, ye men of Athens, in beginning war and violating treaties: For you hinder us from taking due vengeance upon our enemies, by lifting up your arms against us. If you are certainly determined

“to hinder our course, either against Corcyra, or any other place whither we are willing to go, and so violate treaties, take us first who are here in your power, and treat us as enemies.”

The persons sent thus delivered their message: and the whole company of the Corcyréans who heard it, shouted out immediately to “apprehend and put them to death.” But the Athenians returned this answer:

“We neither begin war, ye men of Peloponnesus, nor violate treaties. We are come hither auxiliaries to these Corcyréans our allies. If therefore you are desirous to sail to any other place, we hinder you not. But, if you go against Corcyra, or any other place belonging to it, we shall endeavour to oppose you to the utmost of our power.”

UPON receiving this answer from the Athenians, the Corinthians prepared for their return home, and erected a trophy at Sybota on the continent. But the Corcyréans were employed in picking up the wrecks and bodies of the dead, driving towards them by favour of the tide and the wind, which, blowing fresh the night before, had scattered them all about; and, as if they too had the victory, erected an opposite trophy at Sybota in the island. The reasons upon which each side thus claimed the victory were these—The Corinthians erected a trophy, because they had the better of the engagement till night, and so were enabled to pick up most of the shatters and the dead; they had, further, taken a number of prisoners, not less than a thousand, and had disabled about seventy ships of the enemy.—The Corcyréans did the same; because they also had disabled about thirty; and, upon the coming up of the Athenians, had recovered all the wreck and dead bodies driving towards them; and because the Corinthians, tacking about, had retired from them the night before, so soon as they descried the Athenian ships; and when they came to offer them battle at Sybota, durst not come out against them. In this manner did both sides account themselves victorious.

The Corinthians, in their passage homewards, by stratagem seized Anactorium, which lieth in the mouth of the gulf of Ambracia. It belonged in common to the Corcyréans and themselves. They put it entirely into the hands of the Corinthian inhabitants, and then retired to their own home. Eight hundred of their Corcyréan prisoners, who were slaves, they sold at public sale. Two hundred and fifty they reserved in safe custody, and treated them with extraordinary good usage, that after their ransom they might serve them in their design of gaining Corcyra: For the majority of them were persons of the greatest authority in that *state*. Thus, therefore, is Corcyra preserved in the war of the Corinthians; and the ships of the Athenians after such service left them. But *this* was the *first* ground of war to the Corinthians against the Athenians, because they had assisted the Corcyréans in a naval engagement against themselves, who were in treaty with them.

IMMEDIATELY after this transaction, other misunderstandings also happened between the Athenians and Peloponnesians, tending to a war. For, all the schemes of the Corinthians aiming at revenge, the Athenians jealous of their enmity sent an order to the inhabitants of Potidæa situated upon the isthmus of Pallene, (and though a Corinthian colony, yet allied with and tributary to them) “to demolish that part of the wall which faceth the Pallene, to give them hostages, to send away the *epidemiurgi*, and not to receive *those* magistrates for the future, who were annually sent them from Corinth.” They were apprehensive of a revolt at the instigation of Perdiccas and the Corinthians, and their seducing into the same defection the other dependents of Athens in Thrace. These steps the Athenians thought proper to take with the people of Potidæa, immediately after the sea-fight of Corcyra. For the Corinthians were manifestly at variance with them, and Perdiccas the son of Alexander king of the Macedonians was now become their enemy, who before had been their ally

and friend. His enmity was occasioned by an alliance the Athenians had formed with his brother Philip and Derdas, who were jointly in opposition against him. Alarmed at this, he sent proper persons to Lacedæmon to stir up against them a Peloponnesian war, and to draw over the Corinthians into his interest, in order to bring about the revolt of Potidæa. He had also been tampering with the Chalcideans of Thrace and the Bottiæans to persuade them to revolt at the same time ; concluding, that if he could bring about a junction of the adjacent people, he might venture a war against them with greater probability of success. The Athenians perceived his scheme, and were desirous to prevent the revolt of the cities. They had begun an expedition against his territories with a fleet of thirty ships and a thousand heavy-armed, under the command of Achestratus the son of Lycomedes associated with ten others in this service. They gave particular orders to the commanders to take hostages from the Potidæans and to demolish their walls, and to keep a watchful eye over the neighbouring cities that they might not revolt. The Potidæans had already sent ambassadors to the Athenians, to dissuade them if possible from the execution of any new designs against them : And had at the same time dispatched an embassy to Lacedæmon along with the Corinthians, instructed to procure a promise of redress if there should be occasion. But, when their long negotiation at Athens proved quite ineffectual, and the fleet was gone out to sea both against Macedonia and themselves ; when, farther, the regency at Lacedæmon had given a promise to make an irruption into Attica, if the Athenians should attempt any thing against Potidæa ; upon this encouragement, without loss of time, they revolt in conjunction with the Chalcideans and Bottiæans, all combined by an oath of mutual defence and support. Perdiccas, farther, prevaieth with the Chalcideans to abandon and demolish all their towns upon the sea-coast, and then to remove to Olynthus and fortify that town by a

junction of all their strength. And, to these people, thus abandoning their own homes, he made a cession of that part of Mygdonia which lieth round the lake of Bolbe, for their subsistence during the war with the Athenians. Having thus demolished their own cities, they went to another place of residence, and were employed in preparations for the war.

The thirty ships of the Athenians, arriving on the coasts of Thrace, find Potidea and the other cities already revolted. The commanders, judging it impossible with their present strength to act against Perdiccas and the revolted cities both, turn their course towards Macedonia, pursuing the first design of the expedition. Landing there they joined in the war with Philip and the brothers of Derdas, who with an army had made an irruption from the inland country.

In the mean time, Potidæa being now in revolt and the Athenian fleet on the Macedonian coasts, the Corinthians, anxious for the security of that place, and making the danger their own, dispatched thither some volunteers of their own people and other Peloponnesians taken into their pay, in all sixteen hundred heavy-armed* and four hundred light-armed. The command of this body of men was given to Aristeus the son of Adimantus; since, out of their own private affection to him who had ever been a steady friend to Potidæa, most of the volunteers from Corinth had undertaken the service: and the time of their arrival in Thrace was the fortieth day after the revolt of Potidæa.

An express soon arrived at Athens with the news of the revolt of the cities, and when afterwards they heard of the

* The *heavy-armed* wore a complete suit of armour, and engaged with broad shields and long spears. They were the flower and strength of the Grecian armies, and had the highest rank of military honour. The *light-armed* were designed for skirmishes and fighting at a distance. Their weapons were arrows, darts, or slings. The *targeteers*, mentioned often in this history, were a middle sort of soldiery, armed with targets or narrow shields and spears, neither large nor heavy.

arrival of that body under Aristeus, they send away two thousand of their heavy-armed and forty ships, under the command of Callias the son of Calliades and four colleagues, to reduce the revolted. These, arriving first of all in Macedonia, find the former thousand employed in besieging Pydne, having a little before got possession of Therme. They sat down with them for a time to carry on the siege of Pydne; but afterwards, making with Perdiccas a composition and alliance the best they could in their present exigency, since Potidæa and the arrival of Aristeus were very urgent points, they evacuate Macedonia. They marched next to Beræa; and turning from thence, after having first made an unsuccessful attempt upon the place, they marched by land towards Potidæa. Their army consisted of three thousand heavy-armed of their own, without including a large body of auxiliaries, and six hundred Macedonian horse who had served with Philip and Pausanias: Seventy ships at the same time sailed along the coast. And thus, by moderate marches, they came up in three days to Gignonus, and there encamped.

The Potideans with the body of Peloponnesians commanded by Aristeus, expecting the Athenians, had formed a camp near Olynthus *within* the isthmus, and had a market kept for them without the city. The command of the infantry had been given to Aristeus by the voice of the confederates, and that of the cavalry to Perdiccas: For now again he had abruptly broke with the Athenians and joined the Potidæans, deputing Iolaus to command in his absence. It was the design of Aristeus, by encamping the body under his own command *within* the isthmus, to observe the motions of the Athenians if they advanced, whilst *without* the isthmus the Chalcideans and allies and two hundred horse belonging to Perdiccas should continue at Olynthus, who, when the Athenians came forwards against them, were to throw themselves in their rear, and thus shut up the enemy between the two bodies. But Callias, the general of the

Athenians, in concert with his colleagues, detaches the Macedonian horse, and a few of their allies to Olynthus to prevent any sally from thence ; and then, breaking up their camp, they marched directly for Potidæa. But, when they were advanced as far as the isthmus, and saw their enemies drawn up in order to fight, they also formed ; and in a little time they came to an action. The wing under Aristeus, Corinthians, and the very flower of their strength, who engaged with him, soon compelled their enemies to turn their backs, and pursued execution to a great distance : but the rest of the army, composed of Potidæans and Peloponnesians, were defeated by the Athenians, and chased to the very walls of Potidæa. Aristeus, returning from his pursuit, perceived the rout of the rest of the army, and knew not whither with the least hazard to retreat, whether to Olynthus or Potidæa. But at last, he determined to embody together those he had about him, and, as Potidæa lay at the smallest distance, to throw himself into it with all possible speed. This with difficulty he effected, by plunging into the water near the abutments of the pier amidst a shower of missive weapons, with the loss indeed of some of his men, but the safety of the larger number.

Those who should have come to succour the Potidæans from Olynthus, which is at no greater distance than sixty stadia*, and situated in view, at the beginning of the battle, when the colours were elevated†, advanced indeed a little way as designing to do it, and the Macedonian horse drew up against them as designing to stop them. But, as the victory was quickly gained by the Athenians, and the colours

* About six miles.

† The elevation of the colours or ensigns was the signal of joining battle, and they were kept up during the whole continuance of it : The depression of them was a signal to desist, or the consequence of a defeat. The depression of the colours in this instance, was a proof to the Macedonian cavalry, that all was over. The Athenians in their colours bore an owl, as sacred to Minerva the tutelary goddess of Athens. See *Potter's Archaeologia Græcæ*, vol. ii. c. 9.

were dropped, they retired again within the walls, and the Macedonians marched away to the Athenians: so that the cavalry of neither side had any share in the action. After the battle the Athenians erected a trophy, and granted a suspension of arms to the Potidæans for fetching off their dead. There were killed of the Potidæans and allies very near three hundred, and of the Athenians one hundred and fifty, with Callias their general.

The Athenians, without loss of time, throwing up a work against the wall which faceth the isthmus, blockaded the place on that side, but the wall towards the Pallene they left as they found it. For they thought their number was by no means sufficient to keep the guard within the isthmus, and to pass over to the Pallene side, and block it up also there. They were apprehensive, that thus divided the Potidæans and their allies might fall upon them. And the Athenians at home, hearing there was no work on the Pallene side, send thither a thousand and six hundred heavy-armed of their own people, under the command of Phormio the son of Asopius, who arriving upon the Pallene, and having landed his men at Aphytis, marched forwards to Potidæa, advancing slowly and laying waste the country as he moved along. And, as nobody ventured out to give him opposition, he also threw up a work against that side of the wall which faceth the Pallene. By these methods was Potidæa closely blocked up on either side, and also by the ships which lay before it at sea.

The blockade being thus perfected, Aristeus, destitute of any means of saving the place, unless some relief should arrive from Peloponnesus, or some miracle should happen, proposed it as his advice that "all excepting five hundred men should lay hold of the first favourable wind to quit the place, that the provisions might for a longer time support the rest;" declaring "his own readiness to be one of those who stayed behind." Though he could not prevail with them, yet willing in this plunge to do what could be done, and to manage affairs abroad in the best manner he was able, he made

his escape by sea undiscovered by the Athenian guard. Continuing now amongst the Chalcideans, he made what military efforts he could, and killed many of the inhabitants of Sermyle by an ambuscade he formed before that city; and endeavoured to prevail with the Peloponnesians to send up a timely relief. Phormio, also, after compleating the works round Potidæa, with his sixteen hundred men ravaged Chalcidica and Bottiæa: And some fortresses he took by storm.

THESE were the reciprocal causes of dissension between the Athenians and Peloponnesians. The Corinthians were enraged at the blockade of Potidæa, a colony of their own, in which were shut up both Corinthians and other Peloponnesians. The Athenians resented the proceedings of the Peloponnesians in seducing to a revolt a city in alliance with and tributary to them, and siding openly by a voluntary expedition with the warring rebels of Potidæa. Yet a war open and avowed had not yet broke out between them: Hostilities were suspended for a time. Hitherto it was merely a private quarrel of the Corinthians.

But, when once the blockade of Potidæa was formed, the Corinthians could hold no longer. In *it* their own people were shut up, and they were at the same time in anxiety about the place. They summoned their allies to repair immediately to Lacedæmon, and thither they went themselves with loud accusations against the Athenians, that "they had violated the treaty, and injured Peloponnesus." The Æginetæ indeed, from a dread of the Athenians, did not openly dispatch their embassy; but underhand they had a great share in fomenting the war, asserting that "they were restrained in the privilege of governing themselves, which had been allowed them by the treaty."

The Lacedæmonians, summoning to appear before them not barely their allies, but whoever had any manner of charge to prefer against the Athenians, assembled in grand council as usual, and commanded them to speak: Others who were present laid open their respective complaints, but the Mega-

réans preferred the largest accusations, in particular that “they had been prohibited the use of all the harbours in the Athenian dominions and the market of Athens, contrary to the treaty.” The Corinthians were the last who stood forth. Having first allowed sufficient time to others to exasperate the Lacedæmonians, they preferred their own charge, as followeth—

“THAT faith, ye Lacedæmonians, which ever both in public conduct and in private life you so punctually observe, rendereth what others, what we ourselves may have to say, more difficult to be believed. By it you have gained indeed the reputation of probity, but contract a prejudicial ignorance in regard to remote occurrences. For, though we have frequently suggested to you, what wrongs we were apprehensive of receiving from the Athenians, yet have you not deigned to make enquiry into the grounds of those suggestions, but rather have suspected our ingenuity as speaking from selfish views and private resentments. And it is not to prevent our sufferings, but now, when we already feel their weight, that you convene these confederates together: Before whom, we ought to be indulged in a larger share of discourse, as we have by much the largest share of complaints to utter: wronged as we have been by the Athenians, and by you neglected.

“If indeed by treachery lurking and unobserved they had violated the peace of Greece, those who had not discerned it might justly have demanded explicit proofs. But now, what need can there be of multiplying words, when some you already see enslaved; against others, and those not the meanest of your allies, the same fate intended; and the aggressors fully prepared to receive you, if at length a war should be declared? With other views, they had not clandestinely laid hands on Corcyra, and forcibly detained it from us, nor had they dared to block up Potidæa: of which places this latter lieth the most convenient for extending our power in Thrace, the former could supply Pe-

“loponnesus with the greatest navy. But to your account
“these events are to be charged, who, after the invasion of
“the Medes, first suffered the strength of Athens to be en-
“creased, and afterwards their *long-walls* to be erected.
“Ever since, you have connived at liberty overthrown, not
“only in whatever communities they have proceeded to en-
“slave, but *now*, where even your own confederates are con-
“cerned. For, not to the men who rivet on the chains of
“slavery, but to such as, though able, yet neglect to prevent
“it, ought the sad event with truth to be imputed ; especially,
“when assuming superior virtue they boast themselves the
“deliverers of Greece.

“With much ado we are now met together in council,
“but not even now upon the plain and obvious points. We
“ought not to be any longer debating *whether* we have been
“injured, but by what measures we should avenge ourselves.
“The aggressors, having long since planned out their pro-
“ceedings, are not about to make but are actually making
“attacks upon those, who are yet come to no resolution.
“Nor are we unexperienced by what steps, what gradual
“advances, the Athenians break in upon their neighbours.
“Imagining themselves to be still undiscovered, they shew
“themselves the less audacious because you are insensible.
“But when once they know you alarmed and on your guard,
“they will press more resolutely forwards. For you, Lace-
“dæmonians, are the only people of Greece, who sit indo-
“lently at ease, protecting not with present but with pro-
“mised succour : You alone pull down, not the commencing
“but the redoubled strength of your foes. You have indeed
“enjoyed the reputation of being steady, but are indebted
“for it more to report than fact. We ourselves know, that
“the *Persian* had advanced from the ends of the earth quite
“into Peloponnesus, before you exerted your dignity in re-
“sistance. Now also you take no notice of the Athenians,
“not remote as he was, but seated near you ; and, instead of
“invading them, curse rather to lie upon your defence

“ against their invasions ; and, to expose yourselves more to
“ the hazards of war against a grown augmented power.
“ And all this while you know, that *the Barbarian* was guilty
“ of many errors in his conduct : And the very Athenians
“ frequently, in their contests with us, have been defeated
“ more through their own blunders than the vigour of your
“ resistance : For their confidence in you hath caused the
“ destruction of some, who upon that very confidence were
“ taken unprepared.

“ Let no one in this assembly imagine, that we speak
“ more from malice than just grounds of complaint. Com-
“ plaint is just towards friends who have failed in their duty ;
“ accusation is against enemies guilty of injustice. And
“ surely, if ever any people had, we have good reason to
“ think we have ample cause to throw blame upon our
“ neighbours ; especially, when such great embroilments
“ have arose, of which you seem to have no manner of feel-
“ ing, nor ever once to have reflected, in regard to the
“ Athenians, with what sort of people, how far, and how in
“ every point unlike yourselves, you must soon contend.
“ *They* are a people fond of innovations, quick not only to
“ contrive, but to put their schemes in effectual execution :
“ *Your* method is, to preserve what you already have, to
“ know nothing further, and, when in action, to leave some-
“ thing needful ever unfinished. *They* again are daring be-
“ yond their strength, adventurous beyond the bounds of
“ judgment, and in extremities full of hope : *Your* method
“ is, in action to drop below your power, never resolutely to
“ follow the dictates of your judgment, and in the pressure
“ of a calamity to despair of a deliverance. Ever active as
“ *they* are, *they* stand against *you* who are habitually indo-
“ lent : ever roaming abroad, against *you* who think it misery
“ to lose sight of your homes. *Their* view in shifting place
“ is to enlarge their possessions : *You* imagine, that in foreign
“ attempts you may lose your present domestic enjoyments.
“ *They*, when once they have gained superiority over ene-

“mies, push forward as far as they can go; and if defeated,
“are dispirited the least of all men. More than this, *they*
“are as lavish of their lives in the public service as if those
“lives were not their own, whilst their resolution is ever in
“their power, ever ready to be exerted in the cause of their
“country. Whenever in their schemes *they* meet with dis-
“appointments, they reckon they have lost a share of their
“property: When those schemes are successful, the acqui-
“sition seemeth small in comparison with what they have
“farther in design: If they are baffled in executing a pro-
“ject, invigorated by reviving hope, they catch at fresh ex-
“pedients to repair the damage. *They* are the only people,
“who instantaneously project and hope and acquire: so ex-
“peditious are they in executing whatever they determine.
“Thus, through toils and dangers they labour forwards so
“long as life continueth, never at leisure to enjoy what they
“already have, through a constant eagerness to acquire
“more. *They* have no other notion of a festival than of a
“day whereon some needful point should be accomplished;
“and inactive rest is more a torment to them than laborious
“employment. In short, if any one abridging their charac-
“ters should say, *they* are formed by nature never to be at
“quiet themselves nor to suffer others to be so, he describeth
“*them* justly.

“When such a *state* hath taken the lists of opposition
“against you, do ye dally, O Lacedæmonians? do you ima-
“gine that those people will not continue longest in the en-
“joyment of peace, who timely prepare to vindicate them-
“selves, and manifest a settled resolution to do themselves
“right whenever they are wronged? You indeed are so far
“observers of equity as never to molest others, and stand on
“your guard merely to repel damage from yourselves;—
“points, you would not without difficulty secure, though this
“neighbouring *state* were governed by the same principles
“as you are: But *now*, as we have already shewn you, your
“customs compared with them are quite obsolete; whereas

“those which progressively improve must, like all the works
“of art, be ever the best. Were indeed the continuance of
“peace ensured, unvarying manners would certainly be pre-
“ferable : But such people as are liable to frequent vicissi-
“tudes of foreign contest, have need of great address to vary
“and refine their conduct. For this cause, the manners of
“the Athenians, improved by a long tract of experience, are
“formed in respect of yours upon a model entirely new.
“Here therefore be the period fixed to that slow-moving
“policy you have hitherto observed. Hasten to the relief of
“others, to that of the Potidæans, as by contract you are
“bound. Invade Attica without loss of time, that you may
“not leave your friends and your relations in the mercy of
“their most inveterate foes, and constrain *us* through your
“sloth to seek redress from a new alliance. Such a step,
“if taken by us, could neither scandalize the gods who take
“cognizance of solemn oaths, nor men who own their ob-
“ligation : For treaties are not violated by those who
“left destitute by some have recourse to others, but by such
“as being sworn to give it, withhold their assistance in the
“time of need. Yet, if you are willing and ready to per-
“form your parts, with you we firmly abide. In changing
“*then* we should be guilty of impiety ; and we never shall
“find others so nicely suited to the disposition of our own
“hearts. Upon these points form proper resolutions ; and
“exert yourselves, that the honour of Peloponnesus be not
“impaired under your guidance, who have received from
“your ancestors this great pre-eminence.”

To this effect the Corinthians spoke. And it happened, that at this very juncture an Athenian embassy was at Lacedæmon, negotiating some other points ; who, so soon as they were advertised of what had been said, judged it proper to demand an audience of the Lacedæmonians. It was not their design to make the least reply to the accusations preferred against them by the complainant-states, but in general to convince them, that “they ought not to form any sudden

resolutions, but to consider matters with sedate deliberation." They were further desirous "to represent before them the extensive power of their own *state*, to excite in the minds of the elder a recollection of those points they already knew, and to give the younger information in those of which they were ignorant;" concluding, that "such a representation might turn their attention more to pacific measures than military operations." Addressing themselves therefore to the Lacedæmonians, they expressed their desire to speak in the present assembly, if leave could be obtained. An order of admittance being immediately sent them, they approached and delivered themselves as followeth:

"IT was not the design of this our embassy to enter into
"disputations with your confederates, but to negotiate the
"points for which our *state* hath employed us. Yet, having
"been advertised of the great outcry raised against us, hither
"we have repaired: not to throw in our plea against the ac-
"cusations of the complainant states: for *you* are not the
"judges before whom either *we* or *they* are bound to plead;
"but, to prevent your forming rash and prejudicial resolu-
"tions, upon concerns of high importance, through the in-
"stigation of these your confederates. Our view is, farther,
"to convince you, notwithstanding the long comprehensive
"charge exhibited against us, that we possess with credit
"what we have hitherto obtained, and that the *state* of
"Athens is deserving of honour and regard.

"And what need is there here to go back to remote an-
"tiquity, where hearsay tradition must establish those facts
"to which the eyes of the audience are utter strangers? This
"we shall waive; and call forth first to your review the Per-
"sian invasions and those incidents of which you are con-
"scious, without regarding that chagrin which the remem-
"brance of them will constantly excite in you. Our achieve-
"ments there were attended with the utmost danger: The
"consequence was public benefit, of which you received a
"substantial share: and though the glory of that acquisi-

"tion may not be all our own, yet of a beneficial share we
 "ought not to be deprived. This shall boldly be averred;
 "not with a view of soothing you but doing justice to our-
 "selves, and giving you to know against *what* a State, if
 "your resolutions now are not discreetly taken, you are going
 "to engage. For we aver, that we alone adventured to en-
 "gage *the Barbarian* in that most dangerous field of Mara-
 "thon. And when, upon the second invasion, we were not
 "able to make head by land, we threw ourselves on ship-
 "board with all our people, to fight in conjunction with you
 "by sea at Salamis; which prevented his sailing along the
 "coast of Peloponnesus, and destroying one by one your
 "cities, unable to succour one another against that formid-
 "able fleet. The truth of this *the Barbarian* himself hath
 "undeniably proved: For, thus defeated at sea, and unable
 "to gather together again so large a force, he hastily retired
 "with the greatest part of his army. In this so wonderful an
 "event, where beyond dispute the preservation of Greece
 "was achieved at sea, the three most advantageous instru-
 "ments were contributed by us—the largest number of
 "shipping—a person of the greatest abilities to command
 "—and the most intrepid courage. For of the number
 "of ships, amounting in all to four hundred, very near two
 "thirds were our own. Themistocles was the commander,
 "to whom principally it was owing that the battle was
 "fought in the straits, which was undeniably the means of
 "that great deliverance: And you yourselves paid him ex-
 "traordinary honour* on that very account, more than ever

* Herodotus relates, that after the great victory at Salamis, "the Gre-
 "cians sailed to the Isthmus, to bestow the prize upon him who had de-
 "served best of Greece by his behaviour in the war. But upon their arri-
 "val, when commanders gave in their billets on the altar of Neptune, in
 "which they had wrote the name of him who had behaved best, and of
 "him who was second, each of them had given the preference to his own
 "self, but most of them agreed in awarding the second place to Themis-
 "tocles. Thus, while each competitor was only honoured with his own
 "single voice for the first place, Themistocles was clearly adjudged to de-
 "serve the second. Envy prevented the Grecians from proceeding to a
 "just declaration, and they broke up and departed, leaving the point un-

“ to any stranger who hath appeared amongst you. We our-
“ selves shewed further, on this occasion, the most daring cou-
“ rage ; since, though none before marched up to our succour,
“ and every *state* already enslaved had opened the road against
“ us, we bravely determined to abandon even Athens, to de-
“ stroy our own effects, nor, like the generality of those who
“ were yet undemolished, to desert the common cause, or, dis-
“ persing ourselves, to become useless to our allies, but—
“ to embark at once, to face the urgent danger, without the
“ least resentment against you for your preceding backward-
“ ness of aid. So that we aver the service we then did you
“ to be no less than what we afterwards received. For to our
“ aid indeed at last you came, from cities yet inhabited, from
“ cities you ever designed should still be inhabited, when once
“ you were alarmed for your own safety much more than for
“ ours. So long as we were safe, your presence was in vain
“ expected: But we, launching forth from a city no longer our
“ own, and hazarding our all for a place we almost despaired
“ of recovering, effected our own preservation, and with it, in
“ a great measure, yours. Had we, overcome with fear, gone
“ over early to *the Mede*, as others did, to save our lands ; had
“ we afterwards not dared, as men undone beyond recovery,
“ to throw ourselves on board ; you never had been obliged
“ to fight at sea, as not having sufficient strength to do it ; but

“ decided. Themistocles, however, was celebrated and honoured as the
“ man, who, in prudence, far surpassed all the Grecians then alive. Thus
“ denied the honour due to him for having undoubtedly excelled them all
“ in the affair of Salamis, he immediately repaired to Lacedæmon, desirous
“ to have justice done him there. The Lacedæmonians received him no-
“ bly, and honoured him abundantly. They gave indeed to Euribiades the
“ crown of olive as first in valour ; but for wisdom and dexterity they be-
“ stowed a second crown of olive on Themistocles. They presented him
“ further with the first chariot in Sparta. And after so much applause, he
“ was conducted, in his return, to the frontier of Tegea, by three hundred
“ picked Spartans, who composed the royal guard. He was the only per-
“ son ever known to have received such a compliment from the Spartans.”

Herodotus in *Urania*.

“the invader without a struggle would have leisurely determined the fate of Greece.

“Do we then deserve, Lacedæmonians, that violence of envy with which the Grecians behold us, for the courage we manifested then, for our judicious resolution, and the superior power we now enjoy? That power, superior as it is, was by no means the effect of violent encroachments. You would not abide with us to glean away the relics of the Barbarian war. To us the associated *states* were obliged to have recourse, and intreat us to lead them to its completion. Thus, by the necessary exigence of affairs, obliged to be in action, we have advanced our power to what it now is; at first, from a principle of *fear*; then from the principle of *honour*; and at length from that of *interest*. When envied by many, when obliged to reduce to their obedience some who had revolted, when you, no longer well-disposed towards us, were actuated by jealousy and malice; we thought it not consistent with our own security to endanger our welfare by giving up our power, since every revolt from us was an accession of strength to you. No part of mankind will fix any reproach on men who try every expedient to ward off extremities of danger. Nay, it is your own method also, Lacedæmonians, to manage the *states* of Peloponnesus as suits your own interest best, and to prescribe them law. And, had you abided with us, and persevered in that invidious superiority as we have done, we are well convinced that you would soon have grown no less odious to your allies; and so obliged either to have ruled with rigour, or to have risked the loss of your all. It followeth, therefore, that we have done nothing to raise surprise, nothing to disappoint the human expectation, in accepting a superiority voluntarily assured, in firmly maintaining it thus accepted, upon those most prevailing principles of *honour*, and *fear*, and *interest*.

“The maxim by which we have acted was not first broached by us, since it hath been ever allowed, that in-

“feriors should be controled by their superiors. To be the
“latter we thought ourselves deserving: You thought so too
“till now, when private interests engaging your attention,
“you begin to cry out for justice, which no people ever yet
“so studiously practised, as, when able to carry a point by
“strength, to check their inclination and let it drop. And
“worthy, farther, are they of applause, who, pursuing the
“dictates of human nature, in gaining rule over others,
“observe justice more steadily than their scope of power
“requireth from them. And so far we have reason to con-
“clude, that were our power lodged in other hands, plain
“evidence would soon decide with what peculiar modera-
“tion we use it: Though, so hard indeed is our lot, that
“calumny and not applause hath been the consequence of
“such our lenity. In suits of contract against our depend-
“ents we are often worsted; and, though ever submitting
“to fair and impartial trials in our own courts, we are
“charged with litigiousness. Not one of them reflecteth,
“that those who are absolute in other places, and treat not
“their dependents with that moderation which we observe,
“are for that very reason exempted from reproach: For,
“where lawless violence is practised there can be no room
“for appeals to justice. But our dependents, accustomed
“to contest with us upon equal footing, if they suffer never
“so little damage where they fancy equity to be along with
“them, either by a judicial sentence or the decision of
“reigning power, express no gratitude for the greater share
“of property they yet enjoy, but resent with higher chagrin
“the loss of such a pittance, than if at first we had set law
“aside, and seized their all with open violence: Even, in
“this case, they could not presume to deny, that inferiors
“ought to submit to their superiors. But mankind, it
“seemeth, resent the acts of injustice more deeply than the
“acts of violence: Those, coming from an equal, are look-
“ed upon as rapines: these, coming from a superior, are
“complied with as necessities. The far more grievous op-

“pressions of *the Mede* they bore with patience, but our
“government they look upon as severe: It may be so: For
“to subjects the *present* is always grievous. If you therefore
“by our overthrow should gain the ascendant over them, you
“would soon perceive that good disposition towards you,
“which a dread of us hath occasioned, to be vanishing away;
“especially should you exert your superiority according to
“the specimens you gave during your short command against
“*the Mede*. For the institutions established here amongst
“yourselves have no affinity with those of other places: and
“more than this, not one Spartan amongst you, when delega-
“ted to a foreign charge, either knoweth how to apply his
“own, or make use of those of the rest of Greece.

“Form your resolutions therefore with great deliberation,
“as on points of no small importance. Harken not so far
“to the opinions and calumnies of foreign *states* as to embroil
“your own domestic tranquillity. Reflect in time on the
“great uncertainty of war, before you engage in it. Pro-
“tracted into long continuance, it is generally used to end in
“calamities, from which we are now at an equal distance;
“and to the lot of which of us they will fall, lieth yet to be
“determined by the hazardous event. Men who run eager-
“ly to arms are first of all intent on doing some exploits,
“which ought in point of time to be second to something
“more important; and, when smarting with distress, they
“have recourse to reason. But since *we* are by no means
“guilty of such rashness ourselves, nor as yet perceive it in
“*you*, we exhort you, whilst healing measures are in the elec-
“tion of us both, not to break the treaty, not to violate your
“oaths, but to submit the points in contest to fair arbitration,
“according to the articles subsisting between us. If not, we
“here invoke the Gods, who take cognizance of oaths, to bear
“us witness, that we shall endeavour to revenge ourselves
“upon the authors of a war, by whatever methods *yourselves*
“shall set us an example.”

These things were said by the Athenian embassy. And

when the Lacedæmonians had thus heard the accusations of their allies against the Athenians, and what the Athenians had urged in their turn, ordering all parties to withdraw, they proceeded to serious consultation amongst themselves. The majority agreed in the opinion, that "the Athenians were already guilty of injustice, and that a war ought to be immediately declared." But Archidamus their king, esteemed a man of good understanding and temper, standing forth, expressed his own sentiments thus——

"I HAVE learned myself by the experience of many wars, and I see many of you, ye Lacedæmonians, as great proficients in years as I am, that no one should be fond of an enterprize because it is new, which is a vulgar weakness, judging it thence both advisable and safe. The war, which is at present the subject of your consultation, you will find, if examined discreetly, to bode a very long continuance. Against Peloponnesians, it is true, and borderers upon ourselves, we have ever a competent force in readiness, and by expeditious steps can advance against any of them. But, against a people whose territories are far remote, who are farther most expert in naval skill, who with all the expedients of war are most excellently provided, with wealth both private and public, with shipping, with horses, with arms, and with men, far beyond what any other *state* in Greece can singly pretend to, who, more than this, have numerous dependent *states* upon whom they levy tribute—where is the necessity sanguinely to wish for war against such a people? and wherein is our dependence, if thus unprepared we should declare it against them? Is it on our naval force? But in that we are inferior: And if to *this* we shall apply our care, and advance ourselves to an equality with them, why this will be a work of time. Or, is it on our wealth? In *this* we are yet much more deficient: and neither have it in any public fund, nor can readily raise it from private purses. But the confidence of *some* may perhaps be buoyed up

“with our superiority in arms and numbers, so that we may
“easily march into their territory and lay it waste: Yet,
“other territories, and of large extent, are subject to their
“power, and by sea they will import all necessary supplies.
“If, further, we tempt their dependents to a revolt, we
“shall want a naval strength to support them in it, as the
“majority of them are seated upon islands. What therefore
“will be the event of this our war? For, if we are unable
“either to overpower them at sea, or divert those revenues
“by which their navy is supported, we shall only by acting
“prejudice ourselves. And in such a situation to be forced
“to give it up will be a blemish on our honour; especially
“if we shall be thought to have been the authors of the
“breach. For let us not be puffed up with idle hope that
“this war must soon be over, if we can lay their territory
“waste: I have reason on better grounds to apprehend, that
“we shall leave it behind us a legacy to our children. It is
“by no means consistent with the spirit of Athenians either
“to be slaves to their soil, or, like unpractised soldiers, to
“shudder at a war. Nor again, on the other hand, am I so
“void of sensibility as to advise you to give up your confe-
“derates to their outrage, or wilfully to connive at their en-
“croachments; but only not yet to have recourse to arms,
“to send ambassadors to prefer our complaints, without be-
“traying too great an eagerness for war, or any tokens of
“pusillanimity. By pausing thus, we may get our own af-
“fairs in readiness, by augmenting our strength through
“an accession of allies, either Grecian or Barbarian, where-
“soever we can procure supplies of ships or money. And
“the least room there cannot be for censure, when a people
“in the state we are at present, exposed to all the guiles of the
“Athenians, endeavour to save themselves not merely by Gre-
“cian but even by Barbarian aid. And at the same time let
“us omit no resource within the reach of our own ability.

“If indeed, upon our sending an embassy, they will
“hearken to reason, that will be the happiest for us all. If

“not ; after two or three years delay, then, better provided,
“we may, if it be thought expedient, take the field against
“them. But in good time perhaps, when they see our pre-
“parations and the intent of them clearly explained by our
“own declarations, they may make each requisite concession,
“before their territory is destroyed by ravage, and whilst
“yet they may save their property from utter devastation.
“Regard their territory, I beseech you, in no other light than
“as a hostage for their good behaviour, and the more firm-
“ly such the better may be its culture. Of this we ought to
“be sparing as long as possible, that we drive them not into
“desperate fury, and render more impracticable their defeat.
“For if, thus unprovided as we are, and worked up to anger
“by the instigations of our confederates, we at once begin
“this ravage, reflect whether we shall not taint its reputa-
“tion, and the more embroil Peloponnesus: Since accusa-
“tions as well of *states* as private persons it is possible to
“clear away: But in a war, begun by general concurrence
“for the sake of a single party, which it is impossible to see
“how far it will extend, we cannot at pleasure desist, and
“preserve our honour.

“Let no one think it a mark of pusillanimity, that many
“as we are we do not rush immediately upon one single *State*.
“That State has as large a number of dependents who con-
“tribute to its support: And a war is not so much of arms
“as of money, by which arms are rendered of service; and
“the more so, when a landed power is contending against a
“naval. Be it therefore our earliest endeavour to provide
“amply for this, nor let us prematurely be too much fer-
“mented by the harangues of our allies. Let us, to whose
“account the event, whatever it be, will be principally charged
“——Let us, with sedate deliberation, endeavour in some
“degree to foresee it; and be not in the least ashamed of
“that slow and dilatory temper, for which the Corinthians
“so highly reproach you. For through too great precipi-
“tancy you will come more slowly to an end, because you

“set out without proper preparations. The *state* of which
“we are the constituents, hath ever been free and most cele-
“brated by fame : And *that* reproach can at most be nothing
“but the inborn sedateness of our minds. By this we are
“distinguished as the only people who never grow insolent
“with success, and who never are abject in adversity. And
“when again they invite us to hazardous attempts by uttering
“our praise, the delight of hearing must not raise our spirits
“above our judgment. If any, farther, endeavour to exas-
“perate us by a flow of invective, we are not by that to be
“provoked the sooner to compliance. From tempers thus
“evenly balanced it is, that we are warm in the field of bat-
“tle, and cool in the hours of debate : The former, because
“a sense of duty hath the greatest influence over a sedate
“disposition, and magnanimity the keenest sense of shame :
“And good we are in debate, as our education is not polite
“enough to teach us a contempt of laws, and by its severity
“giveth us so much good sense as never to disregard them.
“We are not a people so impertinently wise, as to invalidate
“the preparations of our enemies by a plausible harangue,
“and then absurdly proceed to a contest ; but we reckon the
“thoughts of our neighbours to be of a similar cast with our
“own, and that hazardous contingencies are not to be de-
“termined by a speech. We always presume that the pro-
“jects of our enemies are judiciously planned, and then se-
“riously prepare to defeat them. For we ought not to found
“our success upon the hope that they will certainly blunder
“in their conduct, but that we have omitted no proper step
“for our own security. We ought not to imagine, there is so
“mighty a difference between man and man ; but that he is
“the most accomplished who hath been regularly trained
“through a course of needful industry and toil.

“Such is the discipline which our fathers have handed
“down to us ; and by adhering to it, we have reaped consi-
“derable advantages. Let us not forego it now, nor in a
“small portion of only one day precipitately determine a

“point wherein so many lives, so vast an expence, so many
“states, and so much honour are at stake. But let us more
“leisurely proceed, which our power will warrant us in doing
“more easily than others. Dispatch ambassadors to the
“Athenians concerning Potidæa; dispatch them concerning
“the complaints our allies exhibit against them; and the
“sooner, as they have declared a readiness to submit to fair
“decisions. Against men who offer this we ought not to
“march before they are convicted of injustice. But, during
“this interval, get every thing in readiness for war. Your
“resolutions thus will be most wisely formed, and strike into
“your enemies the greatest dread.”

Archidamus spoke thus. But Sthenelaïdas, at that time one of the *Ephori*, standing forth the last on this occasion, gave his opinion as followeth:

“THE many words of the Athenians, for my part, I do
“not understand. They have been exceeding large in the
“praise of themselves; but as to the charge against them, that
“they injure our allies and Peloponnesus, they have made no
“reply. If, in truth, they were formerly good against the
“Medes, but are now bad towards us, they deserve to be
“doubly punished; because, ceasing to be good, they are
“grown very bad. We continue the same persons both *then*
“and *now*, and shall not, if we are wise, pass over the injuries
“done to our allies, nor wait any longer to revenge them, since
“they are past waiting for their sufferings. But——other
“people, forsooth, have a great deal of wealth, and ships, and
“horses——We too have gallant allies, whom we ought not
“to betray to the Athenians, nor refer them to law and plead-
“ings, since it was not by pleadings they were injured: But
“we ought, with all expedition and with all our strength, to
“seek revenge. *How* we ought to deliberate when we have
“been wronged, let no man pretend to inform me: It would
“have better become *those* who designed to commit such
“wrongs to have deliberated a long time ago. Vote then the
“war, Lacedæmonians, with a spirit becoming Sparta. And

“neither suffer the Athenians to grow still greater, nor let us betray our own confederates ; but, with the Gods on our side, march out against these authors of injustice.”

Having spoke thus, by virtue of his office as presiding in the college of *Ephori**, he put the question in the Lacedæmonian council. But, as they vote by voice and not by ballot, he said “he could not amidst the shout distinguish the majority ;” and, being desirous that each of them, by plainly declaring his opinion, might shew they were more inclined to war, he proceeded thus——“To whomsoever of you, Lacedæmonians, the treaty appeareth broke, and the Athenians to be in the wrong, let him rise up and go thither,” pointing out to them a certain place : “But, whoever is of the contrary opinion, let him go yonder.” They rose up and were divided ; but a great majority was on that side which voted the treaty broke.

Upon this, calling in their confederates, they told them, “They had come to a resolution that the Athenians were guilty of injustice ; but they were desirous to put it again to the vote in a general assembly of all their confederates, that by taking their measures in concert, they might briskly ply the war, if determined by common consent.”

Matters being brought to this point, they departed to their respective homes, and the Athenian ambassadors, having ended their negotiations, staid not long behind. This decree of the Lacedæmonian council that “the treaty was broke,” was passed in the fourteenth year of the treaty concluded for thirty years after the conquest of Eubœa. But the Lacedæmonians voted this treaty broke and a war

* The college of *Ephori* (or *inspectors*) at Sparta consisted of five. They were annually elected by the people from their own body, and were designed to be checks upon the regal power. They never forgot the end of their institution, and in fact quite lorded it over the kings. In a word, the whole administration was lodged in their hands, and the kings were never sovereigns but in the field, at the head of the troops. One of the *Ephori* had the honour to give its stile to the year, in the same manner as the first *Archon* did at Athens.

necessary, not so much out of regard to the arguments urged by their allies, as from their own jealousy of the growing power of the Athenians. They dreaded the advancement of that power, as they saw the greatest part of Greece was already in subjection to them.

Now the method by which the Athenians had advanced their power to this invidious height, was this* :

After that the Medes, defeated by the Grecians both at land and sea, had evacuated Europe, and such of them as escaped by sea were utterly ruined at Mycale, Leotychides king of the Lacedæmonians who commanded the Grecians at Mycale returned home, drawing away with him all the confederates of Peloponnesus. But the Athenians, with the confederates of Ionia and the Hellespont, who were now revolted from *the King*, continuing in those parts, laid siege to Sestus then held by the Medes ; and, pressing it during the winter-season, the Barbarians at length abandoned the place. After this they separated, sailing away from the Hellespont, every people to their own respective countries.

But the Athenian community, when the Barbarians had evacuated their territory, immediately brought back again from the places of refuge their wives and children and all their remaining effects, and vigorously applied themselves to rebuild the city of Athens and the walls : For but a small part of these was left standing ; and their houses, most of them had been demolished, and but few preserved by way of lodgings for the Persian nobles. The Lacedæmonians, informed of their design, came in embassy to prevent it ; partly to gratify themselves, as they would behold with pleasure

* The series of history on which Thucydides now enters, though not strictly within the compass of his subject, yet most needful to give it light, and to shew how present events are connected with, and how far they resulted from preceding, is excellent in its kind. He states important facts in the clearest and most orderly manner ; he opens before us the source of the Athenian power, and by a neat and concise enumeration of notable events, conducts it to that height, which excited the jealousy of other states, and was the true political cause of the succeeding war.

every city in Greece unwall'd like Sparta ; but more to gratify their confederates, inviting them to such a step from a jealousy of the naval power of the Athenians, now greater than at any time before, and of the courage they had so bravely exerted in the war against the Medes. They required them to desist from building their walls, and rather to join with them in levelling every fortification whatever without Peloponnesus. Their true meaning and their inward jealousy they endeavoured to conceal from the Athenians by the pretence, that “ then *the Barbarian*, should he again invade them, would find no strong-hold from whence to assault them, as in the last instance he had done from Thebes ;” alleging farther, that “ Peloponnesus was a place of secure retreat and certain resource for all.” To these representations of the Lacedæmonians the Athenians by the advice of Themistocles made this reply, that “ they would send ambassadors to them to debate this affair ;” and so without farther explanation dismissed them. Themistocles next advised, that “ he himself might be dispatched forthwith to Lacedæmon, and by no means hastily to send away the others who were to be joined in the commission with him, but to detain them till the walls were carried up to a height necessary at least for a defence ; that the work should be expedited by the joint-labour of all the inhabitants without exception of themselves, their wives and their children, sparing neither public nor private edifice from whence any proper materials could be had, but demolishing all.” Having thus advised them, and suggested farther what conduct he himself designed to observe, he sets out for Lacedæmon. Upon his arrival there, he demanded no public audience, he protracted matters, and studied evasions. Whenever any person in the public administration demanded the reason why he asked not an audience, his answer was, that “ he waited for the arrival of his colleagues, who were detained by urgent business, he expected they would speedily be with him, and was surprized they are not yet come.” As they had a good opinion of

Themistocles, they easily acquiesced in such an answer. But other persons afterwards arriving and making clear affirmation that "the wall is carrying on and already built up to a considerable height," they had it no longer in their power to be incredulous. Themistocles, knowing this, exhorts them, "not rashly to be biassed by rumours, but rather to send away some trusty persons of their own body, who from a view might report the truth." With this proposal they comply; and Themistocles sendeth secret instructions to the Athenians how to behave towards these delegates;—"to detain them, though with as little appearance of design as possible, and by no means to dismiss them before they received again their own ambassadors:" For his colleagues were by this arrived, Abronychus the son of Lysicles, and Aristides the son of Lysimachus, who brought him an assurance that the wall was sufficiently compleated. His fear was, that the Lacedæmonians, when they had discovered the truth, would put them under arrest. The Athenians therefore detained the delegates according to instruction. And Themistocles, going to an audience of the Lacedæmonians, there openly declared, "that Athens was now so far walled, as to be strong enough for the defence of its inhabitants: For the future, when the Lacedæmonians or confederates sent ambassadors thither, they must address themselves to them as to a people who perfectly knew their own interest and the interest of Greece; since, when they judged it most advisable to abandon their city and go on ship-board, they asserted their native courage without Lacedæmonian support; and, in all subsequent measures taken in conjunction, had shewn themselves not at all inferior in the cabinet or the field: At present therefore they judge it most expedient to have Athens defended by a wall, and thus to render it a place of greater security for their own members and for all their allies: It would not be possible, with strength inferior to that of a rival-power, equally to preserve and evenly to balance the public welfare of Greece."—From hence he inferred, that "either all cities of the *states*

which formed the Lacedæmonian league should be dismantled, or it be allowed that the things now done at Athens were just and proper." The Lacedæmonians, upon hearing this, curbed indeed all appearance of resentment against the Athenians:—They had not sent their embassy directly to prohibit, but to advise them to desist upon motives of general good: at that time also, they had a great regard for the Athenians, because of the public spirit they had shewn against the *Mede*:—But however, thus baffled as they were in their political views, they were inwardly provoked; and the ambassadors on each side returned home without farther embroilments.

By this conduct the Athenians in a small space of time walled their city around: And the very face of the structure sheweth plainly to this day that it was built in haste. The foundations are laid with stones of every kind, in some places not hewn so as properly to fit, but piled on at random. Many pillars also from sepulchral monuments and carved stones were blended promiscuously in the work. For the circuit of it was everywhere enlarged beyond the compass of the city, and for this reason, collecting the materials from every place without distinction, they lost no time.

Themistocles also persuaded them to finish the Piræus: For it was begun before this, during that year in which he himself was chief magistrate at Athens*. He judged the place to be very commodious, as formed by nature into three harbours, and, that the Athenians, grown more than ever intent on their marine, might render it highly conducive to an enlargement of their power. For he was the first person, who durst tell them, that they ought to grasp at the sovereignty

* The number of the *Archons* or *Rulers* was nine. They were annually elected by lot, and were required to be of noble birth, of a pure Attic descent, irreproachable both in moral and political character, dutiful to their parents, and perfectly sound in body. The first of the nine gave its stile to the year, and was therefore called *Eponymus* or the *Namer*: The second was stiled *King*: The third *Polemarch*: The other six in common *Thesmo-thete*. All the civil and religious affairs of the state belonged to their department.

of the sea ; and immediately began to put the plan in execution. And by his direction it was, that they built the wall round the Piræus of that thickness which is visible to this day. For two carts carrying the stone passed along it by one another ; Within was neither mortar nor mud ; but the entire structure was one pile of large stones hewn square to close their angles exactly, and grappled firmly together on the outside with iron and lead ; though in height it was not carried up above half so far as he intended. He contrived it to be, both in height and breadth, an impregnable rampart against hostile assaults ; and he designed, that a few, and those the least able of the people, might be sufficient to man it, whilst the rest should be employed on board the fleet. His attention was chiefly confined to a navy ; plainly discerning, in my opinion, that the forces of *the King* had a much easier way to annoy them by sea than by land. He thence judged the Piræus to be a place of much greater importance than the upper city. And this piece of advice he frequently gave the Athenians, that “ if ever they were pressed hard by land, they should retire down thither, and with their naval force make head against all opponents.” In this manner the Athenians, without losing time, after the retreat of the Medes, fortified their city, and prepared all the necessary means for their own security.

Pausanias the son of Cleombrotus was sent out from Lacedæmon, as commander in chief of the Grecians, with twenty sail of ships from Peloponnesus, joined by thirty Athenians and a number of other allies. They bent their course against Cyprus, and reduced most of the towns there. From thence they proceeded to Byzantium garrisoned by the Medes, and blockaded, and carried the place under his directions.

But, being now grown quite turbulent in command, the other Grecians, especially the Ionians and all who had lately recovered their liberty from the *royal* yoke, were highly chagrined. They addressed themselves to the Athenians, re-

questing them “from the tie of consanguinity to undertake their protection, and not to leave them thus largely exposed to the violence of Pausanias.” This request was favourably heard by the Athenians, who expressed their willingness to put a stop to such grievances, and to re-settle the general order, to the best of their power.—But during this the Lacedæmonians recalled Pausanias, that he might answer what was laid to his charge. Many of the Grecians had carried to them accusations against him for an unjust abuse of his power, since in his behaviour he resembled more a tyrant than a general. And it so fell out, that he was recalled just at the time when the confederates, out of hatred to him, had ranged themselves under the Athenian orders, excepting those troops which were of Peloponnesus. Upon his return to Lacedæmon, he was convicted upon trial of misdemeanors towards particulars, but of the heaviest part of the charge he is acquitted: For the principal accusation against him was an attachment to the Medish interest: and it might be judged too clear to stand in need of proof. Him therefore they no longer intrust with the public command, but appoint in his stead Dorcis with some colleagues to command what little force of their own remained. To these the confederates would no longer yield the supreme command; which so soon as they perceived, they returned home. And here the Lacedæmonians desisted from commissioning any others to take upon them that post; fearing, lest those who should be sent might by their behaviour still more prejudice the Lacedæmonian interest, a case they had reason to dread from the behaviour of Pausanias. They were now grown desirous to rid themselves of the Medish war: they acknowledged the Athenians had good pretensions to enjoy the command, and at that time were well affected towards them.

The Athenians having in this manner obtained the supreme command, by the voluntary tender of the whole confederacy in consequence of their aversion to Pausanias; they fixed by their own authority the quotas, whether of ships or

money which each *state* was to furnish against *the Barbarian*. The colour pretended was, “to revenge the calamities they had hitherto suffered, by carrying hostilities into the dominions of *the King*.” This gave its first rise to the Athenian office of *General Receivers of Greece**, whose business it was to collect this tribute: For the contribution of this money was called by that title. The first tribute levied in consequence of this, amounted to four hundred and sixty talents. Delos was appointed to be their treasury; and the sittings were held in the temple there.

Their command was thus at first over free and independent confederates, who sat with them at council, and had a vote in public resolutions. The enlargement of their authority was the result of wars and their own political management during the interval between the invasion of the Medes and the present war, when the contests were against *the Barbarian*, or their own allies endeavouring at a change, or those of the Peloponnesians who interfered on every occasion on purpose to molest them. Of these I have subjoined a particular detail, and have ventured a digression from my subject, because this piece of history hath been omitted by all preceding writers. They have either confined their accounts to the affairs of Greece prior in time, or to the invasions of the Medes. Hellanicus is the only one of them, who hath touched it in his Attic history; though his memorials are short, and not accurately distinguished by proper dates. But this, at the same time, will most clearly shew the method in which the Athenian empire was erected.

* This nice and difficult point was adjusted by Aristides, to the general satisfaction of all parties concerned. Greece conferred upon him this most important trust, he was called to this delicate commission by the united voice of his country; “Poor (says Plutarch) when he set about it; but poorer when he had finished it.” The Athenian state was now furnished with a large annual fund, by which it was enabled not only to annoy the foreign enemies of Greece, but even those Greeks who should at any time presume to oppose the measures of Athens. They soon found out that their own city was a more convenient place for keeping this treasure than the isle of Delos, and accordingly took care to remove it thither.

In the first place, under the command of Cimon* son of Miltiades, they laid siege to Eion, a town upon the Strymon possessed by the Medes, which they carried, and sold all found within it for slaves. They afterwards did the same by Scyros, an island in the Ægean sea, inhabited by the Dolopes, and placed in it a colony of their own people. They had, farther, a war with the Carysthians singly, in which the rest of the Eubœans were unconcerned, who at length submitted to them upon terms.—After this they made war upon the Naxians, who had revolted, and reduced them by a siege. This was the first confederate-state which was enslaved to gratify their aspiring ambition; though afterwards all the rest, as opportunity occurred, had the same fate.

The occasions of such revolts were various; though the principal were deficiencies in their quotas of tribute and shipping, and refusals of common service. For the Athenians exerted their authority with exactness and rigour, and laid heavy loads upon men, who had neither been accustomed nor were willing to bear oppression. Their method of command was soon perverted; they no longer cared to make it agreeable, and in general service disallowed an equality, as it was now more than ever in their power to force revoltors to submission. But these points the confederates had highly facilitated by their own proceedings. For, through a reluctance of mingling in frequent expeditions, a majority of them, to redeem their personal attendance, were rated at certain sums of money, equivalent to the expence of the ships they ought to have furnished.

* Cimon was a great general, a worthy patriot, brave, open, and ingenious, upright in his political conduct like Aristides, and though an able politician, yet not so mischievously refined as to discard honesty and sincerity from public measures. His father Miltiades, after performing most signal services to his country, was heavily fined, thrown into prison, because unable to pay, and there ended his days. Cimon afterwards paid the fine, is now going also to perform great services to the state, is afterwards banished, but recalled, and again employed in foreign commands, dying at last in the service of his country, highly regretted, not only at Athens, but throughout Greece.

The sums paid on these occasions to the Athenians were employed by them to increase their own naval force; and the tributaries thus drained, whenever they presumed to revolt, had parted with the needful expedients of war, and were without resource.

After these things it happened, that the Athenians and their confederates fought against the Medes both by land and sea, at the river Eurymedon in Pamphylia. Cimon the son of Miltiades commanded; and the Athenians were victorious the very same day in both elements. They took and destroyed the ships of the Phœnicians, in the whole about two hundred.

Later in time than this happened a revolt of the Thasians, arising from disputes about places of trade on the opposite coasts of Thrace, and the mines which they possessed there. The Athenians with a sufficient force sailed against Thasus; and, after gaining a victory by sea, landed upon the island.—About the same time, they had sent a colony, consisting of about ten thousand of their own and confederate people, towards the Strymon, who were to settle in a place called the *Nine-ways*, but now Amphipolis. They became masters of the *Nine-ways* by dispossessing the Edonians. But advancing farther into the midland parts of Thrace, they were all cut off at Drabescus of Edonia by the united force of the Thracians, who were all enemies to this new settlement now forming at the *Nine-ways*.—But the Thasians, defeated in a battle and besieged, implored the succour of the Lacedæmonians, and exhorted them to make a diversion in their favour by breaking into Attica. This they promised unknown to the Athenians, and were intent on the performance, but were prevented by the shock of an earthquake. The Helots*, farther, had seized this opportu-

* Helots was the name given in general to the slaves of the Lacedæmonians. The first of the kind were the inhabitants of Helos in Messenia, who were conquered and enslaved by the Lacedæmonians; and all their slaves in succeeding times had the same denomination. The tillage of the ground, the exercise of trades, all manual labour, and every kind of drudgery was thrown upon them. They were always treated by their Spartan

nity, in concert with the neighbouring Thuriatæ and Ethéans, to revolt and seize Ithome. Most of the Helots were descendants of the ancient Messenians then reduced to slavery, and on this account all of them in general were called Messenians. This war against the revolters in Ithome gave full employ to the Lacedæmonians. And the Thasians, after holding out three years blockade, were forced to surrender upon terms to the Athenians:—They were “to level their walls, to give up their shipping, to pay the whole arrear of their tribute, to advance it punctually for the future, and to quit all pretensions to the continent and the mines.”

The Lacedæmonians, as their war against the rebels in Ithome ran out into a length of time, demanded the assistance of their allies, and amongst others of the Athenians. No small number of these were sent to their aid, under the command of Cimon. The demand of assistance from *them* was principally owing to the reputation they then were in for their superior skill in the methods of approaching and attacking walls. The long continuance of the siege convinced them of the necessity of such methods, though they would fain have taken it by storm. The first open enmity between the Lacedæmonians and Athenians broke out from this expedition. For the Lacedæmonians, when the place could not be carried by storm, growing jealous of the daring and innovating temper of the Athenians, and regarding them as aliens, lest by a longer stay they might be tampering with

masters with great severity, and often with the utmost barbarity; at their caprice, or sometimes for reasons of state, they were wantonly put to death or inhumanly butchered. There is a remarkable instance of the latter in the fourth book of this history. According to Plutarch it was a common saying in Greece, That a freeman at Sparta was the freest, and a slave the greatest slave in the world.—Thus miserably oppressed, no wonder they seized an opportunity of revolt. The earthquake here mentioned was so violent, that (according to Plutarch) it demolished all the houses in Sparta, except five. The Helots rose at once effectually to demolish those Spartans too, who were not buried in the ruins. But Archidamus had already, by way of precaution, sounded an alarm, and got them together in a body. The Helots, thus prevented, marched off, and seized Ithome, where they made a long and obstinate resistance.

the rebels in Ithome, and so raise them fresh embarrassments, give a dismissal to them alone of their allies. They strove indeed to conceal their suspicions, by alleging "they have no longer any need of their assistance." The Athenians were convinced that their dismissal was not owing to this more plausible colour, but to some latent jealousy. They reckoned themselves aggrieved: and thinking they had merited better usage from the hands of the Lacedæmonians, were scarcely withdrawn, than in open disregard to the league subsisting between them against *the Medæ*; they clapped up an alliance with *their* old enemies the Argives: And in the same oaths and same alliance the Thessalians also were comprehended with them both.

The rebels in Ithome, in the tenth year of the siege, unable to hold out any longer, surrendered to the Lacedæmonians on the following conditions—that "a term of security be allowed them to quit Peloponnesus, into which they shall never return again; that if any one of them be ever found there, he should be made the slave of whoever apprehended him." The Pythian oracle had already warned the Lacedæmonians "to let go the suppliants of Jupiter Ithometes." The men therefore, with their wives and children, went out of Ithome, and gained a reception from the Athenians, who acted now in enmity to the Lacedæmonians, and assigned them Naupactus for their residence, which they had lately taken from the Locrians of Ozoli.

The Megaréans also deserted the Lacedæmonians, and went over to the Athenian alliance, because the Corinthians had warred upon them in pursuance of a dispute about settling their frontier. Megara and Pegæ were put into the hands of the Athenians, who built up for the Megaréans the *long walls* that reach down from Megara to Nisæa, and took their guard upon themselves. This was by no means the least occasion of that violent enmity now beginning to arise between the Corinthians and Athenians.

Inarus, the son of Psammetichus, a Libyan, and king of

the Libyans bordering upon Egypt, taking his route from Maræa, a city beyond the Pharos, had seduced the greatest part of Egypt into a revolt from king Artaxerxes. He himself was constituted their leader, and he brought over the Athenians to associate in the enterprize. They happened at that time to be employed in an expedition against Cyprus, with a fleet of two hundred ships of their own and their allies: But relinquishing Cyprus, they went upon this new design. Being arrived on that coast, and sailed up the Nile, they were masters of that river, and two thirds of the city of Memphis, and were making their attack upon the remaining part, which is called the *White-wall*. It was defended by the Persians and Medes who had resorted thither for refuge, and by those Egyptians who had stood out in the general defection.—

The Athenians, further, having made a descent at Haliæ, a battle ensued against the Corinthians and Epidaurians, in which the victory was on the Corinthian side.—And afterwards the Athenians engaged at sea near Cecryphélea with a fleet of Peloponnesians, and compleatly gained the victory.—A war also breaking out after this between the Æginetæ and Athenians, a great battle was fought at sea by these two contending parties near Ægina. Both sides were joined by their respective confederates; but the victory remained with the Athenians; who, having taken seventy of their ships, landed upon their territory, and laid siege to the city, under the command of Leocrates the son of Stræbus. The Peloponnesians, then desirous to relieve the Æginetæ, transported over to Ægina three hundred heavy-armed, who before were auxiliaries to the Corinthians and Epidaurians. In the next place they secured the promontory of Geranéa. The Corinthians now with their allies made an incursion into the district of Megara, judging it impossible for the Athenians to march to the relief of the Megaréans, as they had so large a force already abroad in Ægina and in Egypt; or, if they were intent on giving them relief, they must of necessity

raise their siege from Ægina. The Athenians however recalled not their army from Ægina, but marched away all the old and young that were left in Athens to the aid of Megara, under the command of Myronides: And having fought a drawn battle against the Corinthians, both sides retired, and both sides looked upon themselves as not worsted in the action. The Athenians however, upon the departure of the Corinthians, as being at least so far victorious, erected a trophy. The Corinthians at their return heard nothing but reproaches from the seniors in Corinth: so, after bestowing an interval of about twelve days to recruit, they came back again; and, to lay their claim also to the victory, set about erecting a trophy of opposition. Upon this, the Athenians sallying with a shout out of Megara, put those who were busy in erecting this trophy to the sword, and routed all who endeavoured to oppose them. The vanquished Corinthians were forced to fly; and no small part of their number, being closely pursued and driven from any certain route, were chased into the ground of a private person, which happened to be encompassed with a ditch so deep as to be quite impassable, and there was no getting out. The Athenians, perceiving this, drew up all their heavy-armed to front them, and then forming their light-armed in a circle round them, stoned every man of them to death. This was a calamitous event to the Corinthians: But the bulk of their force got home safe again from this unhappy expedition.

About this time also the Athenians began to build the *long-walls* reaching down to the sea, both towards the Phalerus and towards the Piræus.

The Phocians were now embroiled with the Dorians, from whom the Lacedæmonians are descended. Having made some attempts on Bœon, and Cytinium, and Erineus, and taken one of those places, the Lacedæmonians marched out to succour the Dorians with fifteen hundred heavy-armed of their natives, and ten thousand of their allies commanded by Nicomedes the son of Cleombrotus in the right of Pleis-

tionax[†] son of Pausanias their king who was yet a minor ; and having forced the Phocians to surrender upon terms the town they had taken, were preparing for their return. Now, in case they attempted it by passing over the sea in the gulf of Crissa, the Athenians having got round with a squadron were ready to obstruct it. Nor did they judge it safe to attempt it by way of Geranéa, as Megara and Pegæ were in the hands of the Athenians ; for the pass of Geranéa is ever difficult, and now was constantly guarded by the Athenians ; and should they venture this route, they perceived that the Athenians were there also ready to intercept them. They determined at last to halt for a time in Bœotia, and watch for an opportunity to march away unmolested. Some citizens of Athens were now clandestinely practising with them, to obtain their concurrence in putting a stop to the *democracy* and the building of the *long-walls*. But the whole body of the Athenian people rushed out into the field against them, with a thousand Argives and the respective quotas of their allies, in the whole amounting to fourteen thousand. They judged them quite at a loss about the means of a retreat ; and the design also to overthrow their popular government began to be suspected. Some Thessalian horsemen came also up to join the Athenians, in pursuance of treaty, who afterwards in the heat of action revolted to the Lacedæmonians.

They fought at Tanagra of Bœotia, and the victory rested with the Lacedæmonians and allies ; but the slaughter was great on both sides. The Lacedæmonians afterwards took their route through the district of Megara ; and having cut down the woods, returned to their own home through Geranéa, and the Isthmus.

On the sixty-second day after the battle of Tanagra, the Athenians had taken the field against the Bœotians, under the command of Myronides*. They engaged them, and

* Plutarch in his *Apothegm* relates, that when Myronides was putting himself at the head of the Athenians on this occasion, his officers told him "they were not all come out yet into the field," he replied briskly, "All are come out that will fight," and marched off.

gained a compleat victory at Oenophyta* ; in consequence of which, they seized all the territories of Bæotia and Phocis, and levelled the walls of Tanagra. They took from the Locrians of Opus one hundred of their richest persons for hostages ; and——had now completed their own *long-walls* at Athens.

Soon after, the Æginetæ surrendered to the Athenians upon terms.—They “ demolished their fortifications, gave up their shipping, and submitted to pay an annual tribute for the future.”

The Athenians, farther, in a cruize, infested the coast of Peloponnesus, under the command of Tolmidas, the son of Tolmæus. They burnt a dock of the Lacedæmonians, took Chalcis, a city belonging to the Corinthians, and landing their men, engaged with and defeated the Sicyonians.

During all this interval, the army of the Athenians and allies continued in Egypt, amidst various incidents and events of war.—At first, the Athenians had the better of it in Egypt. Upon this, the *king*† dispatched to Lacedæmon, Megabazus, a Persian *noble*, furnished with great sums of money, in order to prevail upon the Lacedæmonians to make an incursion into Attica, and force the Athenians to recal their troops from Egypt : When Megabazus could not prevail, and some money had been spent to no manner of purpose, he carried back what was yet unexpended with him into Asia. He then send-

* This battle is represented by some as more glorious to the Athenians than even those of Marathon or Plataea. In the latter they fought, accompanied by their allies, against Barbarians ; but here, with their own single force, they defeated a far more numerous body of the choicest and best disciplined troops in Greece. Plato hath marked it in his *Funeral Oration*, and told us those who fell in this battle were the first who were honoured with a public interment in the Ceramicus. “ These brave men (says he, “ as translated by Mr. West), having fought against Grecians for the liberties of Grecians, and delivered those whose cause they had undertaken “ to defend, were the first after the Persian war upon whom the common- “ wealth conferred the honour of being buried in this public cemetery.”

† Alexander Longimartus.

eth Megabazus, the son of Zopyrus, a Persian *noble*, against them with a numerous army, who, marching by land, fought with and defeated the Egyptians and their allies ; then drove the Grecians out of Memphis ; and at last shut them up in the isle of Prosopis. Here he kept them blocked up for a year and six months ; till, having drained the channel, by turning the water into a different course, he stranded all their ships, and rendered the island almost continent. He then marched his troops across, and took the place by a land-assault. And thus a war, which had employed the Grecians for six continued years, ended in their destruction. Few only of the numbers sent thither, by taking the route of Libya, got safe away to Cyrene ; the far greater part were entirely cut off. Egypt was now again reduced to the obedience of the *king* : Amyrtæus alone held out, who reigned in the *fenny* parts. The large extent of the fens prevented his reduction ; and besides the Egyptians of the fens are the most remarkable of all for military valour. Inarus, king of the Libyans, the author of all these commotions in Egypt, was betrayed by treachery, and fastened to a cross. Beside this, fifty triremes from Athens and the rest of the alliance, arriving upon the coast of Egypt to relieve the former, were come up to Medasium, a mouth of the Nile, quite ignorant of their fate. These, some forces assaulted from the land, whilst a squadron of Phœnicians attacked them by sea. Many of the vessels were by this means destroyed, but some few had the good fortune to get away. And thus the great expedition of the Athenians and allies into Egypt was brought to a conclusion.

But farther, Orestes, son of Echekratidas, king of the Thessalians, being driven from Thessaly, persuaded the Athenians to undertake his restoration. The Athenians, in conjunction with the Bœotians and Phocians, now their allies, marched up to Pharsalus of Thessaly. They became masters of the adjacent country, so far as they could be whilst keeping in a body ; for the Thessalian cavalry prevented any detachments. They took not that city, neither carried any

one point intended by the expedition, but were obliged to withdraw, and carry Orestes back again with them, totally unsuccessful.

Not long after this, a thousand Athenians going on board their ships which lay at Pegæ, for Pegæ was now in their possession, steered away against Sicyon, under the command of Pericles* the son of Xantippus. They made a descent, and in a battle defeated those of the Sicyonians, who endeavoured to make head against them. From thence they strengthened themselves by taking in some Achæans; and stretching across the gulph, landed in a district of Acarnania, and laid siege to Oenias; yet unable to carry it, they soon quitted, and withdrew to their own homes.

Three years after this a peace to continue for five years was clapped up between the Peloponnesians and Athenians. Upon this, the Athenians, now at leisure from any war in Greece, engaged in an expedition against Cyprus, with a fleet of two hundred ships of their own and allies, commanded by Cimon. Sixty of these were afterwards detached to Egypt, at the request of Amyrtæus king of the fenny part; but the rest of them blocked up Citium. Yet, by the death of Cimon, and a violent famine, they were compelled to quit the blockade of

* Here the name of Pericles first occurs, and a hint should be given to those who are not well acquainted with him to mark a person that was a true patriot, a consummate statesman, a great general, and a most sublime speaker. He was born of one of the most illustrious families in Athens. He was educated in the best manner, and learned his philosophy or the knowledge of nature from Anaxagoras, whose doctrines agreed so little with the superstitious practices and tempers of the Athenians, that the master and all his disciples were charged with atheism, for which many of them were prosecuted, and the divine Socrates most injuriously put to death. He engaged early in public affairs, gained the ascendant over all his competitors, became at length, and continued to his death, master of the affections and liberties too of the Athenian people, and though master, yet guardian and increaser of the latter. In short, according to writers of the best authority and the gravest historians, he was one of the most able and most disinterested ministers that Athens ever had, Athens the most democratical state that ever existed, so fertile in every thing great and glorious, and so over-run at the same time with faction, licentiousness, and wild tumultuary caprice.

Citium: And being come up to the height of Salamis in Cyprus, they engaged at one time a united force of Phœnicians and Cyprians and Cilicians, both by land and sea. They gained the victory in both engagements: and being rejoined by the detachment they had sent to Egypt, returned home.

After this, the Lacedæmonians engaged in that which is known by the name of the *holy* war; and having recovered the temple of Delphi, delivered it up to the Delphians. But no sooner were they withdrawn, than the Athenians marched out in their turn, retook it, and delivered it into the hands of the Phocians.

At no great interval of time from hence, the Athenians took the field against the Bœotian exiles, who had seized Orchomenus and Chæronæa, and some other cities of Bœotia. Their force, sent out upon this service, consisted of a thousand heavy-armed of their own with proportional quotas from their allies, and was commanded by Tolmidas the son of Tolmæus. Having taken and enslaved Chæronæa, they placed a fresh garrison in it, and so withdrew. But upon their march, they are attacked at Coronéa by a body of men consisting of the Bœotian exiles sallying out of Orchomenus, joined by Locrians and the exiles from Eubœa and others of their partizans. After a battle, the victory remained with the latter, who made great slaughter of the Athenians, and took many prisoners. Upon this, the Athenians evacuated Bœotia, and to get the prisoners released consented to a peace. The Bœotian exiles, and all others in the same circumstances, were by this re-settled in their old habitations, and recovered their former liberty and rights.

It was not a great while after these last occurrences that Eubœa revolted from the Athenians. And Pericles was no sooner landed upon that island with an Athenian army to chastise them, than news was brought him that “Megara also had revolted; that the Peloponnesians were going to make an incursion into Attica; that the Athenian garrison had been put to the sword by the Megaréans*, excepting those who

* This revolt of Megara, a little republic almost surrounded by the dominions of Athens, leagued closely with her, and under her protection, gave

had thrown themselves into Nisæa; and that the Megaréans had effected this revolt by a junction of Corinthians and Sicyonians and Epidaurians.* Upon hearing this, Pericles embarked with the utmost expedition, and brought back his army from Eubœa. And soon after, the Peloponnesians marching into Attica as far as Eleusis and Thria, laid the country waste, under the command of Pleistionax* the son of Pausanias king of Sparta: And then, without extending the ravage any farther, they withdrew to their own homes. Now again the Athenians transported a military force into Eubœa, under the command of Pericles, and soon completed its reduction. The tranquillity of the rest of the island was re-established upon certain conditions; but they wholly ejected all the inhabitants of Hestizæa, and repopled it with a colony of their own.—And not long after their return from Eubœa, they concluded a peace for thirty years with the Lacedæmonians and their allies, in pursuance of which they restored them Nisæa and Chalcis, and Pegæ and Træzene; all which places, though belonging to the Peloponnesians, were in the hands of the Athenians.

In the sixth year of this peace† a war broke out between rise to that *decree* which excluded the Megaréans from the ports and markets of Athens. Others add, that they slew an Athenian herald, who was sent to expostulate with them on this account. Could such outrages be pocketed by Athenians? Could Pericles dissuade the people of Athens from shewing resentment? They decreed farther, though not explicitly mentioned by Thucydides, that the *generals of the state* should swear, at their election, to make an incursion twice a year into the Megaris. We shall soon see that the Peloponnesians made it a pretext for the ensuing war, and that Pericles justified the decree, and persuaded the Athenians to hazard a war rather than repeal it. This is the true history of the point, though comedy and raillery and libelling, strangely vary the account.

* As Pleistionax on this occasion evacuated Attica on a sudden, he was banished from Sparta, as having been bribed by the Athenians to quit their territory. Diodorus Siculus relates, that he did it by the advice of Cleandridas his guardian, who attended him in the field on account of his youth; and that Pericles afterwards passing his accounts at Athens, charged “ten talents properly laid out for the service of the state,” which passed without farther explanation or exception.

† Pericles here performed a great and signal service to his country. The motives to this war are, according to our historian, sufficiently strong, upon

the Samians and Milesians about Priene. The Milesians, having the worst in the dispute, had recourse to the Athenians, to whom they bitterly exclaimed against the Samians. Nay, even some private citizens of Samos joined with them in this outcry, whose scheme it was to work a change in the government. The Athenians therefore, putting to sea with a fleet of forty sail, landed upon Samos, where they set up a democracy; and exacted from them fifty boys and as many grown men for hostages, whom they deposited at Lemnos. They had farther, at their departure, left a garrison behind to secure that island. But a body of Samians, who would not submit to the new form of government, and therefore had refuged themselves upon the continent, having gained the correspondence of the most powerful persons abiding in Samos, and the alliance of Pissuthnes son of Hystaspes, at that time governor at Sardis,

the scheme now carrying on by Pericles, to extend the sovereignty of Athens by sea. Yet the comic poets and writers of memoirs and private history, give another account of the affair, which it is surprising to find the authors of the *Universal History* inclined to think as well founded as what is given by Thucydides, that "Pericles engaged the republic in this war, merely to gratify the resentment of Aspasia, who was a native of Miletus, against the Samians." As this Aspasia had all the honour of Pericles's merit imputed to herself, and he hath suffered a weight of reproach in her behalf, the reader will accept a short account of this famous lady. She is allowed on all hands to have been a woman of the greatest beauty and the first genius; but averred by some to have been a libertine, a prostitute, a bawd, nay every thing scandalous and vile. Pericles was doatingly fond of her, and got divorced from a wife whom he did not love, to marry her. She taught him, it is said, his refined maxims of policy, his lofty imperial eloquence; nay, even composed the speeches on which so great a share of his reputation was founded. The best men in Athens frequented her house, and brought their wives to receive lessons from her of economy and right deportment. Socrates himself was her pupil in eloquence, and gives her the honour of that *funeral oration* which he delivers in the *Menexenus* of Plato. There must have been some ground even for complimenting her in this extraordinary manner. And after every abatement, what must we think of a lady who was in such high esteem with the greatest men that ever lived at Athens, who taught force to orators, grace to philosophers, and conduct to ministers of state; in a word, who had Pericles for her lover, and Socrates for her encomiast? See Bayle's *Dictionary*, under *Pericles*, and *Universal History*, vol. vi. p. 415, notes.

and collected a body of seven hundred auxiliaries, passed over by night into Samos. They first exerted their efforts against the *popular* party, and got a majority of them into their power: In the next place, they conveyed away the hostages from Lemnos by stealth; they openly declared a revolt; and delivered up the Athenian garrison, with their officers whom they had seized, to Pissuthnes; and then immediately prepared to renew their war against Miletus. The Byzantines farther joined with them in the revolt.

No sooner were the Athenians informed of this, than they put out against Samos with sixty sail, though sixteen of them were detached for other services. Some of the latter were stationed upon the coast of Caria to observe the motions of a Phœnician fleet, and the rest were ordered to Chios and Lesbos to give there a summons of aid. The remaining forty-four, commanded by Pericles* and nine colleagues, engaged near the isle of Tragia with the Samian fleet, consisting of seventy sail, twenty of which had land-soldiers on board, and the whole was now on the return from Miletus; and here the Athenians gained a signal victory. Afterwards forty sail arrived from Athens to reinforce them, and twenty-five from the Chians and the Lesbians. With this accession

* The Athenians in the assembly of the people chose ten *generals* every year, according to the number of their tribes. They were sometimes, as in the present instance, all sent out in the same employ. They rolled, and each in his turn was *general* of the day. Thucydides seldom gives more than the name of one, whom we may conclude to have been the person of the greatest weight and influence amongst them, in fact a *general in chief*. Philip of Macedon was used to joke upon this multiplicity of generals. "For my part (said he) I have never had the good fortune to find more than one general in my life; and yet the Athenians find ten fresh ones every year." Not but that these generals were often re-elected and continued years in commission. Pericles, it is plain, did so: and in latter times Phocion is said to have been elected five and forty times. Their power was great not only in the field but at Athens. Every point that had relation to war came under their department. Pericles in a foreign employ was always first of the generals, and within the walls of Athens was the first or rather absolute minister of state.

of force, they landed upon the island, overthrew the Samians in battle, invested their city with a triple wall, and at the same time blocked it up by sea.

But Pericles, drawing off sixty of the ships from this service, steered away with all possible expedition towards Caunus and Caria, upon receiving advice that "a Phœnician fleet is coming up against them." Stesagoras also and others had before been sent from Samos with five ships to meet that fleet. In this interval, the Samians launched out in a sudden sally, fell upon the unfortified station* of the Athenians, sunk the vessels moored at a distance, by way of guard, and engaging those who put out against them, victoriously executed their purpose, were masters of their own sea for fourteen days continuance, and made whatever importations or exportations they pleased: But, as Pericles then returned, they were again blocked up by sea†. He afterwards received fresh supplies from Athens, forty ships under Thucydides and Agnon and Phormio, and twenty under Tlepolemus and Anticles, beside thirty others from Chios and Lesbos. And though after this the Samians ventured a short engagement at sea, yet they now found all farther resistance impracticable, so that in the ninth month of the siege they surrendered on the following terms—"To demolish their walls; to give hostages; to deliver up their shipping; and to reimburse by stated payments the expences of the

* When the Grecians continued long on a station, or were apprehensive of being attacked by an enemy, they fortified their naval station and camp towards the land with a ditch and rampart, and towards the sea with a palisade. At other time a number of their ships lay out more to sea, by way of guard or watch to the rest, which were generally dragged ashore, whilst the soldiers lay round them in their tents. Sometimes they were only moored to the shore, or rode at anchor, that they might be ready upon an alarm. See *Potter's Archaeologia*, Vol. II. c. 20.

† The manner of doing this was "to environ the walls and harbour with ships, ranged in order from one side of the shore to the other, and so closely joined together by chains and bridges, on which armed men were placed, that without breaking their order, there could be no passage from the town to the sea." *Potter's Archaeologia*.

war*.”—The Byzantines also came in, upon the engagement of being held only to such obedience as had formerly been required of them.

Not many years intervened between this period of time and the rise of those differences above recited concerning Corcyra and Potidæa, and all occurrences whatever, on which the pretences of *this* Peloponnesian war were grounded. All these transactions in general, whether of Grecians against Grecians, or against the *Barbarian*, fell out in the compass of fifty years, between the retreat of Xerxes and the commencement of this present war; during which period the Athenians had established their dominion on a solid basis, and had rose to a high exaltation of power. The Lacedæmonians were sensible of it, yet never opposed them, except by some transient efforts; and for the most part of the time were quite easy and indifferent about it. That people had never been known in a hurry to run to arms: Their wars were indispensably necessary; and sometimes they were entangled in domestic broils. Thus they looked on with indolent unconcern till the Athenian power was manifestly established, and encroachments were made upon their own alliance. Then indeed they determined to be no longer patient: They resolved upon a war in which their utmost force should be exerted, and the Athenian power, if possible, demolished.

ON these motives was formed the public resolution of the Lacedæmonians—That “the treaty was violated, and the Athenians were guilty of injustice.” They had also sent

* Samos thus reduced, which in maritime power vied with Athens herself, and had well nigh defeated her grand plan of being mistress of the sea, Pericles was received upon his return with all the honours a grateful people could give him, and was pitched upon to make the funeral oration for those slain in the war. He performed his part with high applause. The ladies in particular were loud in their acclamations, and were eagerly employed in caressing and crowning him with garlands. But for a smart piece of raillery from one of them, on this occasion, and his smarter repartee, the reader may consult the *Universal History*, vol. vi. p. 429. the note. In the latter part of that note, the authors seem willing both to deny and to allow Pericles the merit of having served his country in the reduction of Samos.

to Delphi, to enquire of the God, "Whether their war would be successful?" He is reported to have returned this answer, That "if they warred with all their might, they should at last be triumphant, and he himself would fight on their side, invoked and uninvoked."

They had now again summoned their confederates to attend, and designed to put it to a general ballot, "Whether the war should be undertaken?" The ambassadors from the several constituents of their alliance arrived and assembled in one general council. Others made what declarations they pleased, the majority inveighing against the Athenians, and insisting upon war: But the Corinthians (who had beforehand requested every *state* apart to ballot for war) alarmed for Potidæa, lest for want of some speedy relief it might be utterly destroyed, being present also at this council, stood forth the last of all, and spoke to this effect:

"WE can no longer, ye confederates, have any room to complain of the Lacedæmonians, since their own resolution is already engaged for war, and they have summoned us hither to give our concurrence. For it is the duty of a governing and leading *state*, as in private concerns they observe the equitable conduct, so ever to keep their view intent upon the general welfare, suitably to that superior degree of honour and regard, which in many points they pre-eminently receive.

"For our parts, so many of us as have quitted Athenian friendship for this better association, we require no farther trials to awaken our apprehensions. But those amongst us, who are seated up in the inland parts, at a distance from the coast, should now be convinced, that unless they combine in the defence of such as are in lower situations, they would soon be obstructed in carrying out the fruits of their lands, and again in fetching in those necessary supplies which the sea bestoweth upon an inland country. Let them by no means judge erroneously of what we urge as not in the least affecting them; but looking upon it as a certainty, that if they abandon the guard

“ of the maritime situations, the danger will soon advance
“ quite up to them, and they of course no less than we are
“ concerned in the issue of our present determinations. For
“ this reason they ought, without the least hesitation, to make
“ the timely exchange of peace for war.

“ It is indeed the duty of the prudent, so long as they
“ are not injured, to be fond of peace. But it is the duty of the
“ brave, when injured, to throw up peace, and to have recourse
“ to arms; and when in these successful, to lay them down
“ again in peaceful composition; thus, never to be elevated
“ above measure by military success, nor delighted with the
“ sweets of peace to suffer insults. For he who, apprehensive
“ of losing this delight, sits indolently at ease, will soon be de-
“ prived of the enjoyment of that delight which interesteth
“ his fears; and he whose passions are inflamed by military
“ success, elevated too high by a treacherous confidence,
“ hears no longer the dictates of his judgment. Many are
“ the schemes which, though unadvisedly planned, through
“ the more unreasonable conduct of an enemy turn out success-
“ ful: But yet more numerous are those, which, though seem-
“ ingly founded on mature counsel, draw after them a dis-
“ graceful and opposite event. This proceeds from that great
“ inequality of spirit, with which an exploit is projected, and
“ with which it is put into actual execution. For in council
“ we resolve, surrounded with security: in execution we faint,
“ through the prevalence of fear.

“ We now, having been grossly injured, and in abundant
“ instances aggrieved, are taking up arms; and, when we have
“ avenged ourselves on the Athenians, shall at a proper time lay
“ them down again. Success, upon many considerations, we
“ may promise ourselves: In the first place, as we are superior
“ in numbers and military skill: In the next, as we all advance
“ with uniformity to accomplish our designs. A naval force,
“ equal to that in which their strength consists, we shall be en-
“ abled to equip, from competent stores we separately possess,
“ and the funds laid up at Delphi and Olympia*. If we take

* In the temple of Apollo at Delphi, and that of Jupiter at Olympia.

“ up those upon interest for immediate service, we are able by
 “ enlarging their pay, to draw away all the foreigners who man
 “ their fleets. The Athenian power is not supported by a natu-
 “ ral but a purchased strength. And our own is less liable to
 “ be injured by the same method, as we are strong in our per-
 “ sons more than in our wealth. Should we gain the victory
 “ but in one single engagement at sea, in all probability we have
 “ done their business ; or, in case they continue the struggle,
 “ we shall then have a longer space to improve our naval
 “ practice : And when once we have gained an equality of
 “ skill, our natural courage will soon secure us the triumph.
 “ For that valiant spirit which we enjoy by nature it is im-
 “ possible for them to acquire by rules : But that superiority,
 “ with which at present their skill invests them, we may
 “ easily learn to overmatch by practice.

“ Those sums of money by which these points are chiefly
 “ to be compassed, we will respectively contribute. For
 “ would it not in reality be a grievous case, when their de-
 “ pendents are never backward to send in those sums which
 “ rivet slavery on themselves, if we, who want to be revenged
 “ on our foes, and, at the same time, to secure our own pre-
 “ servation—if we should refuse to submit to expences, and
 “ should store up our wealth to be plundered by them, to
 “ purchase oppressions and miseries for ourselves ?

“ We have other expedients within our reach to support
 “ this war,—a revolt of their dependents : and, in conse-
 “ quence of that, a diminution of their revenue, the essence of
 “ their strength ; erecting forts within their territory ; and many
 “ others not yet to be foreseen. For war by no means yields to
 “ the direction of a pre-determined plan ; but of itself, in
 “ every present exigence, confines and methodizeth its own
 “ course. In war, who moves along with a temper in proper
 “ command, hath got the firmest support : But he who hath
 “ lost his temper, is, for that reason, more liable to miscarry.

The wealth repositied in these places must have been very large, considering the great veneration universally paid these deities, and the numerous and valuable offerings sent annually to these famous temples.

“ Let us remember, that if any one single *state* amongst
“ us had a contest with its foes about a frontier, there would
“ be need of perseverance. But now, the Athenians are a
“ match for us all united, and quite too strong for any of us
“ separately to resist: So that unless we support one another
“ with our collective forces, unless every nation and every
“ state unanimously combine to give a check to their ambi-
“ tion, they will oppress us, apart and disunited, without a
“ a struggle. Such a triumph, how grating soever the bare
“ mention of it may be to any of your ears, yet be it known,
“ can end in nothing else but plain and open slavery. To
“ hint in mere words so base a doubt, that so many *states*
“ may be enslaved by *one*, is disgrace to Peloponnesus. In
“ such a plunge, we should either be thought justly to have
“ deserved it, or through cowardice to suffer it, the degenerate
“ offspring of those ancestors who were the deliverers of
“ Greece. And yet we have not spirit enough remaining to
“ defend our own liberty. We suffer one single *state* to
“ erect itself into a tyrant, whilst we claim the glory of
“ pulling down monarchs in particular societies. We know
“ not by what methods to extricate ourselves from these
“ three, the greatest of calamities, from folly, or cowardice,
“ or sloth. For exempt from these in fact you are not, by
“ taking up the plea of *contempt* of your enemies, for which
“ such numbers have suffered. The many misfortunes
“ arising from this have changed the sense of the word, and
“ caused it to stand for arrant *folly*.

“ But on the past what necessity is there to enlarge? or to
“ blame any farther than may be necessary for the present?
“ To prevent worse events for the future, we ought by im-
“ mediate efforts, with toil and perseverance, to seek for re-
“ dress. Through toil to acquire virtues, is hereditary to Pe-
“ loponnesians. This custom is not to be dropped though
“ now in wealth and power you have made some petty ad-
“ vancements: For it never can become you to let go in af-
“ fluence what was gained in want. It becomes you rather
“ upon many accounts, with manly confidence to declare

“for war. The oracle of a God prescribeth it;—that
“God himself hath promised his assistance;—and the rest
“of Greece is ready to join you in the contest, some from
“a principle of fear, and some from a principle of interest.
“Neither on *you* will the first breach of the peace be charged.
“The God who adviseth war plainly judgeth *that* to be
“already broke: You will only act to redress its violation.
“For the breach is not to be charged on those who arm to
“revenge it; but on those who were the first aggressors.

“Since then war, considered in every light, appears hon-
“ourable in regard to you, ye Lacedæmonians; since we,
“with united voices, encourage you to it, as most strongly
“requisite for our general and separate interests—defer no
“longer to succour the Potidæans, Dorians by descent, and
“besieged by Ionians (the reverse was formerly the case), and
“to fetch again the liberty of others. The business will ad-
“mit of no longer delay, when some already feel the blow;
“and others, if it once be known that we met here together,
“and durst not undertake our own defence, will in a very
“little time be sensible of the same. Reflect within your-
“selves, confederates, that affairs are come to extremities,
“that we have suggested the most adviseable measures, and
“—give your ballot for war. Be not terrified at its im-
“mediate dangers; but animate yourselves with the hope of
“a long lasting peace to be procured by it. For a peace
“produced by war is ever the most firm; but from tranquility
“and ease to be averse to war, can by no means abate or
“dissipate our danger. With this certain conclusion, that
“a *state* in Greece is started up into a tyrant, and aims indif-
“ferently at the liberty of us all, her arbitrary plan being
“partly executed and partly in agitation—let us rush against
“and at once pull her down. Then shall we pass the remainder
“of our lives exempt from dangers, and shall immediately re-
“cover liberty for those Grecians who are already enslaved.”

In this manner the Corinthians spoke: and the Lacedæmonians, when they had heard them all deliver their several opinions, gave out the ballots to all the confederates that

were present, in regular order, both to the greater and lesser *states* : and the greatest part of them ballotted for war. But, though thus decreed, it was impossible for them, as they were quite unprepared, immediately to undertake it. It was agreed therefore, that “every *state* should get in readiness their “several contingents, and no time to be lost.” However, in less than a year, every thing needful was amply provided ; and, before its expiration, an irruption was made into Attica, and the war openly on foot. But even this interval was employed in sending embassies to Athens, charged with accusations, that reasons strong as possible for making war might appear on their side, if those should meet with disregard.

BY the first ambassadors therefore whom the Lacedæmonians sent, they required the Athenians——“To drive away the *pollution* of the Goddess.” And the *pollution* was this—

There was one Cylon, an Athenian, who had been victor at the Olympic games, a person of noble descent, and of great consequence in his own person. He married a daughter of Theagenes, a Megaréan, who in those days was tyrant of Megara. This Cylon, asking advice at Delphi about a scheme he had projected, was directed by the God——“To “seize the citadel of Athens upon the greatest festival of “Jupiter.” In pursuance of this, being supplied with a party of men by Thiagenes, and having obtained the concurrence of his own friends, upon the day of the Peloponnesian Olympics, he seized the citadel as instrumental to his tyranny. He imagined *that* to be the greatest festival of Jupiter, and to bear a particular relation to himself, who had been an Olympic victor. But whether the greatest festival meant was to be held in Attica, or any other place, he had never considered, nor had the oracle declared. There is a festival of Jove observed by the Athenians, which is called *the greatest festival of Jupiter the propitious*. This is celebrated without the city, in full concourse of the people, where many sacrifices are offered, not of real victims, but of artificial images of creatures peculiar to the country. Concluding

however, that he had the true sense of the oracle, he put his enterprize in execution. The Athenians, taking the alarm, ran out of the country in one general confluence to put a stop to these attempts, and investing the citadel quite blocked them up. But in process of time, being wearied out with the tediousness of the blockade, many of them departed, leaving the care of it to the nine Archons, with a full power of "acting in whatever manner they should judge most expedient:" For at that time most parts of the public administration were in the management of the Archons. The party with Cylon, thus closely invested, were reduced very low through scarcity of bread and water. Cylon therefore and his brother privately escape. But the rest, reduced to extremities, and some of them had already perished by famine, set themselves down as *suppliants* by the altar in the citadel. The Athenian guard, having ordered them to arise as they saw them just ready to expire in the temple, to avoid the guilt of profanation, led them out and slew them. But some of the number, who had seated themselves at the *venerable goddesses*, at the very altars, they murdered in the act of removal*. And for this action not only the persons concerned in it but their descendants also were called *the sacrilegious and accursed of the Goddess*. The Athenians indeed banished those sacrilegious persons out of the city: Cleomenes the Lacedæmonian drove them out again, when he was at Athens, on account of a sedition; nay, on this occasion they not only drove away the living, but even dug up the bones of the dead, and cast them out; Yet, in process of time, they returned again, and some of their posterity are still in Athens.

* When these *suppliants* were ordered to come out, they tied a string round the altar in the citadel, and keeping hold of it were come as far as the altars of the *venerable goddesses*. Just there the string happened to break, upon which the Archons rushed in to seize them, as if Minerva had thrown them out of her protection. Some of the number sat instantly down for fresh protection at the altars of the *venerable goddesses*: It was an unavailing resource, and they were immediately slain upon the spot. *Plutarch in Solon.*

This was the *pollution* which the Lacedæmonians required them to drive away; with a face indeed of piety, as vindicating the honour of the Gods; but knowing at the same time that Pericles the son of Xantippus was tainted with it by the side of his mother; and thence concluding that if he could be removed, the Athenians would more easily be brought to an accommodation with them. They could not carry their hopes so far as actually to effect his banishment, but to raise against him the public odium, as if the war was partly owing to the misfortune they suffered in him. For, carrying with him the greatest sway of any Athenian then alive, and presiding entirely in the administration, he was most steady in opposition to the Lacedæmonians, dissuading the Athenians from any concession, and exciting them to the war.

The Athenians in return required the Lacedæmonians "to drive away the *pollution* contracted at Tænarus." For the Lacedæmonians some time ago, having caused their suppliant Helots to rise out of Neptune's temple at Tænarus, had led them aside, and slew them. And to this action they themselves impute the great earthquake, which happened afterwards at Sparta.

They further required them "to drive away the *pollution* of the Chalcicæan Pallas," the nature of which was this:—

When Pausanias the Lacedæmonian, upon his being first recalled by the Spartans from his command in Hellespont, and brought to his trial before them, was acquitted of the charge of male-administration, but was no longer intrusted with the public commission; fitting out an Hermionian trireme on his own private account, he arriveth in Hellespont, without any authority from the Lacedæmonians. He gave out that he did it for the service of the Grecian war; but his intention was to carry on his negotiations with *the king*, which, aspiring to the monarchy of Greece, he had begun before. He had formerly conferred an obligation upon *the king*, from which the whole of his project took its date. When, after the return from Cyprus, during his first appear-

ance there, he took Byzantium, which was possessed by the Medes, and in it some favourites and relations of *the king* were made his prisoners, he releaseth them all, to ingratiate himself with *the king*, without the privity of the other confederates, giving it out in public that they had made their escape. He transacted this affair by means of Gongylus the Eretrian, to whose keeping he had intrusted Byzantium and the prisoners. He also dispatched Gongylus to him with a letter, the contents of which, as was afterwards discovered, were these:

“PAUSANIAS, general of Sparta, desirous to oblige you, sends away these his prisoners of war. And by it I express my inclination, if you approve, to take your daughter in marriage, and to put Sparta and the rest of Greece into your subjection. I think I have power sufficient to effectuate these points, could my scheme be communicated with you. If therefore any of these proposals receive your approbation, send down to the coast some trusty person, through whom for the future we may hold a correspondence.”

Thus much was contained in the letter; and, on the reception of it, Xerxes was delighted, and sends away Artabazus the son of Pharnacus down to the coast, with an order to take upon him the government of Dascylis, having first dismissed Megabates who was the governor. To him he intrusted a letter for Pausanias at Byzantium, with an injunction to forward it with all possible expedition, and to let him see his signet; and that, if Pausanias should charge him with any affairs, he should execute them with all possible diligence and fidelity. Artabazus being arrived, obeyed all the other injunctions with exactness, and forwarded the letter, which brought this answer——

“THUS saith king Xerxes to Pausanias.—The kindness done me in those persons, whom from Byzantium you delivered safe on the other side the sea, shall be placed to your account in our family, eternally recorded: and with the

“ other contents of your letter I am delighted. Let neither
“ night nor day relax your earnest endeavours to effectuate
“ those points you promise me : Nor stop at any expence of
“ gold or silver or greatness of military force, if such aid be
“ any where requisite. But confer boldly with Artabazus, a
“ trusty person, whom I have sent to you, about mine and your
“ own concerns, that they may be accomplished in the most
“ honourable and most advantageous manner for us both.”

Upon the receipt of this letter, Pausanias, who before had been in high credit with the Grecians, through the lustre of his command at Plataea, was elevated much more than ever, and could no longer adjust his demeanor by the modes and customs of his native country. He immediately dressed himself up in Persian attire, and quitting Byzantium, travelled through Thrace, attended with Persian and Egyptian guards ; and refined his table into Persian elegance. His ambition he was unable any longer to conceal, but by short sketches manifested too soon, what greater schemes he had formed in his mind for future accomplishment. He then shewed himself difficult of access, and let his anger loose so violently and so indiscriminately upon all men, that no one could approach him. And this was not the least motive to the confederacy for going over to the Athenians. But the Lacedæmonians, informed of this, recalled him the first time upon the account of such behaviour ; and, when he was returned again in the Hermionian vessel without their permission, he plainly appeared to have re-assumed again his former practices. And when forced to remove from Byzantium by the opposition raised against him by the Athenians, he went not back to Sparta ; But withdrawing to Colonæ of Troas, information was given that “ he was negotiating with the Barbarians, and had “ fixed his residence there for very bad designs.” Upon this they could no longer be patient, but the *Ephori* dispatched him a herald and the *Scytale**, with an order—“ Not to stay be-

* The *Scytale* is a famous instrument peculiar to the Lacedæmonians, and used by them for the close conveyance of orders to their ministers abroad.

“hind the herald ; if he did, war was proclaimed against him “by the Spartans.” And he, desirous to clear himself as much as possible from suspicion, and confident that with money he could baffle any accusation, returned the second time to Sparta. The first treatment he met with there was, to be thrown into prison by order of the *Ephori* : For the *Ephori* have so large an authority, even over a *king*. But afterwards, by some private management, he procured his enlargement, and offers to submit to a trial against any who were willing to accuse him. The Spartans indeed had no positive evidence against him, not even his private enemies, nor the general community—none, to support them in proceeding capitally against a person of the royal descent, and at that time invested with the regal dignity : For, being uncle to Pleistarchus, the son of Leonidas, their king, though yet in minority, he was regent-guardian. But, by his disregard of the laws, and his affectation of the Barbarian manners, he afforded them strong reasons to suspect, that he would never conform to the equality then in vogue. They called to remembrance those other passages of his behaviour, in which he had at any time deviated from the institutions of his country ; and that further upon the tripod at Delphi, which the Grecians offered as the choicest part of the Persian spoils, he had formerly presumed, by his own authority, to place this inscription——

It was a long black stick, and the contrivance was this—“When the magistrates gave commission to any general or admiral, they took two round pieces of wood exactly equal to one another ; one of these they kept, and the other was delivered to the commander ; to whom, when they had any thing of moment to communicate, they cut a long narrow scroll of parchment, and rolling it about their own staff, one fold close upon another, they wrote their business upon it ; then taking it off, dispatched it away to the commander, who applying it to his own staff, the folds exactly fell in one with another, as at the writing ; and the characters, which, before it was wrapped up, were confusedly disjoined and unintelligible, appeared very plain.” *Potter’s Archæologia*, Vol. II. c. 13.

If it be asked (says the Scholiast) how Pausanias came to have the Scytale with him now, as he was abroad without the public commission ; the answer is, he had kept it ever since his former employments :

For Persia's hosts o'erthrown, and Græcia freed,
To Phæbus THIS Pausanias hath decreed,
Who led the Grecians to the glorious deed.

These verses indeed the Lacedæmonians immediately defaced from the tripod, and placed in their stead the names of the several *states* which had joined in the overthrow of the *Barbarian*, and in making this oblation. This therefore was now recollected to the prejudice of Pausanias ; and, in his present situation, it was interpreted, from the circumstances of his late behaviour, as an argument that he had been equally guilty long before. They had moreover got an information that he was tampering with the Helots, which in fact was true : For he promised them their liberty and the privilege of citizens of Sparta, if they would rise at his command, and co-operate with him in the whole of his project. But even this would not prevail : They disdained to place so much confidence in the informations given by Helots, as to run into irregularities to punish him. They adhered to the custom ever observed amongst them, never to be hasty in forming a sentence never to be recalled against a citizen of Sparta, without unquestionable evidence. At length they obtained the fullest conviction, as it is said, by means of an Argyllian, an old minion of his, and the person most in his confidence, who was to convey Artabazus the last letters he wrote to *the king*. This man, alarmed by the recollection that no person sent on these errands before him had ever returned again, having already counterfeited the seal, to the end that if he was deceived in his suspicions, or Pausanias should demand them again to make any alteration, he might avoid discovery, breaks open the letters. He found by them, that he was going on the errand his fears foreboded, and that his own murder was expressly enjoined. He carried upon this the packet to the *Ephori*, who were now more than ever convinced, but still were desirous to hear themselves, from the mouth of Pausanias, an acknowledgment of the truth. They therefore contrived, that this person should go to sanctuary at Tæna-

rus as a suppliant, and refuge in a cell built double by a partition. In the inner part of this cell he hid some of the *Ephori*: And, Pausanias coming to him and demanding the reason of his *supplication*, they heard distinctly all that passed. The man complained bitterly to him about the clause in the letters relating to himself, and expostulated with him about every particular—"why he, who had been so trusty to him during the whole course of his negotiations with *the king*, "should now be so highly honoured, as to be murdered upon an equal rank with the meanest of his tools?" Pausanias confessed the truth of all that he alleged; begged him "not to be exasperated with what at present appeared;" assured him "he should not be hurt if he would leave his sanctuary;" and earnestly intreated him, "with all possible speed to go the journey, and not to obstruct the schemes that were then in agitation." The *Ephori*, having exactly heard him, withdrew: And now beyond a scruple convinced, they determined to apprehend him in the city. But it is reported, that at the instant fixed for his arrest, as he was walking along, and beheld the countenance of one of the *Ephori* approaching towards him, he immediately discovered his business; and another of them out of kindness intimating the matter by a nod, he took to his heels, and fled away faster than they could pursue him. The *Chalciæcan* happened to be near, and into a little house within the verge of that temple he betook himself, and sat quietly down to avoid the inclemency of the outward air. They, who had lost the start, came too late in the pursuit. But afterwards, they stripped the house of its roof and doors; and, watching their opportunity when he was within, they encompassed him round about*, immured him within, and placing a constant guard around, kept him beset, that he might perish with hunger. When he was ready to expire, and they found in how bad a state he lay within the house, they led him out of the

* Alcithæa, the mother of Pausanias, is said to have brought the first stone on this occasion: Such was the spirit of the ladies at Lacedæmon.

verge yet breathing a little ; and, being thus brought out, he immediately died. They next intended to cast his body into the Cæada, where they are used to throw their malefactors ; but afterwards changed their minds, and put him into the ground somewhere thereabouts. But the God at Delphi warned the Lacedæmonians afterwards by an oracle “ to remove his body “ to the place where he died : ”—And now it lies in the area before the temple, as the inscription on the pillars sheweth—“ and, as in what they had done they had violated the laws of “ sanctuary, to restore two bodies to the *Chalciæan* for that “ one.” To this they so far conformed, as to dedicate there two statues of brass, as atonements for Pausanias.

(The Athenians, upon the principle that the God himself had judged this a *pollution*, required of the Lacedæmonians, by way of retaliation, to clear themselves of it.)

The Lacedæmonians at that time sent ambassadors to Athens, to accuse Themistocles also of carrying on the same treasonable correspondence with *the Mede* as Pausanias, which they had discovered from the papers which had been evidence against Pausanias, and demanded that “ he should be equally punished for it.” The Athenians complied with this demand. But as he then happened to be under the *ostracism**, and re-

* The *Ostracism* was a compliment of an extraordinary kind paid by the people of Athens to superior merit. When a person had done them great services, and they grew apprehensive they might possibly shew him too much gratitude, to the prejudice of their own liberties, they banished him for ten years. On some particular day each citizen gave in the name of a person, wrote upon an *ostracum* (a shell or piece of tile), whom he desired should be sent into retirement. Six thousand of these votes carried the point; and he, who had thus a legal number of votes, was obliged to quit Athens within ten days. The most disinterested patriot, and most successful commander received, for the most part, this public acknowledgment of their services. At length, a scoundrel fellow, one Hyperbolus, was thus honourably distinguished by the public voice. The Athenians thought afterwards they had profaned the ostracism by treating him like a Themistocles, an Aristides, or a Cimon, and therefore abolished this strange injurious privilege, by which wanton liberty was enabled to triumph over its best friend, public spirit. Other republics in Greece had something of the same nature amongst them. Authors vary much about the circumstances

siding chiefly at Argos, though he frequently visited other parts of Peloponnesus, they send a party along with the Lacedæmoniâns, who readily joined in his pursuit, with orders to seize him wherever they could find him. Themistocles, advised in time, flieth out of Peloponnesus into Corcyra, to which people he had done a signal kindness*. The Corcyréans expressing their fear of giving him refuge, lest it might expose them to the resentment both of Lacedæmonians and Athenians, he is conveyed away by them to the opposite continent. Now, pursued by those who were appointed to do it, and who had by enquiry discovered his route, he is compelled by mere distress to turn in to Admetus king of the Molossians†, who was by no means his friend. It happened that Admetus was not at home; and Themistocles, the *suppliant*, addressing himself to the wife, is by her directed to take their child in his hand, and sit himself down upon the hearth. Admetus returning soon after, he tells him who he was, and conjures him—"though he had formerly opposed him in a suit he had preferred to the people of Athens, not to take revenge upon an exile.—To make him suffer now, would be taking those advantages over a man in distress, which he ought to disdain—The point of honour consisted in equals revenging themselves upon equal terms—He had, it is true, stood in opposition to him, but merely in a point of interest, and not where life was at stake—But if he now gave him up" (telling him by whom, and why he was persecuted) "he deprives him of the only resource he had left to preserve his life." Admetus, having heard him, bids him

of the *ostracism*. I have mentioned those points only which are universally agreed.

* At the time of the Persian invasion, the Corcyréans had refused to join the common cause of Greece. The Grecians therefore had afterwards a design to fall upon and destroy them. But Themistocles interposed, and saved them by remonstrating, that by such proceedings Greece would be plunged into greater calamities, than it would have suffered under the despotic power of Xerxes.

† Admetus had formerly negotiated an alliance at Athens, but was rejected by the influence of Themistocles.

rise together with the child whom he held as he sat down : For this was the most pathetic form of supplication. And when, not long after, the Lacedæmonians and Athenians arrived, and pressed him earnestly to do it, he refuseth to give him up, and sends him under a guard, as he had declared his intention to go to *the king*, to the other sea by a journey over land, as far as Pydne, a town belonging to Alexander. He here met with a trading vessel bound to Ionia ; and going on board, is driven by a storm into the Athenian fleet, which then lay before Naxos. Alarmed at his danger, he discovereth himself to the master (for not one person on board suspected who he was), and telleth him the occasion of his flight ; and, unless he will undertake his preservation, threatens “ to inform against him, as one who had “ been bribed to further his escape ;—preserved he still might “ be, provided no person was suffered, during the voyage, to “ stir out of the vessel :—If he would comply, the favour “ should be acknowledged with effectual gratitude.”—The master of the vessel promiseth his service, and keeping out at sea a day and a night to windward of the fleet, he afterwads landeth him at Ephesus. Themistocles, to recompence his care, made him a handsome present in money (for there he received those sums which he had ordered secretly to be conveyed thither from his friends at Athens, and from Argos) ; and, travelling upwards from thence, in company with a Persian of the maritime provinces, he gets a letter to be delivered to king Artaxerxes the son of Xerxes, who had lately mounted the throne, the purport of which was this :—

“ I THEMISTOCLES am coming to you, who of all “ the Grecians have done the greatest mischiefs to your family, so long as I was obliged by necessity to resist the “ invasion of your father. Yet the good services I did him “ were much more numerous, when my own preservation “ was secured, and his retreat became full of hazards. My “ former generosity calls for a requital ;” (here he inserted the message he had sent to Xerxes about the retreat from

Salamis; and, that out of regard to him, he had prevented the breaking down of the bridges, which was mere fiction;) "and now, able to perform great services for you, I am "near at hand, having been persecuted by the Grecians "for my friendship to you. I beg only a year's respite, "that I may notify to you in person those points which are "the subject of my journey hither."

The king, it is said, was surprized at the spirit* of the man, and ordered him to act as he desired. The time of respite he had thus obtained he spent in making all possible progress in the Persian language, and in learning the manners of the country. When the year was elapsed, appearing at court, he became a favourite with *the king*, a greater than any Greek had ever been before, as well on account of the former lustre of his life, as the hope he suggested to him of enslaving Greece; but above all, by the specimens he gave of his fine understanding.—For, in Themistocles the strength

* The boldness and intrepidity of Themistocles hath been the subject of admiration, in throwing himself on the protection of the Persian monarch, who had fixed a price on his head. And yet he was so high in his esteem, that the night after first giving him audience, he cried aloud thrice in his sleep, "I have got Themistocles the Athenian." He afterwards acknowledged himself 200 talents (near 40,000*l.* sterling) in his debt; "For so much I promised the man that brought you to me." Themistocles soon gave him a specimen of his fine understanding. He was desired by the king to speak his mind freely in relation to the affairs of Greece: He answered by his interpreter, that "discourse, like a Persian carpet, had in it a variety of figures, which never appeared to advantage unless it was quite unfolded, but were not to be apprehended, when wrapped up in the piece." By this ingenious plea he obtained a year's respite to learn the Persian language, that he might be enabled to deliver explicitly his own sentiments to the king in his own words and method. He became afterwards so great a favourite, that the most engaging promise in future times, that the Persian monarch could make to a Greek whom he had a mind to inveigle into his service, was "that he should live with him as Themistocles did with "Artaxerxes." And yet no attachment to his royal friend ever made him an enemy to his country; nor did his disinterested patriotism, of which never man had more, ever render him ungrateful to his benefactor. Through his bounty, he lived the remainder of his life in pomp and affluence, and was used to say humorously to his children, "We had been undone, my children, if we had not been undone."

of nature was most vigorously shewn; and by it, he was so highly distinguished above the bulk of mankind, as to deserve the greatest admiration. By the mere force of his natural genius, without any improvement from study, either in his youth or more advanced age, he could give the best advice upon sudden emergencies with the least hesitation, and was happy in his conjectures about the events of the future. Whatever he undertook he was able to accomplish; and wherein he was quite inexperienced, he had so prompt a discernment that he never was mistaken. In a matter of ambiguity, he foresaw with extraordinary acuteness the better and the worse side of the question. Upon the whole, by the force of natural genius, he was most quick at all expedients, and at the same time excellent, beyond competition, at declaring instantly the most advisable measures of acting upon every occurrence. But, being seized with a fit of sickness, his life is at an end. Some indeed report, that he put an end to his own life by taking poison, when he judged it impossible to perform what he had promised *the king*. His monument however is at Magnesia in Asia, in the forum. Of this province he was governor through the bounty of *the king*, who assigned him Magnesia (which yielded him fifty talents* yearly,) for his bread, Lampsacus for his wine, (which place was in the greatest repute for wine,) and Myus for his meat. His bones are said to have been conveyed home by his relations, in pursuance of his own desire, and to have been interred in Attica without the privity of the Athenians. For it was against law to bury him there, as he had been outlawed for treason†.

* 9,687*l.* 10*s.* Sterling.

† Some authors have related, that his countrymen afterwards honoured him with a cenotaph in the Piræus. Plutarch however disbelieves the fact, and thinks it merely a presumption formed on the following verses of Plato, the comic poet.

To thee, Themistocles, a tomb is due,
Plac'd in the most conspicuous point of view;
Merchants from every port with just acclaim
Should shout thy honour, and confess thy fame;

Such an end had the lives of Pausanias the Lacedæmonian, and Themistocles the Athenian, who in their own age made the greatest figure of any Grecians.

The Lacedæmonians, by their first embassy, had enjoined, what was as amply in turn required of them, to do as hath been above recited, concerning the expulsion of the *sacrilegious*. But, coming a second time to the Athenians, they commanded them—"to quit the blockade of Potidæa;" and—"to permit Ægina to govern itself at its own discretion;" and, above all other points, insist upon this, declaring most expressly that in *this* case war should not be made.—"If they would revoke their decree concerning the Megaréans, in which they had been prohibited from entering any harbour whatever in the dominion of Athens, and from the Attic markets."

But the Athenians listened to none of these demands, nor would revoke the decree, but reproached the Megaréans for tilling land that was sacred, land not marked out for culture, and for giving shelter to runaway slaves.

At last, the final ambassadors arrived from Lacedæmon, namely, Ramphias and Melesippus and Agesander, who, waving all other points which they had formerly required, said thus—"The Lacedæmonians are desirous of peace, and

Each fleet return'd or setting out should join
In owning all the naval glory thine;
It should command, high rais'd, yon wat'ry plain,
And point that fight which gave us all the main.

I cannot end this note about Themistocles, without begging the reader to accept a translation of an epigram in the *Anthologia*, which appears to have been written with a spirit worthy of this illustrious Athenian.

Be Greece the monument; and crown the height
With all the trophies of the naval fight.
Let Persia's Mars and Xerxes swell the base;
Such forms alone Themistocles can grace.
Next, like a column of majestic size,
His acts inscrib'd, let Salamis arise.
Swell every part, and give the hero room,
For nothing small should scandalize the tomb.

“peace there may be, if you will permit the Grecians to govern themselves at their own discretion.”

The Athenians summoned an assembly, where every one was invited to deliver his opinion. They determined, after deliberate consultation on all the points in contest, to return one definitive answer. Several others spoke on this occasion, and were divided in their sentiments ; some insisting on the necessity of a war ; others, that peace should not be obstructed by *that* decree, which ought to be repealed. At length, Pericles, the son of Xantippus, standing forth, who was at that time the leading man at Athens, and a person of the greatest abilities both for action and debate, advised them, thus :—

“ I FIRMLY persevere, Athenians, in the same opinion that I have ever avowed—to make no concessions to the Lacedæmonians—though at the same time sensible, that men never execute a war with that warmth of spirit through which they are first impelled to undertake it, but sink in their ardour as difficulties increase. I perceive it, however, incumbent upon me, to persist in the same uniform advice : And I require those amongst you who are influenced by it, as they concur in the measures, either to unite their efforts for redress, if any sinister event should follow ; or else, upon a series of success, to make no parade of their own discernment. It is usual enough for accidents unforeseen to baffle the best concerted schemes ; since human intentions are by nature fallible. And hence it comes to pass, that whatever falls out contrary to our expectations, we are accustomed to throw all the blame upon fortune.

“ The treacherous designs of the Lacedæmonians, formerly, against us were visible to all ; nor are they, this very moment, less clear than ever. For, notwithstanding that express stipulation—That, upon controversies between us, we should reciprocally do and submit to justice, each party remaining in their present possessions—yet, they have never demanded justice, nor accept the offer of it from us. Their allegations against us they are determined to support by arms and not by evidence : And here they come no longer

“to remonstrate, but actually to give us law. They command
“us—to quit the blockade of Potidæa, to permit Ægina to
“govern itself by its own model, and to repeal the decree
“against the Megaréans——Nay, this their last and peremp-
“tory embassy authoritatively enjoins us—to restore the Gre-
“cians to their former independence. But, let not one of you
“imagine that we excite a war for a trifling concern, if we
“refuse to repeal that decree against the Megaréans. The
“stress they lay upon it, that, if it be repealed, a war shall
“not ensue, is nothing but a colour: Nor think there will be
“any ground for self-accusation, though for so trifling a con-
“cern you have recourse to arms; since that concern, trifling
“as it is, includes within it the full proof and demonstration
“of Athenian spirit. If, for instance, you condescend to this
“demand, you will immediately be enjoined some other con-
“descension of greater consequence, as if this your compliance
“was owing to the prevalence of your fear. But, if at once
“you strenuously refuse to hearken to them, you will convince
“them in a manner clearly to be understood, that they must
“treat with you for the future as with men who are their
“equals.

“From the present crisis, I exhort you, therefore, to form
“a resolution, either timely to make your submission, before
“you begin to suffer; or, if we shall determine for war
“(which to me seemeth most expedient), without regarding
“the pretext of it, be it important or be it trifling, to refuse
“every the least concession, nor to render the tenure of what
“we now possess precarious and uncertain. For not only
“the greatest, but the most inconsiderable demand, if au-
“thoritatively enjoined by equals upon their neighbours, be-
“fore justice hath decided the point, hath the very same
“tendency to make them slaves. But, from the posture in
“which the affairs of both parties are at present, that we may
“risk a war with a prospect of success as fine and as inviting
“as our rivals can——suffer me distinctly to set the reasons
“before you, and be convinced of their weight.—

“The Peloponnesians are a people, who subsist by their

“bodily labour, without wealth either in the purses of individuals, or in any public fund. Again, in wars of long continuance, or wars by sea, they are quite unpractised; since the hostilities in which they have been embroiled with one another have been short and transient, in consequence of their poverty. Such people can neither compleatly man out a fleet, nor frequently march land-armies abroad, abandoning the care of their domestic concerns, even whilst from these they must answer a large expence, and, more than this, are excluded the benefit of the sea. Funds of money are a much surer support of war, than contributions exacted by force. And men, who subsist by the labour of their hands, are more ready to advance a service with their bodies than with their money; since the former, though exposed, they strongly presume will survive the danger, but the latter, they apprehend, must be too speedily exhausted, especially if the war run out into a greater length than they expect, which will probably be the case. In a single battle, it is true, the Peloponnesians and their confederates are able to make head against united Greece; but they are not able to support a war of continuance against an enemy in all respects provided better than themselves; since, by one general council they are not guided, but execute their momentary schemes in sudden and hasty efforts: since, farther, having all of them an equality of suffrage, and being of different descents, each of them is intent on the advancement of a separate interest. In such circumstances no grand design can ever be accomplished. Some of them are eager to obtain a speedy vengeance on a foe; others are chiefly intent on preserving their substance from unnecessary waste. It is long before they can meet together to consult: and then, with great precipitancy they form their public determinations, as the largest part of their time is devoted to domestic concerns. Each thinks it impossible, that the public welfare can be prejudiced by his own particular negligence,

“but that others are intent on watching for himself to share
“the benefit ; and, whilst this error universally prevaieth
“amongst all the several members, the general welfare insen-
“sibly drops to ruin. But the greatest obstruction to them
“will be a scarcity of money, which as they can but slowly
“raise, their steps must needs be dilatory ; and the urgent oc-
“casions of war can never tarry.

“As for any forts they can erect within our territory, or
“their application to a navy, it is beneath us to form any
“apprehensions from thence. To effectuate the former,
“would be difficult for a people of equal strength, in a sea-
“son of tranquillity : Much more so must it be, upon the
“lands of an open enemy, and when we are impowered to
“put the same expedients in execution against them. And,
“if they should fix a garrison in Attica, they might by ex-
“cursions or desertions from us annoy some part of our ter-
“ritory ; but, whatever works they can raise will be insuffi-
“cient to block us up, to prevent our descents upon their
“coasts, and making reprisals upon them by our fleets,
“wherein we are superior. For, we are better qualified for
“land-service by the experience we have gained in that of
“the sea, than they for service at sea by their experience at
“land. To learn the naval skill they will find to be by no
“means an easy task. For even you, who have been in con-
“stant exercise ever since the Persian invasion, have not yet
“attained to a mastery in the science. How then shall men,
“brought up to tillage and strangers to the sea, whose prac-
“tice farther will be ever interrurrupted by us, through the
“continual annoyance which our larger number of shipping
“will give them, effect any point of *éclat* ? Against small
“squadrons they might indeed be sometimes adventurous, em-
“boldening their want of skill by multiplying their num-
“bers : But when awed by superior force, they will of neces-
“sity desist ; and so, by practice interrupted, the growth of
“their skill will be checked, and in consequence of it their
“fears be increased. The naval, like other sciences, is the
“effect of art. It cannot be learned by accident, nor use-

“fully exercised at starts ; or rather, there is nothing which
“so much requireth an uninterrupted application.

“If, farther, they should secrete the funds laid up at Olym-
“pia and Delphi, and endeavour, by an increase of pay to se-
“duce from our service the foreigners, who are on board our
“fleets ;—in case we were not their equals in strength, and
“they themselves and such foreigners could entirely apply
“themselves to the work :—This then might be terrible in-
“deed. But nought would it avail them now, whilst—what
“is our peculiar advantage—we have commanders Athenian-
“born and seamen to man our fleets, in larger number and of
“greater skill than all the rest of Greece together. Besides,
“in so dangerous a crisis, not one of these foreigners would
“think of bartering an exile from his own settlement, and a
“desertion to that side where the prospect of victory is not
“near so inviting, for an enlargement of his pay of few days
“continuance.

“The state of the Peloponnesians I judge to be such, or
“very nearly such as I have described it ; whereas our own
“is exempt from those defects which I have pointed out in
“them, and enjoys other great advantages far beyond their
“competition. Grant, that they may invade our territories
“by land : We too shall make descents upon theirs. And—
“whether is the greatest damage, only some part of Pelopon-
“nesus, or all Attica put to fire and sword—will admit of no
“comparison. In the former case they will have no other
“land to repair the damage, but what they must earn by dint
“of arms : Whilst we have large tracts already in our power,
“both in the islands and on the main.—Of vast conse-
“quence indeed is the dominion of the sea. But—consider
“it with attention. For, were we seated upon an island,
“which of us would be subdued with greater difficulty ?—
“And now, you ought to think, that our present situation is
“as nearly as possible the same ; and so, to evacuate your
“lands and houses here, to confine your defence to the
“sea, and to Athens itself ; and not exasperated against the
“Peloponnesians for the sake of those, to hazard a battle

“against superior numbers. Should we be thus victorious,
“we must fight it over again with another body not inferior;
“and should we be vanquished, at that instant we lose all our
“dependents, the very essence of our strength. For the mo-
“ment we cease to be able to awe them by our forces, they
“will be no longer obedient to our commands. We ought
“not to wail and lament for the loss of our houses or our
“lands, but for the lives of our people: Because lands and
“houses can never acquire men, but are by men acquired.

“Durst I presume on a power to persuade, I would ex-
“hort you to march out yourselves, with your own hands to
“execute the waste, and let the Peloponnesians see that for
“things of such value you will never think of compliance.
“I have many other inducements to hope for victory, if in-
“tending this war alone, you will forbear the ambition of en-
“larging your dominions, and not plunge into voluntary su-
“perfluous hazards. For, in truth, I am more afraid of our
“own indiscretions than the schemes of the enemy. But the
“explanation of what at present I only hint at, shall be re-
“served till due occasions offer in the course of action. Let
“us now dismiss the ambassadors with the following an-
“swer——

“That we will open our market and harbours to the Me-
“garæans, provided the Lacedæmonians, in their prohibition
“of foreigners, except us and our confederates: For neither
“was that act in us, nor will this act in them be contrary to
“treaty.——

“That we will suffer the *states* to govern themselves at
“their own discretion, if they were possessed of that right
“when the treaty was made, and so soon as ever *they* relax
“the necessity they lay upon the *states* in their own league
“of governing themselves by that model, which suits best
“the Lacedæmonian interest, and allow them the choice of
“their own polity.——

“That, farther, we are willing to submit to a judicial de-
“termination, according to treaty.——

“That a war shall not begin, but will retaliate upon those that do.

“Such an answer is agreeable to justice, and becomes the dignity of the Athenian *state*. But you ought to be informed, that a war unavoidably there will be; that the greater alacrity we shew for it, the more shall we damp the spirits of our enemies in their attacks; and, that the greatest dangers are ever the resource of the greatest honours to communities as well as individuals. It was thus that our fathers withstood the Medes, and rushing to arms with resources far inferior to ours, nay abandoning all their substance, by resolution more than fortune, by courage more than real strength, beat back the *Barbarian*, and advanced this *state* to its present summit of grandeur. From them we ought not to degenerate, but by every effort within our ability avenge it on our foes, and deliver it down to posterity, unblemished and unimpaired.”

In this manner Pericles spoke; and the Athenians, judging that what he advised was most for their interest, *decreed* in conformity to his exhortation. They returned a particular answer to the Lacedæmonians, according to his directions, nay in the very words of his motion; and in fine concluded—that “they would do nothing upon command, but were ready to submit the points in contest to a judicial determination, according to treaty, upon a fair and equal footing.” Upon this, the ambassadors departed; and here all negotiations came to a conclusion.

Such were the pretexts and dissensions on both sides previous to the war, and which took their first rise from the business of Epidamnus and Corcyra. These however never interrupted their commercial dealings nor mutual intercourse, which still were carried on without the intervention of heralds, but not without suspicions. For such incidents manifestly tended to a rupture, and must infallibly end in war*.

* As the Athenians were a free people, they made use of their liberty on all occasions to asperse, calumniate, and ridicule the great men amongst them. They were at this time exhibited on the stage by name; and Aris-

tophanes, whose plays were acted during the Peloponnesian war, hath ridiculed the cotemporary statesmen and commanders with the utmost petulance and virulence. The Athenians afterwards thought proper to restrain this licentiousness of their comic poets; but it may not be amiss in the course of the *notes* to quote occasionally some passages from him, to shew my countrymen how much writing libels differs from writing history; and that where liberty is abused, no public merit nor private worth can defend its owners from the malice of faction or the petulance of buffoons.

Our historian hath laid open the true and pretended causes of the Peloponnesian war. Let us now see, how affairs were represented on the stage of Athens. His comedy of *The Acharnians* was exhibited by Aristophanes at Athens in the sixth year of this war, after the death of Pericles. The decree against Megara is the ground-work of it: One *Dicaeopolis* of the borough of Acharnæ is the droll of the play, and amply ridicules it to a set of his neighbours—

“Do not be angry, *says he*, if though a beggar I presume to talk to Athenians about affairs of state, and for once play the tragedian. It is the province of tragedy to give a just representation of things; and I am going to speak in a just manner of very sad things indeed. Cleon will not be able to catch me this bout, for traducing my countrymen in the hearing of strangers. We are here by ourselves, and to-day is the festival of Bacchus. The strangers are not yet come, nor the tributes, nor the confederates from other states: We are here snug by ourselves, all of us true-blooded Athenians. Those odd creatures the sojourners I look upon as the chaff of Athens. And now to speak sincerely, I hate the Lacedæmonians from the bottom of my soul; and I heartily wish that Neptune, the god adored at Tænarus, would give them an earthquake, and tumble down all their houses upon their heads. They have made sad work with me, all my vineyards are quite destroyed by the rogues. But, my dear friends and countrymen here present, why do we blame the Lacedæmonians for this? And mind, Sirs, I cast no aspersions on our own state; I aim at nobody employed in the affairs of the administration, but at a parcel of sad rascals, scurvy, low, infamous scoundrels, who are eternally bringing informations against a Megaræan pair of panners. If they once set eye but on a cucumber, a leveret, a sucking pig, a sprig of parsley, or a grain of salt, they swear at once they belonged to Megaræans, and were sold that very day. These things, however, though the general practice, are of small signification. A parcel of jolly fellows, deep in their cups, had stole away from Megara that jade Simatha. The Megaræans, exasperated at the loss of their wench, made reprisals by carrying off a brace of strumpets that belonged to Aspasia. And thus this cursed war, which plagues all Greece took its rise from three strumpets. Ay, on account of three whores Olympian Pericles began to storm, he lightened, he thundered, roused all Greece to arms; he made new laws as fast as so many ballads, that the poor dogs of Megara must

"be found neither in the fields, nor the markets, nor by sea, nor by land. Upon this, being just ready to starve, away they go to Lacedæmon, to get the decree reversed which had been made on account of three whores. It would not do, embassy after embassy had no avail, and then immediately rose all this clattering of shields."

Calumny hath a dart always left in her quiver, and in another comedy of Aristophanes we find *another* let fly at Pericles. This was, his being an accomplice with Phidias in secreting some of the gold issued from the public treasury for the statue of Minerva in the citadel, the workmanship of that celebrated artist. In his comedy called *The Peace*, Mercury says—
 "Ye wise husbandmen, attend to my words, if you have a mind to know how things came into this sad confusion. Phidias was the first cause of it by cheating the public. Then Pericles helped it forwards, for fear he should share the fate of Phidias. He stood in awe of your tempers: he was afraid of falling under your censure; so, to prevent his own personal danger, he set the whole community in a flame, by lighting up first that little spark of the decree against Megara. He then blew up that spark into this mighty war, the smoke of which hath fetched tears from all the eyes of Greece, from Grecians on both sides."

Pericles had employed Phidias in adorning Athens. The fine taste of the patron and fine execution of the artist have been universally acknowledged. An accusation however was preferred against Phidias by one of his workmen, that he had secreted some gold. By the advice of Pericles he had laid it on so artfully, that it might be taken off without prejudicing the statue. The trial accordingly was made, and the gold found to answer weight. It seems, however, that Phidias was banished; because as the enemies of Pericles attacked him at the same time, for impiety in the persons of his beloved Aspasia and his preceptor in philosophy Anaxagoras, and for a cheat in that of his favourite artist, he had only influence enough to save the former, by pleading earnestly for her, and softening his plea with abundant tears.

Both Plutarch and Cornelius Nepos have recorded a third story of Pericles in relation to this war. It is this—Alcibiades, then a youth, saw him in a very pensive and melancholy mood, and demanded the reason of it. Pericles told him "great sums of public money had passed through his hands, and he knew not how to make up his accounts." "Contrive then," replied Alcibiades, "to give no account at all." And in pursuance of this advice he is said to have involved the *state* in the Peloponnesian war. But is not Thucydides more to be depended upon than a whole host of writers of scandal, memoirs, private history, and satire? If we listen to the latter, there never was and never will be any truth in history; there never was, nor is there this moment any true worth or merit in the world. A buffoon can degrade a hero, a spiteful satirist cloud every good quality in others, and the ears and hearts of men will be filled with nothing but detraction and slander.

THE
PELOPONNESIAN WAR.
BOOK II.

YEAR I.—BEFORE CHRIST 431.

HENCE instantly commenceth the war between the Peloponnesians and Athenians, and the confederates on both sides—during which they had no kind of intercourse with one another without the herald; and now, once engaged, carried it on without intermission. The particular incidents of it are orderly related by the *Summer* and the *Winter*.

The Thirty-years Peace, which was made after the conquest of Eubœa, had now lasted fourteen: But in the fifteenth year, when Chrysis had been forty-eight years *Priestess* at Argos, when Ænesias was *Ephorus* at Sparta, and Pythodorus ten months *Archon* at Athens, in the sixth month after the battle at Potidæa, and in the very beginning of the spring—a body of Thebans, somewhat above three hundred, under the command of Pythangelus the son of Phylidas, and Diemporus the son of Onetoridas, two of the rulers of Bœotia, about the first sleep got into Platæa* of Bœotia with their arms, which place was then in alliance

* Platæa was a city and petty state in Bœotia, on the confines of Attica. The inhabitants of it had ever been so firmly attached to the liberties of Greece, that it drew upon them the lasting rancour of the Thebans, who had joined the Persians when they invaded Greece, and persuaded them to burn down Platæa. The Platæans engaged with the Athenians on the side of Greece, in the famous battle fought within their own territory. The Athenians, to shew their gratitude, gave them a place in the fine battle-piece painted in the *Pæcile* in honour of the victory, made them all citizens of Athens, and ever after concluded their religious solemnities with a prayer for the prosperity of the Platæans.

with the Athenians. They were induced to this attempt, and had the gates opened to them by Nauclides, and associates, citizens of Plataea, who had formed a design, for the sake of aggrandizing themselves, to destroy all their fellow-citizens, averse to their schemes, and to gain the city for the Thebans. But the affair was managed by Eurymachus, the son of Leontiadas, a person of the greatest authority among the Thebans. For the Thebans, foreseeing a war unavoidable, had, even now while peace was actually subsisting and the war not yet declared, a strong desire to get possession of Plataea, which had been at eternal enmity with them. No regular watch was as yet kept in it, which was a means of facilitating their entrance. When they had gained admission, they drew themselves up in order of battle on the public forum, contrary to the scheme proposed by the conspirators, of marching immediately to the houses of their enemies, and putting them to the sword. Their own design was, publicly to offer some fair proposals, and gain the city by an amicable composition. With this view, their herald proclaimed aloud, that—"All who were willing to enter into league, according to the ancient custom of all Bœotians*, should come and join their arms with them." By this method they thought the city would easily be brought to an accommodation.

The Plataeans, when they found that the Thebans were already got in and had surpriszed the town, being in great consternation, and thinking the enemy more numerous than they really were, for the night prevented a view of them, came soon to a composition; and accepting what terms

* Bœotia was one large republic formed by the union of several little states. The sovereignty (as Thucydides informs us, book the *fifth*) was lodged in four *councils*, composed of deputies sent from every city in the union. These were the *states-general*, and sat at Thebes, the principal city of Bœotia. The executive and military powers were lodged in eleven persons, chosen annually, and stiled *Rulers* of Bœotia, in whose election each city had a share. They rolled, and at the battle of Delium, Pagondas was in the chief command, in right of Thebes. Plataea had no share in this union, but was closely allied with and under the protection of Athens.

they offered, made no resistance ; especially as they found that violence was offered to no man. Yet, by means of the parley, they had discovered that the Thebans were few in number ; and judged, should they venture an attack, they might easily overpower them :—for the bulk of the Plataeans had not the least inclination to revolt from the Athenians. It was at length concluded, that this point should be attempted, after having conferred together, by digging through the partition-walls of one another's houses, to avoid the suspicion which going through the streets might have occasioned. Then along the streets they ranged carriages without the oxen, to serve them instead of a rampart, and made a proper disposition for every thing necessary for immediate execution. When they had got every thing ready in the best manner they were able, watching till night began to vanish and the first dawn appear, they marched from their houses towards the Thebans, that they might fall upon them before the full light should embolden their resistance, and give them equal advantages in the fight, and that they might be more intimidated by being charged in the dark, and sensible of disadvantage from their ignorance of the city. The attack was immediately begun, and both sides soon came to action. The Thebans, when they found themselves thus circumvented, threw themselves into an oval, and wherever assaulted, prevented impression. Twice or thrice they beat them back with success ; but when the assaults were again with a loud noise repeated, when the very women and menial servants were shouting and screaming from the houses all around, and throwing stones and tiles amongst them, incommoded further by the rain which had fallen plentifully that night, they were seized with fear, and abandoning their defence fled in confusion about the city. The greatest part of them running in the dark and the dirt, knew not any of the passages by which they could get out (for this affair happened upon the change of the moon), and were pursued by men who knowing them all

prevented their escape, so that many of them perished. The gates by which they entered, and which only had been opened, one of the Platæans had barred fast by thrusting the point of a spear into the staple instead of a bolt, so that they could not possibly get out there. Thus pursued about the city, some of them got upon the walls, and threw themselves over, but most of these were killed by the fall: Some of them found a gate unguarded, and a woman supplying them with a hatchet, they cut the bolt in pieces unperceived, though few only escaped by this means, for they were soon discovered. Others were separately slain in the different quarters of the city. But the greatest part, and chiefly those who had kept in a body, threw themselves into a great house contiguous to the walls, the doors of which happened to be open, imagining the doors of this house to be the city-gates, and a certain passage to a place of safety. When the Platæans saw them thus shut up, they consulted together, whether they should fire the house and burn them all in their inclosure, or reserve them for some other punishment. But at last these and all the other Thebans yet surviving, who were scattered about the city, agreed to give up their arms, and surrender themselves to the Platæans prisoners at discretion. Such was the issue of this attempt on Plataea.

The other Thebans, who ought during night to have come up with all their strength, to reinforce the first body in case they miscarried, and were still upon the march, when the news of this defeat met them, advanced with all possible expedition. Plataea is distant from Thebes about seventy stadia*, and the rain which fell that night had retarded their march; for the river Asopus was so much swelled by it that it was not easily fordable. It was owing to the march in such a heavy rain and the difficulty of passing this river, that they came not up till their men were either slain or made prisoners. When the Thebans were convinced of that

* About seven English miles.

event, they cast their attention towards the Platæans, who were still *without*: For the people of Plataea were scattered about the adjacent country with their implements of husbandry, because annoyance in time of peace was quite unexpected. They were desirous to catch some of these as exchange for their own people within the city, if any were yet living and prisoners there. On this they were fully bent; but in the midst of their project the Platæans, who suspected the probability of some such design, and were anxious for their people yet *without*, dispatched a herald to the Thebans, representing to them—"the injustice of the attempt already made; since treaties subsisting, they had endeavoured to surprize the city;" and then warned them "to desist from any violence to those *without*. If not, they positively declared they would put all the prisoners yet alive to the sword; whereas, in case they retired peaceably out of their territory, they would deliver them up unhurt." This account the Thebans give, and say farther it was sworn to. The Platæans disown the promise of an immediate discharge of the prisoners, which was reserved for terms to be agreed on in a subsequent treaty, and flatly deny that they swore. The Thebans however retired out of their territory, without committing any violence. But the Platæans, when they had with expedition fetched into the city all their effects of value that were out in the fields, immediately put all their prisoners to the sword. The number of those that were taken was one hundred and eighty. Eurymachus was amongst them, with whom the traitors had concerted the surprize. And this done, they dispatched a messenger to Athens; and restored to the Thebans their dead under truce. And then they regulated the affairs of the city in the manner most suitable to their present situation.

The news of the surprisal of Plataea had soon reached the Athenians, who immediately apprehended all the Bœotians then in Attica, and dispatched a herald to Plataea with orders—"to proceed no farther against the Theban pri-

soners, till they should send their determination about them ; —for they were not yet informed of their having been actually put to death. The first messenger had been sent away immediately upon the irruption of the Thebans—the second so soon as they were defeated and made prisoners—as to what happened afterwards, they were utterly in the dark. Thus ignorant of what had since been done, the Athenians dispatched away their herald, who upon his arrival found them all destroyed. Yet after this, the Athenians marching a body of troops to Platæa, carried thither all necessary provisions, left a garrison in the place, and brought away all the hands that would be useless in a siege, with the women and children.

After this business of Platæa, and so manifest a breach of peace, the Athenians made all necessary preparations for immediate war. The Lacedæmonians also and their confederates took the same measures. Nay, both sides were intent on dispatching embassies* to the king†, and to several other Barbarian powers, wherever they had hope of forming some effectual interest for themselves, and spared no pains to win those states over to their alliance, which had hitherto been independent. In the Lacedæmonian league, besides the ships already furnished out for them in Italy and Sicily, the confederates there were ordered to prepare a new quota, proportioned to the abilities of the several states, that the

* By this means the intestine quarrels of Greece were going to throw a power into the hands of the Persian monarch which he could not obtain by force. Each party could cringe to the common enemy, in order to obtain subsidies from him to enable them to distress each other. And thus the balance of power rested at last in his hands, and he became for a time supreme arbiter of Greece. Aristophanes, in his comedy of *The Acarnians*, hath described these embassies and the Persian monarch too with excessive buffoonery, but quite too low and ridiculous to quote. He bears hard upon the Athenian ambassadors for lengthening out the time of their employ as much as possible for the sake of the salary paid them by the state, which is there mentioned at two drachmas a day. Was it either avarice or public rapine—this exorbitant salary of 15*½*d. a day to an ambassador from the republic of Athens to the great king of Persia?

† Artaxerxes of Longimanus.

whole number of their shipping might be mounted to five hundred.—They were farther to get a certain sum of money in readiness ; but in other respects to remain quiet : and till their preparations could be compleated, never to admit more than one Athenian vessel at a time within their ports.—The Athenians made a careful survey of the strength of their own alliance, and sent pressing embassies to the places round about Peloponnesus, to Corcyra, to Cephallene, to the Acarnanians, and to Zacynthus ; plainly seeing, that if these were in their interest, they might securely attack Peloponnesus on all sides.—The minds of both parties were not a little elated, but were eager after and big with war. For it is natural to man, in the commencement of every important enterprize, to be more than usually alert. The young men, who were at this time numerous in Peloponnesus, numerous also at Athens, were for want of experience quite fond of the rupture. And all the rest of Greece stood attentively at gaze on this contention between the two principal states. Many oracles were tossed about, the soothsayers sung abundance of predictions, amongst those who were upon the point to break, and even in the cities that were yet neutral. Nay, Delos had been lately shook with an earthquake, which it had never been before in the memory of the Greeks. It was said, and indeed believed, that this was a prognostic of something extraordinary to happen ; and all other accidents of an uncommon nature whatever were sure to be wrested to the same meaning.

The generality of Greece was indeed at this time much the best affected to the Lacedæmonians, who gave out the specious pretence, that “they were going to recover the liberty of Greece.” Every one made it both his private passion and his public care, to give them all possible succour both in word and act ; and every one thought that the business certainly flagged in those places where he himself was not present to invigorate proceedings. So general an aversion was there at this time formed against the Athenians, when some were passionately desirous to throw off their yoke,

and others apprehensive of falling under their subjection.—With such preparations and such dispositions did they run into the war.

The *states* in league with either party, upon the breaking out of the war, were these.—In confederacy with the Lacedæmonians, were all Peloponnesians within the Isthmus, except the Argives and Achæans, for these had treaties subsisting with both parties. But of the Achæans, the Pellenians singly were the first who went over, though they were afterwards joined by all the rest. Without Peloponnesus were the Megaréans, Locrians, Bœotians, Phocians, Ambraciots, Leucadians, Anactorians. Of these they were supplied with shipping by the Corinthians, Megaréans, Sicyonians, Pellenians, Eléans, Ambraciots, Leucadians; with horse by the Bœotians, Phocians, Locrians: and the other *states* furnished them with foot. This was the confederacy of the Lacedæmonians.—With the Athenians were the Chians, Lesbians, Plataëans, the Messenians of Naupactus, most of the Acarnanians, the Corcyréans, Zacynthians, and other states tributary to them in so many nations: Namely, the maritime people of Caria, the Dorians* that border upon the Carians, Ionia, Hellespont, the cities on the coast of Thrace, all the islands situated to the east between Peloponnesus and Crete, and all the Cyclades, except Melos and Thera. Of these, they were supplied with shipping by the Chians, Lesbians, Corcyréans; the rest supplied them with foot and with money. This was the alliance on both sides, and the ability for the war.

The Lacedæmonians, immediately after the attempt on Plataea, sent circular orders to the *states* both within and without Peloponnesus, to draw their quotas of aid together, and get every thing in readiness for a foreign expedition, as intending to invade Attica. When all was ready, they assembled on the day appointed, with two-thirds of the force

* These were the Dorians, who were seated in the islands of Rhodes, Cos, and Cnidus, according to the *Scholias*.

of every *state*, at the Isthmus. When the whole army was thus drawn together*, Archidamus king of the Lacedæmonians, who commanded in the expedition, convened the commanders from all the auxiliary *states*, with all those that were in authority, and most fitting to be present, and addressed them as follows——

“PELOPONNESIANS and allies, many are the conditions in which our fathers have been engaged both within and without Peloponnesus. Even some of us, who are more advanced in years, are by no means unexperienced in the business of war. Yet never before did we take the field with a force so great as the present. But, numerous and formidable in arms as we may now appear, we are however marching against a most powerful *state*. Thus is it incumbent upon us to shew ourselves not inferior in valour to our fathers, nor to sink below the expectations of the world. The eyes of all Greece are fixed attentively on our motions.—Their good-will to us, their hatred of the Athenians, make them wish for our success in all our undertakings. It is therefore our business, without placing too great confidence in superior numbers, or trusting to the presumption that our enemies dare not come out to fight us—for no reasons like these, to relax our discipline, or break the regularity of our march—but, the commander of every confederate body and every private soldier ought to keep within himself the constant expectation of being engaged in action. Uncertain are the turns of war; great events start up from a small beginning, and assaults are given from indignation. Nay, frequently an inferior number engaging with caution hath proved too hard for a more numerous body, whom contempt of their enemy exposeth to attacks for which they are not prepared. Upon hostile ground, it is always the duty of soldiers to be resolutely bold, and keep ready for action with proper circumspection.

* Plutarch informs us, that the number amounted to sixty thousand men.

“ Thus will they be always ready to attack with spirit, and
“ be most firmly secured against a surprise.

“ We are not marching against a people who are unable
“ to defend themselves, but excellently well qualified for it
“ in every respect ; so that we may certainly depend upon
“ their advancing against us to give us battle ;—not yet per-
“ haps in motion, so long as no enemy appears ; but most
“ assuredly so when once they see us in their territory,
“ wasting and destroying their substance. All men must
“ kindle into wrath, when uncommon injuries are unex-
“ pectedly done them, when manifest outrage glares before
“ them. Reflection then may indeed have lost its power,
“ but resentment most strongly impels them to resistance.
“ Something like this may more reasonably be looked for
“ from Athenians than from other people. They esteem
“ themselves worthy to command others, and their spirit is
“ more turned to make than to suffer depredations. Against
“ so formidable a people are we now to march ; and by the
“ event, whatever it be, shall we acquire the greatest glory or
“ disgrace for our ancestors and ourselves.—Let it therefore
“ be the business of every man to follow his commander, ob-
“ servant in every point of discipline and the rules of war,
“ and obeying with expedition the orders you receive. The
“ finest spectacle and the strongest defence is the uniform ob-
“ servation of discipline by a numerous army.”

When Archidamus had finished his oration and dismissed the assembly, the first thing he did was sending to Athens Melesippus a Spartan, the son of Diacritus, to try, whether the Athenians were grown any thing more pliant, since they found an army upon the march against them. But they would not allow him to come into the city, nor grant him a public audience. For the advice of Pericles had before this gained the general assent, that “ no herald or embassy should be received from the Lacedæmonians so long as they were in the field against them.” They send him back therefore unheard, and ordered him “ to quit their territories that very

day; that further, the Lacedæmonians should retire within their own frontier; and then, if they had any thing to transact with them, should send their ambassadors for the purpose." They even commission some persons to guard Melesippus back, that he might have no conference with any person whatever. When he was brought to the borders and received his dismissal, he parted from them with these words—"This day is the beginning of great woes to the Grecians." Upon his return to the camp, Archidamus was convinced that the Athenians were inflexible as ever, so that he immediately dislodged and advanced with his army into their territories.—The Bæotians sent their quota of foot and their horse to join the Peloponnesians in this expedition, but with the rest of their forces they marched towards Plataea, and laid the country waste.

Whilst the Peloponnesians were yet assembling at the Isthmus, or yet on the march, before they had entered Attica, Pericles the son of Xantippus, who with nine others had been appointed to command the Athenian forces, when he saw an irruption from the Peloponnesians unavoidable, had conceived a suspicion that Archidamus, whom the hospitable* intercourse had made his friend, from a principle of good-nature willing to oblige him, would leave his lands untouched, or, might be ordered to do so by the policy of the Lacedæmonians, as they had already demanded an *ex-communication* on his account; by which means he must

* The tie of *hospitality* was sacred and inviolable amongst the ancients. It was a necessary exertion of humanity at first from the want of inns and lodging-houses, and was frequently improved into friendship and endearment. This between Pericles and Archidamus was merely of a private nature, between the royal family of Sparta and a principal one in the republic of Athens. The family of Alcibiades was the public host of the Spartan state, and entertained their ambassadors and public ministers. The state of Athens had likewise in all places a public host who lodged their ministers. Yet amongst private persons it was a frank disinterested tie; when once they had eat salt together, or sat at the same table, they regarded themselves as under mutual obligations, which small points ought not to abolish. They who swerved from this laudable custom through caprice or ingratitude were looked upon as infamous execrable persons

certainly incur the public jealousy. He declared therefore to the Athenians, in a general assembly of the people—That “though Archidamus was his friend, he should not be so to “to the prejudice of the *state*, and that if the enemy spared “his lands and houses in the general ravage, he made a free “donation of them to the public; so that for any accident of “that nature he ought not to fall under their censure.” He then exhorted all who were present, as he had done before——“to “prepare vigorously for war, and to withdraw all their effects from out of the country—by no means to march out “against the enemy, but keep within the walls, and mind only “the defence of the city;—to fit out their navy, in which their “strength principally consisted, and keep a tight rein over all “their dependants. By the large tributes levied upon those, “*he said*, their power was chiefly to be supported, since success in war was a constant result from prudent measures “and plentiful supplies.—He exhorted them by no means to “let their spirits droop, since besides their certain revenue, “six hundred talents were annually paid them by their tributary states, and they had still in the citadel six thousand talents of silver coined*.” Their primary fund was nine thousand seven hundred talents, out of which had been taken what defrayed the expence of refitting the gates of the citadel, of other public works, and the exigencies of Potidæa.—“That, besides this, they had gold and silver “uncoined, both in public and private repositories, many “valuable vases destined for religious uses and their public “solemnities, and the Persian spoils, the whole value of

* The account here given sheweth Athens at this time to be have been a very opulent *state*. Reduced to English money it stands thus——The tribute paid them annually amounted to 116,250*l.* sterling. The fund yet remaining in the citadel was 1,162,500*l.* sterling. They had expended lately on their public works 3,700 talents, which is equal to 716,875*l.* sterling. The weight of the gold on the statue of Minerva was 40 talents, which, computing the talent only at 65*l.* Troy, to avoid fractions, and the gold at 4*l.* sterling an ounce, amounts in value to 124,800*l.* sterling.

“which would not amount to less than five hundred talents.” —He mentioned further, “the great wealth that was stored up in other temples, which they had a right to use; and if this right should be denied them, they might have recourse to the golden ornaments of the *Goddess* herself.” He declared, “that her image had about it to the weight of forty talents of gold without alloy, all which might be taken off from the statue.—That, for the preservation of their country it might lawfully be employed;” but added “that it ought afterwards to be amply replaced.” In this manner did he render them confident that their funds of money would suffice.—He told them further, that “they had thirteen thousand men that wore heavy armour, exclusive of those that were in garrisons, and the sixteen thousand on the guard of the city;”—for so large a number, draughted from the youngest and oldest citizens and sojourners, who wore the heavy armour, was employed in this service upon the first invasion of their enemies. For the length of the Phalerian-wall to the place where it joined the circle of the city was thirty-five stadia*, and that part of the circular wall which was guarded was forty-three† in length; but that which lay between the long wall and the Phalerian had no guard. The long walls continued down to the Piræus are forty stadia‡, but the outermost of them only was guarded. The whole compass of the Piræus, including Munichia, is sixty stadia§, but then only one half of this had a guard||.—He then assured them, that “they had, including the archers that were mounted, twelve hundred horsemen, sixteen hundred archers, and three hundred triremes fit for sea.”—So great in general, and

* About $3\frac{1}{2}$ English miles.

† Above 4 miles.

‡ About 4 English miles.

§ About 6 English miles.

|| The whole compass of the walls of Athens was 178 stadia, or above 22 Attic miles. But, according to Dr. Arbuthnot, the Attic mile consisted of but 805 paces, whereas the English is 1056. Hence, the compass of Athens appears to have been about 17 English miles.

no less in any one article were the military provisions of the Athenians, when the Peloponnesians had formed the design of invading them, and both sides began the war.—These, and such like arguments, was Pericles continually employing, to convince them that they were well able to carry on a successful war.

The Athenians heard him with attention, and followed his advice. They withdrew from the country their children, their wives, all the furniture of their houses there, pulling down with their own hands the timber of which they were built. Their flocks and their labouring-cattle they sent over into Eubœa and the adjacent islands. But this removal was a very grievous business to them, since it had been the ancient custom of many of the Athenians to reside at large in the country.

This method of living had been more habitual to the Athenians than to any other Greeks, from their first commencement as a people. From the time of Cecrops and their first series of kings down to Theseus, Attica had been inhabited in several distinct towns, each of which had its own *Archons* and its own *Prytanéum**; and, unless in times of danger, had seldom recourse to the regal authority, since justice was administered in every separate *borough*, and each had a council of its own. Sometimes they even warred against one another; for instance, the Eleusinians, when they sided with Eumolpus against Erectheus. But when the regal power devolved upon Theseus, a man of an extensive understanding, and who knew how to govern, in several respects he improved the whole territory; and besides, dissolving all the councils and magistracies of the petty boroughs†, he removed them to the *metropolis*, as it is at present, and constituting one grand Senate and *Prytanéum*, made it the point of union in which all centred.

* That is—Magistrates of its own, and a common-hall, in which those magistrates performed the duties of their office in administering justice, and offering sacrifices, and where they had their diet at the public expence.

† The number of the *boroughs* in Attica was one hundred seventy-four,

Their private properties he left to them entire, but made them rest contented with Athens alone for their city; which, when all its subjects were now jointly contributing to its support, was quickly enlarged, and delivered so by Theseus to the succeeding kings. In memory of this, from the days of Theseus quite down to the present time, the Athenians have held an anniversary solemnity to the *Goddess*, which they call *Synæcia* or *Cohabitation*. Before this, that which is now *the Citadel*, and that part which lies on the south-side of the citadel, was all the city. The temples built either within the citadel or without sufficiently shew it. For in the south-part of the city, particularly, stand the temples of the Olympian Jove, of the Pythian Apollo, of Terra, and of Bacchus in Linnæ, in honour of whom the old Bacchanalian feasts are celebrated on the twelfth day of the month Anthesterion*: which custom is still retained to this day by the Ionians of Attic descent. All the other ancient temples are seated in the same quarter. Near it

* The English reader may perhaps call this a hard word, but I hope will not be frightened. The names of other Attic months will occur in the sequel, which I shall leave as I find them, because no exact correspondence hath been found out between the Attic months which were lunar and those now in use. Monsieur *Tourreil*, the celebrated French translator of Demosthenes, hath made it a very serious point. "I have long doubted (says he) whether in my translation I should give the months their old Greek names, or such as they have in our language. The reason that made me balance is the impossibility of computing the months so that they shall answer exactly to our French.—My first determination was to date in our own manner; I chose to be less exact, rather than frighten the greatest part of my readers by words to which they are not accustomed. For what French ears would not be appalled at the words, *Thergolion*, *Boedromion*, *Elaphebolion*," &c.? He then gives reasons for retaining Greek ones, and adds, "I declare then once for all, that I am far from pedantically affecting the terms of an old calendar conceived in a language barbarous to numbers of people, who, shocked at the sound, would perhaps impute to me a taste which thank God I have not. I protest that to my ear, no less than to theirs, the French name of the word would be more pleasing and would sound better. But neither false delicacy nor vicious complaisance hath been able to prevail with me to expose myself to reproaches, for knowingly leading others into mistake, and using words appropriated to Roman and solar months, which have no corres-

also is the fountain, now called the *Enneakrounos* or *Nine-pipe*, from the manner in which it was embellished by the Tyrants*; but formerly, when all the springs were open, called *Callirrhæ*; and which, as near at hand, they preferred on the most solemn occasions. And that ancient custom is to this day preserved, by making use of the same water in connubial and many other religious rites. And further, it is owing to such their ancient residence in the citadel, that it is *eminently* called by the Athenians to this very day, *The City*.

In the manner above-mentioned, were the Athenians for a long series of time scattered about the country, in towns and communities at their own discretion. And as not only the more ancient, but even the latter Athenians, quite down to the present war, had still retained the custom of dwelling about the country with their families, the general removals into the city, after they were formed into one body, were attended with no small embarrassment; and particularly *now*, when they had been refitting their houses, and resettling themselves after the Persian invasion. It gave them a very sensible grief and concern to think, that they must forsake their habitations and temples, which, from long antiquity, it had been their forefathers and their own religious care to frequent; that they must quite alter their scene of life, and each abandon as it were his native home. When they were come into the city, some few had houses ready for their reception, or sheltered themselves with their friends and relations. The greater part

“pondence with the lunar or Attic.” He says a deal on the subject so little affecting his countrymen, that since his death they have again thrown all the Greek terms into the margin, and placed in the text the incongruous modern ones, for the sake of familiar sounds. If the English reader be as delicate, he may read *April* or *May* at his option. The ablest chronologers are unable to exchange them into currency with any tolerable exactness. A great deal of learning might be also displayed about the days of the month and the Grecian method of counting them: But as it is exceeding easy to translate these right, learning may be excused in a point where no light is wanting.

* The Pisistratidæ.

were forced to settle in the less frequented quarters of the city, in all the buildings sacred to the Gods and Heroes, except those in the citadel, the Eleusinian, and any other from whence they were excluded by religious awe. There was indeed a spot of ground below the citadel, called the *Pelasgic*, which to turn into a dwelling-place, had not only been thought profaneness, but was expressly forbid by the close of a line in a Pythian oracle, which said,

—“Best is Pelasgic empty.”

Yet this sudden urgent necessity constrained them to convert it to such a use. To *me*, I own, that oracle seems to have carried a different meaning from what they gave it. For the calamities of Athens did not flow from the profane habitation of this place, but from the war which laid them under a necessity of employing it in such a manner. The oracle makes no mention of the war, but only hints that its being some time inhabited would be attended with public misfortune. Many of them, further, were forced to lodge themselves within the turrets of the walls, or wherever they could find a vacant corner. The city was not able to receive so large a conflux of people. But afterwards, the *Long-walls*, and a great part of the Piræus, were portioned out to them for little dwellings. At the same time they were busied in the military preparations, gathering together the confederate-forces, and fitting out a fleet of one hundred ships to infest Peloponnesus. In affairs of such great importance were the Athenians engaged.

The Peloponnesian army, advancing forwards, came up first to Oënoë, through which they designed to break into Attica. Encamping before it they made ready their engines, and all other necessities for battering the walls. For Oënoë, being a frontier-town between Attica and Bœotia, was walled about, since the Athenians were used, upon the breaking out of war, to throw a garrison into it. The enemy made great preparations for assaulting it, and by this and other means spent no little time before it.

This delay was the occasion of drawing very heavy censures on Archidamus. He had before this been thought

too dilatory in gathering together the confederate-army, and too much attached to the Athenians, because he never declared warmly for the war. But after the army was drawn together, his long stay at the Isthmus, and the slow marches he had made from thence, exposed him to calumny, which was still heightened by the length of the siege of Oënoe: For, in this interval of delay, the Athenians had without molestation withdrawn all their effects from the country, though it was the general opinion, that, had the Peloponnesians advanced with expedition, they might undoubtedly have seized them, were it not for these dilatory proceedings of Archidamus. Under such a weight of resentment did Archidamus still lie with his army before Oënoe. His remissness was said to be owing to his presumption, that the Athenians, if their territory was spared, would make some concessions, and that they dreaded nothing more than to see it destroyed. But after their assault on Oënoe, and the successive miscarriage of all the methods employed to take it, the Athenians still resolutely refraining from the least shew of submission, they broke up the siege and marched into Attica, in the height of summer, when the harvest was ripe, about eighty days after the Thebans had miscarried in the surprize of Platæa. They were still commanded by Archidamus son of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedæmonians, and having formed their camp began their devastations. They first of all ravaged Eleusis and the plain of Thriasia. Near Rheiti they encountered and put to flight a party of Athenian horse. Then they advanced farther into the country through Cecropia, leaving mount Ægaleon on their right, till they came to Acharnæ, the greatest of all those which are called *The Boroughs* of Athens. They sat down before it, and having fortified their camp, continued a long time there, laying all the adjacent country waste.

The design of Archidamus in stopping thus before Acharnæ, keeping there his army ready for battle, and not marching down there this first campaign into the plains, is said to

be this.—He presumed that the Athenians, who flourished at that time in a numerous youth, and who never before had been so well prepared for war, would probably march out against him, and would not sit quiet whilst their lands were ravaged before their eyes. But when he had advanced to Eleusis and the plain of Thriasia without any resistance, he had a mind to try whether laying siege to Acharnæ would provoke them to come out. This place seemed further to him a convenient spot for a long encampment. Besides, he could not persuade himself, that the Acharnians, so considerable a body amongst the citizens of Athens (for three thousand of them now wore the heavy armour), could see with patience their own properties ruined by hostile devastation, without inciting all their fellow-citizens to rush out to battle. And if the Athenians would not come out against them this campaign, he might another campaign with greater security extend his devastation even to the very walls of Athens. He thought it not likely that the Acharnians, when all their lands had been ruined in this manner, would cheerfully run into hazards to prevent the losses of others, and that hence much dissention might be kindled up* amongst

* Aristophanes wrote his comedy of *The Acharnians* upon this plan, and abundantly ridiculed the public conduct as injurious to the citizens of Athens. Though it was not brought upon the stage till the sixth year of the war, it amply shews us, how the Acharnians resented their being thus exposed to the ravage of the enemy; and how the wits, that lived upon the public passions, helped still more to exasperate them, and misrepresented the measures of the ablest politicians, and who perfectly well understood and aimed at the general welfare of the whole community, as weak, corrupt, and mischievous. No care to redress, and no commiseration for the Acharnians, as *Dicæopolis* hints, who was one of that *borough*—"And what? it will be said, Can this possibly be helped? Be helped, do you say? why not? Tell me, if you can. Suppose only, that a Lacedæmonian had stood across in his skiff to Seriphus, and after killing a favourite lap-dog got off again safe:—Would ye now in this case sit still? Quite the contrary. You would immediately be putting out to sea with three hundred sail of ships: Athens would roar with the tumult of soldiers; the captains of vessels would be shouting, pay delivering, and our gold flying about. What a bustle would there be in the long *portico*! what distributing of provisions, skins, thongs, casks full of olives, onions in

them. Of these imaginary schemes was Archidamus full, whilst he lay before Acharnæ.

The Athenians, so long as the enemy remained about Eleusis and the plain of Thriasia, conceived some hopes that they would advance no farther. They put one another in mind, that Pleistoanax, son of Pausanias king of the Lacedæmonians, when, fourteen years before this war, he invaded Attica with an army of Peloponnesians, came only as far as to Eleusis and Thrias, and then retreated without penetrating any farther—that, upon this account he had been banished Sparta, because it looked as if he had been bribed to such an unseasonable retreat. But when they saw the enemy advanced to Acharnæ, which was distant but sixty stadia* from Athens, they thought their incursions were no longer to be endured. It appeared, as it reasonably might, a heavy grievance, to have all their inlands thus ravaged within their sight;—a scene like this the younger sort never had beheld, nor the elder but once—in the Persian war. The bulk of the people, but especially the younger part, were for sallying out and fighting, and not to stand tamely looking upon the insult. Numbers of them assembled together in a tumultuous manner, which was the rise of great confusion, some loudly demanding to march out against the enemy, and others restraining them from it. The soothsayers gave out all manner of predictions, which every hearer interpreted by the key of his own passions. The Acharnians, regarding themselves as no contemptible part of the Athenian body, because their lands had been wasted, in a most earnest manner insisted upon a sally. The whole city was in a ferment, and all their resentment centered on Pericles. They quite forgot the prudent conduct he had formerly planned out for them.—They reproached him as a general that durst not head them against their enemies, and regarded him as author of all the miseries which their city endured.

“nets, &c. &c. &c. all the decks would be crowded with seamen. What a dashing of oars, music sounding, boatswains bawling; nothing but hurry and confusion! Such, I am well assured, would then be the case.”

* About six English miles.

Pericles seeing their minds thus chagrined by the present state of their affairs, and in consequence of this intent upon unadvisable measures, but assured within himself of the prudence of his own conduct in thus restraining them from action, called no general assembly of the people, nor held any public consultation, lest passion, which was more alive than judgment, should throw them into indiscretions. He kept strict guard in the city, and endeavoured as much as possible to preserve the public quiet. Yet he was always sending out small parties of horse, to prevent any damage that might be done near the city, by adventurous stragglers from the army. By this means, there happened once at Phrygii a skirmish between one troop of the Athenian horse accompanied by some Thessalians, and the horsemen of Bœotia, in which the Athenians and Thessalians maintained their ground, till some heavy armed foot reinforced the Bœotian horse. Then they were forced to turn about, and some few, both Thessalians and Athenians, were slain. However they fetched off their bodies the same day without the enemy's leave, and the next day the Peloponnesians erected a trophy. The aid sent now by the Thessalians was in consequence of an ancient alliance between them and the Athenians. These auxiliaries consisted of Larisséans, Pharsalians, Parasians, Cranonians, Peirasians, Gyrtonians, Pheræans. Those from Larissa were commanded by Polymedes and Aristonus, each heading those of his own faction; those from Pharsalus, by Menon; and those from the rest of the cities had their respective commanders.

The Peloponnesians, when the Athenians made no shew of coming out against them, broke up from Acharnæ, and laid waste some other of the Athenian *boroughs*, which lay between the mountains Parnethus and Brilissus.

During the time of these incursions, the Athenians sent out the hundred ships they had already equipped, and which had on board a thousand heavy-armed soldiers and four hundred archers, to infest the coast of Peloponnesus. The com-

manders in the expedition were Carcinus son of Xenotimus, Proteas son of Epicles, and Socrates son of Antigenes. Under their orders, the fleet so furnished out weighed anchor and sailed away.

The Peloponnesians, continuing in Attica till provisions began to fail them, retired not by the same route they came in, but marched away through Bœotia. And passing by Oropus, they wasted the tract of ground called Piraïce, which was occupied by the Oropians, who were subject to Athens. On their return into Peloponnesus, the army was dispersed into their several cities.

After their departure, the Athenians settled the proper stations for their guards both by land and sea, in the same disposition as they were to continue to the end of the war. They also made a decree, that “a thousand talents should be taken from the fund of treasure in the citadel, and laid up by itself; that this sum should not be touched, but the expense of the war be defrayed from the remainder—and, that if any one moved or voted for converting this money to any other use, than the necessary defence of the city, in case the enemy attacked it by sea, he should suffer the penalty of death.” Beside this, they selected constantly every year a hundred of their best triremes, with the due number of able commanders. These also they made it capital to use upon any other occasion, than that *extremity* for which the reserve of money was destined.

The Athenians on board the fleet of one hundred sail on the coasts of Peloponnesus, being joined by the Corcyræans in fifty ships and by some other of their confederates in those parts, hovered for a time and infested the coast, and at length made a descent and assaulted Methone a town of Laconia, whose walls were but weak and poorly manned. It happened that Brasidas* the son of Tellis a Spartan had

* Here the name of *Brasidas* first occurs, and I must beg the reader to note him as one who is to make no ordinary figure in the sequel. Trained up through the regular and severe discipline of Sparta, he was brave, vigilant, and active. He was second to none of his countrymen, in those good

then the command of a garrison somewhere near Methone. He was sensible of the danger it was in, and set forwards with one hundred heavy-armed to its relief. The Athenian army was then scattered about the country, and their attention directed only to the walls; by which means, making a quick march through the midst of their quarters, he threw himself into Methone, and, with the loss of but a few who were intercepted in the passage, effectually secured the town. For this bold exploit, he was the first man of all who signalized themselves in this war, that received the public commendation at Sparta. Upon this the Athenians re-embarked and sailed away, and coming up to Pheia, a town of Elis, they ravaged the country for two days together. A body of picked men of the lower Elis, with some other Eleans, that were got together from the adjacent country, endeavoured to stop their devastations, but coming to a skirmish, were defeated by them. But a storm arising, and their ships being exposed to danger on the open coast, they went immediately on board, and sailing round the cape of Icthy's, got into the harbour of Pheia. The Messenians in the mean time, and some others who had not been able to gain their ships, had marched over-land and got possession of the place. Soon after, the ships, being now come about, stood into the harbour, took them on board, and quitting the place put out again to sea. By this time a great army of Eléans was drawn together to succour it, but the Athenians were sailed away to other parts of the coast, where they carried on their depredations.

About the same time, the Athenians had sent a fleet of thirty sail to infest the coast about Locris, and at the same time to guard Eubœa. This fleet was commanded by Cleoqualities which did honour to the Spartans; and was free from all the blemishes, which their peculiarity of education was apt to throw upon them, such as haughtiness of carriage, ferocity of temper, and an arrogance which studied no deference or condescension to others. He serves his country much by his valour and military conduct, and more by his gentle, humane, and engaging behaviour. In a word, the distinguishing excellencies both of the Spartan and Athenian characters seem to have been united in this *Brasidas*.

pompus the son of Clinias, who, making several descents, plundered many maritime places, and took Thronium. He carried from thence some hostages, and at Alope defeated a body of Locrians who were marching to its relief.

The same summer, the Athenians transported from Ægina all the inhabitants, not only the men but the children and the women, reproaching them as the principal authors of the present war. And judging they might securely keep possession of Ægina, which lay so near to Peloponnesus, if they peopled it with a colony of their own—with this view, not long after, they fixed some of their own people in possession of it. The Lacedæmonians received the Æginetæ on their expulsion, and assigned them Thyreæ for their place of residence, and the country about it for their subsistence, not only on account of their own enmity to the Athenians, but the particular obligations they lay under to the Æginetæ, for the succour they had given them in the time of the earthquake and the insurrection of the Helots. The district of Thyreæ lies between Argia and Laconia, declining quite down to the sea. Here some of them fixed their residence, but the rest were dispersed into other parts of Greece.

The same summer, on the first day of the lunar month, at which time alone it can possibly fall out, there was an eclipse of the sun in the afternoon. The sun looked for a time like the crescent of the moon, and some stars appeared, but the full orb shone out afterwards in all its lustre.

The same summer also, the Athenians, who had hitherto regarded as their enemy Nymphodorus, the son of Pythes of Abdera, whose sister was married to Sitalces, and who had a great influence over him, made him their *public* friend, and invited him to Athens. They hoped by this to gain over Sitalces, the son of Teres king of Thrace, to their alliance. This Teres, father of Sitalces, was the first who made the kingdom of Odrysa the largest in all Thrace: For the greater part of the Thracians are free, and governed by their own laws. But this Teres was not in the least related to Tereus, who marri-

ed from Athens Procne, the daughter of Pandion, nor did they both belong to the same part of Thrace. Tereus lived in Daulia, a city of that province which is now called Phocis, and which in his time was inhabited by Thracians. Here it was that the women executed the tragical business of Itys; and many poets who make mention of the nightingale, do it by the name of the *Daulian* bird. And it is more probable that Pandion matched his daughter to a person at this lesser distance from him, from the view of mutual advantage, than to one seated at Odrysæ, which is many days journey further off. But Teres, whose name is not the same with Tereus, was the first king of Odrysæ, and compassed the regal power by violence. This man's son Sitalces, the Athenians admitted into their alliance, hoping he might gain over to their side the cities of Thrace and Perdiccas. Nymphodorus arriving at Athens finished the alliance with Sitalces, and made *his* son Sadocus an Athenian. He also undertook to bring the war now in Thrace to an end, and to persuade Sitalces to send to the Athenians a body of Thracian horsemen and targeteers. He also reconciled Perdiccas to the Athenians by procuring for him the restitution of Therme: Immediately after which, Perdiccas joined the Athenians and Phormio in the expedition against the Chalcidæans. Thus was Sitalces the son of Teres, a Thracian king, and Perdiccas, the son of Alexander, a Macedonian king*, brought into the Athenian league.

The Athenians in the fleet of one hundred sail, still continuing their cruize on the coast of Peloponnesus, took Solium a fort belonging to the Corinthians, and delivered the place with the district of land belonging to it to the Paliren-

* Macedonia at this time was not reckoned a part of Greece, and both king and people were regarded as Barbarians. Alexander, father of this Perdiccas, was obliged to plead an Argive pedigree, in order to assist at the Olympic games. And Perdiccas now himself, whose successor Alexander the Great, not many years after, was leader of Greece and conqueror of Asia, was at this time balancing between the Lacedæmonians and Athenians, important to either merely as a neighbour to their colonies in Thrace. The Greek generals will be sometimes seen in this history to use the monarch of Macedonia very cavalierly.

sians, exclusively of other Acarnanians. They took also by storm Astacus, of which Evarchus was tyrant, whom they forced to fly away, and added the town to their own association. Sailing from hence to the island Cephallene, they reduced it without a battle. Cephallene lies towards Acarnania and Leucas, and hath four cities; the Pallensians, Cranians, Samæans, Pronæans. Not long after this the fleet sailed back to Athens.

In the autumn of this summer, the Athenians with all their forces, citizens and sojourners, made an incursion into the territories of Megara, under the command of Pericles the son of Xantippus.—Those also who had been cruising about Peloponnesus in the fleet of one hundred sail (for they were now at Ægina), finding, upon their return, that all their fellow-citizens were marched in the general expedition against Megara, followed them with the fleet and came up to them. By this means, the army of the Athenians became the largest they had ever at any time got together, the city being now in its most flourishing state, and as yet uninfected with the plague: For there were of Athenian citizens only no less than ten thousand heavy-armed, exclusive of the three thousand who were now at Potidæa: The sojourners of Athens who marched out along with them, were not fewer than three thousand heavy-armed: They had besides a very large number of light-armed soldiers. They laid waste the greatest part of the country, and then returned to Athens. Every succeeding year of the war the Athenians constantly repeated these incursions into the territory of Megara, sometimes with their cavalry, and sometimes with all their united force, till at last they made themselves masters of Nisæa.

In the close also of the Summer, Atalante, an island lying near the Locrians of Opus, till now uninhabited, was fortified and garrisoned by the Athenians, to prevent the pirates of Opus, and other parts of Locris, from annoying Eubœa.

—These were the transactions of the Summer, after the departure of the Peloponnesians out of Attica.

The Winter following, Evarchus the Acarnanian, who had a great desire to recover Astacus, prevailed with the Corinthians to carry him thither, with a fleet of forty ships, and a force of fifteen hundred heavy-armed, and endeavour to re-establish him. He himself also hired some auxiliaries for the same purpose. This armament was commanded by Euphymadas son of Aristonymus, Timoxenus son of Timocrates, and Eumachus son of Chrysis; who sailing thither executed their business. They had a mind to endeavour the reduction of some others of the maritime towns of Acarnania, but miscarrying in every attempt they made, they returned home. But in their passage touching at Cephallene, and debarking upon the lands of the Cranians, they were treacherously inveigled into a conference, where the Cranians falling suddenly upon them, kill some of their men. It was not without difficulty, that they drew the others safely off, and gained their own ports.

But the same Winter, the Athenians, in conformity to the established custom of their country, solemnized a public funeral for those who had been first killed in this war, in the manner as follows—

The bones of the slain are brought to a tabernacle erected for the purpose three days before, and all are at liberty to deck out the remains of their friends at their own discretion. But when the grand procession is made, the cypress-coffins are drawn on carriages, one for every tribe, in each of which are separately contained the bones of all who belonged to that tribe. One sumptuous bier is carried along empty for those that are lost, whose bodies could not be found amongst the slain. All who are willing, both citizens and strangers, attend the solemnity; and the women who were related to the deceased, stand near the sepulchre groaning and lamenting. They deposit the remains in the public sepulchre,

which stands in the finest suburb of the city ;—for it hath been the constant custom *here* to bury all who fell in war, except those at Marathon, whose extraordinary valour they judged proper to honour with a sepulchre on the field of battle. As soon as they are interred, some one selected for the office by the public voice, and ever a person in great esteem for his understanding, and of high dignity amongst them, pronounces over them the decent panegyric—and this done, they depart. Through all the war, as the occasions recurred, this method was constantly observed. But over these, the first victims of it, Pericles son of Xantippus was appointed to speak. So, when the proper time was come, walking from the sepulchre, and mounting a lofty pulpit erected for the purpose, from whence he might be heard more distinctly by the company, he thus began—

“ MANY of those, who have spoken before me on these occasions, have commended the author of that law which we are now obeying, for having instituted an oration to the honour of those who sacrifice their lives in fighting for their country. For my part, I think it sufficient, for men who have approved their virtue in action, by action to be honoured for it—by such as you see the public gratitude now performing about this funeral ; and—that the virtues of many ought not to be endangered by the management of any one person, when their credit must precariously depend on his oration, which may be good and may be bad. Difficult indeed it is, judiciously to handle a subject, where even probable truth will hardly gain assent. The hearer, enlightened by a long acquaintance, and warm in his affection, may quickly pronounce every thing unfavourably expressed, in respect to what he wishes and what he knows, —whilst the stranger pronounceth all exaggerated, through envy of those deeds which he is conscious are above his own achievement. For the praises bestowed upon others are then only to be endured, when men imagine they can do those feats they hear to have been done : They envy

“ what they cannot equal, and immediately pronounce it
“ false. Yet, as this solemnity hath received its sanction
“ from the authority of our ancestors, it is my duty also to
“ obey the law, and to endeavour to procure, as far as I am
“ able, the good-will and approbation of all my audience.

“ I shall therefore begin first with our forefathers, since
“ both justice and decency require we should on this occasion
“ bestow on them an honourable remembrance. In this our
“ country they kept themselves always firmly settled, and
“ through their valour handed it down free to every since
“ succeeding generation. Worthy indeed of praise are they,
“ and yet more worthy are our immediate fathers ; since en-
“ larging their own inheritance into the extensive *empire*
“ which we now possess, they bequeathed *that* their work of
“ toil to us their sons. Yet even these successes, we ourselves
“ here present, we who are yet in the strength and vigour of
“ our days have nobly improved, and have made such pro-
“ visions for this our Athens, that now it is all-sufficient in
“ itself to answer every exigence of war and of peace. I
“ mean not here to recite those martial exploits by which
“ these ends were accomplished, or the resolute defences we
“ ourselves and our fathers have made against the formidable
“ invasions of Barbarians and Greeks—your own knowledge
“ of these will excuse the long detail. But—by what methods
“ we have rose to this height of glory and power ; by what
“ polity and by what conduct we are thus aggrandized, I
“ shall first endeavour to shew ; and then proceed to the
“ praise of the deceased. These, in my opinion, can be no
“ impertinent topics on this occasion ; the discussion of them
“ must be beneficial to this numerous company of Athenians
“ and of strangers.

“ We are happy in a form of government which cannot
“ envy the laws of our neighbours :—for it hath served as a
“ model to others, but is original at Athens. And this our
“ form, as committed not to the *few*, but to the whole body
“ of the people, is called a *democracy*. How different soever

“ in a private capacity, we all enjoy the same general equali-
“ ty our laws are fitted to preserve ; and superior honours
“ just as we excel. The public administration is not confined
“ to a particular family, but is attainable only by merit.—
“ Poverty is not a hindrance, since whoever is able to serve
“ his country meets with no obstacle to preferment from his
“ first obscurity. The offices of the *state* we go through with-
“ out obstructions from one another ; and live together in the
“ mutual endearments of private life without suspicions ; not
“ angry with a neighbour for following the bent of his own
“ humour, nor putting on that countenance of discontent,
“ which pains though it cannot punish—so that in private life
“ we converse without diffidence or damage, whilst we dare
“ not on any account offend against the Public, through the
“ reverence we bear to the magistrates and the laws, chiefly
“ to those *enacted* for redress of the injured, and to those *un-*
“ *written*, a breach of which is allowed disgrace. Our laws
“ have further provided for the mind most frequent intermis-
“ sions of care by the appointment of public recreations and
“ sacrifices throughout the year*, elegantly performed with a
“ peculiar pomp, the daily delight of which is a charm that
“ puts melancholy to flight. The grandeur of this our Athens
“ causeth the produce of the whole earth to be imported
“ here, by which we reap a familiar enjoyment, not more of
“ the delicacies of our own growth, than of those of other na-
“ tions.

“ In the affairs of war we excel those of our enemies,
“ who adhere to methods opposite to our own. For we lay
“ open Athens to general resort, nor ever drive any stranger
“ from us whom either improvement or curiosity hath
“ brought amongst us, lest any enemy should hurt us by

* Beside the vast number of festivals, which were celebrated at Athens with pompous processions, costly sacrifices and sometimes public games, the *presidents* in course offered up sacrifices every morning constantly for the public welfare.

“ seeing what is never concealed. We place not so great a
“ confidence in the preparatives and artifices of war, as in the
“ native warmth of our souls impelling us to action. In point
“ of education, the youth of some people are inured by a course
“ of laborious exercise, to support toil and exercise like men ;
“ but we, notwithstanding our easy and elegant way of life,
“ face all the dangers of war as intrepidly as they. This
“ may be proved by facts, since the Lacedæmonians never in-
“ vaded our territories, barely with their own, but with the uni-
“ ted strength of all their confederates. But, when we in-
“ vaded the dominions of our neighbours, for the most part we
“ conquer without difficulty in an enemy’s country those who
“ fight in defence of their own habitations. The strength of
“ our whole force no enemy yet hath ever experienced, be-
“ cause it is divided by our naval expeditions, or engaged in
“ the different quarters of our service by land. But if any
“ where they engage and defeat a small party of our forces,
“ they boastingly give it out a total defeat ; and if they are
“ beat, they were certainly overpowered by our united strength.
“ What though from a state of inactivity rather than laborious
“ exercise, or with a natural rather than an acquired valour,
“ we learn to encounter danger ?—this good at least we re-
“ ceive from it, that we never droop under the apprehension
“ of possible misfortunes, and when we hazard the danger,
“ are found no less courageous than those who are continu-
“ ally inured to it. In these respects our whole community
“ deserves justly to be admired, and in many we have yet to
“ mention.

“ In our manner of living we shew an elegance tem-
“ pered with frugality, and we cultivate philosophy without
“ enervating the mind. We display our wealth in the sea-
“ son of beneficence, and not in the vanity of discourse. A
“ confession of poverty is disgrace to no man, no effort
“ to avoid it is disgrace indeed. There is visibly in the same
“ persons an attention to their own private concerns and
“ those of the public ; and in others engaged in the labours

“ of life, there is a competent skill in the affairs of govern-
“ ment. For we are the only people who think him that
“ does not meddle in state-affairs—not indolent, but good for
“ nothing. And yet we pass the soundest judgments, and
“ are quick at catching the right apprehensions of things, not
“ thinking that words are prejudicial to actions, but rather
“ the not being duly prepared by previous debate, before we
“ are obliged to proceed to execution. Herein consists our
“ distinguishing excellence, that in the hour of action we shew
“ the greatest courage, and yet debate beforehand the expe-
“ diency of our measures. The courage of others is the re-
“ sult of ignorance ; deliberation makes them cowards. And
“ those undoubtedly must be owned to have the greatest souls,
“ who, most acutely sensible of the miseries of war and the
“ sweets of peace, are not hence in the least deterred from
“ facing danger.

“ In acts of beneficence, further, we differ from the many.
“ We preserve friends, not by receiving but by conferring
“ obligations. For he, who does a kindness, hath the advan-
“ tage over him, who by the law of gratitude becomes a debtor
“ to his benefactor. The person obliged is compelled to act
“ the more insipid part, conscious that a return of kindness is
“ merely a payment and not an obligation. And we alone
“ are splendidly beneficent to others, not so much from inte-
“ rested motives, as for the credit of pure liberality. I shall
“ sum up what yet remains by only adding—that our Athens
“ in general is the school of Greece ; and, that every single
“ Athenian amongst us is excellently formed by his personal
“ qualifications for all the various scenes of active life, acting
“ with a most graceful demeanor, and a most ready habit of
“ dispatch.

“ That I have not on this occasion made use of a pomp
“ of words, but the truth of facts, that height to which, by
“ such a conduct, this *State* hath rose, is an undeniable
“ proof. For we are now the only people of the world who
“ are found by experience to be greater than in report—the

“only people who, repelling the attacks of an invading
“enemy, exempts their defeat from the blush of indigna-
“tion, and to their tributaries yields no discontent, as if
“subject to men unworthy to command. That we deserve
“our power, we need no evidence to manifest. We have
“great and signal proofs of this, which entitle us to the ad-
“miration of the present and of future ages. We want no
“Homer to be the herald of our praise; no poet to deck
“off a history with the charms of verse, where the opinion
“of exploits must suffer by a strict relation. Every sea hath
“been opened by our fleets, and every land hath been pe-
“netrated by our armies, which have everywhere left be-
“hind them eternal monuments of our enmity and our
“friendship.

“In the just defence of such a *State* these victims of
“their own valour, scorning the ruin threatened to it, have
“valiantly fought and bravely died. And every one of
“those who survive is ready, I am persuaded, to sacrifice
“life in such a cause. And for this reason have I enlarged
“so much on national points, to give the clearest proof
“that in the present war we have more at stake than men
“whose public advantages are not so valuable, and to il-
“lustrate by actual evidence, how great a commendation is
“due to them who are now my subjects, and the greatest
“part of which they have already received. For the enco-
“miums with which I have celebrated the *State*, have been
“earned for it by the bravery of *these*, and of men like
“*these*. And such compliments might be thought too high
“and exaggerated, if passed on any Grecians but them
“alone. The fatal period, to which these gallant souls are
“now reduced, is the surest evidence of their merit—an
“evidence begun in their lives and compleated in their
“deaths. For it is a debt of justice to pay superior honours
“to men, who have devoted their lives in fighting for their
“country, though inferior to others in every virtue but that
“of valour. Their last service effaceth all former demerits,

“ it extends to the public ; their private demeanors reached
“ only to a few. Yet, not one of these was at all induced to
“ shrink from danger through fondness of those delights
“ which the peaceful affluent life bestows,—not one was the
“ less lavish of his life, through that flattering hope attend-
“ ant upon want, that poverty at length might be ex-
“ changed for affluence. One passion there was in their
“ minds much stronger than these,—the desire of venge-
“ ance on their enemies. Regarding this as the most ho-
“ nourable prize of dangers, they boldly rushed towards the
“ mark, to glut revenge, and then to satisfy those secon-
“ dary passions. The uncertain event they had already se-
“ cured in hope ; what their eyes shewed plainly must be
“ done they trusted their own valour to accomplish, think-
“ ing it more glorious to defend themselves and die in the
“ attempt, than to yield and live. From the reproach of
“ cowardice indeed they fled, but presented their bodies to
“ the shock of battle ; when, insensible of fear, but tri-
“ umphing in hope, in the doubtful charge they instantly
“ dropt—and thus discharged the duty which brave men owe
“ to their country.

“ As for you, who now survive them—it is your business
“ to pray for a better fate—but, to think it your duty also to
“ preserve the same spirit and warmth of courage against
“ your enemies ; not judging of the expediency of this from
“ a mere harangue—where any man indulging a flow of
“ words may tell you, what you yourselves know as well as
“ he, how many advantages there are in fighting valiantly
“ against your enemies—but rather, making the daily-in-
“ creasing grandeur of this community the object of your
“ thoughts, and growing quite enamoured of it. And when
“ it really appears great to your apprehensions, think again,
“ that this grandeur was acquired by brave and valiant
“ men ; by men who knew their duty, and in the moments
“ of action were sensible of shame ; who, whenever their
“ attempts were unsuccessful, thought it dishonour their

“country could stand in need of any thing their valour
“could do for it, and so made it the most glorious *present*.
“Bestowing thus their lives on the public, they have every
“one received a praise that will never decay, a sepulchre
“that will always be most illustrious—not that in which
“their bones lie mouldering, but that in which their fame
“is preserved, to be on every occasion when honour is the
“employ of either word or act, eternally remembered.
“This whole earth is the sepulchre of illustrious men ; nor
“is it the inscriptions on the columns in their native soil
“alone that shews their merit, but the memorial of them,
“better than all inscriptions, in every foreign nation, repo-
“sited more durably in universal remembrance, than on
“their own tomb. From this very moment, emulating
“these noble patterns, placing your happiness in liberty,
“and liberty in valour, be prepared to encounter all the
“dangers of war. For to be lavish of life is not so noble
“in those whom misfortunes have reduced to misery and
“despair, as in men who hazard the loss of a comfortable
“subsistence, and the enjoyment of all the blessings this
“world affords, by an unsuccessful enterprize. Adversity,
“after a series of ease and affluence sinks deeper into the
“heart of a man of spirit, than the stroke of death insensibly
“received in the vigour of life and public hope.

“For this reason, the *parents* of those who are now gone,
“whoever of them may be attending here, I do not bewail,
“——I shall rather comfort. It is well known to what un-
“happy accidents they were liable from the moment of their
“birth ; and that happiness belongs to men who have reach-
“the most glorious period of life, as these now have who
“are to you the source of sorrow,—these, whose life hath
“received its ample measure, happy in its continuance, and
“equally happy in its conclusion. I know it in truth a diffi-
“cult task to fix comfort in those breasts, which will have
“frequent remembrances in seeing the happiness of others,
“of what they once themselves enjoyed. And sorrow

“flows not from the absence of those good things we have
“never yet experienced, but from the loss of those to which
“we have been accustomed. They who are not yet by age
“exempted from issue, should be comforted in the hope of
“having more. The children yet to be born will be a private
“benefit to some, in causing them to forget such as no
“longer are, and will be a double benefit to their country,
“in preventing its desolation, and providing for its security.
“For those persons cannot in common justice be regarded
“as members of equal value to the public, who have no
“children to expose to danger for its safety.—But you,
“whose age is already far advanced, compute the greater
“share of happiness your longer time hath afforded for so
“much gain, persuaded in yourselves, the remainder will be
“but short, and enlighten that space by the glory gained by
“*these*. It is greatness of soul alone that never grows old;
“nor is it wealth that delights in the latter stage of life, as
“some give out, so much as honour.—

“To you, the *sons* and *brothers* of the deceased, whatever
“number of you are here, a field of hardy contention
“is opened. For him, who no longer is, every one is ready
“to commend, so that to whatever height you push your de-
“serts, you will scarce ever be thought to equal, but to be
“somewhat inferior to these. Envy will exert itself against
“a competitor, whilst life remains; but when death stops the
“competition, affection will applaud without restraint.

“If after this it be expected from me to say any thing to
“*you*, who are now reduced to a state of widowhood, about
“female virtue, I shall express it all in one short admonition;
“—It is your greatest glory not to be deficient in the
“virtue peculiar to your sex, and to give the men as little
“handle a possible to talk of your behaviour, whether *well*
“or *ill*.

“I have now discharged the province allotted me by the
“laws, and said what I thought most pertinent to this as-
“sembly. Our departed friends have by facts been already

“honoured. Their children from this day till they arrive at
 “manhood shall be educated at the public expence of the
 “*State**, which hath appointed so beneficial a meed for
 “these and all future relicts of the public contests. For
 “wherever the greatest rewards are proposed for virtue,
 “there the best of patriots are ever to be found.—Now,
 “let every one respectively indulge the decent grief for his
 “departed friends, and then retire.”

Such was the manner of the public funeral solemnized this winter, and with the end of which, the first year of this war was also ended.

YEAR II.

IN the very beginning of summer, the Peloponnesians and allies, with two-thirds of their forces, made an incursion as before into Attica, under the command of Archidamus son of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedæmonians, and having formed their camp, ravaged the country.—

They had not been many days in Attica, before a† sick-

* The law was, that they should be instructed at the public expence, and when come to age presented with a compleat suit of armour, and honoured with the first seats in all public places.

† The historian in the *funeral oration* hath given us a very exalted idea of the Athenian *state*, and the distinguishing excellencies of that humane and polite people. The *plague*, which now broke out enables him to contrast his pieces, and give his history a most agreeable variety. It is now going to be exceeding solemn, serious, and pathetic. It is as a *historian* and not as a *physician* that he gives us the relation of it: A relation, which in general hath been esteemed an elaborate and complete performance. He professeth to give an accurate detail of it. The accuracy hath generally been allowed, but it hath been blamed as too minute. Lucretius however hath transferred all the circumstances mentioned by Thucydides into his own poem, l. 6. enlarging still more minutely upon them; and yet, this is the greatest ornament, and certainly the least exceptionable part of his poem. Lucretius, an excellent poet, affected to write with the precision of a philosopher; and Thucydides, the historian, always composed with the spirit of a poet. Hippocrates hath left some *cases* of the plague, which he hath recited as a physician; but not one of them is dated at Athens. Thucydides hath mentioned nothing of his practising there, much less of his practising with success. He says on the contrary that “all human art was totally unavailing;” and his follower, Lucretius, that “*Mussabat taci.*

ness began first to appear amongst the Athenians, such as was reported to have raged before this in other parts, as about Lemnos, and other places. Yet a plague so great as this, and so dreadful a calamity, in human memory could not be paralleled. The physicians at first could administer no relief, through utter ignorance ; nay, they died the fastest, the closer their attendance on the sick, and all human art was totally unavailing. Whatever supplications were offered in the temples, whatever recourse to oracles and religious rites, all were insignificant ; at last, expedients of this nature they totally relinquished, overpowered by calamity. It broke out first, as it is said, in that part of Ethiopia which borders upon Egypt; it afterwards spread into Egypt and Lybia, and into great part of *the king's* dominions, and from thence it on a sudden fell on the city of the Athenians. The contagion shewed itself first in the Piræus, which occasioned a report that the Peloponnesians had caused poison to be thrown into the wells, for as yet there were no fountains there. After this it spread into the upper city, and then the mortality very much increased. Let every one, physician or not, freely declare his own sentiments about it ; let him assign any credible account of its rise, or the causes strong enough in his opinion to introduce so terrible a scene—I shall only relate what it actually was, and, as from an information in all its *symptoms*, none may be quite at a loss about it, if ever it should happen again, I shall give to *medicina timore*.” The letters of Hippocrates, which mention this affair, are certainly spurious : The facts they would establish are without any grounds, as Le Clerc hath proved to conviction in his *Histoire de la médecine*, l. 3. They make the plague to have broke out first in Europe, and to have spread from thence into the dominions of the king of Persia. This is quite contrary to the account of Thucydides, and to the experience of every age. All plagues and infectious distempers have had their rise in Africa. Need I say more than that Dr. Mead hath proved it ? But whether his account of this plague at Athens be duly succinct, not too minute, serious, affecting ; and, whether Thucydides hath well managed the opportunity it gave him to moralize like a man of virtue and good sense, every reader will judge for himself. The *translator* hath chiefly endeavoured to preserve that solemn air, which he thought the prime distinction of the original.

an exact detail of them ; having been sick of it myself, and seen many others afflicted with it.

This very year, as is universally allowed, had been more than any other remarkably free from common disorders ; or whatever diseases had seized the body, they ended at length in this. But those who enjoyed the most perfect health were suddenly, without any apparent cause, seized at first with headaches extremely violent, with inflammations, and fiery redness in the eyes. Within—the throat and tongue began instantly to be red as blood ; the breath was drawn with difficulty and had a noisome smell. The symptoms that succeeded these were sneezing and hoarseness ; and not long after the malady descended to the breast, with a violent cough ; But when once settled in the stomach, it excited vomitings, in which was thrown up all that matter physicians call *discharges of bile*, attended with excessive torture. A great part of the infected were subject to such violent hiccups without any discharge, as brought upon them a strong convulsion, to some but of a short, to others of a very long continuance. The body, to the outward touch, was neither exceeding hot, nor of a pallid hue, but reddish, livid, marked all over with little pustules and sores. Yet inwardly it was scorched with such excessive heat, that it could not bear the lightest covering or the finest linen upon it, but must be left quite naked. They longed for nothing so much as to be plunging into cold water ; and many of those who were not properly attended, threw themselves into wells, hurried by a thirst not to be extinguished ; and whether they drank much or little, their torment still continued the same. The restlessness of their bodies and an utter inability of composing themselves by sleep never abated for a moment. And the body, so long as the distemper continued in its height, had no visible waste, but withstood its rage to a miracle, so that most of them perished within nine or seven days, by the heat that scorched their vitals, though their strength was not exhausted ; or, if they continued longer the distemper fell into the belly, causing violent ulcerations in the bowels, accompanied with an incessant flux, by which many, reduced

to an excessive weakness, were carried off. For the malady beginning in the head, and settling first there, sunk afterwards gradually down the whole body. And whoever got safe through all its most dangerous stages, yet the extremities of their bodies still retained the marks of its violence. For it shot down into their privy-members, into their fingers and toes, by losing which they escaped with life. Some there were who lost their eyes ; and some who being quite recovered had at once totally lost all memory, and quite forgot not only their most intimate friends, but even their own selves. For as this distemper was in general virulent beyond expression, and its every part more grievous than yet had fallen to the lot of human nature, so, in one particular instance, it appeared to be none of the natural infirmities of man, since the birds and beasts that prey on human flesh either never approached the dead bodies, of which many lay about uninterred ; or certainly perished if they ever tasted*. One proof of this is the total disappearance then of such birds, for not one was to be seen, either in any other place, or about any one

* This passage is translated close to the letter of the original. It was intended by the author to shew the excessive malignancy of the plague, as the very flesh of the dead bodies was so fatally pestilential to carnivorous animals ;—" Either they never tasted ; or, if they tasted, died." One proof of this is presumptive, arising from the disappearance of all birds of prey. The second was certain, and an object of sensible observation. Every body could see that dogs, those familiar animals who live with and accompany men abroad, either never tasted ; or, if hunger at any time forced them to it, they certainly lost their lives. Lucretius literally translates the *circumstance* itself, but hath enlarged in the *proofs*, and intimates that the distemper raged amongst those animals even without eating the flesh of the dead, and was general to every living species.

Multaque humi cum inhumata jacerent corpora supra
 Corporibus, tamen alitum genus atque ferarum,
 Aut procul absiliebat, ut acrem exiret odorem :
 Aut, ubi gustarat, languebat morte propinquâ.
 Nec tamen omnino temere illis solibus ulla
 Comparebat avis, nec noctibu' sæcla ferarum
 Exhibant sylvis : languebant pleraque morbo,
 Et moriebantur : cum primis fida canum vis
 Strata viis animam ponebat in omnibus ægram :
 Exorquebat enim vitæ vis morbida membris.

of the carcases. But the dogs, because of their familiarity with man, afforded a more notorious proof of the event.

The nature of this pestilential disorder was in general—for I have purposely omitted its many varied appearances, or the circumstances particular to some of the infected in contradiction to others—such as hath been described. None of the common maladies incident to human nature prevailed at that time ; or whatever disorder any where appeared, it ended in this. Some died merely for want of care ; and some, with all the care that could possibly be taken ; nor was any one medicine discovered, from whence could be promised any certain relief, since that which gave ease to one was prejudicial to another. Whatever difference there was in bodies, in point of strength or in point of weakness, it availed nothing ; all were equally swept away before it, in spite of regular diet and studied prescriptions. Yet the most affecting circumstances of this calamity were—that dejection of mind, which constantly attended the first attack ; for the mind sinking at once into despair, they the sooner gave themselves up without a struggle—and that mutual tenderness, in taking care of one another, which communicated the infection, and made them drop like sheep*. This latter case caused the mortality to be so great. For if fear withheld them from going near one another, they died for want of help, so that many houses became quite desolate for want of needful attendance : And if they ventured, they were *gone*. This was most frequently the case of the kind

* This passage is thus translated upon the authority of Dr. Mead, in his treatise on *the Plague*, which convinced me that the comma should be omitted in the original after *ἐρέβη*, and *δεραπειας* be governed of *ἀπὸ*. Lucretius hath given it a different turn, as if the resemblance to sheep was not in their dying fast, but to the forlorn and solitary manner in which those creatures die ; and he hath put before it what follow sa little after in Thucydides.

Nam quicunque suos fugitabant visere ad ægros,
Vitai nimum cupidi, mortisque timentes,
Pœnibat paulo post turpi morte malaque
Desertos, opis expertes, incuria mactans,
Lanigeras tanquam pecudes, et buccera sæcla

and compassionate. Such persons were ashamed, out of a selfish concern for themselves, entirely to abandon their friends, when their menial servants, no longer able to endure the groans and lamentations of the dying, had been compelled to fly from such a weight of calamity. But those especially, who had safely gone through it, took pity on the dying and the sick, because they knew by experience what it really was, and were now secure in themselves; for it never seized any one a second time so as to be mortal. Such were looked upon as quite happy by others, and were themselves at first overjoyed in their late escape, and the groundless hope that hereafter no distemper would prove fatal to them. Beside this reigning calamity, the general removal from the country into the city was a heavy grievance, more particularly to those who had been necessitated to come thither. For as they had no houses, but dwelled all the summer season in booths, where there was scarce room to breathe, the pestilence destroyed with the utmost disorder, so that they lay together in heaps, the dying upon the dead, and the dead upon the dying. Some were tumbling one over another in the public streets, or lay expiring round about every fountain, whither they had crept to assuage their immoderate thirst. The temples, in which they had erected tents for their reception, were full of the bodies of those who had expired there. For in a calamity so outrageously violent, and universal despair, things sacred and holy had quite lost their distinction. Nay, all regulations observed before in matters of sepulture were quite confounded, since every one buried wherever he could find a place. Some, whose sepulchres were already filled by the numbers which had perished in their own families, were shamefully compelled to seize those of others. They surprised on a sudden the piles which others had built for their own friends, and burned their dead upon them; and some, whilst one body was burning on a pile, tossed another body they had dragged thither upon it, and went their way.

Thus did the pestilence give their first rise to those iniquitous acts which prevailed more and more in Athens. For every one was now more easily induced openly to do what for decency they did only covertly before. They saw the strange mutability of outward condition, the rich untimely cut off, and their wealth pouring suddenly on the indigent and necessitous ; so that they thought it prudent to catch hold of speedy enjoyments and quick gusts of pleasure ; persuaded that their bodies and their wealth might be their own merely for the day. Not any one continued resolute enough to form any honest or generous design, when so uncertain whether he should live to effect it. Whatever he knew could improve the pleasure or satisfaction of the present moment, *that* he determined to be honour and interest. Reverence of the Gods or the laws of society laid no restraints upon them ; either judging that piety and impiety were things quite indifferent, since they saw that all men perished alike ; or throwing away every apprehension of being called to account for their enormities, since justice might be prevented by death ; or rather, as the heaviest of judgments to which man could be doomed, was already hanging over their heads, snatching this interval of life for pleasure, before it fell.

With such a weight of calamity were the Athenians at this time on all sides oppressed. Their city was one scene of death, and the adjacent country of ruin and devastation. In this their affliction they called to mind as was likely they should, the following *prediction*, which persons of the greatest age informed them had been formerly made,

Two heavy judgments will at once befall,
A Doric war *without*, a plague *within* your wall.

There had indeed been a dispute before whether their ancestors in this prediction read *λοιμὸς* a *plague*, or *λίμος* a *famine*. Yet in their present circumstances all with probability agreed that *λοιμὸς* a *plague*, was the right : For they

adapted the interpretation to what they now suffered.—But in my sentiments, should they ever again be engaged in a Doric war, and a famine happen at the same time, they will have recourse with equal probability to the other interpretation. It was further remembered by those who knew of the oracle given to the Lacedæmonians, that when they inquired of the *God*, “whether they should engage in this war,” his answer was, that—“if they carried it on with all their strength, they should be victorious, and he himself would fight on their side;”—and therefore they concluded that what now befel was the completion of the oracle.—The pestilence broke out immediately upon the irruption of the Peloponnesians, and never extended itself to Peloponnesus, a circumstance which ought to be related. It raged the most, and for the longest time in Athens, but afterwards spread into the other towns, especially the most populous.—And this is an exact account of the plague.

The Peloponnesians, after they had ravaged the inland parts, extended their devastations to those which are called *The Coast*, as far as Mount Laurium*, where the Athenians had silver-mines. And here they first ravaged the part which looks towards Peloponnesus, and afterwards that which lies towards Eubœa and Andros. But Pericles, who was then in the command, persisted in the same opinion as before, in the former incursion, that “the Athenians ought not to march out against them.” Yet, whilst the enemy was up in the country, before they had advanced as far as the coast, he had equipped a fleet of a hundred ships to invade Peloponnesus; and when every thing was ready, he put to sea†. On board these ships

* The silver-mines at Laurium originally belonged to private persons, but were united to the public domain by Themistocles. A great number of slaves were employed in working them, and the produce paid amply for all the labour bestowed upon them. Whether the state was much enriched by them is a question; the undertakers and proprietors of the slaves who wrought them drew great wealth from them, as we are told by Xenophon in his treatise of *revenue*.

† Plutarch relates in the *life* of Pericles that on this occasion, when all was ready, “when the forces were shipped, and Pericles himself was just

he had embarked four thousand heavy-armed Athenians; and in vessels for transporting horse, now first fitted up for this service out of old ships, three hundred horsemen. The Chians and the Lesbians joined in the expedition with fifty sail. At the very time this fleet went to sea from Athens, they left the Peloponnesians on the *coast* of Attica. When they were arrived before Epidaurus, a city of Peloponnesus, they ravaged great part of the country about it, and making an assault on the city itself, had some hopes of taking it, but did not succeed. Leaving Epidaurus, they ravaged the country about Træxene, Halias, and Hermione; all these places are situated on the seacoast of Peloponnesus. But, sailing hence, they came before Prasizæ, a fort of Laconia, situated upon the sea, around which they laid the country waste; and having taken the fort by assault, demolished it. After these performances they returned home and found the Peloponnesians no longer in Attica, but retired within their own dominions.

The whole space of time that the Peloponnesians were upon the lands of the Athenians, and the Athenians employed in their sea-expedition, the plague was making havoc both in the troops of the Athenians, and within the city. This occasioned a report, that the Peloponnesians, for fear of the infection, as having been informed by deserters that it raged in the city, and been witnesses themselves of their frequent interments, retired out of their territory with some precipitation. Yet they persevered in this incursion longer than they had ever done before, and had made the whole

“got on board his trireme, the sun was eclipsed. It soon grew so dark, that all men were astonished at so dreadful a prodigy. Pericles, seeing his own pilot quite terrified and confounded, threw a cloak over his face, and wrapping him up in it, asked, Whether he saw any thing dreadful, or any thing that portended danger? The pilot answering in the negative, What difference then (he went on) between this affair and that, unless that what hath darkened the sun is bigger than a cloak.” Pericles had easily learned of his preceptor, Anaxagoras, how to account for eclipses. But whether Plutarch hath placed this incident in right time, is a question: For Thucydides, who is exact in these things, mentions no eclipse of the sun this summer.

country one continued devastation ; for the time of their continuance in Attica was about forty days.

The same summer, Agnon, the son of Nicias, and Cleompompus, the son of Clinius, joined in the command with Pericles, setting themselves at the head of the force which he had employed before, carried them without loss of time against the Chalcidéans of Thrace. But when they were come up to Potidæa, which was still besieged, they played their engines of battery against, and left no method unattempted to take it. But the success in this attempt did not answer expectation, nor indeed was the event in any respect the least proportioned to their great preparations ; For the plague followed them even hither, and making grievous havoc among the Athenians, destroyed the army ; so that even those soldiers that had been there before, and had from the beginning of the siege been in perfect health, caught the infection from the troops brought thither by Agnon.—Phormio, and the body of sixteen hundred men under his command, had before this quitted Chalcidico, so that Agnon sailed back with the ships to Athens, of his four thousand men the plague having swept away one thousand and fifty in about forty days : But the soldiers who were there before were left to carry on the siege of Potidæa.

After the second incursion of the Peloponnesians, the Athenians, whose lands were now a second time laid waste, who felt the double affliction of pestilence and war, had entirely changed their sentiments of things. The blame was universally thrown on Pericles, as if at his instigation they had engaged in this war, and by him had been plunged in all these calamities. They desired with impatience to make up the breach with the Lacedæmonians ; but though they dispatched an embassy for this purpose no terms could be agreed on. Thus grievously distressed, and no method of resource occurring to their minds, their resentments fell still heavier on Pericles. He, seeing them quite dispirited with their present misfortunes, and intent on such projects as he had reason

to expect they would, called a general assembly of the people, which, by still continuing in the command of the army, he was authorised to do. He had a mind to encourage them, to soothe the hot resentments fermenting in their breasts, and bring them into a more calm and confident temper. He presented himself before them, and spoke as follows——

“ I FULLY expected, I freely own it, to become the
“ object of your resentments. I am not ignorant of the
“ causes of it; and for this purpose have convened *this* as-
“ ssembly, to expostulate with, nay even to reprimand you,
“ if without any reason you make me the mark of your dis-
“ pleasure, or cowardly sink under the weight of your mis-
“ fortunes: For it is my firm opinion, that by the full health
“ and vigour of a *state* the happiness of its constituents is
“ better secured, than when each separate member is thriv-
“ ing whilst the public welfare totters. Be the situation of
“ any private person prosperous and fine as his heart can
“ wish—if his country be ruined, he himself must neces-
“ sarily be involved in that ruin. But he that is unfortunate
“ in a flourishing community, may soon catch hold of expe-
“ dients of redress. When therefore your country is able
“ to support the misfortunes of its every member, and yet
“ each of those members must needs be involved in the
“ ruin of his country, why will you not join and unite
“ your efforts to prevent that ruin—and not (as you are
“ now going to do, because confounded with your do-
“ mestic misfortunes) basely desert the public safety, and
“ cast the most unjust of censures upon me who advised
“ this war, upon your own selves also who approved this
“ advice? What—I am the man that must singly stand the
“ storm of your anger?—I am indeed the man who I
“ am confident is not inferior to any one amongst you in
“ knowing what ought to be known, and in speaking what
“ ought to be spoke, who sincerely loves his country, and is
“ superior to all the sordid views of interest. For he who

“thinks aright, and yet cannot communicate his own thoughts,
“is just as insignificant as if he could not think at all. He
“that enjoys both these faculties in perfection, and yet is an
“enemy to his country, will in like manner, never say any
“thing for his country’s good : Or, though he love his coun-
“try, and be not proof against corruption, he may prostitute
“every thing to his own avarice. If therefore you judged
“my qualifications in all these respects to be in some mode-
“rate degree superior to those of other men, and were thus
“drawn into a war by my advice, there can certainly be no
“reason why I should be accused of having done you wrong.
“Those indeed who are already in the fast possession of all
“the ends attainable by war must make a foolish choice if
“they run to arms : But, if once under a necessity, either
“through tame submission to be enslaved by a neighbour-
“power, or by a brave resistance to get the mastery over
“them—he who flies danger in such a case, is much more
“worthy of reproach than he who meets it with bold defiance.

“I indeed am the man I was, and of the mind I was.
“It is you whose resolutions have wavered ;—you who,
“whilst unhurt, through my persuasion resolved on war, and
“repent so soon as you feel its strokes—who measure the
“soundness of my advice by the weakness of your own judg-
“ments, and therefore condemn it, because the present disasters
“have so entirely engaged the whole of your attention, that
“you have none left to perceive the high importance of it to
“the public. Cruel indeed is that reverse of fortune which
“hath so suddenly afflicted you, dejecting your minds and
“dispiriting your former resolutions ! Accidents sudden and
“unforeseen and so opposite to that event you might reasona-
“bly have expected, enslave the mind ;—which hath been your
“case in all the late contingencies, and more particularly so
“in this grievous pestilence. Yet men who are the constitu-
“ents of such a mighty *State*, and whose manners have been
“by education formed for its support, ought never to want
“that inward fortitude which can stem the greatest of afflic-

“ tions, nor by self-desertion utterly to efface their native dig-
 “ nity. The world will always have equal reason to condemn
 “ the person who sinks from a height of glory by his own
 “ pusillanimity, and to hate the person who impudently pre-
 “ tends to what he never can deserve. It must be therefore
 “ your duty to suppress this too keen a sensibility of your own
 “ private losses, and with united fortitude to act in the de-
 “ fence of the public safety. Let us therefore bravely un-
 “ dergo the toils of this war ; and if the toil increaseth, let
 “ our resolution increase with it. And let these, added to all
 “ those other proofs of my integrity I have exhibited on other
 “ occasions, suffice to convince you that your present censures
 “ and suspicions of me are rash and groundless.

“ I shall now lay before you a *point*, which, so far as I
 “ can judge, you have as yet never properly considered, nor
 “ have I in any former discourse insisted upon—“ the
 “ means within your reach, of rising to supreme dominion.”
 “ Nor should I meddle even now with a point*, pompous be-
 “ yond poetic visions, did I not see you beyond measure fear-
 “ ful and dejected. You think you are only masters of your
 “ own dependents ; but I loudly aver that you are greater
 “ masters now both at land and sea, those necessary spheres
 “ for carrying on the services of life, than any other power ;
 “ and may be greater yet, if so inclined. There is not now
 “ a king, there is not any nation in the universal world, able
 “ to withstand that navy, which at this juncture you can

* Pericles here is about to convince the Athenians, that they may rise to supreme dominion in consequence of their naval superiority. It was his ambition to execute the grand extensive plan which was formed originally by Themistocles. And the words, in which he introduceth this topic are so full of energy, that they bear hard upon a translator. He calls it a *point*—*Κομπωδεσέραν έχοντι τῷ προσπίησιν*. My first attempts at them were very faint and imperfect. I was soon convinced of it by the greatest *genius* of the age, who did me the honour to read over this speech in manuscript, and who, as he thinks and speaks like Pericles, could not endure that any of his words should be depreciated. I hope now I have expressed all the ideas which the original words include. Mr. *Hobbes* hath entirely dropped them in his translation.

“launch out to sea. Why is not this extensive power regarded in balancing the loss of your houses and lands, those intolerable damages which you think you have suffered?—It is not so reasonable to grieve and despond under such petty losses, as to despise from the thought, that they are merely the trappings and embellishments of wealth; to fix the firm remembrance within us, that liberty, in defence of which we are ready to hazard our all, will easily give us those trifles again; and that by tamely submitting to our enemies, the possession of all we have will be taken from us. We ought not in either of these respects to degenerate from our fathers. By toil and toil alone they gained these valuable acquisitions, defended themselves in the possession, and bequeathed the precious inheritance to us. And to lose the advantages we have possessed will be much more disgraceful than to have miscarried in their pursuit. But we ought to encounter our enemies not with valour only, but with confidence of success. Valour starts up even in a coward, if he once prevails through lucky ignorance; but *such* a confidence must be in every mind, which is seriously convinced of its own superiority, as is now our case. Nay even when the match is equal, the certainty of what must be done arising from an inward bravery, adds the greater security to courage. Confidence then is not built on hope, which acts only in uncertainty, but on the sedate determination of what it is able to perform, an assurance of which is more guarded against disappointments.

“It is further your duty to support the public *character* (as in it to a man you pride yourselves) with which its extensive rule invests our community, and either not to fly from toils, or never to aim at glory. Think not you have only one point at stake, the alternative of slavery instead of freedom; but think also of the utter loss of sovereignty, and the danger of vengeance for all the offences you have given in the practice of it. To resign it is not in your

“power,—and of this let *him* be assured, who refines
“through fear, and hopes to earn indemnity by exerting it
“no longer. In your hands it hath run out into a kind of
“tyranny. To take it up seems indeed unjust, but to lay it
“down is exceeding dangerous. And if such dastardly
“souls could persuade others, they would soon bring this
“*state* to utter ruin, or indeed any other, where they were
“members and enjoyed the chief administration of affairs.
“For the undisturbed and quiet life will be of short continu-
“ance without the interposition of a vigilant activity. Sla-
“very is never to be endured by a *state* that once hath go-
“vernèd—such a situation can be tolerable only to *that* which
“hath ever been dependent.

“Suffer not yourselves therefore to be seduced by men
“of such mean and groveling tempers, nor level your re-
“sentments at me—since, though I advised the war, it was
“not begun without your approbation—if the enemy hath
“invaded in such a manner as you could not but expect
“from your own resolutions never to be dependent. What
“though beyond our apprehensions we have suffered the
“sad visitation of pestilence!—Such misfortunes no hu-
“man foresight will be able to prevent—though I know
“that even *this* hath in some measure served to sharpen
“your aversion to me. But if this be just, I claim as my
“lawful right the glory of all those happy contingencies,
“which may ever befall you beyond your expectation. The
“evils inflicted by heaven must be borne with patient resig-
“nation; and the evils by enemies with manly fortitude.
“Such rational behaviour hath hitherto been habitual in
“Athens; let it not now be reversed by you;—by you,
“who know to what a pitch of excellence this *State* hath
“rose in the esteem of the world, by not yielding to adver-
“sity, but by braving all the horrors of war, and pouring
“forth its blood in the glorious cause, hath reached the
“highest summit of power, and ever since retained it. The
“memory of this, time itself will never be able to efface,

“ even though we may suffer it to droop and perish in our
“ hands—as what is human must decline—Our memory, I say,
“ who, though Grecians ourselves, gave laws to all other Gre-
“ cians, stood the shock of most formidable wars, resisted
“ them all when combined against us, conquered them all when
“ separately engaged, and maintained ourselves in possession
“ of the most flourishing and most powerful *State* in the world.
“ *These* things let the indolent and sluggish soul condemn, but
“ *these* let the active and industrious strive to emulate, for
“ *these* they who cannot attain will envy.

“ To be censured and maligned for a time, hath been the
“ fate of all those whose merit hath raised them above the
“ common level ;—but wise and judicious is the man who, en-
“ joying the superiority, despiseth the envy. An aversion so
“ conceived will never last. His merit soon breaks forth in all
“ its splendour, and his glory is afterwards handed down to
“ posterity never to be forgot. You, who have so clear a pros-
“ pect before you, both of what will be some time glorious, and
“ of what at present is not disgraceful, recollect your own
“ worth and secure both. Sink not so low as to petition terms
“ from the Lacedæmonians ; nor let them imagine that you feel
“ the weight of your present misfortunes. The man whose re-
“ solution never sinks before it, but strives by a brave opposi-
“ tion to repel calamity, *such*—whether in a public or private
“ capacity—must be acknowledged to be the worthiest man.”

By arguments like these did Pericles endeavour to mollify the resentments of the Athenians against himself, and to divert their minds from their public calamities. In regard to the public, they seemed to be satisfied with all that he had urged ; they desisted from soliciting an accommodation with the Lacedæmonians ; and were more hearty than ever for continuing the war. Yet, in their own private concerns, they were grievously dejected under their present misfortunes. The poor citizens who had but little, could not bear with patience the loss of that little. The rich and the great regretted the loss of their estates, with their country-seats and splendid furniture ;—but

worst of all, that instead of peace they had the sad alternative of war. However, neither poor nor rich abated their displeasure to Pericles, till they had laid upon him a pecuniary fine*. And yet, no long time after—so unsteady are the humours of the people—they elected him *general* again, and intrusted him with the administration of affairs. The keen sense they had at first of their own private losses soon grew blunt and unaffecting, and they could not but allow him the most capable person to provide for all the urgent necessities of the public. For the supreme authority he enjoyed in times of peace he had exercised with great moderation; he was vigilant and active for the good of the community, which never made so great a figure as under his administration; and after war broke out it is plain he best knew the reach of its ability to carry it on. He lived two years and six months from its commencement: and after his death†, his judicious foresight in regard to this

* Plutarch (in the *life* of Pericles) says, authors are not agreed about the quantity of the fine at this time laid upon Pericles. Some lower it to fifteen talents, others mount it up to fifty. The demagogue, who incited the people to fine him, is also said by some to have been *Cleon*, with whose genius and character the reader will soon become acquainted.

† As the historian is here going to take his leave of Pericles, he adjoins a true representation of his patriot spirit, his great abilities, his judicious foresight, and successful administration. And here the reader may be informed of some points, which Thucydides either thought needless when he wrote, or foreign to his subject.—Pericles had two sons by his former wife. The eldest of them proved a great vexation to his father, who was unable to support him in his expensive way of living. Pericles had no large estate, and he was not richer for fingering the public money. He laid it all out in adorning his Athens, and was rewarded for it by giving so many magnificent and lasting proofs of his fine taste in painting, sculpture, and building. For the city of Rome received not so much decoration from her foundation till the time of the Cæsars, as Athens did from Pericles alone. Yet economy was his passion at home, as that of his son Xantippus was luxury. This son however was taken off by the plague, as was afterwards a sister of Pericles, most of his intimates and relations, and his other son Paralus. This last was the heaviest blow; he felt it deeply: And all Athens did all that lay in their power to comfort him, since, contrary to a law of Pericles' own making, they enrolled his son Pericles, whom he had by Aspasia, an Athenian of the full blood. At length he was seized himself by the plague; and, after languishing a long time, in a manner differ-

war was more and more acknowledged. For he had assured them they could not fail of success, provided they would not meddle by land, but apply themselves solely to their navy, without being solicitous to enlarge their territories in this war, or exposing Athens itself to danger. But they had recourse to schemes quite opposite to these, nay even to some that had no connexion at all with this war, wherein private ambition or private interest pushed them to such management as was highly prejudicial to themselves and their allies. Whenever these politic schemes succeeded, private persons carried off all the honour and advantage ;—whenever they miscarried, the hardships of the war fell more severely on the *State*. The reason was this—Pericles, a man of acknowledged worth and ability, and whose integrity was undoubtedly proof against corruption, kept the people in order by a gentle management, and was not so much directed by them as their principal director. He had not worked himself into power by indirect methods, and therefore was not obliged to sooth and

ent to most others, died of it. In his last moments he shewed to a friend who was visiting him a charm which the women had hung about his neck, as if he was sick indeed when he could submit to such foolery. When several of them were sitting round his bed, and, thinking he did not hear them, were enumerating the great exploits of his life, the shining incidents of his administration, his victories, and the nine trophies he had erected, he interrupted them with these words, “ I wonder you lay stress upon such “ actions, in which fortune claims a share along with me, and which many “ others have performed as well as myself, and yet pass over the highest “ glory and most valuable part of my character, that no citizen of Athens “ ever put on mourning through me.” The wonderful man, though engaged forty years in business, and constantly attacked by every furious, seditious, and turbulent Athenian, had never amidst all his power given way to the spirit of revenge. For this, as Plutarch finely observes, he in some measure deserved the lofty title of *Olympian*, too arrogant in any other light for man to wear ; since gentleness of manners and the habits of mercy and forgiveness raise men to the nearest resemblance of the Gods. Plutarch adds, that the Athenians never regretted any man so much, and with so much reason.—If the reader be willing to hear any more of Aspasia, the same writer tells us, that after the death of Pericles, she married one Lysicles, a low and obscure man and a dealer in cattle, whom however she improved into an Athenian of the first class.

honour their caprices, but could contradict and disregard their anger with peculiar dignity. Whenever he saw them bent on projects injurious or unreasonable, he terrified them so by the force of his eloquence, that he made them tremble and desist; and when they were disquieted by groundless apprehensions, he animated them afresh into brave resolution. The *State* under him, though stiled a democracy, was in fact a monarchy. His successors, more on a level with one another, and yet every one affecting to be chief, were forced to cajole the people, and so to neglect the concerns of the public. This was the source of many grievous errors, as must unavoidably be the case in a great community and possessed of large dominion;—but in particular of the expedition to Sicily; the ill conduct of which did not appear so flagrantly in relation to those against whom it was undertaken, as to the authors and movers of it, who knew not how to make the proper provision for those who were employed in it. For engaged in their own private contests for power with the people, they had not sufficient attention to the army abroad, and at home were embroiled in mutual altercations. Yet, notwithstanding the miscarriage in Sicily, in which they lost their army with the greater part of their fleet, and the sedition which instantly broke out in Athens, they bravely resisted for three years together, not only their first enemies in the war, but the Sicilians also in conjunction with them, the greater part of their dependents revolted from them, and at length Cyrus *the king's* son, who favouring the Peloponnesians, supplied them with money for the service of their fleet;—nor would at last be conquered, till by their own intestine feuds they were utterly disabled from resisting longer. So much better than any other person was Pericles acquainted with their strength, when he marked out such a conduct to them as would infallibly have enabled the Athenian *State* to have continued the war longer than the Peloponnesians could possibly have done.

The Lacedæmonians, in junction with their allies, the same summer fitted out a fleet of one hundred ships against

the island Zacynthus which lies over-against Elis. They are a colony of the Achæans of Peloponnesus, and were then in league with the Athenians. On board this fleet were a thousand heavy-armed Lacedæmonians; and Cnemus the Spartan commanded in the expedition. Making a descent upon the island they ravaged great part of the country,—but finding the entire reduction of it impracticable, they re-embarked and returned home.

In the close of the same summer, Aristeus the Corinthian, Aneristus, Nicolaus, Protodemus, and Timagoras of Tegea, ambassadors from the Lacedæmonians, and Polis the Argive without any public character, travelling into Asia, to engage the Persian king to supply them with men and money for carrying on the war, on their journey stop first in Thrace, and address themselves to Sitalces the son of Teres. They had a mind to try if they could prevail upon him to quit the Athenian alliance, to march to the relief of Potidæa, now besieged by the Athenians, to desist for the future from giving the latter any assistance, and to obtain from him a safe conduct through his territory for the continuance of their journey beyond the Hellespont to Pharnaces son of Pharnabazus, who would afterwards conduct them in safety to the royal court. Learchus the son of Callimachus, and Ameiniadas the son of Philemon, happening at that time to be with Sitalces, on an embassy from Athens, persuade the son of Sitalces, who had been made a citizen of Athens, to seize and deliver them up to them, that they might not go forward to the *king*, to the prejudice of that community of which he was a member. He hearkening to their advice arrests them just as they were going on shipboard to cross the Hellespont, after they had travelled through Thrace to the spot marked for their embarkation. He executed this by means of some trusty persons dispatched purposely after them along with Learchus and Ameiniades, and expressly ordered to deliver them up to the latter: They, so soon as they had got them in their power, carried them to Athens. Upon their arrival there, the Athenians

standing in great fear of Aristæus, lest upon escape he might do them further mischief, since before this he had been the author of all the projects to their prejudice both at Potidæa and in Thrace, put them to death on the very day of their arrival, unjudged and suing in vain to be heard, and cast them into pits. This cruel usage of them they justified from the example of the Lacedæmonians, who had in the same manner put to death and cast into pits the Athenian merchants and those of their allies, whom they had seized in the trading vessels upon the coasts of Peloponnesus. For, in the beginning of the war, the Lacedæmonians had put to death as enemies all those whom they could take at sea—not those only who belonged to the *States* in alliance with the Athenians, but even such as were of the yet neutral communities.

About the same time in the end of summer, the Ambraciots in conjunction with many of the Barbarians whom they had excited to take up arms, invaded Argos of Amphilochia, and made excursions over all its dependent territory. Their enmity against the Argives took its original from hence.—This Argos was first built, and this province of Amphilochia first planted by Amphilochus the son of Amphiaræus, immediately after the Trojan war, who on his return home, being dissatisfied with the state of affairs in that other Argos, founded this city in the gulf of Ambracia, and gave it the same name with the place of his nativity. It soon became the largest city of Amphilochia, and the inhabitants were most powerful of any thereabouts. Yet many generations after, being sunk by misfortunes, they prevailed upon the Ambraciots bordering upon Amphilochia to unite with them. This community of residence brought them to their present use of one common language, the Greek: But the rest of the Amphilochians are still Barbarians. Yet in process of time, the Ambraciots drive the Argives from amongst them, and keep possession of the city for themselves. Upon this event the Amphilochians threw

themselves under the protection of the Acarnanians, and both together implored the succour of the Athenians, who sent thirty ships to their assistance under the command of Phormio. Upon Phormio's arrival they take Argos by storm, make all the Ambraciots slaves, and then both the Amphilo-chians and Acarnanians settle themselves together in the city. To these incidents was first owing the league offensive and defensive between the Athenians and Acarnanians. The chief cause of the inveteracy which the Ambraciots bore to the Argives, was their having made them in this manner slaves ; and which afterwards impelled them, in the confusion of this war, to form this invasion with the junction of the Chaonians and some other neighbouring Barbarians. Advancing up to Argos, they were entire masters of the whole territory, but in vain endeavoured to take the town by assault ; upon which they again returned home and dispersed to their respective nations.—Such were the transactions of the summer.

On the first approach of winter, the Athenians sent out twenty ships to cruize on the coasts of Peloponnesus, under the command of Phormio ; who, fixing his station before Naupactus, kept so strict a guard, that nothing durst pass in nor out from Corinth and the gulf of Crissa.—Six other ships they send to Caria and Lycia, under the command of Melesander, to levy contributions there, and to stop the excursions of the Peloponnesian privateers, harbouring in those parts, from molesting the course of their trading vessels from Phæcelis, Phœnicia, and the adjacent continent. Melesander, with the Athenian and confederate force he had on board his ships, landed in Lycia, and was defeated in the first battle, in which he lost part of his army and his own life.

The same winter, the Potidæans, as they were no longer able to hold out the siege ; and as, besides, the irruptions of the Peloponnesians into Attica had not induced the Athenians to raise it ; their provisions being quite spent ; and amongst other calamities to which their extremities had reduced them,

having been forced to feed upon one another; they held a parley about their surrender with the Athenian officers, who commanded in the siege*, Xenophon, the son of Euripides, Hestiodorus, the son of Aristoclide, and Phanomachus, the son of Callimachus. They, sensible of the hardships their troops suffered by long lying abroad in the winter season, and that the carrying on of the siege had already cost Athens two thousand talents†, granted them a composition. The terms agreed on were these—"That they should quit the place " with their wives, their children, and auxiliaries, every man " with one suit of clothing, but the women with two; and with " a certain sum of money to defray the expence of their departure."—By virtue of this composition they went away to Chalcis, where every one shifted for himself. But the Athenians called their *generals* to account for their conduct, because they had signed this composition without their privity (for they thought it in their power to have made them surrender at discretion), and afterwards sent to Potidæa some of their people whom they settled in a colony there.—These things were done this winter, and so ended the second year of this war, the history of which hath been compiled by Thucydides.

* In this siege of Potidæa, two persons served amongst the heavy-armed as private soldiers, one of whom was the glory of human nature; and the other the glory and bane of his country: I mean the divine Socrates, and at this time young Alcibiades. Plutarch (in the life of Alcibiades) says, they lay in the same tent, and fought always side by side. Once, in a sharp skirmish, both of them distinguished themselves above all their fellow-soldiers. Alcibiades at length was wounded and dropped; Socrates stood over and defended him, and saved both him and his arms from the enemy. Socrates therefore had the justest right to the public reward, as the person who had behaved best in this action. But when the *generals*, on account of Alcibiades's quality, shewed a great desire to confer honour upon him, Socrates, willing also to increase his ardour for gallant actions, turned witness in his favour, and procured him the wreath and the public present of a compleat suit of armour. Socrates coveted no recompence for brave exploits but the consciousness of having performed them, and young Alcibiades was to be nursed up to virtue. He was capable of every degree either of virtue or vice: And Socrates always endeavoured to encourage him in the former, and give his eager and enterprizing soul the just direction.

† 387,500*l.* sterling.

YEAR III.

EARLY the next summer, the Peloponnesians and their allies, omitting the incursion as before into Attica, marched their forces against Plataea. Archidamus son of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians, commanded; who, having encamped his army, was preparing to ravage the adjacent country. He was interrupted by an embassy from the Plataeans, who addressed themselves to him in the following manner.

“The war, O Archidamus and Lacedaemonians, you are now levying on Plataea, is a flagrant breach of common justice, a blemish on your honour and that of your fathers. Pausanias, the Lacedaemonian, son of Cleombrotus, when—aided by those Grecians, who cheerfully exposed themselves with him to the dangers of that battle which was fought on our land—he had delivered Greece from Persian slavery, at a public sacrifice to Jupiter *the deliverer*, solemnized by him on that occasion in the public forum of Plataea, called all the confederates together, and there conferred these privileges on the Plataeans—“That they should have free possession of the city and territory belonging to it, to be governed at their own discretion;—that no one should ever unjustly make war upon them, or endeavour to enslave them; and in case of such attempts, all the confederates then present should avenge it to the utmost of their power.”—Such grateful returns did your fathers make us in recompence of our valour, and the zeal we excited in the common dangers. Yet their generosity you are now reversing—you, with the Thebans, our inveterate foes, are come hither to enslave us. But, by the Gods, who were then witnesses to the oath they swore, by all the tutelary Deities both of your own and of our community, we adjure you to do no damage to Plataean ground, nor to violate your oaths, but to retire and leave

“us in that state of independence which Pausanias justly
“established for us.”——To these words of the Plataeans
Archidamus made this reply——

“What you have urged, ye men of Plataea, is just and rea-
“sonable, if it be found agreeable to your actions. Let the
“declarations of Pausanias be observed; be free and inde-
“pendent yourselves, and at the same time vindicate their
“own freedom to others, to those who, after participation of
“the same common dangers, made that oath in your favour,
“and yet are now enslaved by the Athenians. To rescue
“them and others from that slavery have our preparations
“been made, this war hath been undertook. You who know
“what liberty is, and are such advocates for it, do you abide
“firmly by your oaths; at least, as we heretofore advised you,
“keep at quiet, enjoying only what is properly your own;
“side with neither party; receive both in the way of friend-
“ship, in the way of enmity neither.—To a conduct like this
“we never shall object.”

When the Plataean ambassadors had heard this reply of
Archidamus they returned into the *city*, and communicating
what had passed to the body of the citizens, they carried
back in answer to him——“That they could not possibly com-
“ply with his proposals, without the consent of the Athe-
“nians, because their wives and children were in their
“power——that they were apprehensive a compliance might
“endanger their whole community, since in such a case ei-
“ther the Athenians might not confirm the neutrality, or
“the Thebans, who were comprehended in the same neutral
“oath to the two principal powers, might again attempt to
“seize their city.”——Archidamus, to remove their apprehen-
sions, spoke as follows——“Deliver up your city and your
“houses to us Lacedæmonians; let us know the bounds of
“your territory and the exact number of your trees, and
“make as true a calculation as you possibly can of all that
“belongs to you. Depart yourselves, and reside wherever
“you please so long as the war continues; at the end of it

“we will restore every thing again. In the mean time, we
“will make the best use of every thing intrusted to us, and
“pay you an annual equivalent for your subsistence.” Upon
hearing this, they again returned into the city, and the whole
body of the people assisting at a general consultation, they
returned for answer—“That they desired only to communi-
“cate the proposals to the Athenians, and then with their
“approbation would accept them. In the mean time they
“begged a suspension of arms, and to have their lands spared
“from depredation.” He granted them a truce for the time
requisite to receive an answer, and forbore ravaging the
country.

The ambassadors of Plataea, having been at Athens, and
consulted with the Athenians, return again with this answer
to their city.—“The Athenians say, that in no preceding
“time, ever since we entered into confederacy with them,
“did they ever suffer us in any respect to be injured ; that
“neither will they neglect us now, but send us a powerful
“aid. And you they solemnly adjure by the oaths which
“your fathers have sworn, to admit no change or innovation
“in the league subsisting between you and them.”—When
the ambassadors had thus delivered the answer of the Athe-
nians, after some consultation the Plateans resolved, “never
“to desert them, to bear any devastation of their lands, nay
“if such must be the case, to behold it with patience, and to
“suffer any extremities to which their enemies might reduce
“them ; that, further, no person should stir out of the city,
“but an answer be given from the walls—“That it was im-
“possible for them to accept the terms proposed by the Lace-
“dæmonians.”

This was no sooner heard than Archidamus the king
made this solemn appeal to all their tutelary Heroes and
Gods.—“Ye Gods and Heroes, *said he*, who protect this
“region of Plataea, bear witness to us, that it was not till
“after a violation of oaths already sworn, that we have
“marched into this country, where our fathers through the

“ blessings you sent down upon their prayers overcame the
“ Medes, and which you then made that fortunate field
“ whereon the arms of Greece were crowned with victory—
“ and that whatever we shall here undertake, our every step
“ shall be agreeable to justice. We have offered many ho-
“ nourable conditions to them, which are all rejected.
“ Grant therefore our supplications, that the first trans-
“ gressors of justice may receive their punishment, and that
“ those who fight with equity may obtain revenge.” After
this solemn address to the Gods, he roused up his army into
action.

He first of all formed an inclosure round about them
with the trees they had felled, so that no one could get out
of the city. In the next place, they raised a mount of
earth before the place, hoping that it could not long hold
out a siege against the efforts of so large an army. Having
felled a quantity of timber on mount Cithæron, with it they
framed the mount on either side, that thus cased it might
perform the service of a wall, and that the earth might be
kept from mouldering away too fast. Upon it they heaped
a quantity of matter, both stones and earth, and whatever
else would cement together and increase the bulk. This
work employed them for seventy days and nights without
intermission, all being alternately employed in it, so that one
part of the army was carrying it on, whilst the other took
the necessary refreshments of food and sleep. Those Lace-
dæmonians who had the command over the hired troops of
the other *States*, had the care of the work, and obliged them
all to assist in carrying it on. The Platæans, seeing this
mount raised to a great height, built a counterwork of wood,
close to that part of the city-wall against which this mount
of earth was thrown up, and strengthened the inside of it
with bricks, which they got for this use by pulling down the
adjacent houses. The wooden case was designed to keep it
firm together, and prevent the whole pile from being weak-
ened by its height. They farther covered it over with

sheep-skins and hides of beasts, to defend the workmen from missive weapons, and to preserve the wood from being fired by the enemy. This work *within* was raised to a great height, and the mount was raised with equal expedition *without*. Upon this, the Plataeans had recourse to another device. They broke a hole through the wall, close to which the mount was raised, and drew the earth away from under it into the city. But this being discovered by the Peloponnesians, they threw into the hole hurdles made of reeds and stuffed with clay, which being of a firm consistence could not be dug away like earth. By this they were excluded, and so desisted for a while from their former practice. Yet digging a subterranean passage from out of the city, which they so luckily continued that it undermined the mount, they again withdrew the earth from under it. This practice long escaped the discovery of the besiegers, who still heaping on matter, yet the work grew rather less, as the earth was drawn away from the bottom, and that above fell in to fill up the void. However, still apprehensive, that as they were few in number, they should not be able long to hold out against such numerous besiegers, they had recourse to another project. They desisted from carrying on the great pile which was to counterwork the mount, and beginning at each end of it where the wall was low, they run another wall in the form of a crescent along the inside of the city, that if the great wall should be taken this might afterwards hold out, might lay the enemy under a necessity of throwing up a fresh mount against it, and that thus the further they advanced the difficulties of the siege might be doubled, and be carried on with increase of danger.

When their mount was compleated, the Peloponnesians played away their battering-engines against the wall; and one of them they worked so dextrously from the mount against the great pile within, that they shook it very much, and threw the Plataeans into consternation. Others they applied in different parts against the wall, the force of which was

broke by the Platæans, who threw ropes around them ; they also tied large beams together, with long chains of iron at both ends of the beams, by which they hung downwards from two other transverse beams inclined and extended beyond the wall ;—these they drew along obliquely, and against whatever part they saw the engine of battery to be aimed, they let go the beams with a full swing of the chains, and so dropped them down directly upon it, which by the weight of the stroke broke off the beak of the battering machine. Upon this the Peloponnesians, finding all their engines useless, and their mount effectually counterworked by the fortification within, concluded it a business of no little hazard to take the place amidst so many obstacles, and prepared to draw a circumvallation about it.

But first they were willing to try whether it were not possible to set the town on fire, and burn it down, as it was not large, by help of a brisk gale of wind ; for they cast their thoughts towards every expedient of taking it without a large expence and a tedious blockade. Procuring for this purpose a quantity of faggots, they tossed them from their own mount into the void space between the wall and the inner fortification. As many hands were employed in this business, they had soon filled it up, and then proceeded to toss more of them into the other parts of the city lying beyond, as far as they could by the advantage which the eminence gave them. Upon these they threw fiery balls made of sulphur and pitch, which caught the faggots, and soon kindled such a flame as before this time no one had ever seen kindled by the art of man. It hath indeed sometimes happened, that wood growing upon mountains hath been so heated by the attrition of the winds, that without any other cause it hath broke out into fire and flame. But this was exceeding fierce ; and the Platæans, who had baffled all other efforts, were very narrowly delivered from perishing by its fury ; for it cleared the city to a great distance round about, so that no Platæan durst approach it : And if the

wind had happened to have blown along with it, as the enemy hoped, they must all unavoidably have perished. It is now reported, that a heavy rain falling on a sudden, attended with claps of thunder, extinguished the flames, and put an end to this imminent danger.

The Peloponnesians, upon the failure of this project, marched away part of their army ; but, continuing the remainder there, raised a wall of circumvallation quite round the city, the troops of every confederate *state* executing a determinate part of the work. Both inside and outside of this wall was a ditch, and by first digging these they had got materials for brick. This work being compleated about the rising of Arcturus*, they left some of their own men to guard half of the wall, the other half being left to the care of the Bæotians ; then marched away with the main army, and dismissed the auxiliary forces to their respective cities.

—The Platæans had already sent away to Athens their wives, their children, their old people, and all the useless crowd of inhabitants. There were only left in the town during this siege four hundred Platæans, eighty Athenians, and one hundred and ten women to prepare their food. This was the whole number of them when the siege was first formed ; nor was there any other person within the wall, either slave or free.—And in this manner was the city of Plataea besieged in form.

The same summer, and about the time that the army appeared before Plataea, the Athenians, with a body of their own people, consisting of two thousand heavy-armed, and two hundred horsemen, invaded the Chalcideans of Thrace and the Bottiæans. The corn was in the ear, when this army was led against them under the command of Xenophon the son of Euripides and two colleagues. Coming up to Spartolus, a town in Bottiæa, they destroyed the corn, and hoped to get possession of the place by the management of

* Beginning of September.

a faction they had within. But a contrary party, having sent in good time to Olynthus, had procured from thence an aid of heavy-armed and other force for their protection. These even made a sally out of Spartolus, and forced the Athenians to a battle under the walls of the town. The heavy-armed Chalcideans, with some of their auxiliaries, are defeated by the Athenians, and retire into Spartolus. The horse and light-armed Chalcideans get the better of the horse and light-armed Athenians; but they had with them a small number of targeteers from the province called Crusis. On the first joining of battle other targeteers came to their assistance from Olynthus. The light-armed of Spartolus seeing this reinforcement just come up, and reflecting that they had received no loss before, with reanimated courage again charge the Athenians, in conjunction with the Chalcidean horse, and the fresh reinforcement. The Athenians retire to the two companies which they had left to guard the baggage. Here they drew up again, and whenever they thought proper to charge, the enemy fell back; when they retreated from the charge, the enemy pressed upon and infested them with missive weapons. The Chalcidean horse rode up where they thought they could break them, and falling in without fear of a repulse, put the Athenians to flight, and pursued them to a great distance. The Athenians fly for refuge to Potidæa; and afterwards, obtaining a truce to fetch off their dead, return with their shattered army to Athens. In this action they lost four hundred and thirty men, and all their commanders. The Chalcideans and Bottiæans erected a trophy, and having taken proper care of their dead, separated to their own cities.

Not long after this, in the same summer, the Ambraciots and Chaonians, who aimed at the total reduction of Acarnania, and to compass a general defection there from the Athenians, prevailed upon the Lacedæmonians to supply them with shipping from their confederate cities, and to send a thousand heavy-armed into Acarnania. They told

them, that—"if they would join them with a land and a naval force at the same time, it would be impossible for the Acarnanians to succour one another by sea; that hence they might easily get all Acarnania into their power, from whence they might become masters of Zacynthus and Cephallene, and a stop would then be made to the Athenian cruizes on the coasts of Peloponnesus; nay, that there was even a hope of reducing Naupactus."—This scheme was pleasing to the Lacedæmonians, who ordered Cnemus (yet their admiral) to sail thither with a few ships, having on board the heavy-armed; and circulated orders to their confederates to fit out their ships, and repair with all expedition to Leucas. The Corinthians were those who shewed most zeal for the Ambraciots, a colony of their own; and the shipping of Corinth, Sicyon, and the adjacent places, was prepared with all possible expedition; but that of Leucas, Anactorium, and Ambracia was already at Leucas, and waiting for the rest. Cnemus and the thousand heavy-armed performed their voyage undiscovered by Phormio, who commanded the Athenian fleet of twenty sail, stationed round Naupactus, and immediately landed his men for the destined service. Besides the thousand Peloponnesians he brought with him, he was now joined by the Ambraciots, Leucadians, Anactorians, of the Grecians;—of the Barbarians, by a thousand Chaonians, not subject to a regal government, but commanded by Photius and Nicanor, men of those families which had a right to command by annual election. With the Chaonians came the Thesprotians, who also had no king. Sabylinthus, guardian of their king Tharyps, yet a minor, led the Melossians and Antitanians. The Paravæans were headed by their own king Ordæus, who had also the command of a thousand Orestians, subjects of Antiochus, which served with his troops by the permission of Antiochus. Perdiccas sent also a thousand Macedonians, of which the Athenians were ignorant, but these were not yet come up.

With these forces Cnemus began his march, without waiting the arrival of the ships from Corinth, and passing through Argia, they destroyed Limnæa, a village unfortified. They march next for Stratus, the capital city of Acarnania, judging that if they first took *this*, all other places would readily submit. The Acarnanians, finding a large army broke in amongst them by land, and more enemies coming to attack them by sea, gave up all view of succouring one another, and stood separately on their own defence. They sent information to Phormio, and requested him to come up to their relief. He sent them word, "he could not possibly leave Naupactus without a guard, when a fleet was ready to sail from Corinth." The Peloponnesians and their allies, dividing themselves into three bodies, advanced towards the city of the Stratians, with a design to appear before it, and if it did not surrender at once, to storm it without loss of time. The Chaonians and the rest of the Barbarians marched in the middle; to the right were the Leucadians, Anactorians, and their auxiliaries; to the left, Cnemus with his Peloponnesians, and the Ambraciots; each body at so great a distance from the rest, that sometimes they were out of one another's sight. The Grecians, in their march, kept firm within ranks, and guarded all their motions, till they came up to the spot fit for their encampment. But the Chaonians, confident of their own bravery, and valuing themselves as the most martial people in that part of the world, could not bear the delay of encamping, but, with the rest of the Barbarians, rushing eagerly forwards, thought to take the town at a shout, and carry all the honour. The Stratians finding them thus advanced, thought, that could they master *them*, thus detached, the Grecians would become more averse to attack them. With this view they place ambuscades in the approaches of the city; and when the enemy was near, rush up at once from the places of ambush, and out of the city, charging them on all sides. The Chaonians are thrown into consternation, and many of them are slain. The rest

of the Barbarians, when they saw them give way, durst not keep their ground, but fled immediately. Neither of the Grecian bodies knew any thing of this engagement, so hastily had those advanced, and were supposed to have done it only to encamp with greater expedition. But when the Barbarians came running back to them in disorderly rout, they received them into shelter, and all closing firm together stood quiet the rest of the day. The Stratians durst not directly assault them, because the other Acarnanians were not yet come up to their assistance, but were continually slinging at them from a distance, thus harassing them abundantly, but unable, without better weapons, to make them dislodge: The Acarnanians only could have attacked them with effectual vigour.

By the favour of a dark night, Cnemus withdrew his army by a quick march to the river Anapus, which is eighty stadia* distant from Stratus. The next day he obtains a truce to fetch off the dead. And the Oeniadæ coming up in a friendly manner to his relief, he went to take refuge amongst them, before the Acarnanians could draw their succours together, and from thence the forces which composed his army marched to their own homes. But the Stratians erected a trophy on account of their victory over the Barbarians.

The fleet of Corinth and the other confederate states, that was to sail from the gulf of Crissa, to attend the orders of Cnemus, and prevent the Acarnanians on the coast from succouring those within the land, never arrives: For about the time of the action at Stratus, they had been compelled to fight the Athenian squadron of twenty ships, stationed at Naupactus under the command of Phormio. Phormio had watched their coming out of the gulf, intending to attack so soon as ever they got out to sea. The Corinthians and their allies sailed out indeed, yet not so well prepared to fight by sea, as to forward the land expedition on Acarnania. They never

* About eight miles.

imagined that the Athenians with their twenty ships durst presume to attack them who had forty-seven. Yet when they saw them steering the same course on the opposite shore, they kept first along their own coast, and afterwards from Patræ of Achaia stretched over to the opposite side in order to make for Acarnania. But now again they descried them standing directly against them from Chalcis and the river Evenus, and found they had observed their anchoring the night before. Thus are they compelled to come to an engagement in the midst of the open sea*. The ships of every state were under the command of those who had been appointed by their principals: Over the Corinthians were Machon, Isocrates, and Agatharchidas. The Peloponnesians drew up their ships in form of a circle, as large as they possibly could, without leaving open a passage for the ships of the enemy. The heads of the ships stood to sea, the sterns were turned inwards. Within were ranged the small vessels that attended the fleet and five ships that were prime sailers, which were to start out at narrow passages, wherever the enemy should begin the attack. The Athenians drawing up their ships in a line, and sailing quite round them, brushed along by them in their passage, and making successive feints of engaging, forced them to draw into a smaller compass. Phormio had beforehand given strict orders not to engage without the signal: for he hoped the enemy could not long preserve that order of battle like

* Phormio was watching to catch them in the open sea, ἐν τῇ εὐρυχωρίᾳ, as Thucydides words it above. They were now out of the gulf, stretching across the sea, in the midst of which Phormio came up to them, and engaged, κατὰ μέσον τ' πορθμῖον. The sea without the capes that form the mouth of the gulf of Crissa, is indeed a narrow sea, or ὀρθμῖς, but then it was open sea in regard to the gulf within the capes, and gave Phormio all the advantages which more expert seamen knew how to use. As the Peloponnesian fleet stood out from Patræ in Achaia, and the Athenian from Chalcis in Ætolia, the situation of those two places easily guides to the place of the engagement. Phormio got a deal of honour by this action, which Plutarch, in his piece about *the glory of the Athenians*, reckons up amongst the most remarkable exploits related by our historian.

a land-army, but that the ships must fall foul upon one another, and the small vessels within give them no little embarrassment; that further, the wind would blow out of the gulf, as was usual every morning; in expectation of which he continued to sail round about them, and then they could not possibly keep firm in their stations for any time. He thought farther, that the time of engagement was entirely in his own power, as his ships were best sailers, and that it was most advisable to begin at such a juncture. As soon as that wind began to rise, and the greater ships, now contracted into a narrow circle, were disordered both by the wind and the smaller vessels within, one falling foul upon another, the poles applied to push them off again; amidst the noise caused by this confusion, calling out to *take care*, and cursing one another, they could no longer hear the orders of their commanders or their masters; and the sea beginning to run so high as to render useless the oars of unexperienced mariners, as they were, they left the unmanageable ships to the pilots' art. Exactly at this juncture Phormio gives the signal. The Athenians engage, and at the first shock sink one of the admiral-ships, and several more afterwards in the different parts of the engagement. They pursued their success with so much fury, that amidst the general disorder not one durst think of resisting, but all with the greatest precipitation, fled towards Patræ and Dyme of Achaia. The Athenians pursuing, and taking twelve of their ships, and having slaughtered most of the crews, draw off to Molychrium; and having erected a trophy on the promontory, and consecrated a ship to Neptune, returned to their station at Naupactus.

The Peloponnesians, without loss of time, crept along the coast with the remnant of their fleet saved at Patræ and Dyme, to Cyllene a dock belonging to the Eleans; whither, after the battle of Stratus, arrived also from Leucas, Cnemus and the ships of that station, which ought to have been joined by these other. The Lacedæmonians send thither Timocrates, Brasidas, and Lycophron to assist Cnemus in

his naval conduct, ordering him to get ready for a more successful engagement, and not to leave the dominion of the sea to such a small number of ships. For their late defeat appeared to them quite unaccountable, especially as this was the first trial they had of an engagement at sea; nor could they think it so much owing to a want of skill in naval affairs, as to a want of courage, never balancing the long experience of the Athenians with their own short application to these matters. These persons therefore they sent away in anger, who, coming to Cnemus, issued their circular orders to the *states* for new quotas of shipping, and refitted what was already there for another engagement. Phormio also sends messengers to Athens with an account of these preparations, and to report the victory they had already gained; requesting a further reinforcement of as many ships as they could expeditiously dispatch, since he was in daily expectation of another fight.

Twenty ships were the number they agree to send him, but they ordered him who was to carry them to touch by the way at Crete. For Nicias a Cretan of Gortys, a public friend of the Athenians, had persuaded them to appear before Cydonia, assuring them that this place, which had been an enemy to them, should soon be their own. This he insinuated merely to gratify the Polychnitæ, who bordered upon the Cydonians. The commander therefore with these ships went to Crete, and joining the Polychnitæ, ravaged the territory of the Cydonians; by which, together with adverse winds and weather unfit for sea, no little time was unseasonably wasted away.

The Peloponnesians at Cyllene, during the time that the Athenians lay weather-bound in Crete, having got every thing in readiness for another engagement, sailed along the coast of Panormus of Achaia, where the land-forces of the Peloponnesians were come to forward their attempts. Phormio likewise, with the twenty ships which had fought the former battle, sailed up to cape Molychrium, and lay at an-

chor just without it. This cape belonged to the Athenian alliance, but the other cape*, over against it, belonged to the Peloponnesians. The arm of sea which divides them is about seven stadia† over; and this is the mouth of the gulf of Crissa. The Peloponnesians with a fleet of seventy-seven ships rode also at anchor under the cape of Achaia, which is not far distance from Panormus, where their land-forces lay. When they had here a sight of the Athenians, both parties lay for six or seven days over-against each other, intent on the needful preparations for engaging. The scheme on each side was this:—The Peloponnesians, struck with their former defeat, would not sail from without their capes into the open sea:—The Athenians would not enter into the straits, judging it would be an advantage to the enemy to fight in a narrow compass. At length Cnemus, Brasidas, and the other Peloponnesian commanders, desirous to come soon to an engagement, before the Athenian squadron should receive a reinforcement, called first their soldiers together, and seeing some of them not yet recovered from the terror occasioned by the former defeat, and by no means eager to fight again, endeavoured to animate and rouse up their courage by the following harangue—

“ If the former engagement, ye men of Peloponnesus, affects any of you with sad apprehensions about the event of another, know that it by no means affords you any reasonable ground for such desponding thoughts. That was owing, as you well know, to a deficiency in all needful preparations; for you were not then fitted out for service of sea, but for the service of land. We then were distressed in several respects by the adverse turns of fortune; and in some, we who fought for the first time at sea run into errors through want of skill. It thus happened that we were defeated, but not through any cowardice of our

* The cape on the Peloponnesian side was called Rhium, or the Rhium of Achaia: the opposite cape Antirrhium, or Molychrium.

† About three quarters of a mile.

“own. There can be no reason for men, who were not conquered by superior courage, but who can explicitly account for the means of their defeat, to let their spirits be sunk by a calamity merely accidental; but they ought to reflect, that though fortune may disconcert the human enterprizes, yet that men can never be deserted by their own valour; and where true valour is, they ought not to catch a plea from want of experience to palliate what signs of cowardice they betray. Inferior skill in you is by no means a balance for your superior valour. The expertness of your enemies, which you so much dread, if it be accompanied with valour, will indeed direct them in a performance of their duty, amidst all the hazards of war; but if it wants true valour, those hazards will be too hard for all human art. For fear banisheth the remembrance of what ought to be done; and art without strength is quite unavailing. Place therefore your own superior valour in the balance against their superior skill; and remove the apprehensions flowing from your defeat by the recollection that you were not prepared to fight. You have now the advantage of a larger number of ships, and an opportunity of fighting on your own coasts, in sight of a land-army of your own. Victory is generally obtained by those who are most in number and best provided. So that, upon close examination, no reason appears why we should dread the event. Our former miscarriages make not against us; nay, the past commission of them will instruct us now. Let every master, therefore, and every mariner act his part with manly resolution; let each take care to perform his duty, nor quit the post to which he is appointed. We shall take care to order the engagement, in no worse a manner than our predecessors have done; and shall leave no man any reason to excuse his cowardice. Yet, if any one will be a coward, he shall certainly receive the punishment he deserves; but the valiant shall be honoured with rewards proportioned to their merit.”

In such terms did their commanders animate the Peloponnesians. But Phormio,—who began to apprehend a depression of spirits in his own men, since he plainly saw that by keeping their ships close together they were afraid of the numerous ships of the enemy—had a mind by calling them together to reinspire them with courage, and give them an exhortation suitable to their present condition. He had hitherto in all his discourses insisted, and induced them to give him credit, that—“no number of ships could be got together large enough to make head against them.” And his seamen had long since been elated with this presumption, that “as they were Athenians, they ought not to avoid any fleet of the Peloponnesians, however numerous.” But, when he saw them intimidated by the formidable object before their eyes, he thought it high time to endeavour to revive their sinking courage. The Athenians being gathered round him, he harangued them thus—

“I HAVE observed, my fellow-soldiers, that the number of your enemies hath struck you with fear.—I have therefore called you together, as I cannot bear to see you terrified with what is by no means dreadful. These enemies of yours, whom you have already conquered, who in no wise think themselves a match for you, have got together a great number of ships and a superior force. In the next place they come confidently to attack you with the vain presumption, that valour is only peculiar to themselves. Their confidence is occasioned by their skill in the service of the land. Their frequent successes there induce them to suppose that they must also for certainty be victorious at sea. If they have any reason to presume so far upon their excellence at land, you have more to form presumptions in your own favour, since in natural courage they are not in the least superior to us, and if larger degrees of skill give either side an advantage, we have hence an argument to be more confident of success. The Lacedæmonians, now at the head of their

“league, merely to preserve their own reputation, have
“dragged numbers hither to fight against their will: other-
“wise, they durst never have attempted to engage us a
“second time, after receiving so signal a defeat. Frighten
“not yourselves with extravagant suspicions of their courage
“—but rather strike a panic into them; a panic, for which
“they have more ample reason, as you have already gained
“a victory over them, and as they are certain you would not
“give them another opportunity to fight, unless you had
“some grand design to execute. An enemy, that like them
“exceeds in number, in action depends more on their
“strength than on their conduct. They who are far inferior
“in strength of numbers, and dare, though uncompelled,
“to fight, must do it through the prevalence of some exten-
“sive views. This they cannot but know, and hence dread
“more this our diminutive than they would an equal force.
“Large armies defeated, through defect of skill, or some-
“times through defect of courage, by an inferior force, are
“cases that have often happened. Yet neither of these de-
“fects can be imputed to us. For my own part, I shall not
“willingly hazard the event within the gulf, nor will I sail
“into it. For I am not ignorant that want of sea-room is
“very improper for a few ships that sail best and are best
“managed, against a number which those on board them
“know not how to govern. In such a situation, no one can
“pour down to an attack in the proper manner for want of
“having a clear view of the enemy; nor, if he is forced to
“sheer off, can he do it with safety. There is no room to
“break through, or to tack at pleasure, which is the business
“of ships that are better sailers; but the fight must of ne-
“cessity be the same with a battle at land, and in this case
“the greater number of ships must have the advantage. I
“shall take the greatest care I am able to prevent these in-
“conveniences. And you I expect to stand regularly to
“your posts on board every ship. Receive your orders with
“alacrity, especially as we lie so near our enemy; and above

“all things, when we come to action, observe the rules of discipline without hurry and noise : For these are matters of great importance in every scene of war, and of not the least in a naval engagement ;—and charge your enemies with a spirit worthy of your former achievements. Great indeed are the points you are now to decide, the hopes of the Peloponnesians of making a figure at sea are now either to be totally demolished, or the power of the sea must become precarious to the Athenians, even near their own homes. Once more I call to your remembrance, that great part of these enemies you have already conquered—and the courage of enemies once conquered is seldom equal to what it was, when unconscious of defeat.”

In this manner Phormio encouraged his men.—But the Peloponnesians, when they found that the Athenians would not sail into the gulf and straits, had a mind to compel them to it against their inclinations. At break of day they began to move, their ships being ranged in lines consisting of four, and stood along their own coasts within the gulf, the right wing leading the course in the same order as they had lain at anchor. In this wing they had ranged twenty of their best sailers, with a view that if Phormio should imagine they had a design upon Naupactus, and he himself should hasten to its succour, the Athenians might not be able to outsail them and escape their outermost squadron, which composed the right wing, but be surrounded on all sides. He, just as they expected, being alarmed for that place, which he knew was defenceless, no sooner saw them under sail, than against his will and in no little hurry he got on board, and sailed along his own coast—the land forces of the Messenians marching along the adjacent shore to be ready with their assistance. The Peloponnesians seeing them move along in a line ship after ship, and that they were now within the gulf and near the shore, which was what they chiefly wanted—on a signal given at once altered their course, pouring down directly upon the Athenians, all as fast as their ships could advance, in

full expectation of intercepting the whole fleet. Eleven of the Athenian ships, which were a-head of the rest, being too quick for the wing of the Peloponnesians and the shifting of their course towards the open sea, ran safely off*. Yet intercepting all the rest, they run them aground and so disabled them. The Athenians on board, who could not escape by swimming, were slaughtered to a man: Some of these empty ships they got off again and carried away in tow; and one they had already took with the whole crew on board. The Messenians got down to the succour of some of them. They waded with their arms through the water, and climbing on board and fighting from the decks saved some which were already in tow.—In this manner did the Peloponnesians defeat and destroy the Athenian ships.

Their twenty ships which were of the right wing, gave chase to the eleven Athenians, which on the shifting of the course had ran off amain. But all these, excepting one ship, outsailed them, and got safe into Naupactus. Having gained their harbour, they tacked about under the temple of Apollo, and stood ready to defend themselves, in case the enemy should make an attempt upon them so near the shore. Soon after, they appeared, sailing along and singing their pæan, as having gained a victory. One ship belonging to Leucas was shot far a-head of the rest, giving chase to that only ship of the Athenians which was left behind. It happened that a trading vessel was then lying out at anchor before the harbour. The Athenian ship came up

* The Latin translators, whose chief aim is a grammatical construction, have made a slip here in point of chorography; they say, "*Subterfugerunt* or *fugerunt in apertum mare.*" But it is surprizing that Mr. *Hobbes* should be guilty of so much inadvertence, as to make eleven Athenian ships "get out into open sea." The Peloponnesians made their tack *towards* the open sea, on purpose to prevent them from getting out of the gulf, which gave opportunity to the foremost ships in the Athenian line to run away up the gulf towards Naupactus, for the sake of securing which they had thought themselves obliged, though contrary to their judgment and inclination, to come within the capes. Had they run out to sea, they never could have reached Naupactus, but would have run directly from it.

first with this vessel, and fetching a compass round her, runs directly against the Leucadian that was chasing, and instantly sinks her. By this accident, so sudden and unexpected, the Peloponnesians are thrown into consternation; and having besides followed the chase without any regular order, as secure of victory, some of the ships now dropping their oars, stopped further motion. This was an unlucky expedient when so near the enemy; but their design was to wait for the greater number of ships that were yet behind. Some of them, being ignorant of the coast, ran upon the shelves and were stranded. When the Athenians saw them suffer these distresses, their courage began to revive. Shouting out aloud with one voice, they encouraged one another to attack. The miscarriages of which they were this moment sensible, and their irrecoverable disorder, prevented the others from making any long resistance. And they soon were forced to run back again towards the station of Panormus, from whence they came. The Athenians, chasing them thither, took the six ships that were most behind, and recovered their own, which were in the enemy's hands by having been run ashore, and afterwards brought off in tow. Some men besides they killed, and made some prisoners.

On board the Leucadian, which was sunk near the trading vessel, was Timocrates the Lacedæmonian, who, when the ship received the stroke that sunk her, immediately slew himself*, and floated afterwards into the harbour of Naupactus. The Athenians, returning thither again, erected a trophy

* We have here a notable proof of the peculiar spirit and genius of the *Spartans*. They regarded the land as their own element, in which they were superior to the rest of the world. And yet now they were convinced, that without practice at sea, they should never be able to pull down the power of Athens. Their first attempts are awkward and unsuccessful. The art shewn by the Athenians in tacking round, darting out again, and sinking a ship at one stroke, put them all to a stand; and it seems made so sudden and strong an impression on Timocrates, whose passion it was to die fighting, and with wounds all *before*, that he could not endure the thought of perishing in a whole skin, and therefore snatched the moment, and killed himself for fear he should be drowned.

near the place from whence they had pursued this victory. They took up their dead, and the shattered pieces of their ships, whatever they found on their own coasts, and by a truce gave permission to the Peloponnesians to fetch off theirs.

The Peloponnesians also erected a trophy, in token of a victory gained by forcing ashore and damaging some of the enemy's ships. The ship they took they consecrated on the Rhium of Achaia, near their trophy. Yet, after this, being in some dread of the reinforcement expected from Athens, all of them, except the Leucadians, sailed away by favour of the night into the gulf of Crissa and Corinth. The Athenians, in the twenty ships from Crete, that ought to have been up with Phormio before the engagement, not long after the above retreat of the other ships, arrived at Naupactus. And here this summer ended.

Before the separation of the fleet that withdrew into Corinth and the gulf of Crissa, Cnemus, Brasidas, and the other commanders of the Peloponnesians, by the advice of the Megaréans, formed a design, in the beginning of this winter, to make an attempt on the Piræus, the haven of the Athenians. It was not guarded or secured in the usual manner; nor was this judged requisite, as the naval power of Athens was become so extensive. Their project was, that every mariner carrying with him an oar, a cushion, and a leathern thong, should march over-land from Corinth, to the sea on which Athens is situated, and that making the best of their way to Megara, and drawing out the forty ships that lay there in the Nisæan dock, they should immediately stand into the Piræus. For there was not so much as one ship appointed to its guard; nor was there the least suspicion at Athens that the enemy would attempt in this manner to surprise them: For, openly, and in a regular train, they durst not attempt it; nor could a project which required deliberate procedure have escaped discovery. But no sooner had they resolved upon, than they set out to execute the present scheme. Arriving in the night, they drew the ships

out of the Nisæan dock ; but instead of making directly for the Piræus, as they at first intended, dismayed with the danger of the attempt, and, as it is said, forced by a contrary wind to steer another course, they went over to that promontory of Salamis which faceth Megara. Upon this promontory was a fort, and three ships were stationed below to prevent all importation and exportation at Megara. This fort they assaulted, and carried the three ships, though empty, away with them. Other parts of Salamis they plundered, as the inhabitants never dreamed of this invasion.

The lights*, that signify the approach of enemies, were however held up and waved towards Athens, which caused as great a consternation there as was known during all the series of the war. Those in the city imagined the enemy to be already within the Piræus. Those in the Piræus concluded the city of the Salamanians to be taken, and that the enemy was only not within their port, which indeed they might easily have been, had they not been hindered by their own fears and a contrary wind. At break of day, the Athenians ran down in general concourse to the Piræus. They got their ships afloat, and leaping on board with the utmost expedition and uncommon tumult, sailed away for Salamis, but left what land-forces they had to guard the Piræus. When the Peloponnesians had notice of the approach of this succour, having now over-run great part of Salamis, and got many prisoners and a large booty, beside the three ships stationed at Budorus, they made the best of their way back to Nisæa. They were afraid of trusting too much to their ships, which having been long laid up were become leaky. After thus getting back to Megara, they returned

* These (according to the *Scholiast*) were lighted torches, which persons on the walls reared aloft in the air, to notify to neighbouring and confederate places that they discerned the approach of enemies, in order to put them on their guard. The same thing was also done at the approach of friends, to notify what succour was at hand. In the latter case, they held the lights steady and unmoved; in the former they waved them to and fro, as an indication of fear.

again over-land to Corinth. The Athenians, finding they were gone from Salamis, sailed home again. But ever after this they guarded the Piræus in a stricter manner, barring up the mouth of the haven, and omitting no method of securing it effectually for the future.

About the same time, in the beginning of this winter, Sitalces the Odrysian, son of Teres, a Thracian king, marched an army against Perdiccas, the son of Alexander, king of Macedonia, and the Chalcideans bordering on Thrace, to enforce the execution of two engagements, one made to and the other by himself. For Perdiccas, who had entered into some engagement to him, for reconciling him to the Athenians when he was formerly pressed hard with war, and for not restoring his brother Philip, then at enmity with him, to his throne, had not yet performed that engagement. And he himself was under an engagement to the Athenians, since the late alliance offensive and defensive made between them, that he would finish the war for them against the Chalcideans of Thrace. On both these accounts, he undertook the present expedition, carrying along with him Amyntas the son of Philip, to restore to him the kingdom of Macedonia, with the Athenian ambassadors commissioned to attend him on this occasion, and Agnon an Athenian general: Though the Athenians had obliged themselves by treaty to accompany the expedition with a fleet by sea and a numerous land-army.

Beginning the march himself from Odrysæ, he summons to attend him first all his Thracian subjects that live within the mountains Hæmus and Rhodope, quite down to the Hellespont and Euxine sea; next, the Getæ beyond mount Hæmus, and as many other nations as lay between the river Ister and along quite down to the Euxine. The Getæ, and the nations so situated, border upon the Scythians, wearing the same habiliments of war, and all like them drawing the bow on horseback. He procured also to join him many of the free Thracians that live upon the

mountains, and make use of scimeters, who are distinguished by the name of Dians, and dwell most of them about Rhodope. Some of these he took into pay, but some of them voluntarily attended. He had levies also from amongst the Agrianians, Leæans, and the other nations of Pæonia subject to himself. These were the furthest people in his dominions, reaching up to the Graæans and Leæans of Pæonia and the river Strymon, which deriving its source from mount Scomius waters the Graæans and Leæans, and is the boundary of his empire from those Pæonians who still are free. Towards the Triballians, who are also a free people, the boundary is formed by the Trerians and Tilatæans. These live to the north of mount Scomius, and reach westerly as far as the river Oscius, which riseth out of the same mountain with the Nestus and the Heber, a great but barren mountain adjoining to the Rhodope.

The kingdom of Odrysæ is of this large extent along the coast, reaching from the city of Abdera to the mouth of the river Ister in the Euxine sea. The shortest cut round its coast requireth four days and as many nights for a trading-vessel, of the round-built, sailing directly before the wind. A good walker will also be eleven days in going the nearest way by land from Abdera to the Ister. So large was its extent along the coast. But towards the continent, to go along it from Byzantium to the Leæans and the Strymon, for so far does it run upwards from the sea, would cost an expeditious walker thirteen days continued journey. The yearly tribute exacted from this tract of Barbaric land, and his cities in Greece, by Seuthæ, who succeeding Sitalces in these dominions very much improved the revenue, amounted to four hundred talents of silver*, though it might be paid either in silver or gold. The presents constantly made to him either of gold or silver were not less in value, besides gifts of vestments both figured and plain, and all kinds of furniture, which were not only made to him, but

* 78,940*l.* sterling.

to all his officers and the noble Odryssians. The custom observed by them and general to all the Thracians, "of receiving rather than bestowing," was contrary to that which prevails in the Persian court, where it was a greater shame to be asked and to deny, than to ask and be denied. Yet, as their power was great, this practice continued long in vogue amongst them; for nothing could be obtained by him who brought no present: And this afforded a large increase of power to his kingdom. It had the greatest revenue, and was in other respects the most flourishing of all the kingdoms in Europe between the gulf of Ionia and the Euxine sea. But in military strength and numerous armies, it was the second, though at a great distance from the Scythians. For there is no one nation in Europe, nor even in Asia, that in these points can in any degree be a match for them; or when standing singly, nation against nation, is able to make head against the Scythians, united and in good harmony with one another. Yet, at the same time, in every point of conduct, and management of all the necessary affairs of life, they fall vastly short of other people.

Sitalces therefore, who was king of so large a country, got his army together; and, when every thing was ready, marched against Macedonia. He first of all passed through his own dominions; then over Cercine a desert mountain, the boundary between the Sintians and Pæonians. He went over it by a passage he had, by cutting down the wood, made formerly himself, in an expedition against the Pæonians. In their march from Odrysæ over this mountain, they left the Pæonians on their right, but on their left the Sintians, and Mædians. On their descent from it, they arrived at Doberus, a city of Pæonia. He lost none of his army in the march, but by sickness; notwithstanding which it was very much increased: For many of the free Thracians came daily in without invitation, and followed for the sake of plunder; so that the whole number is said at last to have amounted to a hundred and fifty thousand. Of these,

the greater part were foot, but about a third of them were horse. The greatest share of the horse was provided by the Odrysians, and next to them by the Getæ. Of the foot, the free Thracians that came from about mount Rhodope, and used scimetars, were the most valiant: All the rest that followed were a mixt crowd, formidable only in their number. All these therefore were got together at Doberus, and preparing to break in to the lower Macedonia, subject to Perdiccas, under the ridge of the mountains. For in the general name of Macedonians are comprised the Lyncestians and Helimiotians, and other nations lying upwards, allied to and dependent upon the rest, yet governed as distinct kingdoms. The dominion over the maritime Macedonia was first obtained by Alexander, father of Perdiccas, and his ancestors the Temenidæ, who derived their original from Argos. These, by a successful war, had driven the Pierians out of Pieria, who afterwards fixed their residence at Phagres under mount Pangæus, on the other side the Strymon, and at other places; for which reason, the tract of ground lying under Pangæus towards the sea is still called the gulf of Pieria. From the region called Bottia they also expelled the Bottiæans, who now live upon the confines of the Chalcideans. And further, they seized in Pæonia, near the river Axius, a narrow tract of land running along from the mountains down to Pella, and the sea; and got possession of that which is called Mygdonia, lying between the Axius and the Strymon, by driving away the Edonians. They expelled the Eordians out of what is now called Eordia (of whom the greatest part were destroyed, but a small number dwell now about Physca); and out of Almopia, the Almopians. These Macedonians also conquered other nations, of which they are still in possession, as Anthemus, Grestonia, and Bisaltia, and a large part of the territories belonging to the other Macedonians. But this whole tract of country hath the general name of Macedonia, and Perdiccas, son of Alexander, reigned over them when Sitalces formed this invasion.

The Macedonians, unable to make head against the numerous army by which they were invaded, retired within the walled and fortified places of the country, which at this time were not many. But Archelaus son of Perdiccas, succeeding his father in the kingdom, built those fortresses which are now there, opened the roads, and made many other regulations, both in the military way about horses and arms, and in other public matters, more than all the eight preceding kings put together. The Thracian army from Doberus broke first into that part of the country, which was formerly in the possession of Philip. They took Eidomene by storm; and got Gortynia, Atalante, and some other places by composition, which were readily brought to capitulate, out of their regard for Amyntas, whose son Philip now appeared amongst them. They also laid siege to Europus, but were not able to reduce it. They afterwards advanced into the other Macedonia, lying to the left of Pella and Cyrrhus. Within these, they did not advance into Bottiæa and Pieria; but ravaged Mygdonia, Grestonia, and Anthemus. The Macedonians never once thought of being able to make head against them with their foot; but, sending for horse from their allies in the upper Macedonia, wherever by the advantage of ground a few could encounter with many, they made frequent attacks upon the Thracian army. They made so strong an impression, that nothing could resist such excellent horsemen and so completely armed. For this reason, the enemy enclosed them about with their numerous forces, and thus made it exceeding hazardous for them to fight against such manifold odds of numbers; so that at last they were forced to give over these skirmishes, judging it imprudent to run any hazards against so large an inequality of strength.

Sitalces, at a parley held with Perdiccas, imparted to him the motives of the war. And, as the Athenians were not yet come up with their fleet, because diffident of his punctuality to the engagement between them, and had only sent him presents and ambassadors, he detached part of his army

against the Chalcideans and Bottiæans; where, by driving them into their fortresses, he ravaged the country. During his stay in these parts, the southern Thessalians, Magnetians, and other people subject to the Thessalians, and the Grecians as far as Thermopylæ, grew apprehensive that his army might be turned against them, and prepared for their defence. Under the same apprehensions were the northern Thracians beyond the Strymon that inhabit the plains, the Panæans, the Odomantians, the Droans, and the Dersæans, who are all of them free and independent. He farther gave occasion for a rumour that spread amongst the Grecians, enemies to Athens, that his army, brought into Greece by virtue of an alliance with them, would invade them all in their turns. Yet, without advancing any further, he was at one and the same time continuing his ravage upon Chalcidica, and Bottiæa, and Macedonia. But unable to execute any of those points for which he formed this invasion, when his army began to want provisions, and to suffer by the rigor of the winter's cold, he is persuaded by Seuthes, the son of Sparadoxus, and his own cousin-german, who had a greater influence over him than any other person, to march back again with the utmost expedition. This Seuthes had been secretly gained by Perdiccas, who promised to give him his sister, and a large dower with her. Thus persuaded, after a stay upon the whole of but thirty days, and eight of these in Chalcidica, he retired precipitately into his own dominions. Perdiccas, according to promise, soon after gives his sister Stratonice in marriage to Seuthes. And to this end came this grand expedition of Sitalces*.

The same winter, the Athenians at Naupactus, after the se-

* Sitalces, and his son Sadocus, who as Thucydides relates above, was made a citizen of Athens, have not escaped the buffoonery of Aristophanes, in his comedy of *The Acharnians*. Act. I. Sc. 4. "Crier. Ambassador to Sita'ces, come into court. *Embass.* Here. *Dicæopolis.* Oh! here's another knave summoned to make his appearance. *Embass.* We should not have stayed so long in Thrace——*Dicæopolis.* I believe you, unless you had been well paid for it. *Embass.* Had not a great snow fallen and covered all the country, and all the rivers at the same time been froze over. When Theognis was contending here for glory, we were drinking

paration of the Peloponnesian fleet, coasting from thence under the command of Phormio, appeared before Astacus. Making there a destent, they pierced into the midland parts of Acarnania, with four hundred heavy-armed Athenians from on board the fleet, and four hundred Messenians; and expelled from Stratus, Coronta, and other places, the disaffected part of the inhabitants; and having re-established at Coronta, Cynes, the son of Theolytus, embarked again on board their ships. They judged it not adviseable in the winter season, to undertake any thing against the Oeniadæ, the only people of Acarnania who had persisted in continual hostilities against them. For the river Achelous, that takes its rise from mount Pindus, and runs through Dolopia, the provinces of the Agræans and the Amphilochians, and all the plains of Acarnania, passing above by the city of Stratus, and discharging itself into the sea near the Oeniadæ, renders all the adjacent country one continued morass, and by a stagnation of water makes it impracticable for an army in the winter-season. Most of the isles of the Echinades lie over-against the Oeniade, not greatly distant from the mouth of the Achelous; insomuch that the river being great, causeth a continual afflux of sand, and by it some of these islands are already joined to the main-land; and it is expected that all the rest in a short time will be so too: For the current is large and rapid, and brings down with it great quantities of sand. The isles stand thick; and stopping, bind fast together from farther dissipation, the sands brought down by the current. They lie not in a line, but in an alternate situation one from another, preventing the strait course of the waters forwards into the sea. They are further uncultivated, and of no large extent. The tradition is—that

“all the time with Sitalces. He is an honest heart, and loves Athenians
 “dearly. In good truth, he is doatingly fond of you all: He is for ever
 “writing upon the walls, *O rare Athenians!* And his son, whom we made
 “an Athenian, longs mightily for some of your dainty sausages, and hath
 “pressed his father to succour his dear countrymen. He, at a solemn sa-
 “crifice, swore he would; and hath got such a numerous army at his
 “heels, that the Athenians cry out—What a vast swarm of gnats is
 “coming along here!”

Apollo, by an oracle, made a grant of this land to Alcmaeon the son of Amphiaraus, when a vagabond, after the murder of his mother, telling him, that “he never should be freed from the terrors that haunted him, till he found a place for his residence, which at the time he slew his mother had never been seen by the sun, and then was not land ;” because every other part of the earth was polluted by the parricide. After great perplexities, he at length, as it is said, discovered these rising heaps of sand at the mouth of the Achelous, and thought enough cast up to suffice for his support, after the long course of wandering about to which he had been necessitated ever since he murdered his mother. Fixing therefore his residence in the parts about the Oeniadæ, he grew powerful, and left to the whole country the name of Acarnania from his son Acarnas. This account of Alcmaeon we have given exactly as we have received it from tradition.

The Athenians and Phormio weighing from Acarnania, and touching again at Naupactus, very early in the spring returned to Athens. Thither they brought all the freemen whom they had made prisoners in the late naval engagements (these were afterwards exchanged man for man) and the ships taken from the enemy.

And thus the winter ended, and with it the third year of the war, the history of which hath been compiled by Thucydides.

THE
PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

BOOK III.

YEAR IV.—BEFORE CHRIST 428.

IN the succeeding Summer, the Peloponnesians and allies, when the corn was full-grown, made incursion into Attica, under the command of Archidamus son of Zeuxidamus king of the Lacedæmonians, and having fixed their camp ravaged the country. The Athenian cavalry at all convenient places skirmished with them as usual, and checked the greater number of the light-armed from advancing before the heavy-armed, and infesting the parts adjacent to the city. Having continued here till provisions began to fail, they retired and were disbanded to their respective cities.

Upon this irruption of the Peloponnesians, Lesbos immediately revolted from the Athenians, excepting Methymné. They were well inclined to such a step before the war broke out, but were discountenanced by the Lacedæmonians, and now were necessitated to make their revolt sooner than they intended. They would have been glad to have deferred it, till they had compleated the works they were about for securing their harbour, perfecting their walls and the ships then upon the stocks—till they had received what they wanted from Pontus, both archers and corn, and whatever they had already sent for thither.

The reason was—the people of Tenedos then at enmity with them, those of Methymné, and even some persons of Mitylene underhand, who in a civil broil had received the

hospitable protection at Athens, had sent the Athenians advice—"That they are compelling all Lesbos to go into Mitylene, and are getting every thing in readiness for a revolt by the aid of the Lacedæmonians and their kindred Bæotians; and if timely prevention be not given, Lesbos will be lost."

The Athenians, at present miserably distressed by the plague, and a war now grown very brisk and vigorous, knew that the accession of Lesbos to their enemies, possessed as it was of a naval force and fresh in strength, must be a terrible blow, and would not listen at first to the accusations sent, chiefly from the earnestness of their own wishes, that they might be groundless. But when they had in vain dispatched an embassy to the Mitylenéans to put a stop to the forced resort of the Lesbians thither and their other preparations, their fears were increased, and they became intent on some expedient of timely prevention—and order thither, on a sudden, forty sail that lay ready fitted out for a cruize on Peloponnesus. Cleïppides, son of Deinias, with two colleagues, had the command of this fleet. Information had been given them, that the festival of Apollo Maloeis was soon to be celebrated without the city, at which solemnity the whole people of Mitylene are obliged to assist.—It was therefore hoped, that they might surprize them on this occasion, and by one sudden assault complete the work. Should it so fall out, it would be a happy turn;—But, if this miscarried, they were to order the Mitylenéans to deliver up their shipping and demolish their works, and in case they refused to make instant war.

With these instructions the fleet went to sea. And the Athenians seized ten Triremes belonging to the Mitylenéans, which happened at that time to be lying in their port as an auxiliary quota in pursuance of treaty, and cast into prison all their crews. But a certain person passing over from Athens to Eubœa, and hastening by land to Geræstus, finds a vessel there ready to put off, on board of

which he gets a quick passage to Mitylene, and on the third day after his setting out from Athens, gives notice to the Mitylenéans that such a fleet was coming to surprize them. Upon this they adjourned their festival, and patching up their half-finished walls and harbours as well as they could, stood ready on their guard. Not long after the Athenian fleet arrived, and finding the alarm had been given, the commanders notified to them the injunctions they brought; with which as the Mitylenéans refused to comply, they ranged themselves for action.

The Mitylenéans, unprepared as they were, and thus suddenly necessitated to make some resistance, advanced on board their ships a little beyond the mouth of their harbour, as willing to engage. But being forced to retreat upon the approach of the Athenian fleet, they begged a parley with the commanders, from a view, if it were possible upon easy conditions, to rid themselves of that fleet for the present. And the Athenian commanders readily accorded, from the apprehension, they had not sufficient strength to support the war against all Lesbos.

Hostilities having thus ceased for a time, the Mitylenéans dispatched their agents to Athens, and amongst the number one of those persons who had sent intelligence of their motions, but had now repented of the step—to procure, if possible, the recalment of the fleet, by assurances, that they were not bent on any innovations. But in the mean time, undiscovered by the Athenian fleet, which lay at anchor in the road of Malea, to the north of the city, they send away a trireme to carry an embassy to Lacedæmon; for they had no room to believe they should succeed in their negotiation at Athens. This embassy, after a laborious and dangerous voyage, arriving at Lacedæmon, began to solicit a speedy succour.—And when their agents returned from Athens, totally unsuccessful, the Mitylenéans and all the rest of Lesbos, excepting Methymne, prepare for war. This last place sent in aid to the Athenians, as

did also the Imbrians and Lemnians and some few other of their allies.

The Mitylenéans once indeed made a general sally with all their people against the station of the Athenians. Here-upon a battle ensued, after which the Mitylenéans, though by no means worsted, yet durst not continue all night in the field, but diffident of their own strength retreated behind their walls. After this they kept themselves quiet, unwilling to run any more hazards, till they had got some additional strength from Peloponnesus, and were in other respects better provided. By this time Meleas a Lacedæmonian and Hermæondas a Theban are arrived among them, who had been dispatched on some business before the revolt, and unable to compass the return before the Athenian fleet came up, had now in a trireme got in undiscovered since the battle. It was the advice of these to dispatch another trireme and embassy in company with *them*, which is accordingly done. But the Athenians, as the Mitylenéans remained in so quiet a posture, became more full of spirits than before, and sent summons of aid to their confederates, who came in with more than ordinary alacrity, as they saw such an appearance of weakness on the side of the Lesbians. Having now formed a station on the south side of the city, they fortified by a wall two camps, which invested the place on both sides, whilst their shipping was so stationed as to shut up both the harbours. By this means the communication by sea was quite cut off from the Mitylenéans. Of the land indeed the Mitylenéans and other Lesbians, who had now flocked to their aid, were for the most part masters. The quantity which the Athenians had occupied by their camps was but inconsiderable, as the station of their shipping and their market was held chiefly at Malea: And in this posture stood the war against Mitylene.—

About the same time this summer, the Athenians send out thirty sail of ships against Peloponnesus, under the command of Asopius the son of Phormio, in pursuance of

some solicitations they had received from the Acarnanians to send them either a son or some relation of Phormio to command in those parts. These ships sailing along the coasts of Laconia ravaged all the maritime places. After this Asopius sends back the greatest part of his ships to Athens, but with a reserve of twelve proceeds himself to Naupactus. And raising afterwards the whole force of the Acarnanians, he leads them against the Oeniadæ. With his ships he sailed up the Achelous, and the army marching by land laid the country waste. But when this was found ineffectual he dismisseth the land force, and stretching over *himself* to Leucas, and having made a descent upon Nericum, was intercepted in his retreat—by those of the adjacent country, who ran together for mutual aid, supported by a small party that lay there for guards,—with the loss of his own life, and a part of his army. After this, the Athenians stayed only to take up their dead by favour of a truce obtained from the Leucadians, and then steered homewards.

The ambassadors of Mitylene, who were sent in the first ship, having been ordered by the Lacedæmonians to repair to Olympia, that their applications might be addressed, and resolutions formed about them, in the grand resort of their whole alliance, arrive at that place. It was that Olympiad, in which Doricus the Rhodian was a second time victor*. So, when the solemnity was ended, and an audience was granted them†, they spoke as follows—

“YE men of Lacedæmon and you their Confederates,

* Olympiad 88.

† In this manner for private ends, and through party-feuds, was a most noble and sacred institution abused. All Grecians in general paid their attendance at the Olympic Games; and were obliged by all the ties of honour and religion to suspend their animosities and quarrels, and meet together as countrymen and brethren with frank and open ingenuity. And yet, in the present instance, they are going to contrive the means of annoying one another, so soon as that solemnity is over, which was calculated to teach them union and concord, and a steady attachment to the interests of Greece their common mother. The policy however of the present proceeding is remarkable. The Athenians who assisted at the games could

“ we are sensible of that method of procedure, which hath
“ hitherto prevailed amongst the Grecians—Revolters whilst
“ a war is on foot, and deserters from a former alliance, they
“ readily receive, and so long as their own interest is further-
“ ed by it, abundantly caress them: Yet, judging them trai-
“ tors to their former friends, they regard them as persons
“ who ought not to be trusted. To judge in this manner is
“ certainly right and proper, where those who revolt and those
“ from whom they break asunder happen to be equal to one
“ another in turn of principle, in benevolent affection, and
“ well matched together in expedients of redress and military
“ strength, and no just reason of revolt subsists.—But the
“ case is quite different between us and the Athenians. And
“ we ought not to be treated with censure and reproach, from
“ the appearance of having deserted them in extremities, af-
“ ter having been honourably regarded by them in the season
“ of tranquillity. This our conduct to justify and approve,
“ especially as we come to request your alliance, our words
“ shall first be employed, as we know that friendship can be
“ of no long continuance in private life, nor public associa-
“ tions have any stability unless both sides engage with an
“ opinion of reciprocal good faith, and are uniform in princi-
“ ple and manners. For out of dissonancy of temper, diver-
“ sities of conduct continually result.

“ An alliance, it is true, was formerly made between us
“ and the Athenians, when you withdrew yourselves from
“ the Median war, and they stayed behind you to compleat
“ what was yet to be done. We grant it—we made an alli-

suspect nothing from the presence of the Mitylenéans, who were equally bound in duty to attend. The Lacedæmonians and allies had thus an opportunity of assembling together to receive complaints, and to encourage revolts from Athens, without danger of suspicions or a detection of their counsels, till they were ripe for execution. “ The Lacedæmonians, (it is
“ a remark which will afterwards occur in this history,) amongst one ano-
“ ther and in paying all due regard to the laws of their country, gave am-
“ ple proofs of honour and virtue. But in regard to the rest of mankind,
“ they reputed as honourable the things which pleased them, and as just
“ the things which promoted their interest.”

“ance with the Athenians—not to enslave the rest of Greece
“to Athenians, but to deliver Greece from the Barbarian
“yoke. And whilst they led us on in just equality, so long
“with alacrity we followed their guidance. But when once
“we perceived that they relaxed in their zeal against the
“*Mede*, and were in earnest in rivetting slavery upon allies,
“we then began to be alarmed. It was impossible, where
“so many parties were to be consulted, to unite together
“in one body of defence, and thus all the allies fell into
“slavery, except ourselves and the Chians. We indeed,
“left in the enjoyment of our own laws, and of nominal
“freedom, continued still to follow them to war: But, from
“the specimens we had hitherto seen of their behaviour,
“we could no longer regard these Athenians as trusty and
“faithful leaders. For it was not in the least probable, that
“after enslaving those who were comprehended in the same
“treaty with ourselves, they would refrain from treating
“such as yet were free in the same tyrannic manner, when-
“ever opportunity served. Had we all indeed been left in
“the free exercise of our own laws, we should then have
“had the strongest proof that the Athenians acted upon ho-
“nest uninnovating principles. But now, when they have
“laid their yoke upon the greater number, though they
“still continue to treat us as their equals, yet undoubtedly
“it highly grates them; and they cannot long endure,
“when such numbers couch beneath their power, that our
“*State* alone should stand up and claim equality. No; it
“cannot be! For the more their power hath swelled in
“bulk and strength, by so much are we become more deso-
“late. The only secure pledge of a lasting alliance is that
“mutual awe which keeps the contracting parties in proper
“balance. For then, if any be disposed to make incroach-
“ments, he finds he cannot act upon advantage, and is ef-
“fectually deterred. Our preservation hitherto hath not
“been owing to their honesty but their cunning. Their
“scheme hath been gradually to advance their empire by

“all the specious colourings of justice, by the road of policy rather than of strength. And thus, we have been reserved to justify their violence, and to be quoted as a proof, that unless those whom they have enslaved had deserved their fate, a *State* upon an equal footing with themselves would never have marched in conjunction with them to execute their vengeance. By the same strain of policy, their first step was to lead out those that were strongest against the weaker parties, designing to finish with them, when left destitute of any outward resource, by the prior reduction of the rest. Whereas, if they had begun with us, the confederate body remaining yet possessed of its strength and able to make a stand, their enslaving project could not have equally succeeded. They were besides under some apprehension of our naval force, lest, uniting with yours, or any other *State*, such an accession might have endangered the whole of their plan. Some respite also was gained, from the respect we have ever shewn to their whole community, and to the series of magistrates who have presided amongst them. We knew, however, that we could not long hold out, had not this war come timely to our relief. We saw our own fate in the examples which had been made of others.

“What friendship therefore, what assurance of liberty could subsist, when receiving each other with the open countenance, suspicion lay lurking within ;—when, in war, apprehensive of our power, to us they paid their court ; and we, from the same principle, paid our court to them in the season of tranquillity ? The bond of union, which mutual good-will cements in others, was in us kept fast by fear. For through the prevalence of fear, and not of friendship, we have thus long persisted in alliance. And whichever side security had first emboldened, that side would first have began encroachments upon the other. Whoever, therefore, chargeth us with injustice for revolting, whilst they were only meditating our ruin, and before we actually

“felt the miseries designed us:—that person chargeth us
“without a reason. For had our situation been such, that
“we could have formed equal schemes to their prejudice and
“disconcerted all their projects, what necessity did we lie
“under to resign our equality and receive their law? But,
“as the power of attempting was ever within their reach, we
“ought certainly to lay hold of every proper expedient to
“ward off the blow.

“Such are the reasons, ye men of Lacedæmon, and you
“their confederates, such the grievances which induced our
“revolt;—reasons so clear, that all that hear them must
“justify our conduct—grievances so heavy, that it was time
“to be alarmed, and to look for some expedient of safety.
“We long since shewed our inclination to find this expedient,
“when, during the *peace*, we sent you to negotiate a revolt,
“but, by you rejected, were obstructed in our scheme. And
“now, no sooner did the Bæotians invite, than we, without
“a pause, obeyed the call. Now we have determined to
“make a double revolt;—one from the Grecians, no longer
“in concert with the Athenians to force the load of oppres-
“sion upon them, but with you to vindicate their freedom
“—another from the Athenians, that we may not in the
“train of affairs be undone by them, but timely vindicate our
“own safety.

“Our revolt, we grant it, hath been too precipitate and
“unprepared—But this lays the stronger obligation upon
“you to admit us to alliance, with the utmost expedition to
“send us succours, that you may shew your readiness to
“redress the oppressed, and at the same instant annoy your
“foes. Such a juncture for this was never known before.
“What with the plague and the exorbitant expence of the
“war, the Athenians are quite exhausted. Their fleet is
“divided, some to cruize upon your coast, others to make
“head against us. It is not probable they can have now
“the competent reserve of shipping, should you invade
“them a second time this summer both by land and sea;

“so that, either they must be unable thus divided to make
“head against you, if you singly attack them, or the union
“of us both they will not be able to face.

“Let no one amongst you imagine, that this will be en-
“dangering your own domestic welfare for the sake of fo-
“reigners with whom you have no connexion. For though
“Lesbos lies apparently at a great distance from you, yet the
“conveniences of it will lie near at hand for your service.
“For the war will not be made in Attica, as such a one
“supposeth, but in those parts whence Attica deriveth its sup-
“port. Their revenue ariseth from the tribute paid by their
“dependents. And that revenue will be increased if they
“can compass the reduction of us. For then not a soul will
“dare to revolt, and their own will be enlarged by the addi-
“tion of our strength, and more grievous burdens will be
“laid upon us, as being the last who have put on their yoke
“On the other hand, if with proper alacrity you undertake
“our support, you will gain over a *State* possessed of a cor-
“siderable navy, that acquisition you so greatly want; and
“you will more easily be enabled to demolish the Athenians,
“by withdrawing their dependents from them: For then,
“every one of that number will with assurance and confi-
“dence revolt—and you yourselves be cleared of the bad im-
“putation you at present lie under, of rejecting those who
“fly to you for protection. If, added to this, you manifest
“your views to re-establish the general freedom, you will so
“considerably strengthen the sinews of war, that all resist-
“ance will be unavailing.

“Reverencing therefore as you ought, these hopes which
“Greece hath conceived of you;—Reverencing further Olym-
“pian Jove, in whose temple we now stand, like supplicants
“distressed and suing for redress—Grant to the Mitylené-
“ans the honour of your alliance, and undertake their pro-
“tection. Reject not the intreaties of men, who have now
“indeed their lives and properties exposed to dangers merely
“their own, but whose deliverance from their present plunge

“will reflect security and advantage upon all; and who, if you now continue to be deaf to their intreaties, must drop into such a ruin as will at length involve you all. At this crisis shew yourselves to be the men, which the voice of Greece united in your praise and our dreadful situation require you to be.”

In this manner the Mitylenéans urged their plea; and the Lacedæmonians and confederates, having listened with attention, and owned themselves convinced, admitted the Lesbians into their alliance, and decreed an incursion into Attica. To put this in execution, orders were issued to the confederates then present expeditiously to march with two-thirds of their forces to the Isthmus. The Lacedæmonians themselves arrived there first, and got machines ready at the Isthmus to convey their ships over-land from Corinth to the sea of Athens, that they might invade them at the same time both by land and sea. *They* indeed were eager and intent on the enterprize: But the other confederates were very slow in assembling together, as they were busy in getting in their harvest, and began to be sadly tired of the war.

When the Athenians found that such preparations were made against them, as an avowed insult on their imagined weakness, they had a mind to convince their foes that such imaginations were erroneous, and that they were well able, without countermanding their fleet from before Lesbos, to make head against any force that could come from Peloponnesus. Accordingly, they manned out a hundred ships, obliging all, as well sojourners as citizens (those excepted of the first and second class*), to go on board. Shewing themselves

* The original is, “except those who were worth five hundred *medimns*, and the *Horsemen* or *Knights*.” The Athenians were ranged into classes by Solon. Plutarch hath described the manner in *the life of Solon*, as thus translated in Potter’s *Antiquities of Greece*, v. i. p. 14.

“Solon finding the people variously affected, some inclined to a monarchy, others to an oligarchy, others to a democracy, the rich men powerful and haughty, the poor men groaning under the burden of their oppression, endeavoured as far as was possible to compose all their differences, to ease their grievances, and give all reasonable persons satisfaction. In the prose-

first before the Isthmus in great parade, they displayed their force, and then made descents at pleasure all along the coast. The Lacedæmonians seeing them thus strong beyond what they had imagined, concluded that the Lesbians had purposely amused them with fictions ; and being perplexed how to act, as their confederates were not yet come up to join them, and as information was brought them, that the first Athenian squadron consisting of thirty sail was laying waste the territory round about their city, they retired to their own homes.

Afterwards they set about the equipment of a fleet to be sent to Lesbos ; and ordered the confederate cities to send in their contingents, the whole amounting to forty sail ; and further appointed Alcidas to be admiral in chief, who was ready to put himself at the head of the expedition. The Athenians departed off the coast with their hundred sail, when they saw their enemies had retreated.

cution of this design he divided the Athenians into four ranks, according to every man's estate ; those who were worth five hundred *medimns* of liquid and dry commodities he placed in the first rank, calling them *Pentacosimedimni*. The next were the horsemen, or *Ippeis*, being such as were of ability to furnish out a horse, or were worth three hundred *medimns*. The third class consisted of those that had two hundred *medimns*, who were called *Zeugitæ*. In the last he placed all the rest, called them *Thetes*, and allowed them not to be capable of bearing any office in the government, only gave them a liberty to give their votes in all public assemblies ; which, though at the first it appeared inconsiderable, was afterwards found to be a very important privilege ; for it being permitted every man after the determination of the magistrates to make an appeal to the people assembled in convocation, hereby it came to pass, that causes of the greatest weight and moment were brought before them. And thus he continued the power and magistracy in the hands of the rich men, and yet neither exposed the inferior people to their cruelty and oppression, nor wholly deprived them of having a share in the government. And of this equality he himself makes mention in this manner :

What power was fit I did on all bestow,
Nor rais'd the poor too high, nor press'd too low ;
The rich that rul'd and every office bore,
Confin'd by laws they cou not press the poor :
Both parties I secured from lawless might,
So none prevail'd upon another's right."—Mr. CREECH.

During the time this fleet was out at sea, though the Athenians at the commencement of the war had as large if not a larger number of ships, yet they never had their whole navy so completely fitted out for service and with so much pomp as now. One hundred of their ships were stationed for guards round Attica and Eubœa and Salamis; and another hundred were coasting all along Peloponnesus, beside those that were at Potidæa, and in other parts,—insomuch that the whole number employed this summer amounted to two hundred and fifty sail. The expence of this, with that of Potidæa, quite exhausted their treasure. For the pay of the heavy-armed who were stationed at Potidæa, was two drachmas a day, each of them receiving a drachma* for himself and another for his servant. The number of the first body sent thither was three thousand, and not fewer than those were employed during the whole siege;—but the sixteen hundred who came with Phormio were ordered away before its conclusion. The whole fleet also had the same pay. In this manner was their public treasure now for the first time exhausted—and such a navy, the largest they ever had, compleatly manned.

The Mitylenæans, during the time the Lacedæmonians lay at the Isthmus, with a body of their own and auxiliaries marched by land against Methymne, expecting to have it betrayed to them. Having assaulted the place, and being disappointed in their expectations, they marched back by way of Antissa and Pyra and Eressus. In each of these places they halted for a while, to settle affairs in as firm order as possible, and to strengthen their walls, and then without loss of time returned to Mitylene.

Upon their departure, the Methymnæans marched out against Antissa. The Antisséans with a party of auxiliaries sallying out to meet them, gave them a terrible blow, so that many of them were left dead upon the spot, and those who escaped made the best of their way back.

The Athenians—advised of these incidents, and that fur-

* Seven pence three farthings.

ther the Mitylenéans were quite masters of the country, and that their own soldiers were not numerous enough to bridle their excursions—about the beginning of autumn send a reinforcement of a thousand heavy-armed of their own people commanded by Pachus, the son of Epicurus. These, having rowed themselves the transports which brought them, arrive; and build a single wall in circle quite round Mitylene, and on the proper spots of ground strengthened it by erecting forts. Thus was Mitylene strongly besieged on all sides, both by sea and land—And by this time it began to be winter.

But the Athenians, wanting money to carry on the siege, determined now to tax themselves, and by their first contribution* raised two hundred talents† for the present service; and at the same time dispatched twelve ships under the command of Lysicles and four colleagues, to levy money abroad. He, intent on raising contributions, made a visit for this purpose to several places; and, having landed at Myus, in Caria, intending to pierce through the plain of Mæander as far as the hill of Sandius, he was attacked on his route by the Carians and Anæitans, where himself and a great part of his army perished.

This winter the Platæans—for they were still blocked up by the Peloponnesians and Bæotians—finding themselves much distressed by the failure of their provisions, giving up all hope of succour from the Athenians, and quite destitute of all other means of preservation, formed a project now in concert with those Athenians who were shut up with them

* It was a voluntary contribution: The original *term* implieth it. The manner was no doubt the same as was observed in succeeding times, when the necessities of the *state* called for an extraordinary supply. On such occasions the *presidents* of the *assembly* laid before the Athenians the present want of money, and exhorted them with cheerfulness and generosity to contribute towards the national support. Such as were willing rose up in turn, saying, "I contribute so much," and naming the sum. Such as, though rich, were niggardly and strangers to all public spirit, sat silent on these occasions, or as fast as they could stole out of the assembly.

† 38,750*l*.

in the blockade, "first of all to march out of the town in company, and to compass their escape, if possible, over the works of the enemy." The authors of this project were Thæanetus, the son of Timedes, a soothsayer, and Eumolpidas, the son of Daimachus, who was one of their commanders. But afterwards, half of the number, affrighted by the greatness of the danger, refused to have a share in the attempt. Yet the remainder, to the number of about two hundred and twenty, resolutely adhered to attempt an escape in the following manner——

They made ladders equal in height to the enemy's wall. The measure of this they learned from the rows of brick, where the side of the wall facing them was not covered over with plaster. Several persons were appointed to count the rows at the same time; some of them might probably be wrong, but the greater part would agree in the just computation; especially, as they counted them several times over, and were besides at no great distance, since the part marked out for the design was plainly within their view. In this method, having guessed the measure of a brick from its thickness, they found out what must be the total height for the ladders.

The work of the Peloponnesians was of the following structure.—It was composed of two circular walls; one towards Plataea, and the other outward, to prevent any attack from Athens. These walls were at the distance of sixteen feet one from the other; and this intermediate space of sixteen feet was built into distinct lodgments for the guards. These however, standing thick together, gave to the whole work the appearance of one thick entire wall, with battlements on both sides. At every ten battlements were lofty turrets of the same breadth with the whole work, reaching from the face of the inward wall to that of the outward; so that there was no passage by the sides of a turret, but the communication lay open through the middle of them all. By night, when the weather was rainy, they quitted the

battlements, and sheltering themselves in the turrets, as near at hand and covered over-head, there they continued their watch. Such was the form of the work by which the Platæans were inclosed on every side.

The enterprising body, when every thing was ready, laying hold of the opportunity of a night tempestuous with wind and rain, and further at a dark moon, marched out of the place. The persons, who had been authors of the project, were now the conductors. And first, they passed the ditch which surrounded the town ; then they approached quite up to the wall of the enemy, undiscovered by the guards. The darkness of the night prevented their being seen, and the noise they made in approaching was quite drowned in the loudness of the storm. They advanced also at a great distance from one another, to prevent any discovery from the mutual clashing of their arms. They were further armed in the most compact manner, and wore a covering only on the left foot, for the sake of treading firmly in the mud. At one of the intermediate spaces between the turrets they got under the battlements, knowing they were not manned. The bearers of the ladders went first and applied them to the wall. Then twelve light-armed with only a dagger and a breast-plate scaled, led by Ammeas the son of Choræbus, who was the first that mounted. His followers, in two parties of six each, mounted next on each side of the turrets. Then other light-armed with javelins succeeded them. Behind came others holding the bucklers of those above them, thus to facilitate their ascent, and to be ready to deliver them into their hands, should they be obliged to charge. When the greater part of the number was mounted, the watchmen within the turrets perceived it. For one of the Platæans, in fastening his hold, had thrown down a tile from off the battlements, which made a noise in the fall ; and immediately was shouted an alarm. The whole camp came running towards the wall, yet unable to discover the reason of this alarm, so dark was

the night, and violent the storm. At this crisis the Platæans, who were left behind in the city, sallied forth and assaulted the work of the Peloponnesians, in the part opposite to that where their friends were attempting to pass, from them to divert as much as possible the attention of the enemy. Great was the confusion of the enemy yet abiding in their posts, for not one durst leave his station to run to the place of alarm, but all were greatly perplexed to guess at its meaning. At last the body of three hundred, appointed for a reserve of succour upon any emergency, marched without the work to the place of alarm. Now the lighted torches, denoting enemies, were held up towards Thebes. On the other side, the Platæans in the city held up at the same time from the wall many of these torches already prepared for this very purpose, that the signals given of the approach of foes might be mistaken by their enemies the Thebans, who judging the affair to be quite otherwise than it really was, might refrain from sending any succour, till their friends who had sallied might have effectuated their escape, and gained a place of security.

In the mean time those of the Platæans, who having mounted first, and by killing the guards had got possession of the turrets on either hand, posted themselves there to secure the passage, and to prevent any manner of obstruction from thence. Applying further their ladder to these turrets from the top of the wall, and causing many of their number to mount, those now upon the turrets kept off the enemies, running to obstruct them both above and below, by discharging their darts; whilst the majority, rearing many ladders at the same time, and throwing down the battlements, got clean over at the intermediate space between the turrets. Every one, in the order he got over to the outward side, drew up upon the inner brink of the ditch, and from thence, with their darts and javelins, kept off those who were flocking towards the work to hinder their passage. When all the rest were landed upon the outside of the work,

those upon the turrets coming down last of all, and with difficulty got also to the ditch. By this time the reserve of three hundred was come up to oppose them, by the light of torches. The Platæans by this means, being in the dark, had a clear view of them, and, from their stand upon the brink of the ditch, aimed a shower of darts and javelins at those parts of their bodies which had no armour. The Platæans were all obscured, as the glimmering of lights made them less easy to be distinguished; so that the last of their body got over the ditch, though not without great difficulty and toil. For the water in it was froze, not into ice hard enough to bear, but into a watery congelation, the effect not of the northern but eastern blasts. The wind blowing hard, had caused so much snow to fall that night, that the water was swelled to a height not to be forded without some difficulty. However, the violence of the storm was the greatest furtherance of their escape.

The pass over the ditch being thus completed, the Platæans went forwards in a body, and took the road to Thebes, leaving on their right the temple of Juno, built by Androcrates. They judged it would never be supposed, that they had taken a route which led directly towards their enemies: And they saw at the same time the Peloponnesians pursuing with torches along the road to Athens, by Cythæron and the *Heads of the Oak**. For six or seven stadia† they continued their route towards Thebes, but then turning short, they took the road to the mountains by Erythræ and Hysiæ; and having gained the mountains, two hundred and twelve of the number completed their escape to Athens. Some of them, indeed, turned back into the city, without once attempting to get over; and one archer was taken prisoner at the outward ditch.

The Peloponnesians desisted from the fruitless pursuit, and returned to their posts. But the Platæans within the city, ignorant of the real event, and giving ear to the assu-

* Dryosephalæ.

† Above half a mile.

rances of those who turned back, that "they are all to a man cut off," dispatch a herald, as soon as it was day, to demand a truce for fetching off the dead ; but learning hence the true state of the affair, they remained well satisfied. And in this manner these men of Plataea, by thus forcing a passage, wrought their own preservation.

About the end of this winter, Salæthus, the Lacedæmonian, was dispatched in a trireme from Lacedæmon to Mitylene ; who, being landed at Pyrrha, went from thence by land, and having passed the Athenian circumvallation by favour of a breach made in it by a torrent of water, gets undiscovered into Mitylene. His commission was, to tell the governors of the place, that, "at the same time, an incursion will be made into Attica, and a fleet of forty sail be sent to their relief, according to promise ; that he himself was dispatched beforehand, to assure them of these, and to take all proper care of other points." Upon this the Mitylenæans resumed their spirits, and grew more averse to any composition with the Athenians.

The winter was now past, and in this manner ended the fourth year of the war, of which Thucydides hath compiled the history.

YEAR V.

IN the beginning of the ensuing summer—after that the Peloponnesians had dispatched Alcidas, admiral appointed, and the forty-two ships under his command, to the relief of Mitylene, with the most pressing orders—they and their confederates invaded Attica. Their design was, by this diversion to give the Athenians so much employ on all sides, that they might be unable to give any obstruction to their squadron bound for Mitylene. This present invasion was led by Cleomenes, who was his father's brother, in the right of Pausanias son of Pleistionax the king, but yet in his minority. They now utterly destroyed those parts of Attica that had been ravaged already. Whatever again be-

gan to flourish, and whatever had been spared in former incursions, now fell before their fury. And this incursion, next to the second, was the sharpest they ever made upon the Athenians. For, having continued their stay so long, as to give time to their squadron to arrive at Lesbos, and send them news of their success, they had leisure to extend their devastations over almost all the country. But when all their expectations ended in disappointment, and forage began to fail, they withdrew, and were disbanded to their respective cities.

In the meantime the Mitylenéans, when they saw nothing of the squadron from Peloponnesus (which was loitering in the course), and their provisions began to fail, are necessitated to capitulate with the Athenians, upon this occasion—Salæthus, who had also himself given up all hopes of relief, causeth the *populace*, who before were light-armed, to put on heavy armour, with a design to make a sally on the Athenians. But they, so soon as they had received their armour, would no longer obey their governors, but assembling together in bodies, ordered those in authority either publicly to produce what provisions they had and divide equally among them, or otherwise they would immediately make their own terms with the Athenians, and give up the city. Those in command being sensible that they had not force sufficient to hinder this, and that their own danger would be extreme, should they by standing out be excluded the capitulation, join with them in procuring the following terms from Paches and the Athenians—

“ That it should be submitted to the people of Athens to determine as they please in relation to the Mitylenéans.

“ That the Mitylenéans should immediately receive their army into the city—and dispatch an embassy to them to know their pleasure.

“ That sufficient respite should be indulged for this, during which Paches should put no one Mitylenéan in

“chains, should make none a slave, should put none to death.”

These were the terms of the surrender.—But those of the Mityleneans who had been most active in all the negotiations with the Lacedæmonians, were thrown into the utmost consternation, and being quite in despair when the army took possession of the place, seat themselves down at the altars for refuge. Paches, having ordered them to arise, with a promise of protecting them from insults, sends them over to Tenedos, till he could know the pleasure of the Athenians. Having further dispatched some triremes to Antissa, he took it in, and made all other dispositions he judged expedient in regard to his army.

The Peloponnesians on board the squadron of forty ships, who ought to have made the utmost expedition, but instead of that had loitered upon the coast of Peloponnesus, and made the rest of the voyage in a leisurely manner, had proceeded so far as Delos, before their motions were known at Athens. Being advanced from Delos to Icarus and Myconus, they receive the first intelligence that Mitylene was taken. But being desirous of certain information, they sailed forwards to Embatus of Erythræa. Mitylene had been taken about seven days before they came up to Embatus. Here assured of the truth, they consulted what was now to be done ; and Teutiaplus, an Eléan, gave his opinion thus——

“To you, O Alcidas, and as many other Peloponnesians
“as are joined with me in the present command, I freely
“declare it to be my own opinion, that we should sail to Mitylene, as we are, before the enemy is apprized of our arrival. It is probable, as they are so lately possessed of the
“city, we shall find it very remissly and imperfectly guarded:
“and towards the sea entirely neglected, as on that side
“they cannot in the least expect the approach of an enemy,
“and our strength in that element is superior. It is proba-

“ble also that their land force is dispersed, in that negligent
“manner which victory indulgeth, into the scattered houses
“of refreshment. If therefore we can come upon them by
“surprize and by night, I hope by the assistance of our
“friends within, if really within we have a friend remaining,
“to give a new turn to our affairs. Let us not be staggered
“at the danger of the attempt, but remember, that all the
“turns of war are owing to some such reverse as this : which,
“that commander who is most on his guard against, and who
“can discern and seize such critical moments for assaulting
“his enemies, must be most frequently successful.”

He gave his opinion thus, but it had no effect upon Alcidas. Some other persons, exiles from Ionia, and some Lesbians who were also on board, advised him further——
“That since he seemed to be discouraged by the apparent
“danger of that attempt, he should seize some city in Ionia,
“or Cyme in Ætolia : that, by favour of such a hold for war,
“they might bring about the revolt of Ionia : That in such
“a step success might justly be hoped, as his presence would
“be highly acceptable there : That, if they could cut off the
“very great revenue which accrued thence to the Athenians,
“the loss, added to the expence of endeavouring a recovery,
“must drain their treasure.—That they further thought they
“could prevail on Pissuthness, to join with them in the war.”

But Alcidas would not listen to these proposals, and got a majority to support his own opinion——“That, since it was
“too late to succour Mitylene, they should, without loss of
“time, return to Peloponnesus.” Weighing therefore from Embatus, he put again to sea ; and touching at Myonesus of the Teians, he there butchered in cold blood a number of prisoners, whom he had taken in the voyage. Putting afterwards into Ephesus, he was attended there by an embassy from the Samians of Anæa, representing to him——“That it
“was no honourable method of vindicating the liberty of
“Greece, to butcher men, who had not so much as lift up
“the hand against him, who were not enemies in heart, but

“ of mere necessity dependent on the Athenians: that, unless he changed his conduct, he would bring over but few of his enemies into friendship, but turn a far greater number of friends into enemies.” — He was wrought upon by this remonstrance, and set all the Chians and others, whom he had yet reserved, at liberty. For those, who had at any time desried this squadron, had never thought of flying, but boldly approached it as certainly Athenian. They really had no ground to imagine, that whilst the Athenians were masters of the sea, a Peloponnesian fleet should dare to put over to Ionia.

From Ephesus, Alcidas made the best of his way, or rather fled outright; for he had been discovered by the *Salaminian* and the *Paralus*, whilst he lay at anchor near Claros. These vessels happened at that time to be on a course from Athens. He was now apprehensive of a chace, and so stretched out to sea; determining, if possible, not to make any land again till he had reached Peloponnesus. Notice of him came first to Paches and the Athenians from Erythræa; it was then repeated from all parts. For as the country of Ionia is quite unfortified, the sight of the Peloponnesians on that coast, had struck a panic, lest, though their intention was not to continue there, they should at once assault and destroy their cities. The *Salaminian** also and *Paralus*, after they had desried him at Claros, came voluntarily to notify the tidings. Paches set upon the chace with warmth, and pursued it as far as the isle of Latmos. But there giving up all hope of reaching him, he turned back again for his post; and since he had not been able to

* These two vessels seem to have been the packets or yachts of the State of Athens. Their force was small in comparison of the ships of war, as they were chiefly designed for nimbleness and expedition. They carried ambassadors to and fro, went on all public errands, whether of a civil or religious nature, and transported magistrates and generals to and from their posts. They were navigated only by free-born citizens of Athens, who besides receiving more pay, esteemed it also a greater honour to serve on board these vessels, which were sacred.

come up with them by sea, thought a great point was carried, in not finding them refuged in any harbour, where they must have been under a necessity to fortify their station, and oblige him to a regular procedure and attack.

In sailing back he touched at Notium of the Colophonians, in which at this time the Colophonians resided, the upper city having been taken by Itamenes and the Barbarians, who had broke in by favour of an intestine sedition. It was taken about the time, that the Peloponnesians made their second incursion into Attica. But in Notium a second sedition broke out, between those who resorted thither for refuge and the old inhabitants. The latter having obtained an aid of Arcadians and Barbarians from Pissuthness kept within a part separated by a traverse wall, and the management of affairs was in the hands of some Colophonians of the upper city, who were in the Medish interest, and had been received amongst them as an aid. But the former, who had resorted hither for refuge, and were a body of exiles, apply to Paches for protection. He invited Hippias, the commander of the Arcadians within the transverse wall, to come out to a conference, assuring him, “if they came to no agreement, he would replace him within both safe and sound.” Upon this Hippias came out; And Paches immediately put him under an arrest, but laid no bonds upon him. This done, he on a sudden assaults the wall: by favour of the surprize carries it; and puts all the Arcadians and Barbarians within to the sword. After this, he replaceth Hippias within, in the same state he had promised; but when he had him there, immediately apprehends him again and shoots him to death with arrows. Notium he delivers into the hands of the Colophonians, excluding those only who were in the interest of the Mede. In process of time, the Athenians having sent leaders thither on purpose, and declared Notium an Athenian colony, settled in it the Colophonians that were any where to be found, under the accustomed regulations.

Paches, being returned to Mitylene, completed the reduction of Pyrra and Eressus; and having apprehended Salæthus the Lacedæmonian, who had been concealed in the city, sends him to Athens along with those citizens of Mitylene from Tenedos, whom he had kept in safe custody there, and all others who appeared to have been concerned in the revolt. As an escort to these he sends away also the greater part of his army. With the remainder he himself stayed behind to regulate the affairs of Mitylene and the rest of Lesbos, to the best of his discretion.

When the authors of the revolt and Salæthus were arrived at Athens, the Athenians instantly put Salæthus to death. He made them many fruitless proposals to save his life; and amongst the rest, that the siege of Plataea should be raised, which was still besieged by the Peloponnesians. They next entered into consultation, what should be done with the revolters; and in the warmth of anger decreed—“That not only those who were now at Athens should be put to death, but the same sentence should extend to all the men of Mitylene who were adult; and the women and children be sold for slaves. They were exasperated against them not only because they had revolted, but because they had done it without the provocation which others had received in the rigour of their government. The Peloponnesian fleet added the greater impetuosity to this their resentment, as they had dared to venture so far as Ionia in aid of the Rebels. For it plainly appeared to them, that the revolt had not been made without much previous deliberation. In short, they dispatch a trireme to notify their decree to Paches, with orders to see it put in immediate execution upon the Mitylenæans.

The day following, repentance on a sudden touched their hearts, moved by the reflection, that they had passed a savage and monstrous decree in dooming a whole city to that destruction, which was only due to the authors of the guilt. This was no sooner perceived by the Mitylenæan

ambassadors then residing at Athens, and such of the Athenians, as inclining to mercy had a mind to save them, than they addressed themselves to the magistrates, begging the decree might be again debated. Their request was the more easily granted, as the magistrates had discovered that the bulk of the city were desirous to have a second opportunity of declaring their sentiments. An assembly of the people is again convened, and various opinions were offered by different persons, till Cleon the son of Cleanetus, who in the former assembly had proposed and carried the murdering sentence, who in all other respects was the most violent of all the citizens, and at this time had by far the greatest influence over the people, stood forth again and spoke as follows——

“UPON many other occasions my own experience hath convinced me, that a democracy is incapable of ruling over others ; but I see it with the highest certainty now in this your present repentance concerning the Mitylenéans. In security so void of terror, in safety so exempt from treachery, you pass your days within the walls of Athens, that you are grown quite safe and secure about your dependents. Whenever, soothed by their specious intreaties, you betray your judgment or relent in pity, not a soul amongst you reflects that you are acting the dastardly part, not in truth to confer obligations upon those dependents, but to endanger your own welfare and safety. It is then quite remote from your thoughts, that your rule over them is in fact a tyranny, that they are ever intent on prospects to shake off your yoke——*that* yoke, to which they ever reluctantly submitted. It is not forgiveness on your part, after injuries received, that can keep them fast in their obedience, since this must be ever the consequence of your own superior power and not of gratitude in them.

“Above all, I dread that extremity of danger to which we are exposed, if not one of your decrees must ever be

“carried into act, and we remain for ever ignorant—that
“the community which uniformly abides by a worse set of
“laws, hath the advantage over another, which is finely mo-
“delled in every respect, except in practice ;—that modest
“ignorance is a much surer support than genius which
“scorns to be controled ;—and that the duller part of man-
“kind in general administer public affairs much better than
“your men of vivacity and wit. The last assume a pride in
“appearing wiser than the laws ; in every debate about the
“public good they aim merely at victory, as if there were
“no other points sufficiently important, wherein to display
“their superior talents ; and by this their conduct they ge-
“nerally subvert the public welfare : The former, who are
“diffident of their own abilities, who regard themselves as
“less wise than the laws of their country—though unable to
“detect the specious orator, yet being better judges of equity
“than champions in debate, for the most part enforce the
“rational conduct. This beyond denial is our duty at pre-
“sent ; we should scorn competitions in eloquence and wit,
“nor wilfully and contrary to our own opinion mislead the
“judgment of this full assembly.

“For my part, I persist in my former declarations, and
“I am surprized at the men who proposed to have the affair
“of Mitylene again debated, who endeavour to protract the
“execution of justice, in the interest of the guilty more than
“of the injured. For by this means the sufferer proceeds
“to take vengeance on the criminal with the edge of his
“resentment blunted ; when revenge, the opposite of wrong,
“the more nearly it treads upon the heels of injury, gene-
“rally inflicts the most condign punishment. But I am
“more surprized at him, whoever he be, that shall dare to
“contradict, and pretend to demonstrate that the injuries
“done by the Mytelenéans are really for our service, and
“that our calamities are hardships on our dependents. He
“certainly must either presume upon his own eloquence, if
“he contends to prove that what was plainly decreed was ne-

“ ver decreed ; or, instigated by lucre, will endeavour to
“ seduce you by the elaborate and plausible artifice of
“ words. In such contentions, the *State* indeed awards the
“ victory to whom she pleaseth, but she sustains all the da-
“ mage herself. You are answerable for this, Athenians !
“ You ! who fondly doat on these wordy competitions !
“ You ! who accustomed to be spectators of speeches and
“ hearers of actions. You measure the possibility of future
“ effects by the present eloquence of your orators ; you
“ judge of actions already past, not by the certain conviction
“ of your own eyes, but the fallible suggestions of your
“ ears, when soothed by the inveigling insinuating flow of
“ words. You are the best in the world to be deceived by
“ novelty of wit, and to refuse to follow the dictates of the
“ approved judicious speaker,—slaves as you are to whatever
“ trifles happen always to be in vogue, and looking down
“ with contempt on tried and experienced methods. The
“ most earnest wish that the heart of any of your body ever
“ conceived is, to become a speaker ; if that be unattain-
“ ble, you range yourselves in opposition against all who
“ are so, for fear you should seem in judgment their infe-
“ riors. When any thing is acutely uttered, you are ready
“ even to go before it with applause, and intimate your own
“ preconception of the point, at the same time dull at dis-
“ cerning whither it will tend. Your whole passion, in a
“ word, is for things that are not in reality and common
“ life ; but of what passeth directly before your eyes you
“ have no proper perception. And, frankly, you are quite
“ infatuated by the lust of hearing, and resemble more the
“ idle spectators of contending sophists, than men who meet
“ to deliberate upon public affairs. From such vain amuse-
“ ments endeavouring to divert you, I boldly affirm, that
“ no one city in the world hath injured you so much as Mi-
“ tylene.

“ Those who, unable to support the rigour of your go-
“ vernment, or who, compelled to do it by hostile force,

“ have revolted from you, I readily absolve. But for a
“ people who inhabit an island, a fortified island ; who had
“ no reason to dread the violence of our enemies, except by
“ sea ; who even at sea, by the strength of their own ship-
“ ping were able to guard themselves against all attacks,
“ who enjoyed their own model of government, and were
“ ever treated by us with the highest honour and regard—
“ for such a people to revolt in this manner is never to be
“ forgiven. Is not their whole procedure one series of
“ treachery ? Have they not rather made war upon than
“ revolted against us ? for revolt can only be ascribed to
“ those who have suffered violence and outrage. Have they
“ not further sought out our implacable foes, and begged to
“ participate with them in our destruction ? This certainly
“ is a much greater aggravation of guilt, than if merely on
“ their own domestic strength they had rebelled against us.
“ They would not be deterred by the calamities of their
“ neighbours, who have frequently before this revolted, and
“ been punished for it by a total reduction ; nor would they
“ so far acquiesce in present felicity, as not to hazard the
“ dangerous reverse of misery. Audacious in regard to the
“ future, presumptuous above their strength, but below their
“ intention, they made war their choice, and in preferring
“ violence to the just observance of duty have placed their
“ glory. For, though uninjured and unprovoked, the first
“ moment they saw a probability of prevailing, they seized
“ it and rebelled.

“ It is the usual effect of prosperity, especially when felt
“ on a sudden, and beyond their hope, to puff up a people
“ into insolence of manners. The successes of mankind,
“ when attained by the rational course, are generally of
“ much longer continuance than when they anticipate pur-
“ suit. And in a word, men are much more expert at re-
“ pelling adversity than preserving prosperity. By this
“ ought we long ago to have adjusted our conduct towards
“ the Mitylenéans, never distinguishing them above others

“with peculiar regard; and then, they never would have
“been that insolent people we have found them now. For
“so remarkably perverse is the temper of man, as ever to
“contemn whoever courts him, and admire whoever will not
“bend before him.

“Let condign punishment therefore be awarded to their
“demerits. Let not the guilty be avenged upon the heads
“of the *few*, and the bulk of offenders escape unpunished.
“The whole *people* to a man have rebelled against us, when
“it was in their power to have been sheltered here, and now
“again to be reinstated in their former seats. But they
“judged the danger would be lessened by the general concur-
“rence with the *few*, and so all revolted in concert.

“Extend further your regards to the whole body of your
“dependents; for if you inflict the same punishments on
“those who revolt by compulsion of enemies, and who revolt
“on pure deliberate malice, which of them, do you think,
“will not seize the least pretext to throw off your yoke;
“when, if he succeeds, his liberty is recovered, and, though
“he fails, the hurt is so easy to be cured? Besides this, our
“lives and fortunes will be endangered upon every single at-
“tempt which shall be made. Suppose we succeed, we only
“recover an exhausted ruined city, but shall for the future
“be deprived of the revenue arising from it, the essence of
“our strength: But, if we cannot prevail, we shall enlarge
“the number of enemies we already have: And at a time
“when we ought to be employed in resisting our present ad-
“versaries, we shall be intangled in wars against our own de-
“pendents. We ought not therefore to encourage the hope,
“whether raised by the force of intreaty, or purchased by the
“force of corruption, that their errors are but the errors of
“men, and shall therefore be forgiven. The damage they
“have done was not involuntary, but they have been delibe-
“rate determined villains: Forgiveness is only for those who
“erred not by design.

“Moved by the ardency and zeal of my former plea, you

“made the decree ; and now I earnestly conjure you, not to
“repent of your own determinations, not to plunge yourselves
“in inextricable difficulties, through pity, through delight of
“hearing, and soft forbearance, the three most prejudicial ob-
“stacles of power. It is just to shew pity to those who
“are its proper objects, and not to men who would never
“have felt compassion for us, nor to foes who must of neces-
“sity be implacable. The orators, those delights of your
“ears, will have room in debates of lesser moment to catch
“at your applause, but should be silenced here, where they
“only can give the public a short-lived pleasure, whilst they
“embroil it with perplexities, not easy to be surmounted, and
“themselves alone in requital of speaking well will be well re-
“warded for it. Forbearance, further, may be shewn to
“those who are willing to be, and will for the future prove
“themselves our friends ; but not to such inveterate souls as
“these, who, if suffered to live, will live only to wreak their
“malice against you.

“I shall wave enlargements, and give you only one
“short assurance, that if you hearken to my admonitions,
“you will at the same time do justice to the Mitylenéans
“and service to yourselves ; but if you resolve in any other
“manner, you will receive no thanks from them, and will
“establish the clearest evidence for your own condemnation.
“For, if these men had reason to revolt, it follows that you
“have tyrannically ruled them. Grant the injustice of such
“a rule, but yet that you have presumed to be guilty of
“it ;—why then, upon the mere motive of interest, you
“ought now to chastise them beyond what is right, or im-
“mediately to forego your power, and dropping yourselves
“down into impotent security, to set about the practice of
“humanity and virtue. But, adieu to this vain expedient !
“and at once resolve to make them feel that weight of
“misery they designed for us. Convince them that those
“who have escaped it can feel as strong resentments as
“those who projected the fatal blow. Determine now, by

“recollecting with yourselves what kind of usage you would
 “have received from them, had *they* succeeded in their plots,
 “*they*! the uninjured, unprovoked aggressors. It is an al-
 “lowed truth, that men who, without the least provocation,
 “have recourse to acts of malice, will be sated with nothing
 “less than complete destruction, as they must ever be terri-
 “fied at the sight of a surviving foe. For he who suffers from
 “a quarter whence he never deserved it, will not so easily
 “lay down his resentments, as when mutual enmity hath kin-
 “dled the contention. Be not therefore traitors to your own
 “selves. Figure to yourselves, as strongly as you can, the
 “miseries they designed you; remember how you wished
 “for nothing in this world so much as to have them in your
 “power, and now retaliate upon them. Relent not at the
 “scene of horror imagination may present to your fancy, but
 “fix your remembrance fast on that weight of misery, which
 “was just now suspended over your own heads. Punish these
 “wretches according to their deserts; make them a notable
 “example to the rest of your dependents, that death must be
 “the portion of whoever dares revolt. For when once they
 “are certain of this, your arms will no more be recalled from
 “your foreign enemies, to be employed in the chastisement of
 “your own dependents.”

In this manner Cleon* supported the decree, and when he

* From the short sketch of Cleon's character given before by Thucy-
 des, and the speech he hath now made, it is likely he can be no favourite
 with the reader. Cicero hath styled him, “a turbulent but eloquent Athe-
 nian.” By means of his eloquence, and an impudence that never could be
 dashed, he was now a prime favourite with the people, but the scorn and
 error of all good men at Athens. He had ever been a snarler at Pericles,
 but so long as he lived could obtain no share in the public administration.
 He had now got the ascendant by cajoling the people, and by his loud and
 daily invectives against their ministers and commanders. He will make a
 very splendid and very despicable figure in the sequel. Aristophanes, who
 had a particular grudge against him, hath exhibited him in the most dis-
 tasteful light. His comedy of the *Hersemen* or *Knights* is entirely employed
 to shew him off. He calls him throughout the *Paphlagonian*, to brand his
 low and brutal disposition, who, “quitting his original trade of selling lea-

had concluded, Diodotus the son of Eucrates, who in the former assembly had most strenuously opposed the bloody sentence against the Mitylenéans, stood forth, and thus replied.

“ I NEITHER blame those who proposed the resumption
“ of the decree against Mitylene, nor do I praise the men
“ who inveigh against repeated consultations on points of the
“ greatest importance. But I lay it down for certain, that
“ there are no two greater impediments of sound mature coun-
“ sel than precipitation and anger ; of which, the one is closely
“ connected with madness, the other with raw inexperience
“ and short liminary judgment.

“ It may indeed be warmly asserted, that words are not the
“ proper guides to actions. But the author of such an asser-
“ tion is either wanting in discernment, or confines it only to
“ his own selfish views. He is wanting in discernment, if he
“ imagines there is any other possible method of putting light
“ into things that are future or unseen ; or confines it only to
“ himself, if willing to recommend a scandalous measure, and
“ conscious he hath not eloquence enough to support it openly,
“ he launcheth out into plausible calumnies, to intimidate his
“ opponents as well as his audience.

“ But odious beyond all support is their procedure who
“ prematurely condemn the advice of others as purchased
“ and corrupt. For would they only acquiesce in the charge
“ of ignorance, the defeated opponent goes off with the

“ ther, vile leather, since people rather swam than walked in the shoes
“ made of it, was now become the leading politician, the scourge and pest
“ of the republic.” The *chorus* of the play salutes him with the most vil-
lainous titles. And an oracle is cooked up, which prophesieth that they
shall never get rid of Cleon, till he is overpowered by a greater scoundrel
than himself. A dealer in black-puddings is at last procured to be his
competitor. The contest is carried on with all the ribaldry and scurrility
that unbridled wit could forge for such characters, and Cleon is at length
defeated. This is the event upon the stage, but was by no means so in the
State of Athens. The wit of Aristophanes seldom hurt knaves and scound-
rels ; it wounded and was mischievous only to the ablest ministers and
the warmest patriots

“bare character of a man less enlightened indeed, but quite
“as honest. If he be charged with corruption, his point
“he may carry, but his honesty will ever be suspected ; and
“if his point be lost, he must pass for knave and blockhead
“both. Such methods can never be conducive to the pub-
“lic good. The men, best able to advise, are by this means
“intimidated : Though the public welfare would then be
“best secured, if every person of so disingenuous a temper
“was not able to open his mouth ; for then, by his seduce-
“ments, the public could never be misled. But it is the
“duty of every true patriot to despise the slanders of oppo-
“nents, and on fair and impartial views to get his own
“advice accepted. It is the duty of every well-regulated
“public, not indeed to load a man with honours for having
“given the best advice, but never to abridge him of his
“present portion ; and if he cannot prevail, by no means
“to disgrace, much less to punish him : For then, neither
“would the successful debater, from a view of inhancing
“his own personal honours, ever speak against conscience,
“or aim merely at applause ; nor would he, who hath been
“unsuccessful in his motions, be greedy of proposing what-
“ever may cajole, and so earn popularity for himself. But
“the method in vogue with us is the reverse of this ; and
“what is worse, if a person be suspected of corruption,
“though he advise the most prudent expedients, yet the
“odium raised against him upon the weak suggestion of
“lucre, quite weighs him down, and we are deprived of
“the manifest service he could do to the *State*. Nay, such
“is our method, that even the best advice, if readily of-
“fered, can escape suspicion no more than the worst. And
“hence it is necessarily incumbent, as well upon him who
“would persuade the public into the most prejudicial mea-
“sures, to seduce the people with art ; as upon him who
“would advise the best, to disguise the truth in order to
“prevail. Amidst these jugglings, the public alone is de-
“barred the service of its most able counsellors, since in a

“ plain and open method they cannot possibly act, and artifice
“ must clear the way before them. For the man who openly
“ bestows any benefit upon it, is constantly suspected of doing
“ underhand a greater to himself.

“ When affairs therefore of so high concern are before
“ you, when the general temper is so over-run with jealousy,
“ we, who presume to advise, must enlarge our prospect
“ farther than you, who only assist at a transient consulta-
“ tion; because we are accountable for what we propose,
“ and you are not accountable for the prejudices with which
“ you hear. For if not only he who proposed, but he who
“ complied, were equally answerable for events, your deter-
“ minations would be better framed than they are at present.
“ But now, hurried along as you are by your hasty resent-
“ ments on any sinister event, you wreak your fury only upon
“ the single opinion of the person who advised, and not upon
“ your own joint opinions, by concurrence of which the mis-
“ carriage was incurred.

“ For my part, I neither stand up to deny certain facts
“ in favour of the Mitylenéans, nor to waste the time in
“ fruitless accusations. We are not debating now what
“ wrongs they have done us, since that would be a reproach
“ to sense; but what determination about them is best.
“ For though I can prove, beyond a scruple, that they have
“ injured us in the most outrageous manner, yet I shall not
“ for that reason advise you to butcher them, unless it be
“ expedient; nor, were they objects of forgiveness, should
“ I advise forgiveness, unless I judged it for the interest of
“ the public. I apprehend, that our consultations turn
“ more upon a future than a present view. And Cleon
“ here most confidently asserts, that the surest expedient of
“ your future welfare is, to prevent all other revolts by in-
“ flicting death in doom of this; but, equally confident of
“ the just expedient of future security, I declare quite on
“ the other side. And I intreat you, by no means to reject
“ the real advantage of mine for the specious colourings of

“his advice. Strict justice, I grant, may be with him ; and,
“enraged as you are against the Mitylenéans, may have a
“sudden influence upon you. But we meet not here in judg-
“ment upon them, and justly to decide is not now our em-
“ployment ; we are only to consult how to dispose of them
“best for our own advantage.

“In the public communities of men, death is the pe-
“nalty awarded to several crimes, to such as are not enor-
“mous like this, but of a less guilty nature. Yet, puffed up
“with hope, men run all hazards, and no one ever yet hath
“boldly incurred the danger, if self-convinced beforehand,
“that he could not survive the attempt. Where was the
“city so bent on revolt, that when its own domestic
“strength, or the aid of others, were judged unequal to the
“work, durst ever attempt it? The whole of mankind,
“whether individuals or communities, are by nature liable
“to sin : and a law of infallible prevention will never be
“enacted. Men by repeated trials have inforced all kinds
“of punishment, attentive, if possible, to restrain the out-
“rages of the wicked. And in the early age it is probable,
“that milder penalties were assigned for the most enormous
“wrongs ; but, being found by experience ineffectual, they
“were afterwards extended generally to loss of life : This
“however is not yet effective. Some terror therefore must
“be invented, even more alarming than this, or this will
“never sufficiently restrain. But then there is a poverty
“which renders necessity daring ; there is a power which
“renders pride and insolence rapacious. There are other
“contingencies, which in the fervour of passions, as every
“human mind is possessed by some too stubborn to admit
“a cure, drive them on boldly to confront extremities.
“But the greatest incentives of all are hope and love : This
“points out a path, and that moves along according to
“direction : This thoughtlessly proposeth the scheme, and
“that immediately suggesteth a certainty of success. These

“are the sources of all our evils ; and these invisible principles within us are too strong for all the terrors that are seen without. To these add fortune, who contributes her ample share to divest the mind of its balance. She shews herself by unexpected starts, and encourageth even the incompetent to venture dangers, and hath a greater influence over communities, as the ends proposed by them are of the greatest concern, such as liberty or dominion, where every individual, amidst the universal ardour, unaccountably plumes himself up, and acts with a spirit above himself. But in truth, it is quite impossible : it is a proof of egregious folly to imagine, when human nature is impelled by its own impetuous passions towards such objects, that the force of laws or any intervening terror is strong enough to divert them from the mark. Hence therefore ariseth the strongest dissuasive to us from confiding in the penalty of death as the only pledge of our future safety, which must betray us into weak prejudicial measures, which must drive all revolvers into utter despair, by shewing them plainly, that we shall never accept repentance, shall not give them one moment’s indulgence to palliate their offences.

“Consider with yourselves, in the merciful light, that a revolted city, when for certainty assured that it cannot hold out, may submit upon our own conditions, whilst yet in a capacity to reimburse our expences, and to advance the future tribute. But in the opposite case, can you imagine there is any city which will not better prepare itself for revolt than Mitylene hath done ; and hold out a siege to the last extremity ? Is there no difference between a quick and a slow submission ? Shall not we be hurt, if forced through their despair to continue a tedious and expensive siege ; and, when the place is taken, to be masters only of one heap of desolation, unable for the future to squeeze the least pittance of revenue from it ? It is revenue alone which renders us a terror to our foes. We

“ought not therefore with the rigour of judges to inflict the
“exactest punishments upon these offenders. We ought
“rather to provide for futurity, and by moderate correction
“still to preserve those cities in a full capacity of paying us
“the needful tribute. To keep men firm in their duty, we
“should scorn the expedient of severe and sanguinary laws,
“since mild discretionary caution would better answer the
“purpose. This prudent conduct we are now reversing, if,
“when re-possession of a city stripped of its former liberty
“and ruled with violence, sufficient motives of revolt, that it
“may again become independent; if now we judge, that
“this ought to be avenged with a weight of severity. Men
“who have known what liberty is, ought not to be too se-
“verely chastised, if they have dared to revolt; but we
“ought to observe them with timely vigilance before they
“revolt, to prevent their taking the least step towards it, or
“even once entertaining a thought about it; at least, when
“we have quelled the insurrection, the guilt should be fas-
“tened upon as few as possible.

“Consider, I beseech you, with yourselves, how greatly
“you will err in this, and in another respect, if Cleon’s ad-
“vice be approved. For now, the *populace* of all the cities
“are generally well-affected towards us. They either refuse
“to concur with the *few* in their revolts; or, if their con-
“currence be forced, they instantly turn enemies to those
“who forced them;—and you proceed to determine the
“contest, assured that the *populace* of the adverse city will
“be active in your favour. But if you doom to general
“excision the *people* of Mitylene, those who had no share
“in the revolt; who, when once they had got arms into
“their hands, spontaneously delivered up the place;—
“you will be guilty, first of base ingratitude, for murdering
“your own benefactors,—and you will, next, establish such
“a precedent, as the factious *great* above all things wish to
“see. For then, whenever the latter effect the revolt of
“cities, they will instantly have the *people* attached to their

“party; since you yourselves have enforced the precedent,
“that punishment must fall upon the heads, not only of the
“guilty, but even of the innocent. Whereas indeed, though
“they had been guilty, we ought to have dissembled our
“knowledge of it, that we might not force the only party
“which ever takes our side into utter enmity and aversion.
“And I esteem it much more conducive to the firm support
“of empire, rather to connive at the wrongs we may have
“felt, than in all the severity of justice to destroy those per-
“sons whom in interest we ought to spare. And thus, that
“union of justice to others and duty to yourselves in this in-
“stance of punishing the Mityleneans, as alleged by Cleon,
“is plainly found to be grossly inconsistent, to be utterly im-
“possible.

“Own yourselves therefore convinced, that the greatest
“advantages will result from the conduct which I have re-
“commended; and, without giving too wide a scope to
“mercy or forbearance, by which I could never suffer you
“to be seduced, follow my advice, and in pursuance of it re-
“solve——“To judge and condemn, at your own discretion,
“those guilty Mityleneans whom Paches hath sent hither
“to attend your decisions, and to let the others continue as
“they are.” These are expedients of your future welfare,
“and of immediate terror to your foes. For they who can
“form the soundest deliberations, stand stronger up against
“hostile opposition, than the men who rush to action with
“indiscreet unpremeditating strength.”

Diodotus ended here. And when these two opinions, diametrically opposite to one another, had been thus delivered, the Athenians had a stiff contest in support of each, and, upon holding up of hands, there seemed near an equality; but the majority proved at last to be along with Diodotus.

Upon this they immediately sent away another trireme, enjoining all possible dispatch, lest this second, not coming in time, might find the city already destroyed, as the other

had got the start of a day and a night. The Mitylenéan ambassadors amply furnished them with wine and barley-cakes, and promised them great rewards if they arrived in time. By this means they were so eager to accelerate the passage, that even whilst plying the oar they eat their cakes dipped in wine and oil ; and whilst one half of the number refreshed themselves with sleep, the other kept rowing amain. So fortunate were they that not one adverse blast retarded their course. The former vessel, as sent on a monstrous errand, had not hastened its passage in the least ; and the latter was most intently bent on expedition. *That* indeed got before to Mitylene, but only long enough for Paches to read over the decree, and give orders for its immediate execution. At that crisis the latter arriveth, and prevented the massacre. To such an extremity of danger was Mitylene reduced.

The other Mitylenéans, whom Paches* had sent to Athens as deepest concerned in the revolt, were there put to death, according to the advice of Cleon. And the number of these amounted to somewhat above a thousand.

The Athenians, further, demolished the walls of Mitylene and took away their shipping. They did not for the future enjoin an annual tribute upon the Lesbians, but dividing the whole island into shares (except what belonged to Methymne), three thousand in the whole, they set apart three hundred of these as sacred to the Gods, and sent some of their own people, who were appointed by lot, to take possession of the rest, as full proprietors. The Lesbians, as tenants of these, were obliged to pay them two *Mynæ*† yearly for every share, in consideration of which they had still the use of the soil.—The

* We hear no more in this history of Paches, who certainly, in the reduction of Lesbos, had done a great service to his country, and had behaved through the whole affair with great discretion and humanity. And yet Plutarch tells us in two passages (in the *lives* of Aristides and Nicias) that at his return he was called to account for his conduct during his command, and finding he was going to be condemned, his resentment and indignation rose so high, that he instantly slew himself in court.

† 6*l.* 9*s.* 2*d.* sterling.

Athenians also took from them several towns upon the continent which had belonged to the Mitylenéans, and which continued afterwards in subjection to the Athenians. Thus ended the commotions of Lesbos.

The same summer, after the reduction of Lesbos—the Athenians, commanded by Nicias* the son of Niceratus, executed a design upon Minoa, the island which lies before Megara. The Megaréans, having built a fort upon it,

* Nicias is now for the first time in the chief command, who is to act parts of very great importance in the sequel of the war. We should therefore take some notice of him on his first appearance. Plutarch, who hath wrote his *life*, gives light into several circumstances, which fall not within the cognizance of a general historian. He was born of a noble family in Athens, and was one of the most wealthy citizens. Beside his estates, he had a large annual income from the silver mines at Laurium. Not that those mines belonged to him, as one would infer from Plutarch; for they were the patrimony of the *State*, annexed to it by Themistocles for the support of the navy: But, as Xenophon relates, in his treatise of *revenue*, Nicias had a thousand slaves constantly employed in working these mines. He hired them out to Sosias the Thracian, who was undertaker of the work, on condition to receive a clear *obole* a day for every one of them; and he always kept up the number. His income from hence was therefore near 2000*l.* sterling a year. He acted under Pericles so long as he lived; and, after his death, was set up by the more sober and sensible Athenians as a balance to Cleon, who was the idol of the people. Nicias was a true lover of his country, of unblemished integrity, and very gentle and complacent in his manners. His good qualities were numerous and shining: His foibles were a great diffidence of himself, and a dread of the people, which made him court them by laying out his wealth in public games and shows for their entertainment. He had an inward fund of real piety; but was superstitiously attached to the ceremonial of the religion of his country. His great wealth drew a great number of followers and parasites about him; and his benevolent disposition was always seeking occasions of doing good. In short, says Plutarch, “bad men had a sure fund in his pusillanimity, and good men in his humanity.” No body could either hate or fear him at Athens, and therefore his interest there was great. He was always cautious, and always diffident, and under such an awe of the people in the general assemblies, that they would shout out to him by way of encouragement, as his modesty was amiable and engaging when opposed to the impudence of Cleon.—Thus much may suffice at present, since his military expeditions and the whole of his political conduct will be related by Thucydides.

used it as a garrison. But it was the scheme of Nicias, to fix the post of observation for the Athenians there, as being much nearer situated, and to remove it from Budorus and Salamis. This would prevent the sudden courses of the Peloponnesians, frequent from thence; would curb the piratical cruizers; and, at the same time, stop all importations into Megara. Beginning therefore with the two forts detached from Nisæa, he took them by means of the engines he played against them from the sea; and having thus opened the channel between them and the island, he took in by a wall of fortification that part of the main land from whence, only by crossing the morass and the help of a bridge, a succour could be thrown into the island, which lay at a very small distance from the continent. This work was compleated in a few days, after which Nicias, leaving behind in the island a sufficient garrison to defend the works, drew off the rest of his army.

About the same time this summer, the Platæans, whose provisions were quite spent, and who could not possibly hold out any longer, were brought to a surrender in the following manner—The enemy made an assault upon their wall, which they had not sufficient strength to repel. The Lacedæmonian general being thus convinced of their languid condition, was determined not to take the place by storm. In this he acted pursuant to orders sent him from Lacedæmon; with a view, that whenever a peace should be concluded with the Lacedæmonians, one certain condition of which must be reciprocally to restore the places taken in the war, Platæa might not be included in the restitution, as having freely and without compulsion gone over to them. A herald is accordingly dispatched with this demand—"Whether they are willing voluntarily to give up the city to the Lacedæmonians, and accept them for their judges who would punish only the guilty, and contrary to forms of justice not even one of those."—The herald made this demand aloud. And the Platæans, who were now reduced to excessive weakness, delivered up the city.

The Peloponnesians supplied the Platæans with necessary sustenance for the space of a few days, till the five delegates arrived from Lacedæmon to preside at their trial. And yet, when these were actually come, no judicial process was formed against them. They only called them out, and put this short question to them—"Whether they had done any service to the Lacedæmonians and their allies in the present war?"—Their answer was, that they begged permission to urge their plea at large; which being granted, they pitched upon Astymachus the son of Asopalaus and Laco the son of Aeimnestus, who had formerly enjoyed the public hospitality of the Lacedæmonians, to be their speakers, who stood forth, and pleaded thus—

"PLACING in you, O Lacedæmonians, an entire confidence, we have delivered up our city; but never imagined we should be forced to such a process as this, when we expected only to be tried by justice and laws—when we yielded to plead, not before other judges, as is now our fate; but only before yourselves. Then indeed we thought, that justice might be obtained.—But now, we have terrible grounds for apprehending, that we have at once been doubly over-reached. Strong motives occur to alarm our suspicions, that the point most in view is to deprive us of our lives, and that you will not prove impartial judges. We cannot but be too certain of this, when no manner of crime is formally objected, against which we might form our defence; when barely at our own intreaty we are heard, and your concise demand is such, that if we answer it with truth we condemn ourselves; if with falsehood, must be instantly refuted.

"Thus on all sides beset with perplexities, something of necessity must be said in our own behalf; nay, where the danger is so urgent, the only small glimpse of security appears in hazarding a plea. For persons like us distressed, in silence to abandon their own defence—this may with sad compunction torture them at last, as if their safety might have been earned by speaking for themselves—

“ though never was persuasion so much to be despaired of
“ as at present. Were we indeed, who are the persecuted
“ party, entirely unknown to our judges, we might then al-
“ lege such evidence as through ignorance you could not
“ overturn, and so further our defence. But now we must
“ speak before men who are informed of every point. Nor
“ do our fears result from the prior knowledge you have had
“ of us, as if you were now proceeding against us for having
“ in valour been inferior to yourselves ; but, from our own
“ sad forebodings, that we are cited to a tribunal which hath
“ already condemned us, to gratify others. Yet, what we
“ can justly say for ourselves in regard to all our differences
“ with the Thebans, we shall boldly allege ; the good ser-
“ vices we have done to you and the rest of Greece we shall
“ fairly recite—and strive, if possible, to persuade.

“ To your concise demand—Whether we have done any
“ good service in this war to the Lacedæmonians and their
“ allies?—we answer thus : “ If you interrogate us as ene-
“ mies, though we have done you no good, yet we have
“ done you no harm ; If you regard us as friends, you have
“ offended more than we, in making war upon us.”—In re-
“ gard to the *peace* and against the *Mede*, we have ever
“ honestly performed our duty : The *peace* was not violated
“ first by us against *him*, we alone of all the Bæotians at-
“ tended you in the field to maintain the liberty of Greece.
“ For, though an inland people, we boldly engaged in the
“ sea-fight at Artemisium ; and in the battle, fought upon
“ this our native ground, we assisted you and Pausanias ; and
“ whatever the danger to which Greece, in that trouble-
“ some period of time, was exposed, in all we bore a share
“ beyond our strength. To you in particular, O ye Lace-
“ dæmonians, in that greatest consternation Sparta ever felt,
“ when after the earthquake your rebellious Helots had
“ seized upon Ithome, we immediately dispatched the third
“ part of our force for succour. These things you are bound
“ in honour never to forget. For thus upon former, and
“ those most critical occasions, we with honour shewed our-

“selves your friends.—But at length we became your
“enemies!—For that blame only yourselves: Because
“when we stood in great want of support against the vio-
“lence and oppression of the Thebans, to you we applied,
“and by you were rejected. You commanded us then to
“address ourselves to Athens. Athens you said was near,
“but Sparta lay too remote to serve us. Yet, notwithstand-
“ing this, in the present war we have committed no one
“dishonourable act in regard to you, nor should ever have
“committed. You enjoined us indeed to revolt from the
“Athenians, and we refused to comply; but in this we have
“done no injustice. For they marched cheerfully to our
“succour against the Thebans, when you shrunk back; and
“to betray them afterwards had been base in us; in us,
“who were highly indebted to them, who at our own re-
“quest were received into their friendship, and honoured
“by them with the freedom of Athens. No, it was rather
“our duty boldly to advance wherever they pleased to or-
“der. And whenever either you or the Athenians lead out
“your allies into the field, not such as merely follow you
“are to be censured for any wrong you may respectively
“commit, but those who lead them out to its commission.

“Manifold and notorious are the instances in which the
“Thebans have injured us. But outrageous above all is the
“last, about which you need no information, since by it we
“are plunged into this depth of distress. A right un-
“doubtedly we had to turn our avenging arms upon men,
“who in the midst of peace, and what is more, upon the sa-
“cred monthly solemnity, feloniously seized upon our city.
“We obeyed herein that great universal law, which justi-
“fieth self-defence against a hostile invader; and there-
“fore cannot, with any appearance of equity, be now doom-
“ed to punishment at their instigation. For, if your own
“immediate interest, and their present concurrence with you
“in war, is to prescribe and regulate your sentence, you
“will shew yourselves by no means fair judges of equity;
“but partially attached to private interest. What? though

“ these incendiaries seem now a people well worth your gain-
“ ing? There was a season, a most dangerous and critical sea-
“ son, when you yourselves, and the other Grecians, were
“ in different sentiments. Now indeed, incited by ambition,
“ you aim the fatal blow at others ; but at that season, when
“ the *Barbarian* struck at enslaving us all, these Thebans
“ were then that *Barbarian's* coadjutors. And equitable cer-
“ tainly it is, that our alacrity at that season should be set in
“ the balance against our present transgressions, if transgres-
“ sors at present we have been. You then would find our
“ greater merits quite outweighing our petty offences ; and
“ our merits to be dated at a time when it was exceeding
“ rare to see Grecian bravery ranged in opposition to the
“ power of Xerxes ; when praise was ascribed, not to those,
“ who, intent on self-preservation, dropped all the means of
“ withstanding his invasion, but who chose, through a series
“ of danger, courageously to execute the most glorious acts.
“ Of this number are we, and as such have been pre-emi-
“ nently, most honourably distinguished. And yet, from
“ this original we fear our ruin now may have taken its rise,
“ as we chose to follow the Athenians from a regard to jus-
“ tice, rather than you from the views of interest. But so
“ long as the nature of things continues to be the same, you
“ also ought to convince the world, that your sentiments
“ about them are not changed, that your principles still sug-
“ gest it to you as your greatest interest, that whenever your
“ gallant compatriots have laid upon you an obligation strong
“ enough to be eternally in force, something on every pre-
“ sent occurrence should be done for us by way of just ac-
“ knowledgement.

“ Reflect further within yourselves, that you are now
“ distinguished by the body of Greece as examples for the
“ upright disinterested conduct. Should you therefore de-
“ termine in regard to us what in justice cannot be support-
“ ed—for the eyes of the world are now intent on your pro-
“ ceedings, and as judges applauded for their worth you sit

“ upon us whose reputation is yet unblemished ; take care
“ that you do not incur the general abhorrence, by an inde-
“ cent sentence against valuable men, though you yourselves
“ are more to be valued ; nor reposit in her common tem-
“ ples those spoils you have taken from us the benefactors
“ of Greece. How horrible will it seem for Platæa to be de-
“ stroyed by Lacedæmonians ! that your fathers inscribed the
“ city upon the tripod of Delphos in justice to its merit, and
“ that you expunged its very being from the community of
“ Greece to gratify the Thebans ! To such excess of misery
“ have we been ever exposed, that if the Medes had prevail-
“ ed we must have been utterly undone ; and now must be
“ compleatly ruined by the Thebans, in the presence of you
“ who were formerly our most cordial friends ! Two of the
“ sharpest, most painful trials we are to undergo, who but
“ lately, had we not surrendered our city, must have gradu-
“ ally perished by famine ; and now stand before a tribunal
“ to be sentenced to death. Wretched Platæans, by all man-
“ kind abandoned ! We, who beyond our strength were once
“ the supports of Greece, are now quite destitute, bereft of
“ all redress ! Not one of our old allies to appear in our behalf ;
“ and even you, O ye Lacedæmonians, you our only hope, as
“ we have too much reason to apprehend, determined to give
“ us up !

“ But, by the Gods, who witnessed once the social oaths
“ we mutually exchanged ; by that virtue we exerted for the
“ general welfare of Greece ; by those we abjure you to be
“ moved with compassion, and to relent, if with the Thebans
“ you are combined against us. In gratitude to us, beg the
“ favour of them, that they would not butcher whom you
“ ought to spare ; demand such a modest requital from them
“ for your base concurrence, and intail not infamy upon
“ yourselves, to give others a cruel satisfaction. To take
“ away our lives will be a short and easy task ; but then, to
“ efface the infamy of it, will be a work of toil. You have
“ no colour to wreak your vengeance upon us as enemies,

“ who have ever wished you well, and bore arms against you
“ in mere self-defence. Your decisions can in no wise be
“ righteous, unless you exempt us from the dread of death.
“ Recollect in time, that you received us by free surrender,
“ that to you we held forth our hands ; the law forbids Gre-
“ cians to put such to death ; and that we have been from
“ time immemorial benefactors to you. For cast your eyes
“ *there* upon the sepulchres of your fathers, who fell by the
“ swords of the Medes and were interred in this our earth :
“ These we have annually honoured with vestments, and all
“ solemn decorations at our public expence. Whatever hath
“ been the produce of our soil, to them we have ever offered
“ the first-fruits of the whole ; as friends, out of earth that
“ was dear to them ; as companions, to those who once
“ fought together in the same field ; and, lest all this, by a
“ wrong determination, you instantly disannul, maturely re-
“ flect. For Pausanias interred them here, judging he had
“ laid them in a friendly soil, and in the care of men with
“ friendly dispositions. If therefore you put us to death,
“ and turn this Platæan into Theban soil, what is this but to
“ leave your fathers and relations in a hostile land and in the
“ power of those who murdered them, never again to receive
“ the sepulchral honours ? Will you further inslave the spot
“ on which the Grecians earned their liberty ? Will you lay
“ desolate the temples of those Gods, to whom they address-
“ ed their vows before that battle against the Medes, and
“ so were victorious ? And will you abolish the solemn
“ sacrifices, which those gallant patriots have founded and
“ appointed ?

“ It cannot, O Lacedæmonians, be consistent with your
“ glory, to violate the solemn institutions of Greece, the
“ memory of your own forefathers, and your duty to us your
“ benefactors, *thus*, merely to gratify the malice of a hos-
“ tile party, to put men to death who have never wronged
“ you. No ; but—to spare, to relent, to feel the just emo-
“ tions of compassion, to recal the idea not only what mise-

“ries we are designed to suffer, but what persons they are for
“whom they are designed! and to remember the uncertain
“attack of calamity; upon whom, and how undeservedly
“it may fall! To you, as in honour and necessity too ob-
“liged, we address our intreaties; invoking aloud the Gods
“whom Greece at her common altars and with joint devo-
“tion adores,—to accept our plea: alleging those oaths
“which your fathers have sworn,—to pay them reverence.
“We are suppliants now at the sepulchres of your fathers,
“we call upon the dead repositied there, to be saved from
“Thebans, that the kindest of friends, as we have been,
“may not be sacrificed to the most deadly foes. Again,
“we recal to memory that day, in which having performed
“the most splendid achievements in company with them,
“we are yet this day in danger of the most deplorable fate.
“Conclude we must—though ’tis hard for men in our dis-
“tress to conclude; when the very moment their words are
“ended, their very lives are most imminently endangered:
“yet still we insist that we surrendered not our city to the
“Thebans; rather than that we should have chose the most
“miserable end by famine: but confiding in you, into your
“hands we gave it. And highly fitting it is, that if we
“cannot prevail, you should reinstate us in it, and leave us
“there at our own option to take our fate. But once more
“we conjure you, that we, who are citizens of Plataea,
“who have shewed ourselves the most steady patriots of
“Greece, and now, O Lacedæmonians, your suppliants,—
“may not be turned over, out of your hands, out of your
“protection, to the Thebans, our unrelenting enemies;—that
“you would become our saviours, and not doom to utter de-
“struction—the men to whom all Greece is indebted for her
“freedom.”

In this manner the Plataeans spoke; and the Thebans, fearing lest their words might work so far upon the Lacedæmonians as to cause them to relent, stood forth, and declared a desire to be also heard. “since the Plataeans, as

“they conceived, had been indulged in a much longer dis-
“course, than was requisite to answer the question.” Leave
accordingly was given, and they proceeded thus—

“WE should not have requested your attention to any
“thing we had to offer, if *these* Plataëans had replied in
“brief to the question, and had not run out into slander and
“invective against us ;—if they had not defended themselves
“in points quite foreign to the purpose, and not at all charged
“against them as crimes ; and launched forth into their own
“praise, uncensured and unprovoked. But now it is incum-
“bent upon us, in some points to contradict and in some to
“refute, to prevent the bad effects which might result, either
“from the criminations uttered against us, or the pompous
“praise they have bestowed upon themselves ; that you, un-
“der proper information with whom the greater truth re-
“mains, may fairly decide between us.

“Our enmity against them we openly avow, as it proceed-
“ed from just and honourable motives : since to us, who
“were the founders of Plataea, after we had gained possession
“of Bœotia and of other towns as well as Plataea, which, after
“being purged from extraneous mixtures, remained in our
“jurisdiction,—these men disdained to pay submission, and
“scorned original and fundamental laws. They wilfully di-
“vided from the other Bœotians, transgressing the laws of
“their country, and, when likely to be forced back into their
“duty, they went over to the Athenians, and in concert with
“them accumulated wrongs upon us, which have since been
“justly retaliated upon them.

“But, when the *Barbarian* invaded Greece, they were the
“only Bœotians who did not join the *Mede*.—This *they*
“allege, and hence they arrogate applause to themselves,
“and lavish their calumnies upon us. We grant indeed
“they did not join the *Mede* ; and the reason was, because
“the Athenians did not join him. Yet afterwards, when
“with the same all-grasping ambition the Athenians invaded
“Greece, *they* were the only Bœotians then who joined those

“ *Athenians*. But consider further the respective situations
“ from which such conduct ensued in both. Our city at that
“ time was not administered by the *few* who presided with
“ an equal and steady rule, nor directed by the general voice
“ of the *people*. Its state was such as with laws and sound
“ policy is quite incompatible ; it bordered close upon a ty-
“ ranny : the incroaching ambition of a handful of men held
“ fast possession of it. These with no other view than the
“ strong establishment of their own private authority in the
“ success of the *Mede*, by force overawed the people, and
“ opened their gates to the invader. This was not the act of
“ a whole city, of a city master of its own conduct ; nor ought
“ she to be reproached for offences committed in despite of
“ her laws. But on the other hand, when the *Mede* was once
“ repulsed and the city repossessed of her ancient polity, you
“ ought then to consider—fresh invasions being formed by
“ the Athenians, projects attempted to bring the rest of Greece
“ and our dominions also into their subjection, sedition fo-
“ mented amongst us, by favour of which they seized the
“ greater part—whether in the field of Coronéa we fought
“ them and prevailed, recovered the liberty of Bæotia, pro-
“ ceed even now with all alacrity to regain their liberty for
“ others, supplying them with horse and all other military
“ provision, far beyond any other confederate. Such is the
“ apology we make for all the charge against us in having
“ joined the *Mede*. But—that *you* have been the most out-
“ rageous foes to Greece, and are most deserving of whatever
“ punishment can be inflicted upon you, we shall next endea-
“ vour to demonstrate.

“ In order to procure some revenge on us, it is your
“ own plea, “ you became confederates and citizens of
“ Athens.”—Be it so. You ought then to have marched in
“ their company only against us ; you ought not to have
“ followed them in their expeditions against others. Had
“ your own wills been averse to attend them on these occa-

“sions, it was always in your power to have recourse to that
“Lacedæmonian league, in which you concurred against the
“*Mede*, and about which you make at present the greatest
“parade. That would have been amply sufficient to turn
“aside our enmity from you ; and, what is above all, had se-
“curely enabled you to rectify your measures. But it was
“not against your will, neither was it upon compulsion, that
“you have solely adhered to the Athenians.

“But, then you rejoin—“It was base to betray your bene-
“factors.”—Yet it was much more base and more enormous
“to betray at once the whole body of Grecians, with whom
“you had sworn a mutual defence, than the single Atheni-
“ans ; the Athenians truly have enslaved your country ; and
“the others would regain its freedom. You have not made
“your benefactors the requital which gratitude enjoined, or
“which is exempted from reproach.—“Injured and oppres-
“sed you applied, it is pretended, to them for redress ;”—and
“then you co-operated with them in oppressing others. But it
“is not more dishonourable to be wanting in any act of grati-
“tude, how justly soever it may be due, than to make the re-
“turn in a manner in itself unjust. You yourselves by act-
“ing thus have afforded undeniable proofs, that you alone
“did not join the *Mede*, from a zeal for the Grecians, but
“merely because the Athenians did not join him. You were
“desirous to act in concert with the latter, but in opposition
“to the former ; and now modestly claim to be recompensed
“by your *country*, for all the iniquitous services you have
“done to a *party*. But, justice will never suffer this. To
“Athenians you gave the preference, strive therefore from
“them to obtain redress. Cease vainly to allege the mutual
“oaths you once exchanged, as if they were obliged at pre-
“sent to preserve you:—You renounced, you violated first
“those oaths, who rather concurred to enslave the *Æginetæ*
“and some other people of the same association, than endea-
“voured to prevent it ; and all without compulsion ; still hap-

“py in the uninterrupted possession of your own rights, and
“not compelled to receive law from others, as was our fate.
“Nay, to the very last moment, before this blockade was
“formed against you, when we calmly invited you to be quiet
“and neutral, you insolently refused. Which therefore is
“the people, on whom all Greece may fasten her hatred more
“deservedly than on you, who have made it a point to exert
“your bravery in ruining your country? Those former good
“dispositions you have so largely boasted, you have now
“shewn plainly to be repugnant to your genius. What
“your natural turn hath ever been, the event hath with
“truth ascertained. The Athenians took the road of vio-
“lence, and you attended them through all the journey.—
“And thus, ample proof hath been exhibited by us, that
“against our wills we served the Persian, and that you with
“most chearful disposition have promoted the Athenian
“tyranny.

“But in regard to your finishing charge against us as
“guilty of excessive outrage and injustice:—that, con-
“trary to every law, in the midst of peace, on a day of
“sacred solemnity, we seized upon your city.—This great
“offence, in our opinion, is less to be imputed to us than to
“yourselves. Had we marched indeed against your city in
“a hostile manner, had we scaled your walls and put your
“property to fire and sword, the charge had then been just.
“But if men, of the first rank amongst you both for wealth
“and birth, desirous to put a stop to your foreign combina-
“tions, and recal you to the common institutions of all
“Bæotians; if such at their own free motion invited our
“presence, wherein are we unjust? For the leaders, in all
“cases, are greater transgressors than the followers. Though,
“in the *present*, neither are they in our judgments, nor are
“we transgressors.—They were citizens as well as you;
“they had larger concerns at stake; and therefore opening
“their gate and receiving us within their walls as friends

“and not as foes, they intended to prevent the corrupted
“part of your body from growing worse, and protect the
“worthy and good according to their merit. They calmly
“studied the welfare of your minds and your bodies, not
“suffering your city to become an alien, but recovering it
“again to its duty and relations, exempting it from being
“the foe of any honest Grecian, and re-uniting it in the
“bonds of amity with them all.—There are proofs besides,
“that we did not intermeddle in a hostile manner. We did
“no manner of violence to any one; we proclaimed aloud,
“that “whoever was desirous to conform to the primitive
“institutions of all Bæotians, should come and join us.”—
“You heard our voice with pleasure; you came in and en-
“tered into articles with us; you remained for a time with-
“out disturbance; but at length, having discovered the
“smallness of our number, and then perhaps we were judged
“to have proceeded inhumanly in presuming to enter with-
“out the consent of your populace, you then returned us
“not such treatment as you had received from us, you made
“no remonstrances against innovations, nor persuaded us
“to depart, but in open breach of articles you rushed upon
“us. We lament not here so much the death of those whom
“you slew in this base attack upon us; some colour of law
“might be alleged for their destruction: but when, con-
“trary to every law, in cold blood you murdered men, who
“had spread their arms for mercy, and had surrendered
“themselves prisoners on promise of their lives,—was not
“that a monstrous act? In one short interval of time you
“were guilty of three outrageous enormities, an infraction
“of articles, the succeeding butchery of our people, and a
“breach of the solemn promise made to us, that you would
“not kill them, provided we refrained from plundering your
“lands. Yet still you cry aloud, that *we* are the breakers of
“law; you still remonstrate, that you are not debtors to jus-
“tice. It is false. The point, we presume, will soon be de-

“terminated right: And for these, for all offences, you shall
“have your reward.

“We have thus distinctly run over this affair, for your
“sakes, O ye Lacedæmonians, as well for our own; that you
“may be convinced with how much equity you are going to
“condemn them, and that we have pursued the offenders
“upon yet stronger obligations of justice. Let not the reci-
“tal of their former virtues, if virtues truly they ever had,
“mollify your hearts. Virtue should be pleaded by men
“who have suffered; but, on those who have committed base-
“ness, it should redouble their punishment, because they sin
“in foul contrariety to their former *selves*. Let them not
“save themselves by lamentations and pathetic complaints,
“though they cried out so movingly upon the sepulchres of
“your fathers, and their own destitute forlorn condition. For
“to stop their cries we have proved against them, that our
“youths, when butchered by them, met with a more cruel
“and unjust fate: those youths, some of whose fathers, re-
“conciling Bæotia with you, died in the field of Coronæa; the
“rest, now advanced in years, bereft of their children, their
“houses desolate, prefer a supplication far more just to you,
“to avenge them upon *these* Platæans. Those are most de-
“serving of pity, who have suffered some great indignity;
“but when vengeance is duly inflicted on such men as these
“Platæans, the world hath cause to triumph. Their present
“destitute forlorn condition is the work of themselves. They
“wilfully rejected a better alliance; and, though uninjured,
“broke every law against us; executioners of hatred more
“than justice, though now about to suffer less than the prece-
“dent they set requireth. For they shall be executed by
“lawful sentence; not like men who with stretched-out hands
“obtained fair quarter, as they describe themselves, but who
“surrendered on this condition—to submit to justice.

“Avenge, therefore, O Lacedæmonians, the law of
“Greece so grossly violated by them. Retaliate all the in-

“juries we have suffered, requiting so that chearful friend-
“ship we have ever shewn you ; and let not *their* flow of
“words overturn *our* just demands. Make now a precedent
“for Greece hereafter to follow. Shew them, that deci-
“sions must be formed, not according to what men may say,
“but according to what they have done : If their actions
“have been right, that a short simple narration may at any
“time suffice : But if those actions have been wrong, that
“all studied ornamental periods are intended to disguise the
“truth. If those who preside at judgments, as you at pre-
“sent, would proceed in a summary way, to a general de-
“termination against the guilty, little room would be left to
“disguise unjustifiable actions by plausible speeches.”

In this manner the Thebans replied ; and the Lacedæ-
monian judges agreed in the resolution, that the question,—
“Whether they had received any good service from them
“in the war?”—was properly and fairly conceived. They
grounded this, upon the former proposal made to them to
remain neutral according to the old treaty of Pausanias after
the *Medish* invasion, and upon another more lately, which
they had offered before they had blocked them up, to be
common friends to both sides in conformity to the same
treaty. But after this double refusal, looking upon them-
selves as no longer bound to observe those articles, which
others had deliberately infringed to traverse their interest,—
they now proceed again to bring them forwards man by
man, and put the question—“Whether they had done good
“service to the Lacedæmonians and allies in the present
“war?”—and upon their answering *No*, led them aside and
slew them. Not one of the number did they exempt ; so
that in this massacre there perished of Platæans not fewer
than two hundred, and twenty-five Athenians who had been
besieged in their company ; and all the women were sold
for slaves. The Thebans assigned the city, for the space of
a year, to be the residence of certain Megaréans, who had
been driven from home in the rage of a sedition, and to

those surviving Plataeans who had been friends to the Theban interest. But afterwards they levelled it with the earth, rooted up its whole foundation, and near to Juno's temple erected a spacious inn two hundred feet square, partitioned within both above and below into a range of apartments. In this structure they made use of the roofs and doors that had belonged to the Plataeans; and of the other moveables found within their houses, of the brass and iron, they made beds which they consecrated to Juno, in whose honour they also erected a fane of stone one hundred feet in diameter. The land being confiscated to public use, was farmed out for ten years, and occupied by Thebans. So much, nay so totally averse to the Plataeans were the Lacedæmonians become; and this, merely to gratify the Thebans, whom they regarded as well able to serve them in the war which was now on foot*. And thus was the destruction of Plataea compleated in the ninety-third year of its alliance with Athens.

The forty sail of Peloponnesians, which had been sent to the relief of Lesbos, after flying through the open sea to avoid the pursuit from Athens, were driven by a tempest on the coast of Crete; and from thence they separately dropped into Cyllene a Peloponnesian harbour, where they find thirteen triremes of Leucadians and Ambraciots, with Brasidas the son of Tellis sent thither purposely to assist Alcidas with his counsel. It was now the project of the Lacedæ-

* Thucydides hath here been very sparing of his censure. Nothing bad enough can be said of the Lacedæmonian behaviour on this occasion. To put brave men to death coolly and deliberately, who had most gallantly defended themselves, and merely for their steady attachment to liberty and the Athenians were hated by the Thebans, shews the public spirit of Spartans at this time to have been none at all.—The city of Plataea, thus barbarously demolished, was rebuilt after the peace of Antalcidas, which put an end to the Peloponnesian war. But not long after it was again demolished by the Thebans, for a refusal to join them against the Lacedæmonians. However, Alexander the Great once more re-established it, in a generous acknowledgment of the services that little *State* had rendered to Greece; and the Plataeans continued, even in the time of Plutarch, to celebrate the annual festival in honour of those, who at the famous battle of Plataea had died for the liberties of Greece.

monians, since they had miscarried at Lesbos, to augment their fleet, and sail immediately for Corcyra now embroiled in sedition, as there were no Athenians in those parts, excepting only twelve ships which were stationed at Naupactus—and thus their design might be effectuated, before a fleet large enough to obstruct them could be sent from Athens.—This was their plan, and Brasidas and Alcidas prepared for its execution.

The Corcyréans were now embroiled in a sedition, excited by the return of the prisoners, whom the Corinthians had taken in the naval engagements of Epidamnus. They had obtained their release, as was publicly given out, for the sum of eighty talents*, for the payment of which their former friends at Corinth had joined in a security; but in fact, for a secret promise they had made the Corinthians, to put Corcyra into their hands. To fulfil their engagements they tampered with every single Corcyréan in order to bring about a revolt from the Athenians. An Athenian and Corinthian ship arrived at the same time with ambassadors on board. These were admitted together to an audience, at which the Corcyréans decreed, “to maintain their alliance “with the Athenians according to treaty,—but to be friends “to the Peloponnesians as in preceding times.” Pythias, who at that time was at the head of the *people*, entertained and lodged the Athenians without the public warrant. And therefore against him the accomplices prefer an accusation, as plotting how to subject Corcyra to Athenian slavery. Pythias being acquitted, in his turn exhibits a charge against five of the most considerable of their number, for having cut pales in the sacred grove of Jupiter and Alcinus. The fine for every pale was by law a *stater*†. Being condemned to pay the whole, they fled into the temples and sat down as supplicants, in hope to obtain a mitigation of their fine, which was quite exorbitant. Pythias, who was also

* 15,500*l.* sterling.† 1*l.* 0*s.* 9*d.*

strong in the senate, gets a fresh order to have it levied in all the rigour of the law. Thus debarred of any legal redress, and conscious further that Pythias, so long as he continued in the senate, would prevail upon the *people* to declare those their friends and those their foes who were so to Athens,—they rise up from the sanctuary, and seizing daggers rush suddenly into the senate-house, where they stab Pythias and others, both senators and private persons, to the number of sixty. Some few indeed who were the adherents of Pythias, saved themselves on board the Athenian vessel, which yet lay in the harbour.

After this bold assassination, they summoned the Corcyreans to assemble immediately, where they justified their proceedings “as most highly for the public good, and the “only expedient of preventing Athenian slavery;”—advising them “for the future to receive neither of the rival parties, “unless they came peacefully in a single vessel; if in more “to declare them enemies;” and in conclusion, they forced the ratification of whatever they had proposed. They also instantly dispatch ambassadors to Athens, representing the necessity they lay under to act as they had done; and to persuade those who had fled for refuge thither, not to rush into such measures as might hurt the welfare of their country, from a dread of the miseries which might thence ensue.

When these ambassadors were arrived at Athens, the Athenians laid them and all their adherents under an arrest as enemies to the *State*, and sent them prisoners to Ægina.

In the mean time, those of the Corcyreans who had thus seized the government, animated by the arrival of a Corinthian trireme and a Lacedæmonian embassy, attack the *people* and overpower them in battle. The *people*, by favour of the night which approached, fly to the citadel and more elevated parts of the city, where they drew up together and secured their posts; they also got possession of the Hyllaic harbour. But their opponents seized the forum,

where most of their own houses were situated, and the harbour which points towards the forum and the continent.

The day following they skirmished a little with their mis-sive weapons, and both parties sent out detachments into the fields, to invite the concurrence of the slaves, upon a promise of their freedom. A majority of slaves came in to the assistance of the *people*, and the other party got eight hundred auxiliaries from the continent.

After one day's respite they come again to blows. The *people* get the better now, by the advantage of their strong posts and their numbers. The women with notable boldness assisted in the combat, by throwing tiles from the tops of the houses, and sustaining the tumult beyond their sex. About the close of the evening, the *few* were forced to fly, and then apprehensive, lest the *people* should rush down upon and so at a shout seize the dock and put them to the sword, in order to stop their passage, they set fire to the houses all round the forum and to such as were adjacent, sparing neither their own nor those of their enemies. The large effects of the merchants were consumed in the flames, and the whole city was in danger of being reduced to ashes, had a gale of wind arose to drive the flame that way.—This put a stop to the contest, and brought on a cessation, when both sides applied themselves to strict guard for the night. The Corinthian vessel, after this victory on the side of the *people*, stole privately away; and many of the auxiliaries, who crept off unperceived, repassed to the opposite shore.

The day following, Nicostratus, the son of Diotrephes, who commanded the Athenian squadron, comes up to their assistance with his twelve sail from Naupactus and five hundred heavy-armed Messenians. He forthwith negotiated an accommodation, and persuades them to make up the affair with one another, by instantly condemning the ten principal authors of the sedition (who immediately fled), and permitting all others to continue in the city, upon articles

signed between both parties and the Athenians—"to have "the same friends and the same foes." Having so far carried his point, he was intent on immediate departure. But the managers for the *people* made him a proposal, to leave five ships of his squadron with them, to deter the enemy from any fresh commotion, which should be replaced by five of their own, which they would instantly man to attend him on his station. With this proposal he complied; and they named distinctly the mariners, who to a man were of the opposite party. Affrighted at this as a pretext to convey them to Athens, they sit down in the temple of the Dioscuri. Nicostratus endeavoured to raise them up and cheer their despondency. Yet all he could say was unavailing; and the people run again to arms, pretending that such a refusal to put to sea was a plain proof that their intentions were insincere throughout. Then they rifled their houses of all the arms they could find; and some of them who fell into their hands had immediately been butchered if Nicostratus had not interposed.

A second party, terrified at these proceedings, take their seats also as suppliants in the temple of Juno. The number of these was not less than four hundred. The *people*, grown now apprehensive of some fatal turn, persuade them to leave their sanctuary; and having prevailed, transport them into that island which faceth the temple of Juno, whither every thing needful for their sustenance was carefully sent them.

The sedition continuing in this posture, about the fourth or fifth day after the transportation of the latter body into the island, the Peloponnesian ships, which had assembled at Cylene after the voyage of Ionia, appear in sight to the number of fifty-three. Alcidas was commander in chief as before, and Brasidas attended as his council. They came to anchor in the harbour of Sybota on the main; and next morning, at break of day, steered directly for Corcyra.

Great was the tumult now at Corcyra: They were afraid

of the malecontents within, and the hostile fleet approaching the city. They got sixty ships immediately on float, and each so fast as it was manned advanced to meet the foe. The Athenians indeed proposed, to put out first to sea themselves; and that the Corcyréans should afterwards come out and join them, when they had got all their ships together. But, as they advanced in a straggling manner towards the enemy, two ships went directly over to them; and on board others the mariners were at blows with one another. In short, there was no manner of order in any of their motions. The Lacedæmonians, perceiving how it was, with twenty of their ships drew up to engage the Corcyréans, and opposed the remainder to the twelve Athenian, two of which were only the *Salaminian* and the *Paralus*.

The Corcyréans, who charged in this disorderly manner, and with few ships in a line, were on their side terribly distressed; whilst the Athenians, fearing, lest the other, vastly superior in number, might quite surround their little squadron, would not venture to attack them when altogether, nor to break upon the middle of the enemy's line; but, assaulting them towards one of the extremities, sink one of their ships. Upon this, the Peloponnesians having formed a circle, the Athenians sailed round and round, and endeavoured to break their order. Those who pursued the Corcyréans perceiving this, and fearing what had happened formerly at Naupactus, steered away from thence to support their own squadron. And now, with their whole embodied strength, they designed to pour upon the Athenians. *They*, having already shifted the helm, fell gradually away. They were desirous to favour the flight of the Corcyréans beyond the possibility of a chace, and so they fell off entirely at their own leisure, keeping the enemy in their front still ranged in order. Such was this engagement, which at the setting of the sun was quite ended.

The Corcyréans were afraid lest the enemy, in prosecution of their victory, should immediately assault the city, or

take up the persons in the island, or by some other method attempt to distress them. For this reason, they removed the prisoners again from the island into the temple of Juno, and applied themselves to guard the city. But the enemy, though victorious at sea, durst not think of proceeding to attack the city; but satisfied with taking thirteen ships belonging to the Corcyréans, they returned to the main, from whence they had sallied to the engagement. The next day also, they refrained from making any attempt upon the city, where the disorder and consternation were as great as ever. Brasidas is reported urgently to have pressed it upon Alcidas, but in the council of war was quite over-ruled. They landed, however, at cape Leucymne, and plundered the country.

The Corcyréan *people*, whose fears were still suggesting that they should be attacked by the enemy's fleet, had conferred with the suppliants and others about the only means to preserve the city. And some of them they persuaded to join in navigating their ships; for by some means or other they had again manned thirty, expecting every moment the enemy's approach. But the Peloponnesians continued the ravage of their fields only till noon, and then repassed to their former stations. Yet before the dawn of the succeeding day, they saw sixty lights held up, to denote an equal number of Athenian ships advancing from Leucas. The Athenians, advertised of the sedition and the course of the fleet under Alcydas against Corcyra, had sent away this reinforcement under the command of Eurymedon the son of Thucles. Upon this, the Peloponnesians, whilst yet it was night, crept homewards along the shore, and carrying their vessels over the isthmus of Leucas, lest they should be discovered in going round it, are safely retreated within their own confines.

When the Corcyréans had discovered the approach of the Athenian reinforcement, and the departure of the enemy, they received the Messenians within their walls who till now

had lodged without ; and, having ordered the ships which they had manned to come about into the Hyllaic harbour, whilst they were going about in pursuance of this order, they put all the adverse faction whom they found to the sword. Those further, who had took on in the ships at their persuasion, they threw into the sea and then retired. They afterwards went to Juno's temple, and persuaded a party of suppliants there, to the amount of fifty, to undergo a judicial trial, in which they were all condemned to die. The majority of suppliants, who refused to hear such persuasion, no sooner saw the fate of their brethren, than they either slew one another within the temple, or hung themselves up upon the trees within its verge ; each finding some expedient for his own dispatch. During those seven days that Eurymedon with his reinforcement continued at Corcyra, the people of that city extended the massacre to all whom they judged their enemies. The crime on which they justified their proceedings, was *their* attempt to overturn the *democracy*.

Some perished merely through private enmity ; some for the sums they had lent, by the hands of the borrowers. Every kind of death was here exhibited. Every dreadful act usual in a sedition, and more than usual, was perpetrated now. For fathers slew their children ; some were dragged from altars ; and some were butchered at them. And a number of persons immured in the temple of Bacchus were starved to death. So cruel was the progress of this sedition, and so excessively cruel did it appear, because the first of so black a nature that ever happened. But afterwards the contagion spread, one may say, through the whole extent of Greece, when factions raged in every city, the *popular* demagogues contending for the Athenians, the aspiring *few* for the Lacedæmonians. In peace, it is true, they were void of all pretext, of all opportunity to invite these rivals. But now, amidst declared hostilities, and the quest of alliance to afflict their enemies and add an increase of strength

to themselves, opportunities were easily found by such as were fond of innovations to introduce the side they favoured. The consequence of this was sedition in cities, with all its numerous and tragical incidents. Such were now, and such things ever will be, so long as human nature continues the same ; but under greater or less aggravations, and diversified in circumstances, according to the several vicissitudes of conjunctures, which shall happen to occur. In the seasons of peace and affluence, communities as well as individuals have their tempers under better regulation, because not liable to that violence which flows from necessity. But war, which snatcheth from them their daily subsistence, is the teacher of violence, and assimilates the passions of men to their present condition.

By these means were cities harassed with seditions. And those to whose fate the later commotions fell, through enquiry what had happened in such instances before, grew enormously ambitious to suppress the machinations of others, both in policy of attempts and extravagance of revenge. Even words lost now their former significance, since to palliate actions they were quite distorted. For truly, what before was a brutal courage, began to be esteemed that fortitude which becomes a human and sociable creature ; prudent consideration to be specious cowardice ; modesty, the disguise of effeminacy ; and being wise in every thing, to be good for nothing : The hot fiery temper was adjudged the exertion of true manly valour ; cautious and calm deliberation, to be a plausible pretext for intended knavery. He who boiled with indignation was undoubtedly trusty ; who presumed to contradict, was ever suspected. He who succeeded in a roguish scheme was wise ; and he who suspected such practices in others, was still a more able genius. But, was he provident enough, so as never to be in need of such base expedients, he was one that would not stand to his engagements and most shamefully awed by his foes. In short, he who could prevent another in executing vil-

lany, or could persuade a well-designing person to it, was sure to be applauded.

Men now, who were allied in blood, were less valued or caressed, than such as were connected by voluntary combination ; since the latter, unscrupulous, and uninquisitive, were more ready to embark in any scheme whatever. For now associations were not formed for such mutual advantage as is consistent with, but for the execution of such rapines as are contrary to human laws. In mutual trust they persisted, not out of any regard to religious obligation, but from the bond of communicated guilt. To the fair and honest proposals of adversaries they hearkened indeed, when such by active strength could controul them, but never through candid ingenuity. Revenge upon another was a more valued possession than never to have suffered injury. Oaths, if ever made for present reconciliation, had a temporary force, so long as neither knew how to break them ; but never when either party had power to abet their violation. He who, at inviting opportunity, durst first incur the perjury, if the adversary was off his guard, executed his rancour with higher spirit, than from enmity open and avowed. Such a step was thought most secure ; and, because he had thus surpassed in guile, it was certainly extolled as a master-piece of cunning. Large is the number of villains, and such obtain more easily the reputation of dexterity than their dupes can that of goodness : The latter are apt to blush ; the former most impudently triumph.

The source of all these evils is a thirst of power, in consequence either of rapacious or ambitious passions. The mind, when actuated by such, is ever ready to engage in party-feuds. For the men of large influence in communities avowing on both sides a specious cause, some standing up for the just equality of the *popular*, others for the fair decorum of the *aristocratical* government, by artful sounds embarrassed those communities for their own private lucre. Both sides, intent on victory, carried on the contention with

the keenest spirit. They most daringly projected, and then regularly executed the most dreadful machinations. Their revenge was not limited by justice or the public welfare; it aimed at more ample satisfaction. Either side constantly measured it by such retaliation as was judged the sweetest, either by a capital condemnation through an iniquitous sentence, or by earning the victory with their own hands, in which they were always ready to glut the present rancour of their hearts. And hence it was, that the pious and upright conduct was on both sides disregarded. And, when any point of great importance was before them, to carry it by specious collusive oratory was the greatest enhancement of their credit. Yet all this while, the moderate members of such communities either hated because they would not meddle, or, envied for such obnoxious conduct, fell victims to both.

Seditions in this manner introduced every species of outrageous wickedness into the Grecian manners. Sincerity, which is most frequently to be found in generous tempers, was laughed out of countenance and for ever vanished. It was become the universal practice, to keep up a constant enmity of intention against one another, and never to believe. No promise was strong enough, no oath sufficiently solemn, to banish such mutual diffidence. Those who excelled in shrewd consideration resigned all hope of any lasting security, and stood ever on their guard against whom it was impossible for them to trust. But persons of meaner understandings took more effectual means for their preservation. Living in constant apprehensions, from their own inferiority and the craft of their opponents, lest by words they should be over-reached, or that such subtle heads might execute their treacheries upon them unawares, they boldly seized the present moment, and at once dispatched the men they dreaded; who, presuming too much on their own penetration, and that it was superfluous to aim a blow at those whom they could at any time supplant by cunning,

despised them so far as to neglect a proper guard, and so contributed to their own destruction.

Many such daring outrages were now by way of precedent committed at Corcyra; nay, all whatever, that men, who are wreaking revenge upon such as before were their masters, and had exerted their superiority with savageness more than humanity, can in turn retaliate upon them, were executed there.—Some joined in these acts of violence to procure a discharge from their former poverty; but the greater number, through a passionate desire to seize the property of their neighbours. Or, though they were not lured by the lust of rapine, but engaged in the contest upon fair and open views, yet hurried to wild extravagance through mad and undisciplined anger, they proceeded to cruel acts, and with inexorable fury. The whole order of human life was for a season confounded in this city. The human temper, too apt to transgress in spite of laws, and now having gained the ascendant over law, seemed pleased with exhibiting this public manifestation, that it was too weak for anger, too strong for justice, and an enemy to all superiority. Men could not otherwise have awarded the preference to revenge over righteous duty, and to lucre over that habit of justice in which envy never yet had power to annoy them. But more than this, when the point in view is revenge upon others, men haughtily make precedents against themselves, by infringing those laws which are binding by the ties of nature, and from which alone any hope of safety can be extracted for themselves in a plunge of misery, precluding thus all possibility of redress, should they be reduced in some future extremity to make the same appeal.

And thus the Corcyréans continued to execute the rage of such cruel passions, upon the heads of one another, within the precincts of their own city, of which this was the first example in Greece, till Eurymedon, with the Athenian fleet under his command, put out again to sea.

But, after his departure, they who by flight had preserved

their lives, to the number of about five hundred, having seized their forts upon the opposite shore, got possession of their own land, on that side the water. Putting out hence, they plundered the Corcyræans in the island, and made such havoc that a violent famine ensued in the city. They further sent a deputation to Lacedæmon and Corinth, to negotiate the means of their restoration. But nothing of this kind succeeding, they got together afterwards a body of auxiliaries and transports, and so passed over to the island of Corcyra, to the amount of six hundred men. Having now set fire to their transports, to preclude every other expedient but gaining firm footing where now they were, they marched up to the mountain Istone, and having fortified themselves there, made cruel work with those in the city, and were masters of the country round about.

About the end of the same summer, the Athenians sent out twenty sail for Sicily, under the command of Laches the son of Melanopus and Charæadas the son of Euphiletus. A war was now on foot between the Syracusans and Leontines. Confederate with the Syracusans were, excepting Camarina, all the Doric cities, which had formerly entered into alliance with the Lacedæmonians before this war broke out, but had yet no where effectually joined them. With the Leontines were the Chalcidic cities, and Camarina. Of Italy, the Locrians sided with the Syracusans; and the Rhegians, from the motive of consanguinity, with the Leontines. The allies therefore of the Leontines sent to Athens*, petitioning the Athenians in respect of their

* One of the persons, or the chief, employed on this occasion, is said to be Gorgias of Leontium, the first rhetorician of that or of any age. When he had his audience from the Athenians to deliver the reasons of his embassy, he made a speech so smooth and flowing, so new in the manner of its turns, so pretty in the expression, and so nicely diversified by a change and opposition of figures, that he won their hearts, and succeeded in his negotiation. Our historian indeed, who takes no notice of Gorgias, gives two political reasons just after the ready compliance of the Athenians on

old alliance and their Ionic descent, to send them a succour of shipping: For the Syracusans had now blocked them up both by land and sea. The Athenians immediately sent one, giving out that they were bound in duty to take this step; but their real motive was, to prevent the exportation of corn from thence to Peloponnesus, and also to sound the possibility of bringing Sicily into their own subjection. Their squadron therefore, arriving at Rhegium on the Italian shore, supported their allies in the present war; and in this the summer ended.

In the beginning of the winter, the plague broke out a second time at Athens, not that during this whole interval of time it had wholly ceased, though its rage had very much abated. But now the mortality began again and continued not less than a year; but the former had raged for the space of two. There was nothing which lay upon the Athenians so hard as this, or so much impaired their strength. It appeared from the muster-rolls, that there perished four thousand and four hundred of those citizens who wore the heavy-armour, and three hundred of the *horsemen*. The number of the lower people that died was not to be computed. There happened at the same time many earthquakes: at Athens; in Eubœa; amongst the Bœotians, and especially at the Bœotian Orchomenus.

The same winter, the Athenians and Rhegians, on the coast of Sicily, form an expedition with thirty sail, against those which are called the isles of Æolus. This was not feasible in the summer-season, for want of water. These isles are inhabited by the Liparœans, who were a colony from Cnidus. Their residence is chiefly in one of them called Liparé, though by no means large. They go from hence to the tillage of the others, Didymé and Strongylé and Hiera. It

this occasion. It is a step, which draws great consequences after it.—Thucydides in the sequel will open all the plan, and give an exact detail of the operations of this new war, into which the Athenians are beginning to embark.

is believed by those people, that Vulcan keeps his forge in Hiera*, because in the night it visibly throws forth a great quantity of fire, and in the day of smoke. These isles are situated over-against the shore of the Siculi and the Messenians, and were allied with Syracuse. The Athenians having plundered the soil, and finding the inhabitants would not come in, put back again to Rhegium.—And here the winter ended, and the fifth year of this war, the history of which Thucydides hath compiled.

YEAR VI.

THE following summer, the Peloponnesians and confederates assembled at the Isthmus, in order to make the usual inroad into Attica; and Agis, son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedæmonians, was there ready for the command. But the frequent earthquakes which happened about this time, caused them to return back, and entirely put a stop to the designed incursion.

About the same space of time shocks of earthquakes were felt in Eubœa, where at Orobœa the sea breaking over what was then land with impetuous swells, laid a part of that city under water: Some of which stagnated there, though some washed its way back: however a tract now continues sea which before was land. All those who could not reach the higher grounds in time, by running before the surge, were drowned.—A similar inundation happened at the isle of Atalanta, amongst the Locrians of Opus, where it washed away the Athenian fort, and of two vessels that lay dry upon the beach staved one to pieces.—

* So Virgil, l. viii. 416.

*Insula sicanium juxta latus Æoliamque
Erigitur Liparum fumantibus ardua saxis:
Quam subter specus & Cyclopum exesa caminis
Antra Ætnæa tonant, valadique incudibus ictus
Auditi referunt gemitum, striduntque cavernis
Stricturæ Chalybum, & fornacibus ignis anhelat:
Vulcani domus, & Vuicania nomine tellus.*

At Peparethus also the surge of the sea rose very high, but did not overflow. An earthquake however demolished part of the fortification*, the town-house, and some few dwelling houses.—My solution of such effects is this : Where the shock of the earthquake was most violent, it forcibly drove away the sea before it, which suddenly returning again occasioned these more violent swells. And without an earthquake I deem all such accidents impossible.

The same summer many of other nations, as they happened to be drawn into the quarrel, were engaged in the war of Sicily as well as the Sicilians themselves who took up arms one against another, and the Athenians together with their allies. Yet, the most memorable actions alone, either of the allies thus aided by the Athenians, or of the common enemy against the Athenians, shall I now relate.—Charœadas the Athenian commander having lost his life in the Syracusan war, Laches, who had now the sole command of the fleet, in junction with the allies, appeared before Mylæ of the Messenians. The garrison of Mylæ consisted of two companies of Messenians ; and these had formed an ambuscade to cut off the enemy when landed. But the Athenians and allies drive them from the place of ambush with great slaughter. Then they proceeded to assault the works, which necessitated the defendants to give up their citadel by capitulation, and even to attend them against Messene. But after this, the Athenians and allies were no sooner approached, than the Messenians also compounded, giving hostages and all other securities required for their future behaviour.

The same summer, the Athenians with thirty sail of ships commanded by Demosthenes† the son of Alcisthenes

* Prytanéum.

† This Demosthenes will make a considerable figure in the course of this war. The most celebrated orator of the same name hath ranked him amongst the greatest of his countrymen, with Aristides, Pericles, and Nicias. He stiles him also an orator ; and Thucydides will give us hereafter a specimen of his manner of haranguing. His *name-sake* indeed hath

and Procles the son of Theodorus, appeared upon the coast of Peloponnesus ; whilst a larger armament of sixty, and two thousand heavy-armed, was employed against Melos, under the command of Nicias son of Niceratus. Melos is an island ; and as the inhabitants of it were averse to the Athenian subjection, and had refused to accede to their alliance, they were now bent on its reduction. Having laid the island waste, and the Melians still refusing to submit, the Athenians put again to sea, and crossed over to Oropus on the opposite shore ; where arriving at night, the heavy-armed were detached to march with all expedition by land towards Tanagra of Bœotia. Notice being given of their arrival there, they were instantly joined by the whole force of Athens, which had marched out of the city under the orders of Hipponicus the son of Callias and Eurymedon the son of Thucles. A camp they formed ; and having for the space of a day laid the territory waste, they reposed themselves there the succeeding night. But the next morning having gained a victory over the Tanagræans, who aided by a party of Thebans sallied out upon them, they only staid to gather up the arms and erect a trophy, and then marched away—these back again to the city ; and those to the fleet. Nicias upon this, putting out again with his sixty sail, plundered all the sea-coast of Locris, and then returned into the harbour of Athens.

It was about this time that the Lacedæmonians founded the colony of Heraclea in Trachinia. Their view in doing it was this :—Those, who in general are stiled Meliensians, are divided into three bodies ; Paralians, Hierensians, and Trachinians. The last of these, the Trachinians, who had been terribly distressed by a war made upon them by the bordering Oetæans, had first of all intended to throw

carried off all the glory of eloquence : But the *Demosthenes*, who is the subject of this note, was an able general, very enterprising, and very brave ; always vigilant in the service of his country, though more as a soldier than a statesman ; and, provided his country was served, not too anxious about who carried off the honour. In short, he was an open-hearted, disinterested, worthy Athenian.

themselves under the Athenian protection ; but afterwards, apprehending they might not be hearty in their support, they made application to Lacedæmon by Tisamenus the delegate appointed by them on this occasion. The Dorians too, from whom the Lacedæmonians are descended, sent their ambassadors also to accompany and join with him in the negociation, for they likewise were infested by these Oetæans. The Lacedæmonians, after an audience, resolved to send out this colony, as a sure expedient not only to protect the Trachinians and Dorians from insult, but to annoy the Athenians more sensibly, in the course of the war, from a city so commodiously seated. For thence they could at any time make an attack upon Eubœa, as the passage was but short ; and further, it lay most conveniently upon the road to Thrace. In a word, they were very eager about building this city. In the first place therefore, they begged the advice of the God at Delphi. His answer being favourable, they sent out a colony composed of their own and the neighbouring people ; encouraging farther all Grecian adventurers whatever to join in this settlement, except Ionians and Achæans, and some of foreign nations. Three Lacedæmonians are appointed to be the leaders of this colony ; Leon, and Alcidas, and Damagon. These arriving at the spot erect upon a new foundation and wall round the city which is now called Heraclea, distant about forty stadia* from Thermopylæ, and twenty from the sea. They proceeded next to build the naval docks ; and these they began at Thermopylæ close under the straits, since there they were capable of the strongest defence.

The Athenians, when they saw the large resort to this colony, were at first under great apprehensions. They suspected it to be chiefly intended for the annoyance of Eubœa, as the passage from it was short to Cenæum in Eubœa ; though, in the sequel, their apprehensions proved entirely groundless. Not the least damage accrued to them

* About four miles.

from this colony ; and the reason was this : The Thessalians, who were masters of all the country round about it, and upon whose very land it was built, fearing lest this new settlement might prove too powerful a neighbour at last, gave it all possible annoyance, and harassed the new inhabitants with continual war, till from the large number they were at first, they mouldered into nothing. When the Lacedæmonians first declared the colony, the whole world was eager to get a settlement in the city, which they thought would want no support. Not but that its sudden decay was owing also in great measure to the Lacedæmonian leaders. From the first moment of their arrival they had spoiled every thing wherein they meddled ; they reduced their numbers to a handful of men, because their fears had driven away the rest, as the government was always severe, and not always just. The neighbouring people, surprising them in such a state, prevailed against them with the utmost ease.

The same summer, and even during that interval of time the Athenians were employed at Melos, the Athenians of the fleet of thirty sail who were upon the Peloponnesian coast, in the first place, having placed an ambush at Elogenius of Leucadia, intercepted and cut off a part of the garrison. In the next place, with an augmented force they came up to Leucas, being attended now by the whole strength of the Acarnanians except the Oeniadæ, by the Zacynthians and Cephallenians, and fifteen sail of Corcyréans. The Leucadians, though their territory was laid waste both without and within the Isthmus, where the city of Leucas and the temple of Apollo are seated, yet durst not venture out against such superior numbers. Upon this, the Acarnanians vehemently pressed it upon Demosthenes the Athenian general, to block them up by a wall of circumvallation ; imagining they might easily reduce them, and rid themselves of a city, which had been their eternal foe. But Demosthenes chose rather to hearken at this time to the suggestions of the Messenians ; “ how glorious it would be, as he

“ was now at the head of so large a force, to invade the Ætolians, who were such plagues to Naupactus ; and, if their reduction could be compleated, the rest of that continent might easily be brought into the Athenian subjection. For, though the Ætolians were a great and warlike people, yet, as they dwelled in open villages remote from one another, as light armour only was in use amongst them, they presumed he might easily complete their reduction, before any succour could reach them.” They advised him further, to begin with the Apodoti, to take the Ophionians next, then to proceed to the Eurytians (which is the most numerous people of Ætolia, reported also to speak in a most barbarous dialect, and to feed upon raw flesh) ; that, if these could be surprised, the rest of Ætolia would submit of course.” He therefore—willing to oblige the Messenians, and incited above all by the thought, that without exposing the Athenian forces, after he had done with the Ætolians, he might march with the allied strength of the continent and penetrate by land as far as Bœotia, through the Locrians of Ozoli, to Cytinium in Doris, keeping Parnassus on his right till he got down amongst the Phocians, who he reckoned, from their constant friendship with the Athenians would readily join him, or, however, might easily be compelled to do it ; and then, that Bœotia borders next on the Phocians :—Demosthenes, I say, weighing from Leucas with his whole force, to the great regret of the Acarnanians, coasted along to Solium. He there communicated his plan to the Acarnanians, in which they refused to join beause he had refused the blockade of Leucas. Demosthenes, with his other force, the Cephallenians, and Messenians, and Zacynthians, and three hundred soldiers draughted from on board the Athenian ships (the fifteen Corcyrean were already departed), set about this expedition against the Ætolians. He began it from Oeneon in Locris : For the Locrians, called Ozolæ, were allies, and had notice to meet the Athenians with all their force in the midland parts. These, being not only borderers, but using also the same kind of arms with the Ætolians, were judged most proper to accompany the expedition,

as they knew so well their method of battle, and their country. Having reposed his army one night within the verge of the temple of the Nemean Jove (in which the inhabitants have a tradition that Hesiod the poet expired*, in pursuance of an oracle which had fixed Nemea for the place of his death), he marched again at break of day and entered Ætolia. On the first day he taketh Potidania, on the second Crocylium, and on the third Tichium. There he halted, and sent away the booty to Eupolium of Locris. It was now his resolution, after he had subdued the rest, to march last of all against the Ophionians, if they did not voluntarily submit beforehand, in his retreat back to Naupactus.

This preparation against them did by no means escape the Ætolians. The scheme was no sooner formed than they had gained intelligence of it; and by that time the army

* The story of Hesiod's death is related by Plutarch in the *The banquet of the seven wise men*. Solon interposing here, said, "Such things, Diocles, must be referred immediately to the Gods, they are above human condition. But the case of Hesiod is within the lot of humanity, and concerns us all. But perhaps you know the story." I do not, he replied. "It is then well worth your hearing. A certain Milesian, it seems, in whose company Hesiod was hospitably lodged and entertained in Locris, had secretly debauched the daughter of their host. When the affair came to light, it was suspected that Hesiod had all along been privy to the intrigue, and concealed such base behaviour; and though he was entirely innocent, he fell a victim to hasty resentment and foul calumny. The brothers of the damsel laid wait for and slew him at the Nemean temple in Locris, and with him his servant, whose name was Troilus. Their bodies being thrown into the sea, that of Troilus indeed, floating up into the river Daphnus, was stopped at a rock quite surrounded with water a small distance from the sea. But the moment Hesiod's body was thrown into the sea, a shoal of dolphins caught it and carried it to Rhium and Molycrium. The Locrians that very day were assembled at Rhium for a solemn festival and sacrifice, which they still continue to celebrate at the same place. The dead body was no sooner beheld in its approach, than, full of wonder, as was likely, they hurried down to the beach, and, knowing it to be the body of Hesiod, and very fresh, they postponed every other care to the discovery of this murder, from their high regard for Hesiod. This was soon done: the assassins were found out, whom they threw headlong into the sea, and demolished their houses. But Hesiod was buried by them in the temple of the Nemean Jove."

was within their borders, they were all drawn together in a numerous body for their mutual defence: Nay, even the most distant Ophionians, who are seated upon the Meliac bay, the Bomiensians and Calliensians were already come up.

The Messenians continued to amuse Demosthenes with the same suggestions as at first: They still insisted, that the conquest of the Ætolians would be an easy performance, and advised him to advance immediately against their villages, nor give them time to gather together in a body to oppose him, but to attack every place he came to, and take it. This advice being quite to his own taste, and relying upon his own good fortune, which hitherto had never been checked, without waiting for the Locrians, who were very much wanted, and were to have joined him (for he stood most in need of light-armed darters), he advanced to Ægitium, and assaulting, takes it by storm. The inhabitants made their escape, and posted themselves upon the hills which overlook the town. It was situated amongst lofty eminences, and distant from the sea about eighty stadia*.

But now the Ætolians, who were come up for the preservation of Ægitium, running down in separate bodies from different eminences, made an attack upon the Athenians and allies, and poured in their javelins amongst them: And whenever the Athenian army approached to charge, they plied before them; when they again fell back, these again returned to the charge. This kind of engagement continued for a long time, a series of alternate pursuits and retreats, in both which the Athenians suffered most. So long however as their archers had darts, and opportunity to use them, they lost no ground; for the light armed Ætolians fell back to avoid the darts. But when the chief of the archers dropped, his party was soon dispersed, and the whole army began to incline. Their strength was quite exhausted by so many repeated charges; and now, the Ætolians pressing hard upon them,

* About eight miles.

and pouring in whole showers of missive weapons, they turned about and fled. Now tumbling into caverns from whence they could not recover themselves, or bewildered in places of which they had no knowledge, they were miserably destroyed. For Cromon, the Messenian, who laid out all the routes, had been killed in the battle. The Ætolians pursued with their darts, and being not only swift of foot, but also lightly armed, easily overtook many of them in their flight, and did great execution. A large party who had lost their way, threw themselves into a wood which was quite impassable. The Ætolians set the wood on fire, in the flames of which they were all consumed. Every affecting species of flight and destruction was now the fate of the Athenian army. Those who had the good fortune to escape, effected it by reaching the sea and Oeneon of Locris, from whence they first began the expedition.

The number of the allies who thus perished, was large ; that of heavy-armed Athenians was about a hundred and twenty ; so considerable was the loss, and all of them in the very flower of their youth. In the whole course of this war, the *State* of Athens never lost at any one time so many of her most gallant citizens as now. Procles also, the other commander in this expedition, perished.

They afterwards fetched off their dead by a truce obtained from the Ætolians. This being done, they retired to Naupactus, and there shipped themselves for Athens. Demosthenes however was left behind at Naupactus, and the parts adjacent. After such a miscarriage he durst not presume to face the people of Athens.

About the same time, the Athenians on the Sicilian station, having sailed towards Locris, landed upon that coast. They destroyed a party of Locrians who endeavoured to make head against them ; and then take Peripolium, a town situated on the river Halex.

The same summer the Ætolians, who had some time before dispatched an embassy to Corinth and Lacedæmon,

composed of Tolophus the Ophionian, Boriades the Eurysthanian and Tisander the Apodotian prevail there in their suit for a diversion against Naupactus, because the Athenians had invaded their territories. It was about autumn when the Lacedæmonians marched away three thousand heavy-armed of their allies; of which number five hundred belonged to Heraclea, the city so lately founded in Trachinæ. Eurylochus, a Spartan, was appointed to command in the expedition, and was accompanied by two other Spartans, Macarius and Menedæus. The army being drawn into a body at Delphi, Eurylochus dispatched a herald to the Ozolian-Locri: His route to Naupactus lay through their territory. He was also desirous to detach them from the Athenian alliance. The Amphissensians were the readiest of all the Locri to give their concurrence, as standing in perpetual awe of the hatred bore them by the Phocians. These therefore were the first who sent in hostages, and who persuaded others to follow their example, from a dread of this army which was now approaching. Accordingly, the Myonensians, their own borderers, were the first who complied; for their part of Locris is most difficult of access. These were followed by the Ippensians, and Messapians, and Tritænsians, and Challæans, Tolophonians, Hessians, and Oeanthians; and all these gave a personal attendance in the expedition. The Olpéans indeed sent in their hostages, but would not attend. The Hyæans refused their hostages till one of their villages called Polis was seized.

When all things were ready, and the hostages placed securely at Cytinium of Doris, Eurylochus with his army, taking the route of Locris, advanced against Naupactus. He seized upon Oeneon and Eupolium as he marched for refusing to concur. When they had entered the territory of Naupactus, and were joined by the Etolian aid, they wasted the country to the very suburb, of which also, because unfortified, they took possession. Turning thence to Molycrium, a Corinthian colony, but now subject to the Athenians, they reduce it.

But Demosthenes the Athenian (for he had continued at Naupactus ever since the Ætolian miscarriage) having received intelligence of this army, and dreading the loss of this place, had addressed himself to the Acarnanians, and with some difficulty, owing to his departure from Leucas, persuades them to send a succour to Naupactus. Accordingly, they put a thousand of their heavy-armed under his orders, whom he threw into the town by sea, which effectually preserved it. For the danger before was manifest, as the wall was very large in compass, and the number of defendants inconsiderable.

When Eurylochus and his council had discovered that such a succour had been received into the town, and that its reduction was now impracticable, they marched away their forces, not towards Peloponnesus, but to that Ætolia which is now called Calydon, to Pleuron, to the neighbouring towns, and to Proschion of Ætolia. The Ambraciots had now been with and prevailed upon them, to join in some attempts upon Argos in Amphilochia, upon the rest of that province, and Acarnania; assuring them, that could these be reduced, the whole continent there would instantly go over to the Lacedæmonian league. Eurylochus having assured them of his concurrence, and given the Ætolians their dismissal, halted thereabouts with his army, till the Ambraciots had entered upon the expedition against Argos, and it was time for him to join them. And here the summer ended.

The Athenians in Sicily, the beginning of the winter, putting themselves at the head of their Grecian allies, and as many of their Sicilian as unable to support the Syracusan yoke had revolted from Syracuse to join them, began fresh operations of war in concert, and assaulted Nessa a town of Sicily, the citadel of which was in the hands of the Syracusans. But the attempt was unsuccessful, and they again determined to draw off. During the retreat, the Syracusans sallying forth, fell upon those allies of the Athenians who marched in the rear, and with such force, that they put

a part of the army to flight, and slew a considerable number.

After this, Laches and the Athenians, having made some attempts, and landed on the coast of Locris near the mouth of the river Caïcinus, were engaged by a party of Locrians consisting of about three hundred, under Proxenus, the son of Capaton. These the Athenians defeated, and having stripped them of their arms, went off the coast.

The same winter also the Athenians purified Delos, in obedience to an oracle. Pisistratus the tyrant had purified it formerly, not indeed the whole, but so much of the island as lies within the prospect of the temple. The purification now was universal, and performed in the following manner.

They broke up all the sepulchres of the dead without exception, and prohibited for the future any death or birth in the island, both which were to be confined to Rhenæa. For Rhenæa lies at so small a distance from Delos, that Polycrates the tyrant of Samos, who was formerly of great power by sea, amongst other isles he reduced to his dominions, took Rhenæa also, which he consecrated to Delian Apollo, and fastened it to Delos by a chain. And after this purification, the Athenians made the first institution of the Delian games to be solemnized every fifth returning year. Not but that in the earlier times there was used to be a great conflux of Ionians and neighbouring islanders to Delos. They resorted to the solemn festivals there with their wives and children, in the same manner as the Ionians do now to Ephesus. Games of bodily exercise and of music were actually celebrated, and cities exhibited their respective chorusses. For this we have the testimony of Homer, in the following verses of his hymn to Apollo.

To thee, O Phœbus, most the Delian isle
Gives cordial joy, excites the pleasing smile ;
When gay Ionians flock around thy fane ;
Men, women, children, a resplendent train,

Whose flowing garments sweep the sacred pile,
 Whose grateful concourse gladdens all the isle,
 Where champions fight, where dancers beat the ground,
 Where cheerful music echoes all around,
 Thy feast to honour and thy praise to sound.

That there was also a musical game to which artists resorted to make trials of the skill, he fully sheweth in other verses to be found in the same hymn: For having sung the Delian chorus of females, he closeth their praise with these lines, in which further he hath made mention of himself;

Hail! great Apollo, radiant god of day;
 Hail! Cynthia, goddess of the lunar sway;
 Henceforth on me propitious smile! and you
 Ye blooming beauties of the isle, adieu!
 When future guests shall reach your happy shore,
 And refug'd here from toils lament no more;
 When social chat the mind unbending cheers,
 And this demand shall greet your friendly ears—
 “Who was the Bard, e’er landed on your coast,
 “Who sung the sweetest, and who pleas’d you most?”
 With voice united, all ye blooming fair,
 Join in your answer, and for me declare;
 Say—“The blind bard the sweetest notes may boast,
 “He lives at Chios, and he pleas’d us most.”

Such an evidence hath Homer left us, that in early times there was a great concourse and festival at Delos. But afterwards the people of the islands and the Athenians sent in their parties for the chorus with victims. But the usual games, and most of the solemn rites, had been disused, through some sinister events, till the Athenians now made a fresh institution of this solemnity, with the addition of a chariot-race which had not formerly been a part of it.

The same winter, the Ambraciots, in pursuance of their engagements with Eurylochus, who waited their motions, march away with three thousand heavy-armed against the Amphilochian Argos. Accordingly, breaking into Argia, they seize Olpæ, a strong place, situated on an eminence on

the sea side. This place had been formerly fortified by the Acarnanians, who used it for the public tribunal of justice. It is distant from the city of Argos, which is also a maritime town, about twenty-five stadia*. The Acarnanians were now in motion, some running to the defence of Argos, others to encamp at the important post of Crenæ in Amphilochia, to observe the motions of the Peloponnesians commanded by Euryloclus, that they might not perfect their junction with the Ambraciots, without some molestation on their route. They also send to Demosthenes the Athenian general in the Ætolian expedition, to come and put himself at their head; and to the Athenian squadron of twenty sail, which was then upon the coast of Peloponnesus, under the command of Aristotle son of Timocrates, and Hierophon son of Antimnestus.

The Ambraciots at Olpæ sent also a messenger to their own city, ordering them, to a man, to come out into the field. They were afraid lest Euryloclus might not be able to pass the Acarnanians, and so they should be compelled either to fight alone; or, should they attempt a retreat, to find it full of danger.

But the Peloponnesians commanded by Euryloclus had no sooner heard that the Ambraciots were at Olpæ, than dislodging from Proschium they marched with all expedition to their support. After passing the Achelous, they took the route of Acarnania, desolate at present, as the inhabitants were fled to the defence of Argos, having on their right the city and garrison of the Stratians, and the rest of Acarnania on their left. When they had passed through the territory of the Stratians, they crossed Phytia, and again through the extremity of Medeon, and then marched across Limnæa. They now entered the kingdom of the Agræans, which had deserted the Acarnanian to favour the Peloponnesian interest. Securing then the mountain Thyamus, a wild uncultivated spot, they crossed it, and descended thence

* About two miles and a half.

by night into Argia. They afterwards passed undiscovered betwixt the city of the Argians, and the post of the Acarnanians at Crenæ, and so perfected their junction with the Ambraciots at Olpæ. After this junction, their numbers being large, they take possession next morn, at break of day, of a post called Metropolis, and there fix their encampment.

Not long after this the Athenian squadron of twenty sail comes into the bay of Ambracia, to succour the Argians. Demosthenes also arrived, with two hundred heavy-armed Messenians, and sixty Athenian archers. The station of the fleet was fixed under the fort of Olpæ. But the Acarnanians, and some few of the Amphilochians, who had already gathered into a body at Argos (for the majority of them was obstructed by the Ambraciots), got every thing in readiness to engage the enemy. They elect Demosthenes to be the commander of the whole associated force, with the assistance of their own generals. He caused them to advance near Olpæ, and there encamped them. A great hollow lay between the armies. For five days they remained in a state of inaction, but on the sixth both sides drew up in order of battle. The Peloponnesians were more numerous, and their line of course was further extended. Demosthenes therefore, that he might not be inclosed, placeth an ambuscade of the heavy and light-armed, to the number in all of about four hundred, in a hollow way overgrown with shrubs and bushes, with orders that in the heat of the charge they should rise up and attack the over extended line of the enemy in their rear. When all things were ready on both sides, they came to blows. Demosthenes led the right wing, composed of the Messenians, and his few Athenians. The other consisted of the Acarnanians, drawn up in the order they happened to fall into as they came up, and the Amphilochian darters who were at hand. But the Peloponnesians and Ambraciots were drawn up promiscuously, except the Mantinéans. The Mantinéans stood embodied rather to the left, but not in the extremity : For Eurylochus, with a

select party, was posted there over-against the Messenians and Demosthenes.

No sooner was the battle joined, and the Peloponnesians on that wing were moving forward their superior numbers to surround the right of their adversaries, than the Acarnanians, starting up from their ambuscade, falling upon them in the rear, assault and put them to flight. They gave way before the very first shock, and struck such a consternation into the bulk of the army, that they also began to run: For they no sooner saw the party with Eurylochus, and which was the flower of their strength, intirely broke, than they felt a panic for themselves. And the Messenians, who fought at the same post with Demosthenes, behaved so very well that they finished the rout. The Ambraciots in the mean time, and those in the right, had got the better of their opponents, and were pursuing them towards Argos; for, beyond a doubt, they are the most warlike people of any in those parts. But when they were returned from the pursuit, they perceived the bulk of their army was defeated; and the rest of the Acarnanians beginning to charge them, with much difficulty they threw themselves into Olpæ. The number of the slain was great, as they had made their attacks without any order, and with the utmost confusion: We must except the Mantinéans, who kept most firmly together, and retreated in the best order of the whole enemy. The battle was ended only with the night.

The next morning, as Eurylochus was killed and Macarius also, the command devolved upon Menedæus. The defeat was irrevocably great, and he was highly perplexed—whether he should abide a siege, in which he must not only be shut up by land, but by the Athenian ships be blocked up also by sea—or, whether he should endeavour to secure his retreat. At length—he treats with Demosthenes and the Acarnanians for a suspension of arms both for his own departure and the fetching off the dead. The dead they at once delivered, and set up a trophy themselves, and took

up their own dead to the number of about three hundred. But a truce for their departure was not openly granted to them all. Demosthenes, in concert with the Acarnanian generals, agreed to a secret article with the Mantinéans and Menedæus and the other Peloponnesian officers, and as many others as were of any consideration—that “they should depart immediately.” His policy was, to have the Ambraciots and the promiscuous body of mercenaries left quite destitute, wishing above all things for such a pretext to calumniate the Lacedæmonians and Peloponnesians amongst the Grecians of those parts, “as men who wilfully abandon their friends, “from a mere selfish treacherous regard to their own safety.” Having leave therefore to fetch off their dead, they interred them all so well as their hurry would admit. And those in the secret were busy in concerting the means of their departure.

But now intelligence is brought to Demosthenes and the Acarnanians, that the Ambraciots of the city with their whole collected force had, in pursuance of the former summons, began their march for Olpæ, through Amphiloichi, designing to join their countrymen at Olpæ, and quite ignorant of the late defeat. Upon this he immediately detacheth a part of his army, to beset all the passes, and to seize all the advantageous posts upon their route, and got ready at the same time to march against them with the remainder of his force.

In the mean time, the Mantinéans, and those comprehended in the secret article, going out of the town upon the pretext of gathering herbs and fuel, went gradually off in small parties, gathering what they pretended to come out for as they passed along. But when they had thus straggled to a considerable distance from Olpæ, they moved away in a more nimble pace. The Ambraciots and others, who in great numbers came out in their company, when they perceived them thus stealing off, felt an inclination to follow, and so taking to their heels, ran speedily after them. The Acarnanians imagined at first, that they were all equally

endeavouring to escape without permission, and therefore set out in the pursuit of the Peloponnesians. Their officers endeavoured to stop them, crying out, that "leave was given for their escape."—Upon which a soldier, concluding their officers had been guilty of treachery, darted his javelin amongst them. But afterwards they connived at the escape of the Mantinéans and Peloponnesians, but made slaughter of the Ambraciots. Great indeed was the tumult, and the perplexity also to distinguish which was an Ambraciot, and which was a Peloponnesian; and amidst the confusion about two hundred were slain. The rest made their escape into the bordering kingdom of Agræis, where Salythius king of the Agræans, who was their friend, took them under his protection.

The Ambraciots of the city were now advanced as far as Idomené. They are two lofty eminences which are called by this name. The higher of the two, by favour of the dark, the detachment sent before by Demosthenes from the camp had seized without being discovered, and had posted themselves upon it. The Ambraciots had possessed themselves already of the lower, and halted there for the night. Demosthenes after his evening repast, and the remainder of the army about shut of evening, began to march. He himself took half of them to attack the enemy in front, whilst the other was fetching a compass round the mountains of Amphilochia.

The next morning was no sooner in its dawn, than he comes upon the Ambraciots yet in their beds, still ignorant of all that had passed, and rather supposing these new-comers to be their friends. For Demosthenes had politicly placed the Messenians in the van, and ordered them to discourse as they moved along in the Doric dialect, thus to prevent any alarm from their advanced guards, who further so long as the dark continued could not possibly distinguish their faces. By this means, he no sooner assaulted the camp than the rout began. Numbers of them were slain upon the spot. The remainder

fled amain towards the mountains. But the passes were all beset; and more than this, the Amphilochians, who were well acquainted with their own country, were pursuing in the *light* enemies who were encumbered with the *heavy* armour. Quite ignorant of the country, nor knowing whither they were flying, they rushed headlong into hollow ways, into all the ambuscades laid ready by the enemy, to their own destruction. Yet as no possible method of escape was unattempted, some of them turned towards the sea, which was not greatly distant. And when they beheld the Athenian ships moving along the shore, in so fatal a concurrence for their ruin, they plunged into the water, and swam up to them, choosing rather, in the present consternation, to be destroyed by the Athenians on board those ships, than by Barbarians and their most inveterate foes, the Amphilochians. Through such a series of misfortunes, but few out of the numerous body of Ambraciots were so happy as to escape to their own home. The Acarnanians having stripped the dead, and erected the trophies, marched back to Argos.

On the following day they were addressed by a herald, sent from those Ambraciots who had escaped from Olpæ, and were now in the Agreïs. His commission was to obtain the bodies of the dead who had been killed since the first engagement, as they were attempting without permission to escape along with the Mantinéans and others who were going off by agreement. This herald casting his eyes upon the arms of the Ambraciots from the city, was astonished at the number. He knew nothing of that fresh calamity, but concluded they all belonged to the party for whom he was now employed. Somebody asked him the reason of his surprise, and what he judged to be the number of the dead! Now he who asked the question supposed the herald to have been sent by those of Idomene. "Not more than two hundred," says the herald. The demandant then replied, "It should seem otherwise by the arms, for these are the arms of more than a thousand men." The herald rejoined,

“ Then they cannot belong to those of our party.” The other replied, “ They must, if you fought yesterday at Idomene.” “ We fought no where yesterday ; we suffered the day before “ in our retreat from Olpæ.” “ But we fought yesterday “ against those Ambraciots, who were advancing from the “ city to relieve you.” When the herald heard this, and found that the army of relief from the city was thus destroyed, he burst into a groan ; and, quite overpowered with the weight of the present calamities, he went off abruptly, and without renewing his demand about the dead.

During the whole course of this war, no other Grecian city suffered so great a loss in so short a time. I have not presumed to mention the number of the slain, because it is said to have been incredibly great, when compared with the size of their city. But I am well convinced, that, if in compliance with the advice of the Athenians and Demosthenes, the Acarnanians and Amphilochians would have proceeded to the excision of Ambracia, they might have done it with a bare shout of their voice. But they dreaded its falling into the hands of the Athenians, who might prove worse neighbours to them than the old.

But to return. A third part of the spoils was bestowed upon the Athenians, the rest was divided amongst the confederate cities. Those allotted the Athenians were lost at sea. For the three hundred suits of armour which are repositied in the Temples of Athens, were selected for Demosthenes, who now returned thither, and brought them with him. The dread he had been under ever since his miscarriage in Ætolia was quite dispelled by the good service he had now performed.

The Athenians, with their squadron of twenty sail, were now returned to Naupactus ; and, since the departure of the Athenians and Demosthenes, the Acarnanians and Amphilochians had granted by treaty to those Ambraciots and Peloponnesians, who had refuged with Salynthius and the Agræans, a safe retreat from amongst the Oeniadæ, who had also

gone over to Salynthius and the Agræans. And afterwards the Acarnanians and Amphilochians concluded a peace and an alliance for a hundred years with the Ambraciots, upon these conditions :

“ That neither the Ambraciots should be obliged to join
“ the Acarnanians in any attempts against the Peloponnesians ;
“ nor the Acarnanians to act with the Ambraciots against the
“ Athenians.

“ That if either were attacked, the others should march to
“ their defence.

“ That the Ambraciots should restore all the places and
“ frontier belonging to the Amphilochians, which were at pre-
“ sent in their hands. And,

“ That they should in no shape support Anactorium, which
“ was then in hostility with the Acarnanians.”

These articles being mutually agreed to, the war came to a conclusion. But after this, the Corinthians sent a party of their own people, consisting of three hundred heavy-armed, commanded by Xenoclides the son of Euthycles, for the guard of Ambracia, who arrived, after great difficulties, as they marched all the way over land. And this is the account of transactions in Ambracia.

The Athenians in Sicily, the same winter, made a descent against Himeræa from their ships, whilst the Sicilians, pouring down from the upper country, were ravaging its frontier. They steered their course also against the isles of Æolus. But when they were returned to their old station at Rhegium, they found there Pythodorus the son of Isolochus, who was commissioned to take upon him the command of the fleet, in the room of Laches. For the confederates of Sicily had sent a deputation to Athens, to solicit a more ample succour of shipping. Because, as, in fact, the Syracusans were masters of all their lands, and they were also awed at sea by a few Syracusan vessels, they were now intent on gathering together such a naval force as might strike an effectual terror. The Athenians equipped out forty sail

as a reinforcement for Sicily. Their motive was, not only to bring the war in those parts to a speedy determination, but also to keep their own mariners in constant practice. Pythodorus, one of the admirals appointed for this service, they sent immediately off with a few ships: Sophocles, son of Sos-tradites, and Eurymedon, son of Thucles, were soon to follow with the main body of the fleet. But Pythodorus, who had now took the command from Laches, steered about the close of the winter, against that fortress of the Locrians which Laches had taken before. But, being defeated at his landing by the Locrians, he returned again to his station.

About the spring of the year, a torrent of fire overflowed from mount *Ætna*, in the same manner as formerly, which destroyed part of the lands of the Catanéans, who are situated at the foot of that mountain, which is the largest in all Sicily. It is said that fifty years intervened between this flow and the last which preceded; and that in the whole, the fire hath thus issued thrice since Sicily was inhabited by the Grecians. Such were the occurrences of this winter, at the end of which the sixth year also of this war, the history of which Thucydides hath compiled, expired.

THE
PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

BOOK IV.

YEAR VII.—BEFORE CHRIST 425.

THE ensuing summer, when the corn was beginning to ear, ten sail of Syracusan, joined by an equal number of Locrian vessels, at the invitation of the inhabitants, stood away for Messene in Sicily, and took possession of the place. And thus Messene revolted from the Athenians. But this event was chiefly owing to the practices of the Syracusans ; who, foreseeing that this town might open the way for the reduction of Sicily, were greatly afraid lest the Athenians should get established there, and with augmented forces pour out from thence upon them. The Locrians assisted out of enmity to the Rhegians, whom they were desirous to have it in their power to attack both by land and sea. At the same time also these Locrians broke in upon the territory of the Rhegians with their intire force, to deter them from any attempt to save Messene, and to gratify also those fugitives from Rhegium, who acted now in combination with them. For Rhegium had for a long time been embroiled in sedition, and so was unable to take the field against these invaders, who for the same reason were more eager to distress them. When the ravage was compleated, the Locrians marched their land-forces back, but their ships were stationed on the guard of Messene. They also were very busy in the equipment of an additional number, which were to repair to that station, and be ready to move from thence to any future operations of war.

About the same season of the spring, before the corn was fully grown, the Peloponnesians and allies made their inroad into Attica. Agis, the son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedæmonians, commanded. They fixed their camp, and ravaged the country.

The Athenians now sent out to sea the forty ships already prepared for the Sicilian voyage, under the command of Eurymedon and Sophocles, who stayed behind to bring up this reinforcement, since Pythodorus the third in the commission was already in his post at Sicily. They had orders also in the course of the voyage to touch at Corcyra, and provide effectually for the preservation of those in the city, who were sadly infested by the outlaws posted on the mountain. Sixty sail of the Peloponnesians were now upon that coast, to act in support of those on the mountain, who, as the city was sorely oppressed with famine, presumed they should with ease carry all before them. Demosthenes further, who had been in no public employ since his return from Acarnania, procured leave to go on board this fleet with authority to employ it on the coast of Peloponnesus, if he judged it for the service.

When they were got to the height of Laconia, intelligence is brought them, that "the Peloponnesian fleet is now in Corcyra." Eurymedon and Sophocles were for making the best of their way thither. But it was the advice of Demosthenes to go first to Pylus, and after they had secured that place, to proceed in their voyage. This was positively refused; but it so happened, that a storm arose which drove the whole fleet to Pylus. Demosthenes insisted that they should immediately fortify the place, since this was the motive of his attendance in the fleet. He shewed them, that "there was at hand plenty of timber and stone for the work; that, beside the strength of its natural situation, the place itself was barren, as was also the greatest part of the adjacent country." For Pylus lies at the distance of about four hundred stadia* from Sparta, in the district which was

* About forty English miles.

formerly called Messenia; but the name given it by the Lacedæmonians is Coryphasium. The others replied, "There are many barren capes in Peloponnesus, which those may secure who have a mind to plunge the commonwealth into needless expenses." This place however seemed to him to be better marked out for this purpose than any other, as being possessed of a harbour; and as the Messenians, who formerly bore some relation to it, and still used the same dialect with the Lacedæmonians, might from hence give them great annoyance, and at the same time effectually keep possession of it. But when neither the commanders nor soldiers, nor the inferior officers*, to whom he afterwards communicated his project, would be brought to a compliance, he quietly let it drop till the mere love of employment, during the idleness of their suspended voyage, seditiously inclined the private soldiers to compass it with a wall. They took the work in hand, and plied it briskly. Tools they had none for hewing and fitting the stones; but picked out and carried such as they judged most proper for the work, and laid them one upon another as compactly as they could. The mud, that was any where requisite, for want of vessels they carried on their shoulders, bending forwards as much as possible that it might have room to stick on, and holding it up with both hands clasped fast behind that it might not slide down. They spared no pains to prevent the Lacedæmonians, and to put the place in a proper posture of defence, before they could come to their disturbance. For the largest part of it was so well fortified by nature, that it stood in no need of the defence of art.

* The word in the original is *Taxiarchs*. They seem to be nearly the same with *Captains of a Company*, in the modern stile, as their command was over about one hundred men. *Taxiarchs* were also officers of a higher class, in number ten, every Athenian tribe appointing one, whose business it was to marshal the armies, to order the marches and encampments, to take care of provisions, and to punish military offences. But the former seem to be the *officers* to whom Demosthenes applied himself in the present instance.

The news of this arrived at Sparta during the celebration of some public festival. They set light by it; assured, that, so soon as they appeared in sight, the enemy would either abandon it, or the place be recovered by an easy effort. And they were something more dilatory because their army was yet in Attica.

The Athenians, having completed their works on the side towards the land and on the other necessary spots in the space of six days, leave Demosthenes with five ships to guard it, and with the larger number resumed their voyage for Corcyra and Sicily.

But the Peloponnesians in Attica were no sooner advertised of this seizure of Pylus, than they marched back with all expedition. The Lacedæmonians, and Agis their king, regarded this affair of Pylus as their own domestic concern. And besides, as they had made the inroad early in the year, and whilst the corn was yet green, many of them laboured under a scarcity of provisions. The weather also, which proved tempestuous beyond what was usual in that season, had very much incommoded the army. In this manner, many accidents concurred to accelerate their retreat, and to render this the shortest of all their invasions. For the whole of their stay in Attica was but fifteen days.

About the same time, Simonides, an Athenian commander, having gathered together a small party of Athenians from the neighbouring garrisons and a body of the circumjacent dependents, took possession of Eïon in Thrace, a colony of the Mendéans. It had declared against the Athenians, but was now put into their hands by treachery. Yet, the Chalcidéans and Bottiæans coming immediately to its relief, he was beat out of it again, and lost a great number of his men.

After the retreat of the Peloponnesians out of Attica, the *Spartans**, in conjunction with those of their allies, marched

* The reader will be pleased to take notice, that the word *Spartans* is here emphatical. It means *those* of the first class, the noblest persons in the community, as is plain from the sequel.

without loss of time to the recovery of Pylus. The rest of the Lacedæmonians were longer in their approach, as but just returned from another expedition. Yet a summons had been sent all round Peloponnesus, to march directly for Pylus. Their fleet of sixty sail was also remanded from Corcyra, which, being transported by land over the isthmus of Leucas, arrive before Pylus, undescried by the Athenians who lay at Zacynthus. And by this time the land army had also approached.

Demosthenes, before the coming up of the Peloponnesian fleet, had timely dispatched two vessels to Eurymedon and the Athenians on board that fleet now lying at Zacynthus, pressing them to return, as the place was in danger of being lost; which vessels made the best of their way, in pursuance of the earnest commands of Demosthenes. But the Lacedæmonians were now preparing to attack the fortress both by land and sea, presuming it would easily be destroyed, as the work had been raised with so much precipitation and was defended by so small a number of hands. But, as they also expected the return of the Athenian ships from Zacynthus, they designed, in case they took not the place before, to bar up the mouths of the harbour, so as to render the entrance impracticable to the Athenians. For an isle, which is called Sphacteria, lying before and at a small distance, locks it up and rendereth the mouths of the harbour narrow; *that* near the fortress of the Athenians and Pylus a passage for two ships only a-breast, and *that* between the other points of land for eight or nine. The whole of it, as desert, was overgrown with wood and quite untrod, and the compass of it at most is about fifteen *stadia**. They were therefore intent on shutting up these entrances with ships moored close together, and their heads towards the sea. And to prevent the molestation apprehended, should the enemy take possession of this island, they threw into it a body of their heavy-armed, and posted another body on

* One mile and a half.

the opposite shore ;—for by these dispositions the Athenians would be incommoded from the island, and excluded from landing on the main land : And as on the opposite coast of Pylus without the harbour there is no road where ships can lie, they would be deprived of a station from whence to succour the besieged : And thus, without the hazard of a naval engagement, it was probable they should get possession of the place, as the quantity of provisions in it could be but small, since the seizure had been executed with slender preparation.—Acting upon these motives they threw the body of heavy-armed into the island, who were draughted by lot out of all the bands. These for a time were successively relieved by others. But the last body, who guarded that post, and were forced to continue in it, consisted of about four hundred and twenty exclusive of the Helots who attended them, and *these* were commanded by Epitadas, the son of Molobrus.

Demosthenes perceiving by these dispositions that the Lacedæmonians would attack him by land and sea, provided for his own defence. The triremes yet remaining with him he drew ashore, and ranged them by way of palisade before the fortress. The mariners he armed with bucklers, sorry ones indeed, as most of them were only twigs of osier plaited. Better arms were not to be procured in so desert a place. And even these they had taken out of a cruizer of thirty oars and a light packet belonging to Messenians, who happened accidentally to put in. The Messenians on board were about forty heavy-armed, whom he ranged amongst his own body. The greater part therefore of the unarmed as well as some who had armour, he placed on the strongest parts of the fortress towards the continent, with orders to beat off the land army whenever they approached. And having selected from his whole number sixty heavy-armed and a few archers, he marched out of the fortress to that part of the beach where he supposed the enemy would endeavour to land. The shore indeed was rough and rocky, and bor-

dered on the main sea ; yet, as the wall was weakest in this quarter, he judged it would soonest tempt and animate an assault. For never imagining they should be outnumbered in shipping, they had left the wall on this side but weak ; and should the enemy now force a landing, the place would undoubtedly be lost.

Sensible of this, and determined if possible to prevent their landing, Demosthenes posted himself with his chosen band on the very edge of the water, and endeavoured to animate them by the following harangue.

“ MY fellow soldiers, here posted with me in this dangerous situation, I conjure you, in so urgent an extremity, to throw away all superfluous wisdom. Let not a soul amongst you compute the perils which now environ us, but regardless of the issue and inspirited by hope let him charge the foe, and be confident of success. A situation desperate like this alloweth no room for calm consideration, but demands the most precipitate venture. Superior advantages however are along with us ;—of this I am convinced, provided we only stand firm together, and, scorning to be terrified at the number of our foes, do not willfully betray those advantages which are now in our favour. The shore is most difficult of access :—This in my judgment makes abundantly for us ;—This will support us, if we keep our ground. But if we give way, difficult as it is now, their landing will be easy—when there are none to obstruct it. Nay, what is worse, we shall make the enemy more furious, when, if we may afterwards press hard upon him, it is no longer in his power to re-embark with ease. For so long as they continue on board they may most easily be encountered ; whilst they are busy in landing, they cannot so far overmatch us, as that we ought to shrink before their numbers. Large though they be, the spot of action will be small for want of ground to draw up in order. What though their force be superior for the land, that advantage will be lost in their present

“service, when they must act from their vessels and on the water, where many lucky contingencies are requisite. And thus am I satisfied, that with these disadvantages they are but merely a balance for our smallness of number.

“As for you, O Athenians, who are now present, and who, by the long experience of frequent descents, are perfectly convinced that men, who stand firm and scorn to give way before the dash of the surge or the menacing approach of a vessel, can never be beat off—from you I insist, that firmly embodied together and charging the enemy on the very margin of the water, you preserve all us who are here, and preserve this fortress.”

In this manner Demosthenes having encouraged his men, the Athenians became more animated than ever ; and, marching forwards to the very margin of the sea, posted themselves there in order of battle. The Lacedæmonians were also in motion ; their land force was marching to assault the fortress, and their fleet was approaching the shore. It consisted of forty-three vessels, and a *Spartan*, Thrasymelidas the son of Cratesicles, was on board as admiral. He steered directly for the spot on which Demosthenes expected his coming. In this manner were the Athenians assaulted on both sides, by land and sea.

The ships of the enemy came on in small divisions, because there was not room for larger. They slackened by intervals, and endeavoured by turns to force their landing. They were brave to a man, and mutually animated one another to beat off the Athenians and seize the fortress.

But Brasidas signalized himself above them all. He commanded a trireme ; and observing that the other commanders and pilots, though they knew they could run aground, yet kept aloof because the shore was craggy, and shunned every hazard of staving their vessels, he shouted aloud, “that it was shameful for the saving of timber to suffer enemies to raise fortifications within their territory.” He en-

couraged them on the contrary “to force their landing, though they dashed their vessels to pieces;” begging the confederates “in this juncture not to refuse bestowing their ships on the Lacedæmonians in lieu of the great services they had done them, but to run them ashore, and landing at all adventures to seize the enemy and the fortress.” In this manner he animated others, and having compelled his own pilot to run the vessel ashore he was at once upon the stairs, and endeavouring to get down was beat back by the Athenians. After many wounds received, he fainted with loss of blood; and falling down upon the gunnel, his shield tumbled over into the water. It was brought ashore and taken up by the Athenians, who afterwards made it a part of the trophy, which they erected for this attack.

The others indeed with equal spirit endeavoured, but yet could not possibly land, as the ground was difficult of access, and the Athenians stood firm, and no where at all gave way. Such now was the strange reverse of fortune, that the Athenians upon land, upon Laconic land, beat off the Lacedæmonians who were fighting from the water; and the Lacedæmonians from ships were endeavouring a descent upon their own now hostile territory against Athenians. For at this period of time it was the general opinion, that *those* were landmen, and excelled most in land engagements, but that *these* were seamen, and made the best figure at sea.

The attack was continued the whole day and part of the next before it was given up. On the third day, they detached some vessels to Asine to fetch timber for engines, hoping by them to accomplish the taking of the wall adjacent to the harbour, which though of a greater height yet might easier be approached by sea.

During this pause, forty sail of Athenians came up from Zacynthus. This fleet had been enlarged by the accession of some guard-ships from off the station of Naupactus, and four sail of Chians. These no sooner discovered the main land about Pylus and the island Sphacteria to be full of

armed soldiers, the harbour also to be occupied by the ships of the enemy, which lay quiet in their posts, than perplexed how to act they sailed back for the present to the isle of Prone not far distant and desart, and there spent the night.

The day following, being formed into the order of battle, they shewed themselves again as ready for engagement, should the enemy venture to stand out against them into the open sea; and if not, were determined to force their way into the harbour. The enemy still kept in the same quiet posture, nor set about executing their former design of barring the entrances. They continued in their usual position along the shore, when they had manned their vessels, and got every thing ready to engage the assailants should they break into the harbour, where there was no danger of being straitened for room. The Athenians, perceiving their intent, broke into the harbour at both entrances. Falling there upon the greater number of vessels now advanced into deep water to obstruct the passage, they put them to flight; and following the chace, which could be but short, they shattered several, and took five, one of which had her whole crew on board. They proceeded to attack the rest, which had fled amain towards the shore. Some moreover, which had just been manned, were disabled before they could launch into the deep. Others, deserted by the mariners who had fled along the shore, they fastened to their own, and towed away empty. The Lacedæmonians seeing these things, and prodigiously alarmed at the sad event, lest now the communication should be cut off with the body in the island, rushed down with all their force to prevent it. Armed as they were they plunged into the water, and catching hold of the vessels in tow pulled them back towards the shore. It was now the apprehension of every soul amongst them, that the business flagged wherever he himself was not present. Great was the tumult in this contest for the ships, inverting the general custom of both contending parties. For the Lacedæmonians, inflamed and

terrified, fought a sea-fight (if it may be so expressed) from the shore : The Athenians, already victorious, and eager to give their good fortune its utmost completion, fought a land-battle from on board. The struggle on both sides was long and laborious, and blood was abundantly shed before the dispute could be ended. But at length the Lacedæmonians recovered all their empty vessels, excepting such as had been taken on the first onset. Each party being retired to their respective posts, the Athenians erected a trophy, and delivered up the dead, and were masters of all the wreck and shatters of the action. Then, without loss of time, they ranged their vessels in circuit quite round the island, and kept a strict watch, as having intercepted the body of men which was posted there. But the Peloponnesians on the main-land, with the accession of their auxiliaries who had now joined them, remained upon the opposite shore near Pylus.

When the news of this action at Pylus was brought to Sparta, it was resolved, as the great calamity was so urgent, that the *magistrates* in person should repair to the camp, and consult upon the very spot what resource they had left. And when their own eyes had shewed them the impossibility of relieving their men, and they were loth to leave them in the wretched extremity either of perishing by famine, or, overpowered by superior numbers, of being shamefully made prisoners, it was concluded “to send to the Athenian commanders to ask a suspension of arms at Pylus, whilst they dispatched an embassy to Athens to procure an accommodation, and to obtain leave as soon as possible to fetch off their *Spartans*.” These commanders accepting the proposal, the suspension was agreed upon on the following conditions.

“THAT the Lacedæmonians should immediately deliver up the ships in which they had fought ; and all the ships of war in general, which they had any where in Laconia, they should bring to Pylus, and deliver up to the Athe-

“nians. That they should refrain from making any attempt
“whatever upon the fortress, either by sea or land.”

“That the Athenians should permit the Lacedæmonians
“on the main-land to carry over a stated quantity of provi-
“sions to those in the island, two Attic *chanixes* of meal
“with two *cotyls* of wine*, and a piece of flesh for every
“Spartan, and a moiety of each for every servant. These
“provisions to be carried thither under the inspection of the
“Athenians; and no vessels whatever to cross over without
“permission.”

“That the Athenians, notwithstanding, be at liberty
“to continue their guard round the island, but not to
“land upon it: and should refrain from giving any annoy-
“ance to the army of the Peloponnesians either by sea or
“land.”

“That if either party should violate these conditions, either
“in the whole or any part whatever, the truce to be immedi-
“ately void; otherwise, to continue in force till the return of
“the Lacedæmonian embassy from Athens.”

“That the Athenians should convoy that embassy thither
“and back again in a trireme.”

“That upon their return the truce should be ended,
“when the Athenians should restore the ships now delivered
“to them, in the same number and condition as they were
“in before.”

On these conditions a suspension of arms took place, in
pursuance of which the ships were delivered up to the num-
ber of sixty, and the ambassadors dispatched away, who, ar-
riving at Athens, addressed themselves as followeth:

“HITHER, O Athenians, we are sent on the part of the
“Lacedæmonians, to negotiate with you in behalf of their
“citizens in the island, and to propose an expedient which
“will tend very much to your advantage, and will at the same
“time preserve as much as possible our own honour, in the
“great calamity with which we are at present beset. It is

* More than two pints of meal, and one pint of wine, *English* measure.

“not our purpose to run out into a long unaccustomed flow
“of words. We shall adhere to the rule of our country, to
“spare many words where few may suffice; and then only to
“enlarge, when the important occasion requireth an exact de-
“tail for the more judicious regulation of necessary acts.
“Receive therefore our discourse with an attention cleared of
“enmity. Be informed as men of understanding ought;
“and conclude that you are only to be put in mind of that
“judicious method of procedure, of which yourselves are
“such competent judges.

“You have now an opportunity at hand to improve a pre-
“sent success to your own interest and credit, to secure the
“possession of what you have hitherto acquired, and to adorn
“it with the accession of honour and glory. You are only
“to avoid that insolence of mind so frequent to men who
“have been, till the present, strangers to success. Such men
“are ever apt to presume too much on larger acquisitions,
“though merely because their present prosperity was beyond
“their expectation: Whilst they who have experienced the
“frequent vicissitudes of fortune, have gained a more judi-
“cious turn, and presume the least upon continuance of suc-
“cess. And there is the highest reason to conclude, that ex-
“perience hath improved the commonwealth of Athens and
“us Lacedæmonians in this piece of wisdom, much more
“than any other people.

“But be assured of it now, when you behold the calami-
“ties with which we are at present environed; we, who are
“invested with the highest honours and dignities of Greece,
“are this moment addressing ourselves to you, begging such
“favours as we formerly thought were more peculiarly
“lodged in our own dispensation. Not that we are thus re-
“duced through failure of our strength, or through former
“strength too haughtily exerted, but merely through the
“weight of such unforeseen disasters as continually happen,
“and to which the whole of mankind alike are ever subject.
“And from hence it is right that you should learn, amidst

“ the present strength of your *State* and its late acquisitions
“ that fortune may not always declare upon your side. Wise
“ indeed are they, who in their estimates of success make
“ judicious allowances for chance. Such are best able to bear
“ the alternatives of calamity with prudence and temper.
“ Such will form their judgments of war, not as the infallible
“ means of accomplishing whatever scheme they please to
“ undertake, but as deriving its effects from the guidance of
“ fortune. Such are the persons who are most of all exempt-
“ ed from fatal miscarriages ; because they are not puffed up
“ by presuming too far on present prosperity, and would
“ gladly acquiesce in the peaceable enjoyment of what they
“ now possess.

“ It concerns your honour, Athenians, to deal in this
“ manner with us, lest, in case you now reject our propo-
“ sals, when you yourselves in future times miscarry (many
“ such events must happen), your present good fortune may
“ then be perversely ascribed to chance, even though you
“ are now able to deliver down to posterity the fame of your
“ power and moderation beyond a possibility of blemish.
“ The Lacedæmonians invite you to agreement, and a con-
“ clusion of the war. They offer you peace and alliance,
“ nay, friendship in its whole extent, and the exchange of
“ good offices mutually revived ; demanding nothing in re-
“ turn but their citizens out of the island. To this step they
“ have condescended rather than be exposed to the dangers
“ incidental on either side, should *they* either seize some fa-
“ vourable opportunity to force their escape by arms, or
“ holding out to the last against your blockade, be reduced
“ with all the aggravations of defeat. Great enmities, in
“ our opinion, may the soonest be brought to a firm deter-
“ mination—not when either party, having exerted all their
“ strength, and gained the far greater superiority in war, dis-
“ dains the fair accommodation, and relieth on that forced
“ acquiescence which necessitated oaths impose ; but rather,
“ when, though victory be within their reach, they recollect

“humanity, and having succeeded by valour quite beyond
“their expectations, determine the contest with temper and
“moderation. Then the foe, who hath not felt the extremity
“of force, is henceforth disarmed by the strength of grati-
“tude, and is more securely bound by the affections of his
“own mind to abide for the future by all his compacts.
“Such ready deference mankind are more apt to shew to-
“wards those who have been with a remarkable superiority
“their enemies, than to such as they have opposed in more
“equal competition. It is natural, when men take the me-
“thod of voluntary submission, for the pleasing contest of
“generosity to be kindled between them ; but to hazard the
“last extremities, and even grow desperate against that
“haughtiness which will not relent.

“Now, if ever, is the crisis come to effect such a pleasing
“reconciliation between us both, before the intervention of
“some incurable event to ulcerate our passions, which may
“lay us under the sad necessity of maintaining an eternal
“enmity, both public and private, in regard to you, and you
“lose the benefit of those advantageous offers we now lay
“within your option. Whilst the event is yet undetermined,
“whilst the acquisition of glory, and of our friendship is
“within your reach, whilst yet we only feel the weight of a
“supportable calamity, and are clear from foul disgrace, let
“us now be mutually reconciled ; let us give the preference
“to peace over war, and effectuate a cessation of miseries to
“the other Grecians. The honour of such an event will by
“them be more abundantly ascribed to you. At present
“they are engaged in a perplexing warfare, unable yet to
“pronounce its authors. But, in case a reconciliation now
“take place, a point for the most part within your decision,
“they will gratefully acknowledge you for generous bene-
“factors.

“If then you thus determine, you gain an opportunity
“to render the Lacedæmonians your firm and lasting
“friends, since now they request your friendship, and choose

“to be obliged rather than compelled. Reflect within
“yourselves how many benefits must in all probability re-
“sult from such a lucky coincidence. For you cannot but
“know, that when *we* and *you* shall act with unanimity, the
“rest of Greece, conscious of inferiority, will pay us the ut-
“most honour and regard.”

The Lacedæmonians talked in this strain upon the presumption, that the Athenians had formerly been desirous of peace, and had been obstructed merely through their opposition; but now, thus freely tendered, they would accept it with joy, and give up the *men*. The Athenians, on the contrary, reckoning the *Spartans* in the island already in their power, imagined that a peace would be at any time in their own option, and were now very eager to improve their present success. But such a measure was insisted upon most of all by Cleon the son of Cleænetus, the greatest demagogue at this time, and most in credit with the people. It was he who persuaded them to return the following answer.

“THAT, previous to all accommodation, the *Spartans*
“shut up in the island must deliver up their arms and their
“persons, and be brought prisoners to Athens. When this
“was done, and the Lacedæmonians had surrendered Nisæa
“and Pegæ, and Træzene and Chalcis, (of which places
“they had not possessed themselves by arms, but in pursu-
“ance of a former treaty, when distress exacted compliance
“from the Athenians, and they had been obliged upon any
“terms to purchase peace), then they might fetch away
“their countrymen, and conclude a peace for whatever term
“both parties should agree.”

To this answer the Lacedæmonians made no direct reply*, they only requested that a *committee* might be appoint-

* Diodorus Siculus, l. 12. says further, That the Lacedæmonian ambassadors offered to set at liberty an equal number of Athenians, who were now their prisoners. And, when this offer was rejected, the ambassadors replied freely, “It was plain they set a higher value on Spartans than on their own citizens, since they judged an equal number of the latter not
“to be an equivalent.”

ed, with whom, after the arguments on each side should be freely offered and discussed, they might agree upon some expedient to mutual satisfaction. Cleon upon this broke out into loud invectives against them, affirming, "he knew beforehand that they intended nothing just or fair; but now their view was manifest to all, as they had absolutely refused to have any transactions with the body of the *people*, and had thus expressed a desire to negotiate with a small *committee*: If their views were fair and upright, he called upon them to explain themselves in the presence of all." But the Lacedæmonians perceiving that nothing they could urge would have any influence on the *people*, and in case, to ward off the distress they feared, they should make too large proposals, these offered and unaccepted, would expose them to the censure of their confederates; and that further, the Athenians would not comply with their demand on any reasonable terms; they broke off all further conference, and quitted Athens. The very moment they return to Pylus, the truce was at an end. The Lacedæmonians re-demanded their ships according to the article for that purpose agreed on. But the Athenians objecting some infractions to them, such as an incursion towards the fortress, expressly prohibited by the articles, and some other matters of little consequence, absolutely refused a restitution. They justified the refusal upon this express stipulation between them, that "if the conditions were in any degree violated, the truce should immediately be void." The Lacedæmonians protested against these proceedings, and, charging the detention of their ships with the highest injustice, broke off all further debate and prepared for war.

Pylus was now the scene in which both these warring parties exerted their utmost efforts. The Athenians sailed the whole day round the island with two ships in an opposite course: in the night, their whole fleet was stationed round it upon guard, except on that side towards the main

sea when the weather was tempestuous. And to strengthen their guard, they had now received a reinforcement of twenty sail from Athens, so that the number of their shipping amounted in the whole to seventy. The Peloponnesians maintained their post on the continent, and made frequent assaults upon the fort : intent all along to seize the first favourable opportunity, and to accomplish the preservation of their countrymen.

In Sicily, this while, the Syracusans and confederates, augmenting the number of their guard-ships on the station of Messene with another squadron they had since equipped, from Messene renewed the war. The Locrians spared no pains to spur them on from the great aversion they bore to the Rhegians. They had now broke into the territories of the latter with their whole force. They had even a mind to hazard a naval engagement against them, as they saw the number of Athenian ships at hand to be very inconsiderable, and had received intelligence that the larger numbers designed for this service were stopped for the present to block up the isle of Sphacteria. For should they once get the better at sea, they hoped, as they then might attack Rhegium both by sea and land, to find it an easy conquest, and so the posture of their own affairs would be considerably strengthened. For as Rhegium, which is a promontory of Italy, lies at a very small distance from Messene in Sicily, they could then prevent the approach of the Athenians, and be entirely masters of the *strait*. This *strait* is that part of the sea which runs between Rhegium and Messene, and over which lies the shortest cut from Sicily to the continent. It is the place which was formerly called Charybdis, and through which Ulysses is said to have sailed. As the current here sets in strongly from two great seas, the Tyrrhene and Sicilian, and runs with great rapidity, it is not at all strange that it should have been esteemed a dangerous passage.

Yet in the very middle of this strait the Syracusans and

confederates, with a number of ships little more than thirty, were forced to engage in the evening of the day, the dispute beginning about a vessel that was passing through. They stood away to oppose sixteen sail of Athenians and eight of Rhegians. They were worsted by the Athenians ; but each side separated in hurry and confusion, just as they could, to their several stations at Messene and Rhegium. They lost one ship in this action, which was stopped by the sudden approach of night.

But after this, the Locrians evacuated the territory of Rhegium, and the whole collected fleet of the Syracusans and confederates took a new station at Peloris of Messene, and their whole land-force attended. The Athenians and Rhegians sailing up to their station, and finding none at present on board the ships, rushed in amongst them. Yet they lost one of their own vessels by the force of a grappling iron fastened upon it, the crew of which was saved by swimming. Immediately after this the Syracusans got on board, and being towed along the shore towards Messene, the Athenians came up again to attack them ; but, the enemy running off into the deep and giving the first charge, they lose another of their ships. Though continuing to be towed along the shore, and to charge in this manner, yet the Syracusans, without suffering any loss, got safe into the harbour of Messene. And now the Athenians, having received intelligence that Camarina was betrayed to the Syracusans by Archias and his accomplices, stood away for that place.

In the mean while the Messenians, with their whole force by land, and accompanied by their ships, marched away against Chalcidic Naxos, which bordered upon their own territory. The first day they force the Naxians to shelter themselves behind their walls, and then they plundered the country. The day following, sailing up the river Acesine, they plundered along the shore, and with their land-force made an assault upon the city. The Siculi, who live upon the mountains, were now pouring down in numbers to repel

the Messenians. This the Naxians perceiving, became more courageous, and animating one another with the thought that the Leontines and their other Greek allies were now marching to their relief, they suddenly sally out of the city and fall upon the Messenians, whom they put to flight, and slaughtered more than a thousand of them; the remainder, with difficulty, escaped to their own homes: for the Barbarians attacked them upon their road, and made great havoc of them. The ships upon the station of Messene brake up soon after, withdrawing respectively to their own harbours.

Immediately the Leontines and allies, in concert with the Athenians, appeared before Messene, as now reduced to a very low ebb. They assaulted it on all sides; the Athenians making their attempt from their ships on the side of the harbour, whilst the land-forces did the same on the body of the place. But the Messenians, and a party of Locrians commanded by Demoteles, who, after their late blow, had been left there for the security of the place, made a sudden sally from the city, and falling unexpectedly on the army of the Leontines, put the greater part to flight, and did great execution upon them. This was no sooner perceived by the Athenians, than they threw themselves ashore to succour their confederates, and falling in with the Messenians, who had lost the order of their battle, drove them again behind their walls. This done, having erected a trophy, they put over to Rhegium. And after this, the Grecians of Sicily continued a land war against one another, in which the Athenians had no participation.

At Pylus, the Athenians still kept the Lacedæmonians blocked up in the island, and the army of the Peloponnesians remained in their old posts upon the continent, in a state of inactivity. Their constant guard subjected the Athenians to excessive hardships, since provisions and fresh water were equally scarce. There was but one single fountain for their use, which lay within the fortress of Pylus, and yielded but a slender quantity of water. The majority

of them were forced to dig into the gravel upon the beach of the sea, and take up with such water as could thus be got. They were further very much straitened in their station for want of room. They had not room enough for their ships to ride in with tolerable convenience, so that alternately one division lay ashore to take their necessary repasts, whilst the other launched more to sea. But what discouraged them most was the length of the blockade, so contrary to what they had expected. They had imagined a few days siege would have worn out a body of men shut up in a barren island, and having only salt-water for their drink. But this had been redressed by the Lacedæmonians, who had, by a public edict, encouraged all who were willing to carry over into the island meal, and wine, and cheese, and any other eatable which might enable them to hold out, assigning a large pecuniary reward for any successful attempt of this nature, and promising freedom to every Helot who carried them provisions. This was performed through a series of dangers by several; but the Helots were most active of all, who, putting off from Peloponnesus (wherever they chanced to be), landed by favour of the dark on the side of the island which lies upon the main-sea. Their chief precaution was to run over in a hard gale of wind. For whenever the wind blew from the sea, they were in less danger of being discovered by the guard of triremes, which then could not safely lie quite round the island. In executing this service they put every thing to hazard. As a prior valuation had been given in, they run their vessels on shore at all adventures; and the heavy-armed soldiers were ready to receive them at every place most convenient for landing. Those, however, who ventured out when the weather was calm, were certainly intercepted. Such, further, as were expert at diving, swam over through the harbour, dragging after them by a string bottles filled with poppies mixed up with honey and the powder of linseed. These for a time escaped discovery, but were afterwards closely watched. No artifice was left

unpractised on either side ; some being ever intent to carry provisions over, and others to intercept them.

At Athens, in the mean time, the people being informed of the hardships to which their own forces are reduced, and that those in the island receive supplies of provision, were perplexed how to act. They were full of apprehensions lest the winter should put a stop to their siege, being conscious of the impossibility of procuring them subsistence from any part of Peloponnesus ; and more so, as the soil about them was barren, and that even in summer they were not able to furnish them with necessary supplies ; that further, as no harbours were in the parts adjacent, there would be no commodious road for their shipping ; so that, in case they relaxed their guard, the besieged would go securely away ; or otherwise, they might get off, by the favour of stormy weather, in those vessels which brought over provisions. But they were most of all alarmed at the conduct of the Lacedæmonians, who, because they had now a safe resource in prospect, had discontinued all manner of negotiation.—In a word, they highly repented the refusal of their former offers.

Cleon, conscious to himself that the blame of baffling that accommodation would be thrown upon him, taxed them who brought the last advices as broachers of falsehoods. But those who had been sent to make the report, demanded, “since they could not be credited, that a deputation might be sent to know its truth.” For which office Cleon himself was nominated by the Athenians, in conjunction with Theogenes.

But now he plainly saw, that he must either be necessitated to make the same report as those had done whom he had charged with falsehood ; or, should he report differently, must soon be convicted of a lie. He perceived also, that the inclinations of the people were mostly bent on an ample reinforcement ; upon which he ventured to give them this further advice—That “sending a deputation on such

“an errand was quite superfluous, since opportunities might be lost by so dilatory a measure: if they were really convinced of the truth of the report, they should at once put to sea against their enemies.” He then proceeded to a malicious glance against Nicias, son of Niceratus, who at that time presided over the military affairs. He hated him, and sneered him thus—That “if their generals were really men, it would be any easy matter to sail thither with an additional strength, and make a seizure of those in the island; for his own part, was he in command, he would do it in a trice.” The Athenians began immediately to clamour and rail at Cleon, for not instantly setting about that enterprise himself, which to him appeared so easy. This Nicias laying hold of, chagrined at the same time by the sneer upon himself, called upon him aloud—“To take what force he pleased, and to perform the service in his stead.” Cleon, imagining this to be a mere verbal offer, declared himself ready. But when he found that Nicias was earnest in the point of resignation, he drew back, alleging, that “it could not be, since not he but Nicias was general.” He trembled now, since he never suspected that the other would venture to give up his office to him.—Nicias however called a second time upon him, and formally surrendered his office to him, so far as related to Pylus, desiring the Athenians to be his witnesses. The people now (for such is the temper of the multitude) the more pains Cleon took to decline the voyage, and disentangle himself from his own bravados, called out so much the more vehemently upon Nicias to give up the command, and roared aloud at the other to go on board. Unable now to extricate himself, he intimates his acceptance of the employ, and standing forth, averred, that “he was not under the least dread of the Lacedæmonians, would not be accompanied by so much as one Athenian, but would take only what Lemnians and Imbrians were at hand, and those targeteers who were come to their aid from Ænus, and the four hun-

"dred archers from other places. With these, *he said*, added to the military force already at Pylus, he would either in the space of twenty days bring off all the Lacedæmonians alive, or put them all to death upon the spot."

This big way of talking raised a laugh among the people; all men of sense however were not a little delighted. They concluded, they should compass by it one of these two desirable ends; either to rid themselves effectually of Cleon, which they chiefly expected; or, should they be disappointed of this, to get those Lacedæmonians into their power*.

Having thus transacted the requisite points in the public assembly, where the Athenians had awarded the expedition to him by a formal decree, and Demosthenes, at Cleon's own request, was joined in the commission of commanders at Pylus, he hastened to his post with the utmost speed. His reason for associating Demosthenes in the command, was owing

* The honour of Athens was very deeply concerned in the point, which had been the subject of this day's debate in the assembly of the people, and yet it hath turned out a mere comic scene. The dignity of the republic had never been well supported on these occasions, since the death of Pericles. Cleon had introduced all kinds of drollery and scurrility into the debates; and it was now become quite the same thing to the people, whether they laughed with or laughed at him. He hath now railed Nicias, though none but a person of so diffident and fearful a temper as Nicias could so have been railed, out of an honourable command; and then is laughed himself into it, and though an arrant poltroon is metamorphosed into a general of the first class, and soon after swells into a very hero. However, the Athenian good sense, whatever turn Thucydides gives it, can hardly be justified on this occasion, in thrusting so important a commission upon Cleon purely for a joke. Plutarch says, they always bore his impertinent and mad way of talking, because it was humorous and diverting. Once, when the assembly had been met some time, and the people had sat long expecting his coming, at length he made his appearance with a garland on his head, and begged the favour of them to adjourn till the morrow, "For at present, *said he*, I am not at leisure, since I have sacrificed to-day, and must entertain my friends." A loud laugh ensued at his impudence, and then they rose and adjourned. This affair of Pylus was, however, far from a jocular point; and the Athenians might have paid very dear for their mirth, had not Cleon been wise enough to associate Demosthenes with him in the command.

to some notice received that he was bent on landing upon the island ; as the soldiers, terribly incommoded by the straitness of their stations, and resembling besieged more than besiegers, were eager for this bold adventure. Demosthenes was animated more to the attempt because the island had lately been set on fire. Before this accident, as it had been quite covered over with wood, and was pathless, because ever uninhabited, he durst not think of such a step, and judged all these circumstances to be for the enemy's advantage. For, though a more numerous army should have landed against them, they were enabled terribly to annoy them from posts undescried. What errors might be committed, or how large their strength, might be more easily concealed on that side by the covert of the woods ; whereas all the errors of his own army would lie clear and open to observation, when the enemy might suddenly attack, and in what quarter they pleased, since battle must be entirely in their own option. On the other side, should he force them to a close engagement on rough and woody ground, the smaller number, by being skilled in the passes, he imagined, must prove too hard for a superior number without such experience ; that by this means his own force, merely on account of its numbers, might be imperceptibly destroyed, as it could not be discerned which part of it was hardest pressed, and stood most in need of support.

These inward suggestions were more prevalent in the mind of Demosthenes from the remembrance of his *Ætolian* defeat, which was partly owing to the woods amongst which he engaged. But as the narrowness of their station had necessitated his soldiers to land sometimes upon the skirts of the island, and under the cover of an advanced guard, to dress their repast, a soldier, though entirely without design, set the wood on fire, which spread but slowly, till a brisk gale happening to arise, the greatest part of it was unexpectedly destroyed by the flames. Demosthenes, having gained by this means a clearer view of the *Lacedæmonians*, found them more numerous than from the quantity of vic-

tuals sent in by stipulation he was used to compute them. He then judged it highly to concern the Athenians to exert their utmost efforts: and, as the island was now become more opportune for a descent, he got every thing in readiness for its execution, having sent for a supply of men from the adjacent confederates, and busied himself about all the dispositions needful for success. He had further received an express from Cleon notifying his approach, who now, at the head of the supply he himself had demanded, arriveth at Pylus. No sooner were they joined, than they dispatched a herald to the camp on the continent, demanding—"Whether they were willing to order their people in the island to surrender their arms and persons, without risking extremities, on condition to be kept under an easy confinement till the whole dispute could be properly accommodated?"—This being positively refused, they remained quiet one day longer; but on the succeeding day, having embarked their whole strength of heavy-armed on board a few vessels, they put out by night, and a little before the ensuing dawn landed on each side of the island, both from the main sea and the harbour, amounting in the whole to eight hundred men in heavy armour. They advanced with their utmost speed towards the first guard on the island. This was done in pursuance of a previous disposition: For this first guard consisted of about thirty heavy armed: The main body under Epitadas was posted about the centre, where the ground was most level and watery: And another party guarded the extremity of the island facing Pylus, which towards the sea was a rocky cliff, and by land altogether impregnable. On the top further of this cliff was seated a fort, built some ages before of stones picked carefully for the purpose. This they judged might be serviceable to them, should they be forced to shelter themselves from superior violence. In this manner was the enemy posted.

The Athenians immediately, in their first career, put the

whole advanced guard to the sword, having surprised them yet in their huts, and but seeking to lay hold of their arms. Their landing was yet undiscovered, since the enemy judged their vessels to be only the usual guard which was every night in motion.

No sooner also was the dawn completely broke, than the remainder of the Athenian force was landed from a number of vessels somewhat more than seventy. All the mariners came ashore, in their respective distinctions of arms, excepting the rowers of the lowest bench*. They were eight hundred archers, and a body no less numerous of targeteers. The Messenian auxiliaries attended, and all in general who had been employed at Pylus, except such as were necessarily detained for the guard of the fortress.

According to a disposition formed by Demosthenes, they advanced in separate bodies, consisting of near two hundred more or less, and took possession of all the eminences. The design was, thus to reduce the enemy to a plunge of distress by surrounding them on all sides, and puzzling them in their choice which party first to make head against, that at the sight of numbers on all sides they might be quite confounded; and, should they then attack the body in their front, they might be harassed by others in their rear; or, should they wheel towards those on either flank, they might be exposed to the bodies both in front and rear. Which way soever the enemy might turn, they were sure to have behind them the light-armed and less martial of their opponents,

* It is in the original, excepting the *Thalamii*. The rowers on the different benches were distinguished by a peculiar name. Those of the uppermost were called *Thranitæ*; those of the middle, *Zeugitæ*; and those of the lowest, *Thalamii*. The labour of the *Thalamii* was the least, though most constant, because of their nearness to the water, and the shortness of their oars. Much more strength and skill were required on the upper benches, and most of all on the uppermost, who for that reason had better pay. Those on the lowest bench seem to have been mere drudges at the oar, and qualified for nothing better; the others were more complete seamen, and ready on all occasions for the duty both of rowing and fighting.

infesting them with their bows and darts and stones. These would do execution from a distance : an enemy could not possibly engage with them ; since, even flying, they would prevail, and when the enemy retreated would return briskly to their work. With so much address had Demosthenes previously planned the order of landing, and in close adherence to it brought them now to action.

The body commanded by Epitadas, and which was the bulk of the whole force in the island, when they saw their advanced guard entirely cut off and the enemy advancing to attack them next, drew up in order and marched towards the heavy-armed of the Athenians, designing to engage them. For the latter was so placed as to oppose them in front ; the light-armed were posted on either of their flanks, and in the rear. But against those heavy-armed they could not possibly come to action, nor gain an opportunity to exert their own distinguishing skill. For the light-armed, pouring in their darts on either of their flanks, compelled them to halt ; and their opposites would not move forwards to meet them, but stood quiet in their posts. Such indeed of the light-armed, as adventured in any quarter to run up near their ranks, were instantly put to flight ; however, they soon faced about and continued their annoyance. They were not incumbered with any weight of armour ; their agility easily conveyed them beyond the reach of danger, as the ground was rough, and ever left desart had never been levelled by culture. In such spots the Lacedæmonians, under the load of their arms, could not possibly pursue. In this kind of skirmish, therefore, they were for a small space of time engaged.

When the Lacedæmonians had no longer sufficient agility to check the attacks of these skirmishing parties, the light-armed soon took notice that they slackened in their endeavours to beat them off. It was then, that their own appearance, many times more large than that of their foes, and the very sight of themselves, began to animate them

with excess of courage. Experience had now lessened that terror in which they had been used to regard *this* foe. They now had met with no rough reception from them, which fell out quite contrary to what they firmly expected at their first landing, when their spirits had sunk very low at the thought, that it was against *Lacedæmonians*. Contempt ensued; and embodying, with a loud shout they rushed upon them; pouring in stones and arrows and darts, whatever came first to hand. At such a shout, accompanied with so impetuous a charge, astonishment seized their foes, quite unpractised in such a form of engagement; at the same time, the ashes of the wood, which had been burnt, were mounting largely into the air. So that now each lost the sight of what was close before him, under the showers of darts and stones thrown by such numbers, and whirling along in a cloud of dust.

Amidst so many difficulties the *Lacedæmonians* now were solely distressed. The safe-guards on their heads and breasts were no longer proof against the arrows, and their javelins were broke to pieces when poised for throwing. They were quite at a loss for some means of defence; they were debarred the prospect of what was passing just before them; and the shouts of the enemy were so loud that they could no longer hear any orders. Danger thus surrounding them on all sides, they quite despaired of the possibility of such resistance as might earn their safety. At last, a great part of that body being wounded, because obliged to adhere firmly to the spot on which they stood, embodying close, they retreated towards the fort on the skirt of the island, which lay at no great distance, and to their guard which was posted there. But when once they began to move off, the light-armed, growing more resolute and shouting louder than ever, pressed hard upon their retreat; and whatever *Lacedæmonian* fell within their reach, in the whole course of the retreat, was instantly slaughtered. The bulk of them with difficulty recovered the fort, and in concert with the

guard posted there drew up in order to defend it in whatever quarter it might possibly be assaulted. The Athenians, speedily coming up, were hindered by the natural site of the place from forming a circle and besetting it on all sides.—Advancing therefore directly forwards, they endeavoured to beat the defendants off. Thus, for a long time, for the greatest part of the day, both sides persisted in the contest, under the painful pressures of battle and thirst and a burning sun. No efforts were spared by the assailants to drive them from the eminence ; nor by the defendants to maintain their post. But here the Lacedæmonians defended themselves with more ease than in the preceding engagement, because now they could not be encompassed on their flanks.

When the dispute could not thus be brought to a decision, the commander of the Messenians, addressing himself to Cleon and Demosthenes, assured them, “they took a deal of pains to no manner of purpose ; but would they be persuaded to put under his guidance a party of the archers and light-armed, to get a round-about way on the enemies rear by a track which he himself could find, he was confident he could force an entrance.” Having received the party he demanded, marching off from a spot undescried by the Lacedæmonians in order to conceal the motion, and continuing to mount higher and higher along the ridge of rock that lay upon the verge of the island, in the quarter where the Lacedæmonians depending upon its natural strength had placed no guard, with great difficulty and fatigue he got behind them undiscovered. Now shewing himself on a sudden upon the summit and in their rear, he astonished the enemy with this unexpected appearance ; and his friends, who now beheld what they so earnestly looked for, he very much emboldened. The Lacedæmonians were now exposed to the missive weapons on both sides ; and (if a point of less consequence may be compared to one of greater) were in a state parallel

to that of their countrymen at Thermopylæ*. For *those* being hemmed in by the Persians in a narrow pass, were utterly destroyed: *These*, now in like manner beset on both sides, were no longer able to contend. Being but a handful of men opposed to superior numbers, and much weakened in their bodies for want of food, they quitted their post. And thus the Athenians became masters of all the approaches.

But Cleon and Demosthenes, assuredly convinced that should the foe give way too fast, it would only conduce to their expeditious slaughter under the fury of the victorious troops, began to stop their fury and to draw off their men. They were desirous to carry them alive to Athens, in case they would so far hearken to the voice of a herald as to throw down their arms, dejected as they must be in spirit and overpowered with the instant danger. It was accordingly proclaimed, that "such as were willing should deliver up their arms and their persons to the Athenians, to be disposed of at discretion."

When this was heard, the greater number threw down their bucklers and waved their hands in token of accepting the proposal. A suspension of arms immediately took place, and a conference was held between Cleon and Demosthenes on one side, and Styphon, the son of Pharax, on the other. Of those who had preceded in the command, Epitadas, who was the first had been slain, and Hippagretes who was his successor, lying as dead among the slain, though he had yet life in him, Styphon was now the third appointed to take the command upon him, according to the provision

* The famous three hundred Spartans with king Leonidas at their head, who stopped the vast army of Xerxes at the pass of Thermopylæ, and at length perished all to a man. They were all afterwards intombed on the spot where they fell with this short epitaph;

Tell, traveller, at Sparta what you saw,

That here we lie obedient to her law.

The same spirit and resolution was at this time generally expected from the Spartans, now encompassed round about by their enemies, in the isle of Sphacteria.

made by their law, in case their generals drop. Styphon intimated his desire of leave to send over to the Lacedæmonians on the continent for advice. This the Athenians refused, but however called over some heralds to him from the continent. Messages passed backwards and forwards twice or thrice ; but the last who crossed over to them from the Lacedæmonians on the continent brought this determination —“ The Lacedæmonians permit you to take care of your own concerns, provided you submit to nothing base.” In consequence of this, after a short consultation with one another apart, they delivered up their arms and their persons. The remainder of the day and the succeeding night the Athenians confined them under a strong guard. But the day following, having erected a trophy upon the island, they got themselves in readiness to sail away, and distributed the prisoners to the custody of the captains of the triremes. The Lacedæmonians, having obtained permission by a herald, fetched off their dead.

The number of those who were slain, and those who were taken alive, stood thus: They who had thrown themselves into the island amounted in the whole to four hundred and twenty heavy-armed. Of these three hundred wanting eight were carried off alive, the rest had been destroyed. Among the prisoners were about one hundred and twenty *Spartans*. The number of Athenians slain was inconsiderable: for it was not a standing fight. The whole space that these men were besieged in the island, from the engagement at sea till the battle in the island, was seventy-two days. Twenty of these, during the absence of the ambassadors to negotiate an accommodation, they were supplied with food: The remainder of the time, they were fed by such as got over by stealth. Nay, meal and other eatables were found in the island, even when all was over. Their commander, Epitadas, had made a more sparing distribution than his stores required.

Now the Athenians and Peloponnesians respectively drew off their forces from Pylus to return home: And the promise

of Cleon, mad as it had been, was fully executed. For within the twenty days, he brought them prisoners to Athens, and made his words good*.

The expectation of Greece was more disappointed by this event, than by any other occurrence whatever in the series of the war. It was generally presumed that neither famine nor any extremity could have reduced these Lacedæmonians to deliver up their arms, but that, sword in hand, and fighting to the last gasp, they would have bravely perished. They could not afterwards believe that those who surrendered were like to those who were slain. Some time after, a soldier in one of the confederate bands of the Athenians, demanding with a sneer of one of them who were taken prisoners in the island, "if the slain were not men of true gallantry and courage?" the other replied, that "a spindle, (by which he meant an arrow) would be valuable indeed, if it knew how to distinguish the brave;" intimating by this answer, that the slain were such as stones and darts dispatched in the medley of battle.

When the prisoners were brought to Athens, it was the public resolution there "to keep them in bonds, till some definitive treaty could be agreed on. And if, previously to this, the Peloponnesians should repeat their inroad into the Attic territory, they should all undergo a public execution." They established also a garrison for Pylus. And the Messenians of Naupactus sending thither the most proper of their own people, as into their own native country

* It should be added here, that he also robbed for the present a very able and gallant officer of the praise he merited on this occasion. The whole affair of Pylus was planned, carried into execution, and brought to a successful and glorious issue by the conduct and bravery of Demosthenes. Aristophanes (in the *Knights*) hath made a low comic character of the latter, and introduced him venting sad complaints against Cleon for pilfering the honour from him. "This *Paphlagonian* (says he) hath snatched from every one of us whatever nice thing we had got to suit the palate of our lord and master (the *people*). 'Tis but the other day, I myself had cooked up a noble pasty of Lacedæmonians at Pylus, when this vilest of scoundrels came running thither, pilfered it away from me, and hath served it up to table, as if it was of his own dressing."

(for Pylus is a part of the ancient Messenia), infested Laconia with depredations and did them vast damage, the more because they spoke the same dialect*.

As for the Lacedæmonians, who never knew before what it was to be thus plundered, war in such a shape being new to them, and their Helots deserting continually to the foe; apprehensive farther, lest such unusual proceedings within their own district might draw worse consequences after them—they had a painful sense of their present situation. This compelled them to send their embassies to Athens, desirous however at the same time to conceal what they really thought of their own state, and spare no artifice for the recovery of Pylus and their people. But the Athenians grew more unreasonable in their demands, and after many journeys to and fro sent them finally away with an absolute denial. Such was the course of proceedings in relation to Pylus.

The same summer, and immediately on the close of the former event, the Athenians set out to invade Corinth with a fleet of eighty ships which carried two thousand heavy-armed of their own people, and with some horse-transports on board of which were two hundred horsemen. They were also attended by some of their confederates, by the Milesians and Andrians and Carysthians. Nicias the son of Niceratus with two colleagues commanded this armament. At the early dawn of morning they came to anchor between Cherro-nesus and Reitus, on the shore of that place which the Soly-gian hill overhangs, of which formerly the Dorians possessing themselves made war upon the Corinthians then in Corinth who were of Æolian descent. Upon that eminence there is now a village called Solygia. From the shore where the armament came now to anchor, this village was distant about twelve†, the city of Corinth sixty‡, and the Isthmus twenty stadia§.

* The *Doric*. † Near 1½ mile. ‡ 6 miles. § 2 miles.

The Corinthians, who had already been advised from Argos of the approach of the Athenian armament, had long since by way of prevention drawn their whole force together at the Isthmus, excepting what was in employ without the Isthmus and the five hundred absent in the guard of Ambracia and Leucadia. With all the rest of their people able to bear arms they were posted on the Isthmus to watch the approach of the Athenians. But when the Athenian fleet had passed by undiscovered by favour of the night, and signals notified their approach elsewhere, leaving half their force at Cenchrea to obstruct any attempt of the Athenians upon Crommyon, they marched with all speed against the enemy. Battus one of their commanders (for there were two such in the field) at the head of a separate body marched up to the open village of Solygia in order to defend it, whilst Lycophron with the remainder advanced to the charge. The Corinthians fell first upon the right wing of the Athenians who were but just landed before Cherronesus, and then proceeded to engage the whole of that army. The action was warm, and fought hand to hand. The right wing, consisting of the Athenians and also the Carysthians who were drawn up in the rear, gave the Corinthians a warm reception, and with much difficulty repulsed them. Retreating therefore upwards to a wall built of stone (for the ground was a continued ascent), and being there above the enemy, they annoyed them with stones; and having sung their pæan, rushed down upon them again. The Athenians having stood the shock, they engaged a second time hand to hand. But a band of Corinthians being come up to the support of their own left wing, occasioned the rout of the right wing of the Athenians, and pursued them to the sea-side. But the Athenians and Carysthians now turned again, and beat them off from the ships.

In other parts of the action the dispute was resolute on both sides, especially where the right wing of the Corinthians, with Lycophron at its head, was engaging the left wing

of the Athenians. They were apprehensive the enemy would endeavour to force their way to the village of Solygia. For a considerable space the battle was obstinate, neither side giving way ; but at length, through the advantage on the Athenian side of being assisted by a party of horse, whereas their opposites had none, the Corinthians were broke and driven up the ascent, where grounding their arms, they came down no more to the charge, but remained in a quiet posture. In this route of the right wing, numbers of the Corinthians perished, and Lycophron their general. But the rest of the body had the good fortune to make a safe retreat, and so to secure themselves upon the eminence, as they could not be briskly pursued, and were not compelled to move off with precipitation. When the Athenians perceived that the enemy would no more return to the charge, they rifled the bodies of the foes whom they had slain, and carried off their own dead, and then without loss of time erected their trophy.

That division of the Corinthians which had been posted at Cenchrea to prevent any attempt upon Crommyon, had the view of the battle intercepted from them by the mountain Oneius. But when they saw the cloud of dust, and thence knew what was doing, they marched full speed towards the spot. The aged inhabitants also, when they are informed of the battle, rushed out of Corinth to succour their own people. The Athenians perceiving the approach of such numerous bodies, and judging them to be succours sent up by the neighbouring Peloponnesians, threw themselves immediately on board their ships, with what spoil they had taken, and the bodies of their own dead excepting two, which not finding in this hurry they left behind. They were no sooner re-embarked than they crossed over to the adjacent islands, from whence they dispatched a herald to demand leave, which was granted, to fetch off the dead bodies they had left behind*.

* This incident is related by Plutarch (in *the Life of Nicias*) as a proof of the great piety and humanity of Nicias. His asking leave to fetch off these

The number of Corinthians slain in the battle was two hundred and twelve ; that of Athenians somewhat less than fifty.

The Athenians, leaving the islands, appeared the same day before Crommyon, situated in its territory, and distant from the city of Corinth one hundred and twenty stadia*. They landed and ravaged the country, and that night reposed themselves there. The day following they sailed along the coast, first to Epidaurus ; and, after a kind of descent there, arrived at Methone, which lies between Epidaurus and Træzen. Possessing themselves there of the isthmus of Cherronesus on which Methone is situated, they run up a wall across it, and fixed a garrison of continuance in that post, which for the future extended their depredations over all the districts of Træzen, Halias, and Epidaurus. But the fleet, when once this post was sufficiently secured, sailed away for Athens.

During the space of time which co-incided with these transactions, Eurymedon and Sophocles, who with the ships of the Athenians had quitted Pylus to proceed in the voyage to Sicily, arrived at Corcyra. They joined the Corcyreans of the city, marching out against those who were posted on the mount of Istone, *that* party who repassing soon after the sedition were at this time masters of the country, and com-

two bodies was, according to that writer, an actual renunciation of the victory ; since it was against all rules for persons who had condescended to such a submission, to erect a trophy. But, without disparaging the good qualities of Nicias, or his obedience to the institutions of his country in regard to the dead, which were ever most sacredly observed, it may be questioned, whether he renounced the victory on this occasion. Thucydides says the trophy was already erected, which ascertained, without doubt, the honour of the victory, and nothing is said of its demolition by the Corinthians, when they received this request of truce from Nicias. His re-embarking in a hurry seems a distinct affair. It had no connexion with the late battle, which had been clearly and fairly won ; but was owing to a fresh army coming into the field on the side of the enemy. This stopped him indeed from gaining any fresh honour, but surely did not deprive him of what he was already possessed of.

* About 12 English miles.

mitted sad ravage. Accordingly they assaulted that post, and carried it by storm. The defendants, who had fled away in a body towards another eminence, were soon forced to capitulate, “giving up their auxiliaries, and then giving up “their own arms, to be proceeded with afterward at the “pleasure of the *people* of Athens.” The commanders removed them all for safe custody into the isle of Ptychia, till they could conveniently be conveyed to Athens, with this proviso, that “if any one person should be caught in an attempt “to get off, the whole number should forfeit the benefit of “the capitulation.”

But the leaders of the *populace* at Corcyra, apprehending that the Athenians, should they be sent to Athens, might possibly save their lives, contrive the following machination. —They tamper successfully with some of those who were confined in the isle, by the means of some trusty agents whom they sent privately amongst them, and instructed that “with “great professions of regard for them, they should insinuate “no other resource was left for them but to make their escape “with all possible expedition, and that themselves would undertake to provide them with a bark, for it was the certain “resolution of the Athenian commanders to give them up to “the fury of the Corcyréan populace.”—When they had given ear to these suggestions, and were on board the bark thus treacherously provided for them, and so were apprehended in the very act of departure, the articles of capitulation came at once to an end, and they were all given up to the Corcyréans. Not that the Athenian commanders did not highly contribute to the success of this treachery; since, in order to make it go down more easily, and to lessen the fears of the agents in the plot, they had publicly declared that “the “conveyance of those persons to Athens by any other hands “would highly chagrin them, because then, whilst they were “attending their duty in Sicily, others would run away with “all the honour.” The Corcyreans had them no sooner in their power, than they shut them up in a spacious edifice.—

Hence afterwards they brought them out by twenties, and having formed two lines of soldiers, in all military habiliments, facing one another, they compelled them to walk between the lines, chained one to another, and receiving blows and wounds as they passed along from those who formed the lines, and struck at pleasure so soon as they perceived the objects of their hatred. They were followed by others who carried scourges, and lashed those forwards who moved not readily along. Threescore persons had been brought forth and destroyed in this manner, before those who remained in the edifice became sensible of their fate. For they had hitherto imagined, that those who fetched them out did it merely to shift their confinement. But when they learned the truth from some person or other whom they could not disbelieve, they called out aloud on the Athenians, and implored as a favour to be put to death by them. To stir from the place of their confinement they now absolutely refused, and averred, that to the utmost of their power they would hinder every body from coming into them. But the Corcyréans had not the least inclination to force an entrance by the doors. They mounted up on the top of the edifice, and tearing off the roof, flung the tiles and shot arrows down upon them. The others protected themselves to the best of their power; and many of them were employed in making away with themselves by cramming the arrows shot from above down their own throats. Others, tearing away the cordage from the beds which happened to be within, or twisting such ropes as they could from shreds of their own garments, so strangled themselves to death. No method was omitted during the greatest part of the night (for night dropt down upon this scene of horror) till, either dispatched by their own contrivance, or shot to death by those above, their destruction was completely finished. So soon as it was day, the Corcyréans, having thrown their bodies on heaps into carriages, removed them out of the city. But their wives, so many as had been taken prisoners in company with their husbands, they adjudged to slavery for life.

In this manner the Corcyréans from the mountains were destroyed by the *people*. And a sedition so extensive was brought to this tragical period, so far at least as relates to the present war. For nothing of the same nature broke out afterwards so remarkable as to need a particular relation.

The Athenians departed from Corcyra, made the best of their way for Sicily, whither they were bound at first setting out, and prosecuted the war there in concert with their allies.

In the close of this summer, the Athenians on the station of Naupactus, marching in junction with the Acarnanians, possessed themselves of Anactorium, a city of the Corinthians, situated on the mouth of the gulf of Ambracia. It was put into their hands by treachery. In consequence of this, the Corinthian inhabitants were ejected, and the place repopled by new inhabitants invited thither from all parts of Acarnania. And the summer ended.

The ensuing winter, Aristides the son of Archippus, one of those who commanded the squadrons which the Athenians had put out to raise contributions among their dependents, apprehended Artaphernes, a noble Persian, at Eïon on the river Strymon. He was going to Lacedæmon on a commission from *the King*. Being conveyed to Athens, the Athenians had his letters, which were wrote in Assyrian, translated and read in public. Their contents were large, but the principal was *this* passage, addressed to the Lacedæmonians—that “he was not yet properly informed what it “was they requested of him. For though he had been attended by frequent embassies, yet they did not all agree in “their demands. If therefore they were desirous to make “an explicit declaration, they should send some of their body “to him in company with this Persian.” But the Athenians afterwards sent Artaphernes back to Ephesus in a trireme, and with an embassy of their own, who meeting at that place with the news that Artaxerxes the son of Xerxes was lately

dead (for about this time that monarch died), the ambassadors returned back to Athens.

The same winter also the Chians demolished their new fortifications. The Athenians had expressly ordered it, suspecting that they were intent on some innovating schemes. It availed nothing, that they had lately given the Athenians all possible securities, and the strongest assurances that they would in no shape attempt or think of innovations. And thus the winter ended; and with it the seventh year of this war, of which Thucydides hath compiled the history, was brought to a conclusion.

YEAR VIII.

EARLY in the following summer, at the time of the new moon, the sun was partially eclipsed; and in the beginning of the same month the shock of an earthquake was felt.

The fugitives from Mitylene and Lesbos in general, who to a great number had sheltered themselves on the continent, assemble in a body, and, having hired some additional succours in Peloponnesus, and drawn them over safely from thence, surprise Rhætium: but, in consideration of two thousand Phocéan staters* paid immediately down, they restored it again undamaged. This being done, they marched next against Antandrus, and got possession of it by the treachery of a party within the city, who betrayed it to them. It was farther their intention to set at liberty those cities styled the Actéan, which had formerly been possessed by the Mitylenéans, but were now in the hands of the Athenians. But their principal view was the possession of Antandrus, which once effectually secured (for it lay convenient for the building of ships, as it had plenty of timber, and mount Ida stood just above it) they would then be amply

* Above 1,800*l.* sterling.

furnished with all the expedients of war, nay, might act offensively from thence, might terribly annoy Lesbos which lies near it, and reduce the Æolian fortresses along the coast. This was the plan which now they were intent to put in execution.

The same summer the Athenians, with a fleet of sixty ships, and taking with them two thousand heavy-armed, a few horsemen, the Milesians, and others of their confederates, made an expedition against Cythera. The command was lodged with Nicias son of Niceratus, Nicostratus son of Diotrophes, and Autocles son of Tolmæus. Cythera is an island: it lies upon the coast of Laconia over-against Malea. The inhabitants are Lacedæmonians, resorting thither from the neighbouring coast. A magistrate was sent over yearly from Sparta by the stile of *Judge of Cythera*; the garrison of heavy-armed established there was regularly relieved; and no care omitted in the good government and management of the place. It was the port which their trading ships first entered, in their return from Egypt and Libya. It was the chief security of Laconia against those piratical parties which might infest it from the sea, from whence alone they are capable of doing them any mischief: for by its situation it hath intirely the command of the seas of Sicily and Crete. The Athenian armament therefore arriving here, with a detachment of ten ships and two thousand heavy-armed, surprise a maritime town which is called Scandæa. With the rest of their force they made a descent on that part of the island which is opposite to Malea, and advanced toward the city of Cythera situated also on the sea, and they found immediately that all the inhabitants were drawn out into the field in readiness to receive them. An engagement ensued, wherein the Cytheréans maintained their ground for a small space of time, but then turning about, fled amain into their citadel. They soon afterwards capitulated with Nicias and his colleagues, submitting to the Athenians at discretion, barring only the penalty of death.

Some of the Cytheréans had before-hand obtained a conference with Nicias. This rendered the capitulation more easy and expeditious, and not only the present, but all future points were by this means speedily and satisfactorily adjusted. For the Athenians insisted that they should evacuate Cythera, because they were Lacedæmonians, and because the island lay so conveniently on the Laconic coast. The accommodation being once perfected, the Athenians, having secured Scandéa, the fortress situated upon the harbour, and fixed a garrison in Cythera, stood away for Asine and Helas, and most of the adjacent places on the coast. There they made descents, and reposing themselves in the nights at the most convenient of those places, they spent about seven days in ravaging the country.

The Lacedæmonians, though they saw the Athenians had possessed themselves of Cythera, and expected further that they would proceed to make more such descents upon their territories, yet no where drew together in a body to repulse them. They only stationed their parties of guard in such posts as were of greatest importance. In other respects they exerted their utmost vigilance, being under apprehensions that the very form of their government was in danger of subversion. Their loss in Sphacteria was unexpected and great indeed. Pylus was now in the hands of the enemy, as was also Cythera. War was bursting in upon them on all sides with irresistible impetuosity. This compelled them, contrary to their usual maxims, to form a body of four hundred horse and archers. If they were ever dejected by the prevalence of fear, at this juncture they were more feelingly so, when they saw the necessity of entering the lists contrary to all that practice of war to which they had been inured, in a naval contest, and in this against the Athenians, whose passion it was to compute as so much loss whatever they left unattempted. Their general misfortune besides, which so suddenly and so fast had poured in upon them, had thrown them into the utmost consternation:

They excessively dreaded the weight of such another calamity, as they had been sensible of in the blow at Sphacteria. Intimidated thus, they durst no longer think of fighting; nay, whatever measures they concerted, they at once desponded of success, as their minds, accustomed till of late to an uninterrupted career of good fortune, were now foreboding nothing but disappointments. Thus, for the most part, whilst the Athenians were extending their devastations all along their coasts, they remained inactive. Each party on guard, though the enemy made a descent in the face of their post, knowing themselves inferior in number and sadly dispirited, made no offer to check them. One party indeed, which was posted near Cortyta and Aphrodisia, perceiving the light-armed of the enemy to be straggling, ran speedily to charge them; but when the heavy-armed advanced to their support, they retreated with so much precipitation, that some (though few) of them were killed, and their arms rifled. The Athenians, after erecting a trophy, re-embarked and re-passed to Cythera.

From thence they sailed again along the coast to the Limerian Epidaurus; and, after ravaging part of that district, they arrived at Thyrea, which, though it lies in the district called Cynuria, is the frontier-town which parts Argia and Laconia. This place belonged to the Lacedæmonians, who had assigned it for the residence of the exiled Æginetæ, in requital of the services they had done them at the time of the earthquake and the insurrection of the Helots, and further because, though subject to the Athenians, they had ever firmly abided in the Lacedæmonian interest. The Æginetæ, thus again invaded by the Athenians, abandoned the fortification upon the sea-side, which they were busy in throwing up, and retreated into the city, which was the place of their residence, seated higher up at the distance of about ten stadia* from the shore. A party of Lacedæmonians had been posted

* About a mile.

there, to assist those who were employed in the new fortification; and yet, though earnestly pressed by the Æginetæ, they refused to accompany them within their walls, being averse to run the risk of a new blockade. They chose rather to retreat towards the eminences, as they judged themselves disabled by the inferiority of their number from facing the enemy, and remained there in a state of inaction.

By this time the Athenians, having compleated their landing and advanced with their whole force, take Thyrea by storm. They set the city in flames and destroyed whatever was within it. Such of the Æginetæ as survived the instant carnage, they carried prisoners to Athens; and with them Tantalus son of Patrocles, who commanded there as general for the Lacedæmonians. He had been wounded, and so taken prisoner. They also carried thither some few persons whom they had taken in Cythera, such as for its security it was expedient to remove. These the Athenians after a consultation decreed "to be disposed of in the islands, but "the rest of the Cytheréans still to occupy their own lands "subjected to the yearly tribute of four talents*; but the "Æginetæ, as many as had been taken prisoners, to be all instantly put to death," (to gratify that eternal rancour they bore them) "and Tantalus to be kept in prison along with his "countrymen taken in Sphacteria."

The same summer, a suspension of arms was agreed on in Sicily; first, between the Camarinéans and Geloans: and then, the other Sicilians, holding a general congress at Gela, whither the ambassadors from the several *States* resorted, entered into conferences about the terms of a general reconciliation. Many different expedients were proposed on all sides and many disputes arose, each insisting on a reparation suitable to their own private sense of grievance. But Hermocrates† the son of Hermon a Syracusan, who

* Seven hundred and seventy-five pounds sterling.

† This great and accomplished Syracusan seems to be ushered into this history with peculiar dignity, as the very mouth of Sicily, exhorting

laboured most of any at a firm re-union, delivered his sentiments thus :

“ I am here the representative, ye men of Sicily, of one
“ and not the meanest of the Sicilian states, nor yet the most
“ exhausted by war ; and what I am going to propose is calculated for, and will, I am convinced, most effectually secure the welfare of our common country. And what need
“ is there now to run over in minute detail the calamities inseparable from war, in the hearing of men who have experienced them all ? None ever plunge headlong into these, through an utter ignorance of them ; nor, when the views are fixed on gratifying ambition, are men used to be deterred by fear. The acquisitions proposed, in the latter case, are generally imagined to overbalance dangers : and the former choose rather to submit to hazards, than suffer diminution of their present enjoyments. Yet, where the parties, actuated by these different views, embroil themselves at a juncture when it is impossible to succeed, exhortations to a mutual agreement are then most highly expedient.

“ To be influenced by such exhortations must at present be highly for the advantage of us all. For it was the strong desire of fixing our own separate views on a firm establishment, which at first embroiled us in this war, and which at present raiseth such mutual altercations even during our endeavours to effect an accommodation : and in fine, unless matters can be so equally adjusted as to satisfy all parties, we shall again have recourse to arms. But then, we ought to recollect, that not merely for securing our separate in-

them all to concord and unanimity, and teaching them the method of securing the welfare and glory of their common country, upon the noblest plan. This is noted merely to draw upon him the attention of the reader. He will act afterwards in the most illustrious scenes, and shew himself on all occasions a man of true honour and probity, a firm and disinterested patriot, an excellent statesman, and a most able commander. The Athenians never had a more determined or a more generous enemy. But that will not hinder our historian from representing him in all his merit

“terests, if we would act like men of sense, is this present
“congress opened ; but, to concert the best measures within
“our reach to preserve (if possible) our country from falling,
“and as I judge, in great danger of falling, a sacrifice to
“Athenian ambition. It is to convince you how unneces-
“sary a reunion is, not so much from what I can urge, as
“from the light these very Athenians themselves hold out
“before you. Possessed of a power far superior to any other
“Grecians, here they lie amongst us with a few ships, to note
“down our indiscretions ; and, under the plausible pretext of
“alliance, though with malice lurking in their hearts, they are
“studying to improve them in a specious manner to their own
“advantage. For should war be again our option ; and in it,
“should the assistance of men be accepted, who though un-
“invited would be glad to invade us ; whilst we are harass-
“ing and exhausting one another, and cutting open for these
“Athenians a road to our subjection, it is much to be appre-
“hended that, when once they behold our strength at the
“lowest ebb, they will pay us a visit with more formidable
“armaments, and exert their utmost endeavours to compleat
“our destruction.

“It becomes each party amongst us, provided we know
“what is really our interest, to form alliances and to launch
“into hazardous attempts, rather to acquire what belongs
“to others than to prejudice what themselves at present pos-
“sess ; and to rest assured that sedition must ruin our sever-
“al *States*, nay Sicily itself, of which we the joint possessors
“are ready, are all of us ready to be supplanted by hostile
“treachery, whilst mutually embroiled in our domestic
“quarrels. It is high time we were convinced of this, that
“every individual might be reconciled with his neighbour,
“and community with community, and all in general com-
“bine together to preserve the whole of Sicily ; that our
“ears be deaf to the mischievous suggestions, that those
“amongst us of Doric descent are enemies to every thing

“ that is Attic, whilst those of Chalcidic, because of that
“ Ionian affinity, are sure of their protection. The Athenians
“ invade us not from private enmity, because we are peopled
“ here from these divided races, but to gratify their lust after
“ those blessings in which Sicily abounds, and which at pre-
“ sent we jointly possess. Nay, this they have already
“ clearly declared, by their ready compliance with the invi-
“ tation of those of the Chalcidic race. For though they
“ have never claimed assistance from hence by virtue of
“ their natural attachments here, yet they have shewn a
“ greater readiness in support of those than any compact be-
“ tween them required. Yet though the Athenians be in
“ this manner rapacious, in this manner politic, by me at
“ least they ought to be forgiven; since I blame not men
“ who are greedy of empire, but such as are too eager to
“ bend their necks to their yoke: Because it is the constant
“ never-failing turn of the human temper, to control who
“ will submit, but to make head against more powerful in-
“ croachments. As for us, who know these things, and yet
“ will not timely provide against them, though each in this
“ assembly be separately convinced, that it demands our
“ greatest attention to unite in dissipating a storm which
“ threatens us all, we err strangely in our conduct; especially,
“ when its diversion might be so readily effected, would we
“ only bring our private quarrels to an amicable determina-
“ tion: For it is not from quarters of their own, that the
“ Athenians rush thus to annoy us; but from ground which
“ belongs to those who invited them. Thus of course, with-
“ out any intervening trouble, one war will not be terminated
“ by another, but dissension will at once subside in peace.
“ And these new-comers, who, under specious colours, are
“ here for our ruin, must return again with a disappointment,
“ which they may as speciously palliate. So desirable a bene-
“ fit will at once infallibly accrue from proper determinations
“ in regard to the Athenians.

“ That peace is the greatest of human blessings, is a truth

“ which all the world alloweth ;—what hindereth us then, why
“ we should not firmly establish it with one another? or, do
“ you rather imagine, that if the condition of one man be
“ happy and that of another be wretched, tranquillity will not
“ contribute sooner than warfare to amend the state of the
“ latter, and to preserve the state of the former from a sad
“ reverse! or, that peace is not better calculated to preserve
“ unimpaired the honours and splendors of the happy, and all
“ other blessings, which, should we descend to a minute de-
“ tail, might largely be recounted, or might be set in the
“ strongest light by opposing to them the calamities which
“ ensue from war? Fix your minds therefore on these con-
“ siderations, that you may not overlook my admonitions, but
“ in compliance with them look out respectively in time for
“ expedients of prevention.

“ In case it be presumed, that success must result from
“ power, without taking into debate the justice or violence
“ of the cause, let me detect the dangerous fallacy of such a
“ sanguine hope, which must be blasted in the end. Many
“ are they, it is well known, who would have gratified their
“ revenge on violent oppressors, and many who have exerted
“ their utmost force for their own aggrandisement; yet the
“ first, so far from accomplishing their revenge, have met
“ destruction in its pursuit; and it hath been the fate of the
“ latter, instead of enlarging, to suffer the loss of what they
“ already possessed. For revenge is not certain, because
“ justly sought after to retaliate violence; nor is power as-
“ sured of its end, because invigorated with sanguine expec-
“ tation. Events are for the most part determined by the
“ fallible unsteady balance of futurity; which, though de-
“ ceivable as deceit can be, yet holds out before us the most
“ instructive hints. For thus, armed equally beforehand
“ with needful apprehension, we embark into mutual contests
“ with wise premeditation. Now therefore, checked by the
“ gloomy dread of the yet invisible event, and awed on all
“ sides by the terrors which the presence of these Athenians

“ spreads amongst us ; deterred further by these hopes already
“ blasted, which assured us alternately of success against one
“ another, had not they interfered to obstruct and controul
“ us ; let us send far away from Sicily these enemies that are
“ hovering about us ; let us enter into firm and lasting uni-
“ on with one another ; at least, let us conclude a truce for
“ so long a time as can possibly be agreed, and defer our
“ own private disputes to a remote decision. In a word, let
“ us acknowledge, that, if my advice takes place, we shall
“ continue free in our respective communities, where, mas-
“ ters of ourselves and accountable to none besides, we shall
“ be enabled to recompence both our friends and our foes ac-
“ cording to their deserts. But, in case it be obstinately re-
“ jected, and the mischievous insinuations of others prevail,
“ why then adieu henceforth to the just vindication of our
“ own wrongs ; or, if we are violently bent upon effecting it,
“ we must strike up a friendship with unrelenting foes, and
“ must range ourselves in opposition there, where nature hath
“ most closely attached us.

“ For my own part, who now (as I observed at setting
“ out) represent the greatest of the Sicilian states, and in
“ this character am more accustomed to attack another than
“ to defend myself, I here, in her name, conjure you to make
“ use of conviction and unite together in a speedy accom-
“ modation, nor so eagerly to thirst after the damage of our
“ foes as to plunge ourselves into irreparable mischiefs. I
“ am not conscious to myself of that foolish haughtiness of
“ heart, which expects to be absolute in its own private will ;
“ or that fortune, whose master I am not, should attend my
“ orders ; but I am ready to give way to good sense and rea-
“ son. And I require you all respectively thus to give way
“ to one another, and not to wait till you are compelled to
“ do so by your enemies. It can argue no baseness, for
“ kinsmen to give way to kinsmen, a Dorian to a Dorian, or
“ a Chalcidean to others of his own race. Nay, what is
“ most comprehensive, we are all neighbours, all joint-in-

“habitants of the same land, a land washed round by the
“sea, and all stiled by the same common name of Sicilians.
“Wars indeed in the course of time I foresee we shall wage
“upon one another, and future conferences will again be held,
“and mutual friendship shall thus revive. But when foreign-
“ers invade us, let us be wise enough to unite our strength,
“and drive them from our shores: For to be weakened in
“any of our members, must endanger the destruction of the
“whole; and to such confederates and such mediators we
“will never for the future have recourse.

“If to such conduct we adhere, we shall immediately
“procure a double blessing for Sicily. We shall deliver her
“from the Athenians, and a domestic war. For the future
“we shall retain the free possession of her in our own hands,
“and more easily disconcert any projects that hereafter may
“be formed against her.”

THE Sicilians acknowledged the weight of these arguments thus urged by Hermocrates, and all the several parties joined in one common resolution “to put an end to the war, “each retaining what they were at present possessed of; but “that Morgantina should be restored to the Camarinéans, “upon the payment of a certain sum of money to the Syracusans.” Such also as were confederated with the Athenians, addressing themselves to the Athenian commanders, notified their own readiness to acquiesce in these terms, and their resolution to be comprehended in the same peace. These approving the measure, the last hand was put to the accommodation.

The Athenian fleet, which had no longer any business there, sailed away from Sicily. But the *people* at Athens manifested their displeasure against the commanders at their return home, by passing a sentence of banishment against Pythodorus and Sophocles, and subjecting Eurymedon, who was the third, to a pecuniary mulct; as if, when able to have perfected the reduction of Sicily, they had been bribed to desist. They had enjoyed so long a career of good for-

tune, that they imagined nothing could disconcert their schemes ; that enterprizes of the greatest as well as of small importance, no matter whether adequately or insufficiently supported, must be ended to their wish. This was owing to the unexpected good luck with which most of their projects had of late succeeded, and now invigorated all their expectations.

The same summer, the Megaréans of the city of Megara, pressed hard by the Athenians, who constantly twice a year made an inroad into their territory with their whole united force ; harassed at the same time by their own outlaws, who having been ejected by the *popular* party in the train of a sedition had settled at Pegæ, and from thence were continually plundering them, began to have some conference about the expediency of recalling their outlaws, that the city might not doubly be exposed to ruin. The friends of these exiles, perceiving such a design to be in agitation, insisted more openly than ever that the affair should be regularly considered. The leaders of the *people* being convinced that their own and the strength of the *people* united in their present low condition could not possibly over-rule it, were so far influenced by their fears as to make a secret offer to the Athenian generals, Hippocrates the son of Aripbron, and Demosthenes the son of Alcisthenes, “to put “the city into their hands ;” concluding, they should be less endangered by such a step than by the restoration of the exiles whom they themselves had ejected. It was agreed, that in the first place the Athenians should take possession of the *long-walls* (these were eight stadia* in length, reaching down from the city to Nisæa their port) to prevent any succour which might be sent from Nisæa by the Peloponnesians, since there alone they kept their garrison for the security of Megara. After this, they promised their endeavours to put them in possession of the upper city. And this they would be able to effect more easily, when the former point was once secured.

* bout three quarters of a mile

The Athenians therefore, when all was fixed and determined on both sides, crossed over by night to Minoa the island of the Megaréans with six hundred heavy-armed, commanded by Hippocrates, and sat themselves down in a hollow whence the bricks for the walls had been taken, and which lay near enough for their purpose: whilst another body, under Demosthenes the other commander, consisting of light-armed Platæans, and the Athenian patrols, concealed themselves near the temple of Mars, which lies still nearer. Not a soul within the city knew any thing of these motions, excepting those whose vigilance it concerned this night to observe them. When the morning was ready to break, the plotters of Megara proceeded thus—

Through a series of time they had established a custom to have the gates of *the long walls* opened to them in the night, by carrying out a wherry upon a carriage, which they persuaded the officers posted there, they conveyed nightly down the ditch into the sea, and so went upon a cruize. And before it was light, bringing it back again to the walls upon the carriage, they conveyed it through the gates, that it might escape the notice of the Athenian watch on Minoa, who by this means might be eluded, as they never would descry any boat in the harbour. The carriage was now at the gates, which were opened as usual for the reception of the wherry. This the Athenians observing (for this was the signal agreed on), came running from their place of ambush to take possession of the gates before they could be shut again. The very moment the carriage was between, and obstructed the closing them together, both they and the Megaréan coadjutors, put the watch which was posted at the gates to the sword. The Platæans and patrolling parties under Demosthenes rushed in first to that spot where the trophy now stands, and having thus gained an entrance (for the Peloponnesians who were nearest had taken the alarm) the Platæans made good their ground against those who attacked them, and secured the gates till the heavy-armed Athenians, who were coming up with all speed, had entered.

Each of these Athenians afterwards, so fast as he got in, advanced along the wall. The Peloponnesian guards, though few in number, made head against them for a time ; some of them soon dropped, and then the rest ran speedily off. They were dismayed at such an attack from their enemies in the night ; and, as the treacherous Megaréans fought against them, they concluded that all the Megaréans were combined together in betraying them. It happened farther, that an Athenian herald had proclaimed of his own accord that “ such Megaréans as were willing to side with the Athenians should throw down their arms.” When the Peloponnesians heard this, they at once quitted their posts ; and, seriously believing that all the Megaréans had combined to betray them, fled amain into Nisæa.

At the time of morning's dawn, the *long walls* being thus surprised, and the Megaréans within the city thrown into a tumult, the agents for the Athenians, in concert with all their accomplices in the plot, insisted on the necessity to throw open the city gates, and march out to battle ; since it had been agreed between them, that so soon as ever the gates were thus opened, the Athenians should rush in. There was a method to be observed on their side, in order to be distinguished ; this was to besmear themselves with ointment, that they might receive no harm. Their security would have been greater, had they opened the gates at once ; for now four thousand heavy-armed Athenians and six hundred horsemen, who had marched in the night from Eleusis, according to a prior disposition, were at hand. But whilst the accomplices, properly besmeared, stood ready at the gates, one of their own party, who was privy to the whole plot, discovereth it to the other Megareans. These drawing up together, came forwards in a body, and denied “ the expediency of marching out (since formerly, when “ stronger than now, they durst not hazard such a step) or “ running such a manifest risk of losing the city : and, “ should any one affirm the contrary, the point should be

“instantly determined by blows.” They gave not the least hint as if they had discovered the design, but strenuously insisted that their own measure was most adviseable, and stood firm together for the security of the gates. Thus it was no longer possible for the conspirators to put their plot in execution.

The Athenian commanders, being sensible that the project had been somehow crossed, and that they were not able themselves to take the city by storm, immediately run up a wall to invest Nisæa; concluding, that could they carry it before any succours came up, it would be impossible for Megara to hold out much longer. Iron and workmen, and all proper materials, were quickly supplied them from Athens. They begun at the wall which they had lately surprised, they ran it along for some time parallel with Megara, and then down to the sea on both sides of Nisæa. The work, both of ditch and wall, was divided amongst the army. They made use of the stones and bricks of the suburbs, and having felled some trees and wood, they strengthened what was weak with an additional palisade. The houses of the suburbs, being topped with battlements, served the use of turrets. This whole day they plied hard at the work; and about the evening of the succeeding day it was only not completed. The garrison within Nisæa was in great consternation. They laboured already under a scarcity of provisions, which they had been used to fetch daily from the upper city. Thus concluding that the Peloponnesians could not succour them with sufficient expedition, and imagining the Megareans were combined against them, they capitulated with the Athenians on the following terms:

“To be dismissed every man at a certain ransom, after delivering up their arms.”

“But as for the Lacedæmonians, their commander, and every other person in that number, *these* to be disposed of by the Athenians at discretion.”

These terms being agreed to, they evacuated Nisæa. And

the Athenians, having thus cut off their long walls from the city of the Megaréans, and possessed themselves of Nisæa, were preparing to accomplish what was yet to be done.

But Brasidas, son of Tellis, the Lacedæmonian, happened at this time to be about Sicyon and Corinth, levying forces to march for Thrace. He was no sooner informed of the surprisal of the walls than he trembled for the Peloponnesians in Nisæa, and lest Megara should be taken. He summons the Bœotians to attend him expeditiously with their forces at Tripodiscus (the place so named is a village of the Megaris under the mountain Geranéa) whither he was marching himself with two thousand seven hundred heavy-armed Corinthians, four hundred Phliasians, six hundred Sicyonians, and what levies he had already made upon his own account. He imagined he might come up before Nisæa could be taken. But hearing the contrary (for he came up in the night to Tripodiscus), with a picked body of three hundred men, before the news of his march could be spread, he approached to the city of Megara, undescried by the Athenians, who were posted near the sea. He intended to declare that he was ready to attempt, and in fact would have been glad to have effected, the recovery of Nisæa. But it was principally his view to get admission into Megara, and provide for its security. He demanded admission, assuring them he had great hope of recovering Nisæa. But the factions in Megara, perplexed at this step of Brasidas—on one side, lest he meant to reinstate the exiles by ejecting them; the other, lest the *people* with such an apprehension might at once fall upon them, and their city thus plunged into a tumult of arms might be lost, if the Athenians, who lay ready in ambush, should seize it; refused him admittance, and both factions thought proper without any stir to await the event. For it was severally their full expectation, that a battle must ensue between the Athenians and these newcomers; and then, without plunging themselves into unne-

cessary hazards, they might join their own favourite party if victorious.

Brasidas, when he could not prevail, withdrew again to the main of his army. By the succeeding dawn the Bœotians joined him, who had resolved to succour Megara, even previous to the summons sent by Brasidas, since they regarded the danger that place was in as their own. They were actually advanced with their whole force as far as Plataea; and the messenger having met with them here, they became much more eager than before. They sent forwards a detachment of two and twenty hundred heavy-armed, and six hundred horsemen, but dismissed the multitude to their own homes. When the whole force was thus united, consisting of at least six thousand heavy-armed, and the heavy-armed Athenians stood drawn up in order near Nisæa and the sea-shore, whilst their light-armed were straggling about the plain, the Bœotian cavalry made an unexpected sally against those stragglers, and chaced them to the shore: For hitherto no aid whatever had taken the field in behalf of the Megaræans. The Athenian cavalry clapped spurs to repel the Bœotian, and a battle ensued. The horse were a long time thus engaged, and both sides claimed a victory. For the general of the Bœotian cavalry, and a small number of his party the Athenians drove before them to Nisæa, where they put them to the sword and rifled them. They remained masters of the dead bodies, gave them up afterwards by truce, and erected a trophy: But neither side so keeping their ground as to render the action decisive, they retreated as it were by consent; the Bœotians to their main-army, and the Athenians to Nisæa.

Brasidas, after this, advanced nearer to the sea, and to the city of Megara with his army. Having occupied there some advantageous ground, they drew up in order and stood still, imagining the Athenians would attack them; and assured, that the Megaræans were intently observing for whom

the victory might declare. In both these respects, they judged their present posture the most judicious; because it was not their own business to attack, or voluntarily to run into conflict and danger; and thus having manifestly exhibited their alacrity to act defensively, a victory might justly be ascribed to them without the expence of a battle. In regard further to the Megaréans the consequence could not but be fortunate: For, in case the latter had never beheld them thus prompt in their succour, they would have stopped all farther risk, and so undoubtedly they should have lost the city, as men completely vanquished: But now, should the Athenians decline an engagement, the points for which they themselves came thither must be secured without a blow; which proved to be the result. For the Megaréans, when the Athenians came out and drew up in order close to the *long walls*, and then, as the enemy did not advance to attack them, stood quiet in their ranks; their commanders also judging the hazard by no means equal, and themselves, who had so far been successful, not at all concerned to begin an engagement against superior numbers, in which, should they prevail, they could only take Megara; but, should they miscarry, must lose the flower of their domestic strength, especially as their opponents would act in probability with more daring resolution, since, as the large strength they had now in the field consisted only of quotas from several constituents, they hazarded but little; thus facing one another for a considerable space, and neither side presuming to make an attack, till each at length wheeled off, the Athenians first towards Nisæa, and the Peloponnesians again to their former post.—Then, I say, the Megaréans in the interest of the exiles, regarding Brasidas as victor, and animated by the refusal of attack on the Athenian side, open the gates of Megara to Brasidas himself, and the several commanders from the auxiliary states; and, having given them admission, proceed with them to consultation, whilst the partizans of the Athenian interest were in the utmost consternation.

Soon afterwards, the confederates being dismissed to their respective cities, Brasidas also himself returned to Corinth, to continue his preparations for that Thracian expedition, in which before this avocation he had been intently employed.

The Athenians also being now marched homewards, the Megaréans in the city, who had acted most zealously in favour of the Athenians, finding all their practices detected, stole off as fast as possible. The others, after concerting the proper steps with the friends of the exiles, fetch them home from Pegæ, having first administered to them the most solemn oaths "to think no more on former injuries, and to promote the true welfare of the city to the utmost of their power."

But these, when re-invested with authority, and taking a review of the troops of the city, having previously disposed some bands of soldiers in a proper manner, picked out about a hundred persons of their enemies, and who they thought had busied themselves most in favour of the Athenians. And having compelled the *people* to pass a public vote upon them, they were condemned to die and suffered an instant execution. They farther new-modelled the government of Megara into almost an *oligarchy*. And this change, though introduced by an inconsiderable body of men; nay, what is more, in the train of sedition, yet continued for a long space of time in full force at Megara.

The same summer, the Mitylenéans being intent on executing their design of fortifying Antandrus, Demodocus and Aristides, who commanded the Athenian squadron for levying contributions, and were now at Hellespont (for Lamachus the third in the commission had been detached with ten ships towards Pontus), when informed of what was thus in agitation, became apprehensive that Antandrus might prove of as bad consequence to them as Anæa in Samos had already done; wherein, the Samian exiles having fortified themselves, were not only serviceable to the Peloponnesians

at sea, by furnishing them with pilots; but farther, were continually alarming the Samians at home, and sheltering their deserters. From these apprehensions they assembled a force from among their dependents, sailed thither, and having defeated in battle those who came out of Antandrus to oppose them, gain once more possession of that town. And no long time after, Lamachus, who had been detached to Pontus, having anchored in the river Calix in the district of Heraclea, lost all his ships. A heavy rain had fallen in the upper country, and the land-flood rushing suddenly down, bore them all away before it. He himself and the men under his command were forced to march over land through Bithynia (possessed by those Thracians who are seated on the other side of the strait in Asia) to Chalcedon, a colony of the Megaréans, in the mouth of the Euxine sea.

This summer also Demosthenes, immediately after he had quitted the Megaris, with the command of forty sail of Athenians, arrives at Naupactus. For with him, and with Hippocrates, some persons of the Bæotian cities in those parts had been concerting schemes how to change the government of those cities, and introduce a *democracy* on the Athenian model. The first author of this scheme was Ptæodotus an exile from Thebes, and matters were now ready for execution.

Some of them had undertaken to betray Siphæ: Siphæ is a maritime town in the district of Thespiæ, upon the gulf of Crissa. Others of Orchomenus engaged for Chæronéa, a town tributary to that Orchomenus which was formerly called the Minyeian but now the Bæotian. Some Orchomenian exiles were the chief undertakers of this point, and were hiring soldiers for the purpose from Peloponnesus. Chæronéa is situated on the edge of Bæotia towards Phanotis of Phocis, and is in part inhabited by Phocians. The share assigned to the Athenians was the surprisal of Delium, a temple of Apollo in Tanagra, looking towards Eubœa. These

things farther were to be atchieved on a day prefixed, that the Bæotians might be disabled from rushing to the rescue of Delium with all their force, by the necessity of staying at home to defend their respective habitations. Should the attempt succeed, and Delium once be fortified, they easily presumed that, though the change of the Bæotian government might not suddenly be effected, yet, when those towns were in their hands, when their devastations were extended all over the country, and places of safe retreat lay near at hand for their parties, things could not longer remain in their former posture ; but in process of time, when the Athenians appeared in support of the revolters, and the Bæotians could not unite in a body to oppose them, the designed revolution must necessarily take place. This was the nature of the scheme at present in agitation.

Hippocrates, having the whole force of Athens under his command, was ready at the proper time to march into Bæotia. But he had dispatched Demosthenes beforehand to Naupactus with forty ships, that after he had collected a sufficient force in those parts from the Acarnanians and their other confederates, he should appear with his fleet before Siphæ, which was then to be betrayed to him. A day also was fixed upon between them, in which both of them were at once to execute the parts assigned them.

Demosthenes, being arrived at Naupactus, found the Oeniadæ already compelled by the united Acarnanians into an association with the confederates of Athens. He marched away, therefore, at the head of the whole confederacy in those parts, and invaded first Salynthius and the Agræans ; and having carried some other points, got all in readiness to shew himself before Siphæ at the time appointed.

About the same time this summer, Brasidas, at the head of seventeen hundred heavy-armed, began his march towards Thrace. When he was come up to Heraclea in Trachis, he dispatched a messenger beforehand to his correspondents in Pharsalus, to beg a safe conduct for himself

and his army. And as soon as he was met at Melitia of Achæa by Panærus, and Dorus, and Hippolochidas, and Torylaus, and Strophacus, who had been formerly the public host of the Chalcidæans, he continued his march forwards. Others also of the Thessalians assisted in conducting him, and from Larissa Niconidas the friend of Perdiccas. The passage through Thessaly without proper guides is always difficult, and must be more so to an armed body. Besides, to attempt such a thing through a neighbouring dominion without permission first obtained, hath ever been regarded by all the Grecians with a jealous eye, and the bulk of the Thessalians had been ever well-affected to the Athenians. Nor could Brasidas have possibly effected it, had not the Thessalian been rather despotic than free governments. For upon his route he was stopped at the river Enipeus by some of contrary sentiments to the rest of their countrymen, who ordered him to proceed at his peril, and taxed him with injustice in having come so far without the general permission. His conductors told them in return, that “without such permission he should not proceed; but, as he had come amongst them on a sudden, they thought themselves obliged in friendship to conduct him.” Brasidas also gave them strong assurances, that “he was come thither for the service of Thessaly and of them; that his arms were not intended against them, but against the common enemy, the Athenians; that he never suspected any enmity between Thessalians and Lacedæmonians, why they might not tread upon one another’s ground; that even now, should they withhold their consent, he was neither willing nor indeed able to proceed; but he conjured them however to give him no molestation.” Having heard these declarations, they acquiesced and withdrew. Brasidas now, by the advice of his conductors, advanced with the utmost speed without ever halting, in order to anticipate fresh and more potent obstruction. Nay, the very same day that he left Melitia, he advanced as far as to Pharsalus, and encamped upon the banks of the Apidanus. From thence he

proceeded to Phacium, and from thence into Peræbia. Being so far advanced, his Thessalian guides received their dismissal ; and the Peræbians, who are tributaries to the Thessalians, escorted him to Dium in the kingdom of Perdiccas : it is a fortress of Macedonia situated under mount Olympus on the Thessalian side. In this manner Brasidas, advancing so expeditiously as to prevent all obstruction, compleated his passage through Thessaly, and arrived in the dominions of Perdiccas and the region of Chalcis. For those in Thrace, who revolted from the Athenians, had joined with Perdiccas in procuring this auxiliary force out of Peloponnesus, because the great success of the Athenians had struck a terror amongst them. The Chalcidéans were persuaded, that they should be first attacked by the Athenians : and in truth their neighbour-states, who yet persevered in their obedience, were secretly instigating them to it. Perdiccas, indeed, had not yet declared himself their enemy ; but he dreaded the vengeance of the Athenians for former grudges ; and now he had a scheme at heart for the subjection of Arribæus king of the Lyncestians.

Other points concurred to facilitate the procurement of such a succour from Peloponnesus, such as the misfortunes by which the Lacedæmonians at present were afflicted. For, the Athenians pressing hard on Peloponnesus, and not least of all on Laconia, they hoped in case they could equally annoy *them* in this quarter, by thus marching an army against their dependents, to effect a diversion. And they were more encouraged by the offers of maintenance for their troops, and solicitations to support revolts. They were at the same time glad of a pretext to rid themselves of their Helots, lest, in the present state of affairs, now that Pylus was in hostile hands, they might be tempted to rebel. This farther gave rise to the following event :—Dreading the youth and number of these slaves (for many precautions have ever been put in practice by the Lacedæmonians to curb and awe their Helots) they made public proclamation, that “ so

“many of them, as could claim the merit of having done
“signal service to the Lacedæmonians in the present war,
“should enter their claims, and be rewarded with freedom.”
The view in this was to sound them, imagining that such,
who had the greatness of spirit to claim their freedom in re-
quital of their merit, must be also the ripest for rebellion.
About two thousand claimants were adjudged worthy, and
accordingly were led about in solemn procession to the
temples, crowned with garlands, as men honoured with their
freedom. But, in no long time after, they made away with
them all, nor hath the world been able to discover, in what
manner they were thus to a man destroyed.

Now also with alacrity they sent away seven hundred of
their heavy-armed under the orders of Brasidas. The rest
of his body were mercenaries, whom he had hired in Pello-
ponnesus. And it was in compliance with his own particu-
lar desire, that Brasidas was employed in this service by the
Lacedæmonians.

The Chalcidéans, however, were highly satisfied with a
person, who had ever passed in Sparta for one of the most
active and accomplished citizens; and who, in his foreign
employments, had performed very signal services for his
country. From his first appearance amongst them, his jus-
tice and moderation so instantly recommended them to the
adjacent cities, that some voluntarily submitted, and others
were by intrigue put into his possession. By him the Lace-
dæmonians were actually impowered, if the accommodation
they wished for took place, which it afterwards did, to make
exchange and restitution of towns, and so relieve Pelopon-
nesus from the hardships of the war.

Nay more, even in succeeding time, upon the breaking
out of the Sicilian war, the virtue and prudence of Brasi-
das exerted at this juncture, which some attested by their own
experience, others upon sound and unsuspected report, im-
printed a zeal on the confederates of Athens to go over to
the Lacedæmonians. For, having been the first sent out to

foreign trust, and approved in all respects as a worthy man, he left behind him a strong presumption, that the rest of his countrymen are like himself*.

So soon therefore as it was known at Athens, that he was arrived to take upon him the conduct of affairs in Thrace, the Athenians declare Perdiccas their enemy, ascribing this expedition to his cabals, and by strengthening their garrisons kept a strict watch over all their dependants in that quarter.

But Perdiccas with his own forces, and accompanied by the body under Brasidas, marcheth against a neighbouring potentate, Arribæus son of Bromerus, king of the Macedonian Lyncestians: Enmity was subsisting between them, and the conquest of him was the point in view. When he was advanced with his army, and in conjunction with Brasidas, to the entrance of Lyncus, Brasidas communicated his intention to hold a parley with Arribæus, before he proceeded to act offensively against him; and (if possible) to bring him over to the Lacedæmonian alliance; For Arribæus had already notified by a herald, that he was willing to refer the points in dispute to the arbitration of Brasidas. The Chalcidæan ambassadors also, who followed the camp, were continually suggesting to him, that, "he ought not to plunge himself rashly into difficulties for the sake of Perdiccas," designing to reserve him more intire for their own service. And besides this, the ministers of Perdiccas had declared it at Lacedæmon to be their master's intention, to bring over all the neighbouring *States* into this alliance: So that it was entirely with public views, that Brasidas insisted upon treating with Arribæus. But Perdiccas urged in opposition, that "he had not brought Brasidas to be the judge of his controversies, but to execute his vengeance on the enemies he should point out to him; that it would be unjust

* When Brasidas was beginning his march for Thrace, he wrote this letter to the *Ephori* at Sparta;—"I will execute your orders in this war, or die." Plutarch's *Laconic Apothegms*.

“in Brasidas to treat with Arribæus, when *he* supported half “the expence of his troops.” Yet, in spite of such remonstrances and in open defiance of him, Brasidas parleyed. And being satisfied with the offers of Arribæus, he drew off his troops, without so much as entering his dominions.—But henceforth Perdiccas, looking upon this step as an injury to himself, reduced his contribution of support from a moiety to a third.

Brasidas however the same summer, without loss of time, continued the operations of war; and, a little before the vintage, being attended by the Chalcidéans, marched towards Acanthus, a colony of the Andrians. The inhabitants of this place were embroiled in a sedition about his reception; a party who co-operated with the Chalcidéans, were for it; but *the people* opposed. Yet, fearing the loss of their fruit which was not quite got in, the *people* were at last prevailed upon by Brasidas, to grant entrance to himself without any attendants, and after giving him audience to resolve for themselves. Brasidas is admitted; and standing forth in the presence of the *people*, for though a Lacedæmonian he was an able speaker, he harangued them thus :

“My commission from the Lacedæmonians and the “march of their troops hither under my command verify, O “ye Acanthians, the declaration made by us, when first we “began this war against the Athenians, that we were going “to fight for the liberties of Greece. But if our appear- “ance here hath been too long deferred, it should be as- “cribed to the unexpected turns of war nearer home, *where*, “as we hoped to demolish the Athenians speedily with- “out endangering you, we ought to be exempted from any “censure *here*. For now, you behold us opportunely at “hand, and intent in conjunction with you to pull these ty- “rants down.

“I am surprized indeed that your gates should be barred “against me, or that my presence should any way chagrin

“you. For we Lacedæmonians, imagining we were going
“to confederates, whose wishes were fastened upon us be-
“fore their eyes could behold us, and from whom we might
“depend upon the most cordial reception ; we, I say, have
“pierced forwards through a series of dangers, marching
“many days together through hostile territories, and sur-
“mounting every obstacle by a zeal for your service. If
“therefore your affections are alienated from us, or if you
“act in opposition to your own, and to the liberty of the rest
“of Greece, your conduct must terribly distress us. And
“that, not only because you yourselves reject us, but may by
“such a step deter all others, to whom I shall afterwards ap-
“ply, from co-operating with me. Such obstacles you will
“raise before me, if you, to whom first I have addressed my-
“self, you who are masters of a city of great importance,
“and are in esteem for your good-sense and discretion,
“should refuse to receive me. I shall be utterly unable to
“put a plausible colour upon such a refusal, and shall be ex-
“posed to reproach, as if I meant injustice under the cloak
“of liberty, or came hither too weak and impotent to make
“head against the Athenian strength, should it be exerted
“against me.

“And yet with that force, of which at this very moment
“I am honoured with the command, I marched myself to
“the succour of Nisæa, and openly defied a superior num-
“ber of Athenians who declined the encounter. It is not
“therefore probable, that they can send hither a force to
“our annoyance equal to that armament they employed
“at Nisæa : Nor am I sent hither to execute the schemes of
“oppression, but to further the deliverance of Greece. I
“have the security of most solemn oaths, sworn by the
“magistrates of Lacedæmon, that whatever people I bring
“over to their alliance shall remain in free possession of
“their own liberties and laws. And farther, we are forbid the
“use of violence and fraud as the means of rendering you
“dependent on us ; but, on the contrary, are to act in sup-

“port of you who are oppressed with Athenian bondage.
“Upon reasons so valid do I insist upon it, that I am no
“longer suspected by you, having given you the strongest
“assurances, that I am no impotent avenger, and that you
“may boldly abet my cause.

“If there be any person in this assembly, who hesitates
“upon the apprehension that I may betray the city into the
“hands of a private cabal, let him bid adieu to his fears, and
“distinguish himself in open confidence. I came not hither
“to be the tool of faction; I am convinced that liberty can
“never be re-established by me, if disregarding ancient
“constitutions, I enslave the *multitude* to the *few*, or the *few*
“to the *crowd*. Such things would be more grievous than
“the yoke of foreign dominion. And should we Lacedæmo-
“nians proceed in this manner, our labours could never
“merit a return of gratitude, but, instead of honour and glory,
“foul reproach would be our portion. The crimes, on which
“we have grounded this war against the Athenians, would
“then appear to be our own, and more odious in us for hav-
“ing made parade of disinterested virtue, than in a *State*
“which never pretended to it. For it is more base in men
“of honour to enlarge their power by specious fraud, than by
“open force. The latter, upon the right of that superior
“strength with which fortune hath invested it, seizeth at
“once upon its prey; the other can only compass it by the
“treachery of wicked cunning.

“It is thus that in all concerns of more than ordinary
“importance, we are accustomed to exert the utmost cir-
“cumspection. And besides the solemn oaths in your fa-
“vour, you can receive no greater security of our honest
“intention than the congruity of our actions with our words,
“from whence the strongest conviction must result, that
“with what I have suggested you are obliged in interest to
“comply. But if all my promises are unavailing, and you
“declare such compliance impossible; if professing your-
“selves our sincere well-wishers, you beg that a denial may

“not expose you to our resentments; if you allege that the
 “dangers through which your liberty must be sought to over-
 “balance the prize; that in justice it ought only to be pro-
 “posed to such as are able to embrace the offer, but that no
 “one ought to be compelled against his own inclinations;—
 “I shall beseech the tutelary gods and heroes of this island
 “to bear me witness, that whereas I come to serve you, and
 “cannot persuade, I must now, by ravaging your country,
 “endeavour to compel you. And, in acting thus, I shall not
 “be conscious to myself of injustice, but shall justify the
 “step on two most cogent motives:—For the sake of the
 “Lacedæmonians; lest whilst they have only your affections,
 “and not your actual concurrence, they may be prejudiced
 “through the sums of money you pay to the Athenians:—
 “For the sake of all the Grecians; that they may not be ob-
 “structed by you in their deliverance from bondage. This
 “is the end we propose, and this will justify our proceedings.
 “For without the purpose of a public good, we Lacedæmo-
 “nians ought not to set people at liberty against their wills.
 “We are not greedy of empire, but we are eager to pull down
 “the tyranny of others. And how could we answer it to the
 “body of Greece, if, when we have undertaken to give liberty
 “to them all, we indolently suffer our endeavours to be tra-
 “versed by you?

“Deliberate seriously on these important points, and ani-
 “mate yourselves with the glorious ambition of being the
 “first who enter the list for the liberties of Greece, of gain-
 “ing an eternal renown, of securing the uninterrupted pos-
 “session of your private properties, and investing the *State*
 “of which you are members with the most honourable of
 “all titles*.”

Here Brasidas concluded. And the Acanthians, who
 had already heard this affair largely discussed on both sides,
 and secretly declared their votes—the majority, because the
 arguments of Brasidas were prevailing, and because they

dreaded the loss of their fruit, resolved to revolt from the Athenians. Then they required of Brasidas himself to swear the oath of their security, which the Lacedæmonian magistrates had at his departure enjoined him to take, that “what-
“ever people was brought over into their alliance by him
“should remain in possession of their own liberties and laws,” and this done, they receive his army. Not long after, Stagyryus also, another colony of the Andrians, revolted. And thus ended the transactions of this summer.

Very early in the succeeding winter, when the strong places of Bœotia were to have been betrayed to Hippocrates and Demosthenes the Athenian commanders, preparatory to which Demosthenes was to shew himself with his fleet before Siphæ, and the other to march to Delium, there happened a mistake about the days prefixed for execution. Demosthenes indeed, who steered towards Siphæ, and had on board the Acarnanians, and many of the confederates of that quarter, is totally disappointed. The whole scheme had been betrayed by Nicomachus, the Phocian of Phanotis, who gave information of it to the Lacedæmonians, and they to the Bœotians. All Bœotians now taking up arms to prevent consequences (for Hippocrates was not yet in their country to distress them on that side), Siphæ and Chæronéa are secured in time. And so soon as the conspirators perceived that things went wrong, they gave up all farther thoughts of exciting commotions in the cities.

Hippocrates, having summoned into the field the whole force of Athens, as well citizens as sojourners, not excepting even foreigners who chanced at that time to be there, arriveth too late before Delium, not before the Bœotians were returned home again from Siphæ. He incamped his forces, and set about fortifying Delium, the temple of Apollo, in the following manner.—Round about the temple and its precincts they sunk a ditch: Of the earth thrown up they formed a rampart instead of a wall. They drove into the ground on each side a row of stakes, and then threw on the vines they

cut from within the precincts of the temple. They did the same by the stones and bricks of the adjacent buildings which had been demolished, and omitted no expedient to give height and substance to the work. They erected wooden turrets upon such spots as seemed most to require it. No part of the old pile of the temple was now standing: The portico, which stood the longest, had lately fell down. They began the work the third day after their marching out from Athens. That day they plied it, and the following, and continued it on the fifth till the time of repast. Then, the work being for the most part compleated, they drew off their army to the distance of about ten stadia* from Delium, in order to return home. Their light-armed indeed, for the most part marched off directly, but the heavy-armed halting there sat down upon their arms.

Hippocrates stayed behind for the time necessary to post the proper guards, and to put the finishing hand to those parts of the fortification which were not yet perfectly compleated. But during all this space the Bæotians had been employed in drawing their forces together to Tanagra. When the quotas from the several cities were come up, and they perceived the Athenians were filing off towards Athens, the other *rulers* of Bæotia (for they were eleven in all) declared their resolution not to engage, since the enemy is no longer on Bæotian ground: for the Athenians, when they grounded their arms, were within the borders of Oropia. But Pagondas, the son of Æoladas, one of the Bæotian *rulers* in the right of Thebes, and at this time in the supreme command, in concert with Arianthidas, the son of Lysimachidas, declared for fighting. He judged it expedient to hazard an engagement; and addressing himself to every battalion apart, lest calling them together might occasion them to abandon their arms, he prevailed upon the Bæotians to march up to the Athenians, and to offer battle. His exhortation to each was worded thus:

* About an English mile.

“IT ought never, ye men of Bæotia, to have entered in-
“to the hearts of any of your *rulers*, that it is improper for
“us to attack the Athenians, because we find them not upon
“our own soil. For they, out of a neighbouring country,
“have rushed into Bæotia, and have fortified a post in it ;
“from whence they intend to ravage and annoy us. And our
“enemies in short they are, in whatever place we find them,
“from what place soever they march to execute hostilities
“against us. Now therefore let him, who hath judged this
“step we are taking hazardous and insecure, acknowledge
“and forego his error. Cautious and dilatory measures are
“not to be adhered to by men who are invaded, and whose
“all is at stake ; they are expedient only for those whose
“properties are secure, and who bent on rapine exert their
“malice in the invasion of others. But it is eternally the
“duty of you Bæotians to combat such foreigners as pre-
“sume to invade you, either upon your own or your neigh-
“bour’s ground, no matter which. And this above all must
“be done against Athenians, not only because they are
“Athenians, but because they are the nearest borderers upon
“us. For it is a maxim allowed, that no *State* can possibly
“preserve itself free, unless it be a match for its neighbour-
“ing powers.

“Let me add farther, that when men are bent on in-
“slaving not neighbours only, but even such people as are
“more remote, how can it be judged improper to encounter
“such, so long as we can find ground whereon to stand ?
“Call to mind for your present information the Eubœans
“situated in yon island opposite to us ; call to mind the
“present disposition of the bulk of Greece in regard to these
“Athenians. Why should we forget, that neighbouring
“*States* so often battle one another about settling their
“various boundaries ; whereas, should we be vanquished,
“our whole country will be turned merely into one heap of
“limitation, and that never again by us to be disputed ?
“For when once they have entered upon it, they will remain

“the masters of it all, beyond controul. So much more
“have we to fear from these neighbours of ours, than any
“other people.

“Those again, who in all the daring insolence of superior strength are wont to invade their neighbours, as
“these Athenians now do us, march with extraordinary degrees of confidence against such as are inactive, and defend themselves only on their own soil. His schemes are
“more painfully compleated, when men sally boldly beyond
“their borders to meet the invader, and if opportunity
“serveth attack him first. Of this truth our own experience will amply convince us. For ever since the defeat
“we gave these very men at Coronea, when taking the advantage of our seditions they had possessed themselves of
“our lands, we have kept Bœotia quiet from every alarm
“till the present. This we ought now to remember, that
“the seniors among us may proceed as they then begun;
“that the juniors, the sons of those sires who then displayed
“such uncommon bravery, may exert themselves to preserve
“unblemished their hereditary virtues. We ought all to
“be confident, that the God will fight on our side, whose
“temple they pollute by raising ramparts, and dwelling
“within its verge. And, as the victims we have offered are
“fair and auspicious, we ought at once to advance to the
“charge of these our foes, and make them know, that their
“lust and rapine they only then can gratify, when they invade such cowards as abandon their own defence: but
“from men, who were born to vindicate their own country
“for ever by the dint of arms, and never unjustly to enslave
“another;—that from such men they shall not get away
“without that struggle which honour enjoins.”

In this manner Pagondas exhorted the Bœotians, and persuaded them to march against the Athenians. He put them instantly in motion, and led them towards the enemy: For it was now late in the day. When he had approached the spot on which they were posted, he halted in a place

from whence, as an eminence lay between, they could have no view of one another. There he drew up his men, and made all ready for the attack.

When the news was brought to Hippocrates, who was yet at Delium, that "the enemy is advancing to the charge," he sendeth orders to the main-body to form into the order of battle. And not long after he himself came up, having left about three hundred horse at Delium, to guard that place in case an attempt should be made upon it, or seizing a favourable opportunity to fall upon the rear of the Bæotians during the engagement. Not but that the Bæotians had posted a party of their own to watch their motions, and find them employment. When therefore the whole disposition was perfected, they shewed themselves on the top of the eminence, and there grounded their arms, remaining still in the same order in which they designed to attack, being in the whole about seven thousand heavy-armed, more than ten thousand light-armed, a thousand horse, and five hundred targeteers. The right wing was composed of Thebans and those who ranked with them; the centre of the Haliartians and Coronéans and Copiensians, and others that live about the lake (Copæis); and the left of Thespiensians, Tanagræans, and Orchomenians. In the wings were posted the cavalry and light-armed. The Thebans were drawn up in files of twenty-five; the others variously, as circumstances required. And such was the order and disposition of the Bæotians.

On the Athenian side, the heavy-armed, being in number equal to their enemies, were drawn up in one entire body of eight in depth. Their cavalry was posted on either wing. But light-armed soldiers, armed as was fitting, the Athenians had none at this juncture, neither in the field nor in the city. The number which had taken the field at first to attend this expedition exceeded many times over the number of the enemy; but then most of them had no arms at all, since the summons had been extended to all who resided in Athens,

both citizens and foreigners. The crowd of these, so soon as ever the route was pointed homewards, were, excepting a few, gone speedily off. But, when they were drawn up in the order of battle, and were every moment expecting the charge, Hippocrates the general shewing himself in the front of the Athenians, animated them with the following harangue :

“ THE admonition, Athenians, I intend to give you will be very concise, but such a one is sufficient to the brave : I pretend not to encourage Athenians, but merely to remind them of their duty. Let the thought be a stranger to every heart amongst you, that we are going to plunge into needless hazards in the territory of a foe. Be it the territory of a foe, yet in it you must fight for the security of your own. And, if we conquer *now*, the Peloponnesians will never again presume, without the aid of the Bæotian horse, to repeat their inroads into Attica. By one battle therefore you acquire this, and secure your own land from future annoyance. Charge therefore your enemies, as you ought, with a spirit worthy of the *State* of Athens, that *State* which every soul amongst you boasts to be the first of Greece ; and worthy of your great forefathers, who formerly at Oenophyta, under the conduct of Myronides, defeated these people in the field, and possessed for a time all Bæotia as their prize.”

Hippocrates had not gone along half the line encouraging them in this manner, when he was compelled to desist and leave the greater part of his army unaddressed. For the Bæotians, to whom Pagondas also had given but a short exhortation and had this moment finished the pæan of attack, were coming down from the eminence. The Athenians advanced to meet them, and both sides came running to the charge. The skirts of both armies could not come to an engagement, as some rivulets that lay between stopped them equally on both sides. The rest closed firm in a stubborn fight, and with mutual thrusts of their shields. The left

wing of the Bæotians, even to the centre, was routed by the Athenians, who pressed upon those who composed it, but especially on the Thespiensians. For, the others who were drawn up with them giving way before the shock, the Thespiensians were inclosed in a small compass of ground, where such of them as were slaughtered defended themselves bravely till they were quite hewed down. Some also of the Athenians, disordered in thus encompassing them about, knew not how to distinguish, and slew one another. In this quarter, therefore, the Bæotians were routed, and fled towards those parts where the battle was yet alive. Their right wing, in which the Thebans were posted, had the better of the Athenians. They had forced them at first to give ground a little, and pressed upon them to pursue their advantage. It happened that Pagondas had detached two troops of horse (which motion was not perceived) to fetch a compass round the eminence and support the left wing which was routed. These suddenly appearing in sight, the victorious wing of Athenians, imagining a fresh army was coming up to the charge, was struck into consternation. And now being distressed on both sides by this last turn, and by the Thebans who pursued their advantage close and put them into a total disorder, the whole Athenian army was routed and fled. Some ran towards Delium and the sea, others to Oropus, and others towards mount Parnes; all, to whatever place they hoped was safe. But the Bæotians, especially their horse, and the Locrians who had come up to the field of battle just as the rout began, pursued them with great execution. But the night putting an end to the chace, the bulk of the flying army preserved themselves more easily.

The day following, such of them as had reached Delium and Oropus, leaving behind a garrison in Delium, which still remained in their possession, transported themselves by sea to Athens. The Bæotians also, having erected a trophy, carried off their own dead, rifled those of the enemy, and having posted a guard upon the field of battle, retired to

Tanagra, and called a consultation about the method of assailing Delium.

A herald, farther, dispatched by the Athenians about their dead, meets upon his way a herald of the Bœotians, who turned him back by assuring him that his errand would be fruitless till he himself should be again returned. The latter, being come to the Athenians, declared to them in the name of the Bœotians ;

“ THAT by their late proceedings they had enormously “ violated the laws of the Grecians, amongst whom it was “ an established rule, that amidst their mutual invasions religious places should be ever spared, whereas the Athenians had not only fortified, but had made Delium a place “ of habitation, and whatever profanations mankind can be “ guilty of had been there by them committed : That the “ water, which it would even be impious for the Bœotians “ themselves to touch, unless by way of ablution, before “ they sacrificed, had been profanely drawn by them for “ common use : That, for these reasons the Bœotians, in “ the cause of the God and in their own, invoking the associated Dæmons and Apollo, gave them this early notice to evacuate the sacred place, and clear it of all incumbrances.”

This message being thus delivered by the herald, the Athenians returned this answer to the Bœotians by a herald of their own :

“ THAT they were hitherto guilty of nothing illegal in “ regard to the holy place, nor would willingly be so for the “ future. They had no such intention when they first entered into it, and their view was merely to give an ejection from thence to persons who had basely injured them. “ It was a law among the Grecians for those who were “ masters of any district, whether great or small, to be also “ proprietors of its temples, which are to be honoured by “ them with the usual forms, and with what additional ones “ they may be able to appoint. Even the Bœotians, as well

“as many other people, who this moment were possessed
“of lands from which they had ejected the old proprietors,
*“made a seizure first of those temples which had belonged
“to others, and continued in the free possession of them.
“For their own parts, could they conquer more of their ter-
“ritory they should manfully retain it; and as to the spot
“they now occupied, their position there was voluntary, and
“as it was their own they would not quit it. It was ne-
“cessity alone made them use the water, which ought not to
“be ascribed to any insolent or profane motive, but to the pre-
“ceding invasions their enemies had made, self-preservation
“against which laid them under a present necessity of acting
“as they did. It might with reason be hoped, that every
“proceeding to which war and violence indispensably obliged,
“would obtain forgiveness from the God: For the altars are
“a refuge to involuntary offences, and transgression is im-
“puted only to those who are bad without compulsion, and
“not to such as urgent necessities may render daring. The
“guilt of impiety belonged more notoriously to such as in-
“sisted on the barter of temple for the bodies of the dead,
“than to those who are content to lose their just demands
“rather than submit to so base an exchange.” They farther
injoined him in their name to declare, that “they would not
“evacuate Bœotia, since the ground which they occupied in
“it belonged to no Bœotians, but was now their own property
“acquired by dint of arms. All they required was a truce
“for fetching off their dead, according to the solemn institu-
“tions of their common country.”

The Bœotians replied thus—“If they are now in Bœotia,
“let them quit the ground which belongeth to us, and carry
“off what they demand. But, if they are upon ground of
“their own, they themselves know best what they have
“to do.” They judged indeed that Oropia, on which it
happened that the bodies of the dead were lying, as the
battle had been fought upon the lines of partition, belonged

to the Athenian jurisdiction, and yet that it was impossible for them to be carried off by force; and truce farther they would grant none, where the point related to Athenian ground; that it was therefore the most proper reply—"they should quit their territory, and so obtain their demands." The herald of the Athenians having heard this, departed without effect.

Immediately after, the Bœotians, having sent for darters and slingers from the Melian bay, and being reinforced by two thousand heavy-armed Corinthians, and the Peloponnesian garrison which had evacuated Nisæa, and a party of Megareans, all which had joined them since the battle, marched against Delium, and assaulted the fortification. They tried many methods, and took it at last by the help of a machine of a very particular structure.—Having split asunder a large sail-yard, they hollowed it throughout, and fixed it together again in a very exact manner, so as to resemble a pipe. At its extremity they fastened a caldron by help of chains, into which a snout of iron was bent downwards from the yard. The inside, farther, of this wooden machine was lined almost throughout with iron. They brought it from a distance to the fortification on carriages, and applied it where the work consisted chiefly of vines and timber. And when near enough, they put a large bellows to that extremity of the yard which was next themselves, and begun to blow. But the blast, issuing along the bore into the caldron, which was filled with glowing coals and sulphur and pitch, kindled up a prodigious flame. This set fire to the work, and burnt with so much fury, that not a soul durst any longer stay upon it, but to a man they abandoned it and fled away amain: and in this manner was the fortress carried. Of the garrison, some were put to the sword, but two hundred were made prisoners. The bulk of the remainder, throwing themselves on board their vessels, escaped in safety to Athens.

It was the seventeenth day after the battle that Delium

was taken. And not long after, a herald dispatched by the Athenians came again, but quite ignorant of this event, to sue for the dead, which were now delivered by the Bæotians, who no longer laid any stress upon their former reply.

In the battle, there perished of the Bæotians very little under five hundred ; of the Athenians, few less than a thousand, and Hippocrates the general ; but of light-armed and baggage-men a considerable number indeed*.

Somewhat later in time than this battle, Demosthenes, who, on his appearance before Siphæ, had been disappointed in his hope of having it betrayed to him, having the land-force still on board his fleet, consisting of four hundred heavy-armed Acarnanians and Agræans and Athenians, made a descent on Sicyonia. But before all his vessels could land their men, the Sicyonians had marched down to make head against them. They defeated those that were landed, and chased them again on board. Some they killed, and some they took alive ; and after erecting their trophy, they delivered up the dead by truce.

* The Athenians received in truth a terrible blow on this occasion. The Bæotians, a people heavy and stupid to a proverb, continued ever after the terror of the Athenians, the politest and most enlightened people upon earth. Nay, that gross and stupid people had, this day, well nigh completed the destruction of all that was pre-eminently wise and good at this time upon earth ; and done an irreparable mischief to sound reason and good sense for ever after. When the two troops of horse, after fetching a compass round the hill, had completed the rout of the Athenians, who were now flying away with the utmost speed, the divine Socrates was left almost alone, facing the enemy, and fighting and retreating like a lion over-powered. Alcibiades, who served in the cavalry, was making off on horse-back ; but, seeing Socrates in such imminent danger, he rode up to him, covered his retreat, and brought him off safe. He thus repaid him the great obligation he had formerly received from him at Potidæa. Strabo relates further (Geog. I. 9.) that Xenophon also the same day owed his life to Socrates. Having fallen from his horse, and being trampled among the crowd, Socrates took him upon his shoulders, and carried him to a place of safety. Upon the whole, brutal strength and mere bodily merit were never so near getting a total conquest over all the light and understanding which human nature hath to boast of, that did not come directly down from heaven.

During the former transactions at Delium, Sitalces also king of the Odrysians was killed in an expedition he had formed against the Triballians, who encountered and vanquished him. And Seuthes the son of Sparadocus, his nephew by the brother, succeeded him in the kingdom of the Odrysians and the rest of Thrace over which he had reigned.

The same winter, Brasidas, in conjunction with the allies of Thrace, marched against Amphipolis, an Athenian colony, upon the river Strymon.—

The spot of ground on which the city now standeth, Aristagoras the Milesian formerly, when he fled from king Darius had endeavoured to plant, but was beat off by the Edonians. Two and thirty years after, the Athenians made the same attempt, having sent thither a colony consisting of ten thousand of their own people and such others as voluntarily came in, all of whom were destroyed by the Thracians at Drabescus. But after an interval of twenty-nine years, the Athenians came hither again with a fresh colony led by Agnon the son of Nicias, who having drove away the Edonians built this city upon that spot of ground which had formerly been called the *nine-roads*. They rushed to the seizure from Eïon, a maritime emporium situated at the river's mouth, and belonging to them. Eïon is distant twenty stadia* from the spot where the city now standeth, and which by Agnon was named Amphipolis, because it is almost surrounded by the Strymon which floweth along it on both sides. Running therefore a wall from the river to the river, he planted his colony on a spot conspicuous both to the land and to the sea.

Against this place, Brasidas, decamping from Arne of Chalcidica, advanced with his army. About sun-set he arrived at Aulon and Bromiscus, where the lake Bolbé issueth into the sea. From hence, after taking the evening-repast, he continued his march by night. It was winter, and a snow was falling. This favoured and encouraged his enterprise, as he intended to surprize the people of Amphipolis,

* About two English miles.

except such as were privy to his design. For there resided in the place a body of Argillians, who are an Andrian colony, and others who acted in combination with him, some of them at the instigation of Perdiccas, and others at that of the Chalcideans: But in a more particular manner the Argillians, who had a place of residence very near it, who farther had ever been suspected by the Athenians, and were really intent on the ruin of the place when now a fair opportunity was within their reach, and Brasidas at hand (who long before had been tampering with these inhabitants of foreign mixture) in order to have the city betrayed to him. The Argyllians at this juncture received him into their own city, and revolting from the Athenians led his army forwards that very night to the bridge laid over the Strymon. The city is seated at some distance from this pass; and it was not then defended by a fort as it is now, but was only the station of a small party of guards. Brasidas therefore easily forced the guard, being favoured in some degree by treachery, not a little also by the season and his own unexpected approach. He then passed the bridge, and was immediately master of all the effects of those Amphipolitans who reside in all the tract without the walls. This passage was so sudden, that those within the city had no notice of it; and as to those without, many of them being seized, and others flying for preservation within the wall, the Amphipolitans were thrown into vast confusion, increased by their mutual suspicions of one another. And it is said, that if Brasidas, instead of permitting his troops to disperse for plunder, had advanced directly against the city, it must unavoidably have fallen into his hands. But he, on the contrary, having ordered them to halt, employed himself in the ravage of what lay without; and, finding nothing effectuated in his favour by accomplices within, he for the present desisted. But those his accomplices were overpowered in number by the opposite party, who prevented their opening the gates immediately to Brasidas; and, acting in concert with Eucles

their commandant, who resided there by the orders of the Athenians to guard the place, they dispatch a messenger to the other commander in Thrace, Thucydides the son of Olorus, who compiled this history, and was then in Thasus (Thasus is an island, a colony of the Parians, and distant about half a day's sail from Amphipolis), pressing him to come instantly to their relief.

Thucydides no sooner received this notice, than, with the utmost expedition, he put to sea with seven ships that happened to be at hand. He designed nothing so much as to prevent if possible the loss of Amphipolis; or, if that was impracticable, to throw himself into Eïon, and secure it in time.

Brasidas in the mean while, fearing at the approach of this succour from Thasus, informed besides that Thucydides drew an ample revenue from the working of his gold-mines in this quarter of Thrace, and was on this account of great credit amongst the principal persons of this part of the continent, tried all possible expedients to get possession of the city before his arrival, lest his appearance amongst them might animate the Amphipolitans with the hope of succour by sea and from Thrace, which the credit of Thucydides might easily obtain for their effectual preservation, and in pursuance of this they might refuse to capitulate. He sent them therefore very moderate terms, ordering his herald to proclaim that "the Amphipolitans and Athenians within the city should, if they desired it, be continued in the free possession of their property, and of all their rights and liberties whatever: But those, who refused to stay, should have the space of five days allowed them to quit the town and remove their effects."

This proposal was no sooner heard, than the inclinations of the *many* took a new turn. The Athenian interest had but a few supporters in the city: The bulk of the inhabitants were a mixture of foreign nations. There were also *within* many persons, relations of those who had been made prison-

ers *without*. And thus, in their present consternation, the proposal was generally received as mild and gentle. The Athenians for their part, who thought themselves more exposed to danger than the rest, and had besides no hope of speedy relief, were delighted with the offer of quitting the place. So also were all the rest, that they were not to lose their rights and liberties as citizens, and should thus escape the danger they had dreaded, even beyond their hopes. Upon this, the agents of Brasidas expatiated only on the mildness and generosity of the terms he had offered, because now they perceived that the multitude had altered their sentiments, and would no longer hearken to the Athenian commandant. In short, an accommodation was perfected, and they opened the gates to Brasidas, upon the conditions he had proposed by his herald. And in this manner did the inhabitants deliver up Amphipolis.

But in the evening of the same day, Thucydides and the squadron came over to Eïon. Brasidas was already in possession of Amphipolis, and designed that very night to seize Eïon also. And unless this squadron had come in thus critically to its defence, at break of day it had been lost.

Thucydides instantly took care to put Eïon in a posture of defence, in case Brasidas should attack it; and to provide farther for its future security, when he had opened a refuge there for such as were willing to remove thither from Amphipolis, according to the articles of the late surrender.

But Brasidas on a sudden fell down the river with a large number of boats towards Eïon, designing if possible to seize the point of land that juts out from the walls, which would have given him the command of the river's mouth. He endeavoured at the same time also to assault it by land, but was repulsed in both attempts. And now he effectually employed his care in resettling and securing Amphipolis.

Mercinus also, a city of Edonia, revolted to him upon the death of Pittacus king of the Edonians, who was killed by the sons of Goaxis and his own wife Braures. Gapselus soon after did the same, and Oesyme: They are colonies of the Thrasians. These events were owing to the practices of Perdiccas, who came thither in person immediately after the surrender of Amphipolis.

The loss of that city cast the Athenians into great consternation, and with reason, because it was a place of great importance to them, since from thence they had materials for building ships and a pecuniary revenue; and farther, because, after a safe conduct through Thessaly, the route was now open to the Lacedæmonians as far as the Strymon, to annoy their dependents. Yet had they not possessed themselves of the bridge, the large lake formed above by the river, and the check given by the triremes stationed at Eïon, would have hindered the Lacedæmonians from penetrating further. But all obstacles appeared to the Athenians now quite easy to be surmounted; and their apprehensions, that their dependents would revolt, alarmed them much. For Brasidas in the rest of his conduct gave constant proofs of an excellent temper; and the declaration was ever in his mouth, "that he had been sent thither to restore the liberty of Greece." Accordingly the cities, which were subject to the Athenians, had no sooner heard of the surrender of Amphipolis together with the brave exploits and the mild engaging deportment of Brasidas, than they conceived the most ardent inclination to shake off the yoke. They secretly dispatched their agents to him, earnestly desiring a visit from him, with respective assurances from each, that *they* would be the first to revolt. They judged, there was no longer room to apprehend any bad consequences from such a step; falsely estimating the Athenian power to be much less considerable than it afterwards appeared. But this their judgment was founded more upon uncertain presumption than deliberate prudence. It is the turn of

mankind when their passions are warm, to give themselves up to blind and sanguine hope, and to throw aside with despotic scorn whatever seemeth to be counter to their wishes. It was but lately that the Athenians had been vanquished by the Bæotians ; and Brasidas had been making such recitals as might persuade, though in fact they were collusive, that at Nisæa with his single force he offered battle to the Athenians and they declined it. This made them confident, and they became perfectly convinced, that there was no longer a strength sufficient to chastise them. But what had the greatest influence on their thoughts, and disposed them entirely to run all hazards, was the immediate pleasure they promised themselves in a change, and that now they were going for the first time to experience the sweets of Lacedæmonian friendship.

These inclinations were perceived by the Athenians, who sent garrisons into each of these cities in order to curb them, with as much expedition as the shortness of time and the wintry season would permit.

Brasidas also had sent to Lacedæmon, soliciting a speedy reinforcement, and was busy himself in providing materials to build triremes in the Strymon. But the Lacedæmonians neglected to supply him, partly through the envy which the leading men at Sparta had conceived against him, and partly because their attention was principally confined to the recovery of their people made prisoners in Sphacteria, and to bring the war to a conclusion.

The same winter, the Megaréans having recovered their *long walls*, which were in the possession of the Athenians, levelled them with the ground.

Brasidas thus master of Amphipolis gathereth together the allies, and leadeth them into the district called Acté. It is the tract, which stretcheth out into the sea from the canal which was dug by Xerxes, and Athos the highest mountain in Acté is its utmost verge upon the Ægean sea. The cities in it are ; Sane, a colony of Andrians, seated close to the ca-

nal and on that part which faceth the sea towards Eubœa, Thyssus farther, and Cleone, and Acrothous, and Olophyxus, and Dyum, which are promiscuously inhabited by various sets of Barbarians, who speak both languages. There is also a small number of Chalcidœans amongst them, but the bulk are Pelasgians (the issue of those Tyrrhenes who formerly inhabited Lemnos and Athens), and Bisaltians, and Crestonians, and Edonians : They reside in small fortresses. Most of them went over to Brasidas ; but Sane and Dium stood out. He therefore made his army halt on their lands, and laid them waste. Yet as this had no effect, he marched from thence to Torone of Chalcidica then possessed by the Athenians. He hastened thither at the invitation of a small party, who were ready to betray the city to him. Being arrived whilst yet it was dark, he sat down about break of day with his army near the temple of the Dioscuri, which lieth not at most above three stadia* from the city. The bulk of the Toronœans and the Athenian garrison were ignorant of his approach : But the accomplices, who knew he would be punctual, sent some of their body unperceived to observe his approach. When these were thus certainly assured he was at hand, they conducted back with them to their friends seven men armed only with daggers. Twenty had at first been selected for this service, but only seven of *them* now had the courage to proceed : Lysistratus the Olynthian was the person who commanded. They got in by the wall towards the sea without causing an alarm, and ascending from thence slaughtered the guard in the citadel which is seated upon the most eminent spot, the whole city being built on the declivity of a hill, and burst open the postern towards Canastrœum. Brasidas, having since advanced a little with the rest of his force, halted again. But he ordered a hundred targeteers to go before, that, when the gates should be opened and the signal given which was before agreed on, they might break in first.

* Above a quarter of a mile.

These after an interval of time wondered at the delay, and by gradually advancing were got close to the city. Such of the Toronéans within, as acted in concert with those who had entered, when once the postern was burst, and the gates leading to the *forum* were thrown open after bursting the bar, in the first place conducting some of them about led them in at the postern, that they might strike a sudden panic on the ignorant inhabitants when attacked in rear and in flank and on all sides. This done they lifted up the appointed signal of fire, and gave instant admittance to the rest of the targeteers through the gates which led to the *forum*.

Brasidas, when once he saw the signal, roused up his army and led them running towards the place, shouting all at once aloud, and thus striking the greatest consternation into the inhabitants. Some immediately rushed in at the gates; others mounted over the square wooden machines, which, as the wall had lately fallen down and was now rebuilding, lay close to it for the raising of stones. Brasidas, with the bulk of his force, betook himself immediately to the upper parts of the city; intending to seize the eminence, and possess himself effectually of the place. The rest dispersed themselves equally through every quarter.

Amidst this surprisal, the majority of the Toronéans, quite ignorant of the plot, were in vast confusion. But the agents in it and all their party were quickly ranged with the assailants. The Athenians, (for of them there were about fifty heavy-armed asleep in the *forum*,) when they found what was done, some few excepted who were slain instantly on the spot, fled away for preservation; and some by land, others in the guard-ships stationed there, got safe into Lecythus, a fort of their own. They kept this in their own hands, as it was the extremity of the city towards the sea stretched along on a narrow isthmus. Hither also those of the Toronéans, who persevered in their fidelity, fled to them for refuge.

It being now broad day and the city firmly secured, Bra-

sidas caused proclamation to be made to those Toronéans who had fled for refuge to the Athenians, that "such as were willing might return to their old habitations, and should enjoy their rights without any molestation." But to the Athenians a herald was sent expressly, commanding them "to evacuate Lecythus which rightfully belonged to the Chalcidéans, and a truce should be granted them to remove themselves and their baggage." An evacuation they absolutely refused, but requested one day's truce to fetch off their dead: He solemnly accorded two. During this space he was very busy in strengthening the houses adjacent to Lecythus, and the Athenians did the same within.

He also convened the Toronéans to a general assembly, and harangued them very nearly in the same manner as he had done at Acanthus,—that "it was unjust to look upon those, who had been his coadjutors in the surprisal of the city, as men worse than their neighbours, or as traitors; they had no enslaving views, nor were biassed to such a conduct by pecuniary persuasions; the welfare and liberty of the city had been their only object. Neither should they, who had no share in the event, be more abridged than those who had. He was not come thither to destroy the city, or so much as one private inhabitant of it. For this very reason he had caused the proclamation to be made to those who had sheltered themselves amongst the Athenians, because such an attachment had not in the least impaired them in his esteem, since it was entirely owing to their ignorance that they had thus undervalued the Lacedæmonians, whose actions, as they were always more just, would for the future entitle them much more to their benevolence; their terror hitherto had been merely the result of inexperience." He then exhorted them in general "to take care for the future to be steady and firm allies, since should they henceforth offend, they would be made answerable for the guilt. They were not chargeable for the past, as they had rather been sufferers themselves from superior

“force ; the preceding opposition therefore deserved forgiveness.”

Having spake thus and revived their spirits, when the truce was expired, he made assaults upon Lecythus. The Athenians defended themselves from a paltry rampart and the battlements of the houses. One whole day they effectually repulsed them. But on the following, when a machine was to be planted against them by the enemy, from whence they intended to throw fire upon their wooden fences, and the army was now approaching to the spot which seemed convenient for lodging their machine and whence it might be played off with effect ; they raised for prevention a wooden turret, the base of which was an edifice that lay ready at hand, and carried up many buckets and tubs of water and heavy stones ; and upon it also many defendants were mounted. But the edifice, too heavily laden, on a sudden was crushed by the weight. The crash with which it fell was great ; and those of the Athenians, who stood near and saw it, were rather concerned than terrified. But those at a distance, and especially such as were most remote, imagining the place was already taken in that quarter, fled again to the sea and to their vessels.

When Brasidas perceived they were quitting the battlements, and had himself beheld the accident, he led his army to the assault, and immediately carrieth the fortress. Such as were found within it were instantly destroyed. And the Athenians in boats and ships, after having thus abandoned it to the enemy, crossed over to the Pallene.

But Brasidas (for in Lecythus there is a temple of Minerva ; and before he proceeded to the assault he had publicly proclaimed, that a reward of thirty *minæ** of silver should be given the man who first mounted the rampart,) concluding now that it was taken less by human than some other means, repositied the thirty *minæ* in the temple, as an offering to the Goddess. And having demolished Lecythus and cleared all

* 96l. 15s. sterling.

away, he consecrated the whole spot as sacred to her. During the remainder of the winter, he provided for the security of the places already in his possession, and was planning future conquests. And with the end of this winter the eighth year of the war expired.

YEAR IX.

VERY early in the spring of the ensuing summer, the Athenians and Lacedæmonians made a truce to continue for a year. The motives on the Athenian side were these—That “Brasidas might no longer seduce any of their towns to revolt, before they were enabled by this interval of leisure to act against him; and besides, that if they reaped any advantage from this truce, they might proceed to a farther accommodation.” On the Lacedæmonian side it was imagined that “the Athenians were under such terrors as in fact they were; and, after a remission of calamities and misfortunes, would more eagerly come into some expedients for a future reconciliation; of course, would deliver up to them their *citizens*, and come into a truce for a larger term.” The recovery of *these* Spartans was a point on which they laid a greater stress than ever, even during the career of success which attended Brasidas. They foresaw that in case he extended his conquests, and even brought them to a balance with their foes, of *those* they must for ever be deprived, and the conflict then proceeding upon equal advantages the dangers also would be equal, and the victory still in suspense.

Upon these motives, both parties and their allies agreed to a truce of the following tenor:

“AS to the temple and oracle of the Pythian Apollo, it seemeth good unto us, that access be granted to all who desire it, without fraud and without fear, according to the laws of our country. The same is approved of by the Lacedæmonians and their allies now present; and

“ they promise to send heralds on purpose, and to spare
 “ no pains to procure the consent of the Bæotians and
 “ Phocians.

“ As to the treasure belonging to the God, care shall be
 “ taken by us to find out those who have presumed to embez-
 “ zle it ; and this fairly and honestly, according to the laws
 “ of our country, both by you, and by us, and by all others
 “ who are willing ; all proceeding respectively according to
 “ the laws of their several constitutions.

“ It hath farther seemed good to the Lacedæmonians and
 “ their other allies, if the Athenians agree to the truce, that
 “ both parties shall keep within their own bounds, and hold
 “ what we are at present respectively possessed of: that is to
 “ say ; the former to keep in Coryphasium*, within the
 “ mountains of Bouphras and Tomeus ; the latter in Cythera ;
 “ without enlarging the communication for the procuring of
 “ alliance, neither on our side against you, nor on your side
 “ against us. That those in Nisæa and Minoa pass not be-
 “ yond the road that leads from the gates of Megara adja-
 “ cent to the temple of Nisus towards the temple of Neptune,
 “ and from the temple of Neptune carrieth directly to the
 “ bridge laid across to Minoa : That neither the Megaréans
 “ nor their allies pass beyond the same road, nor into the island
 “ which the Athenians have taken ; both keeping within their
 “ bounds, and upon no occasion whatever to have any inter-
 “ course with one another : The Megaréans still to retain
 “ what they possess in Træzen, and whatever they hold by
 “ compact with the Athenians ; to have farther the free use
 “ of the sea upon their own coasts, and those of their al-
 “ liance.

“ That the Lacedæmonians and allies shall not navigate
 “ the sea in a long ship†, but in any other vessels rowed
 “ with oars, and of no larger burden than five hundred
 “ talents‡.

* In which stood the fort of Pylus.

† A ship of war.

‡ Five and twenty tons.

“That by virtue of this truce, safe-conduct be granted
 “both of passage and repassage, either by land or sea, either
 “to Peloponnesus or to Athens, to all heralds and ambassa-
 “dors, and their whole retinue how numerous soever, com-
 “missioned to negotiate the determination of the war, or to
 “get controverted points adjudged.

“That so long as this truce be in force, no deserters be
 “entertained, neither by you, nor by us, whether they be free-
 “men or slaves.

“You shall do justice in our causes, and we shall do the
 “same for you, according to the laws of our respective con-
 “stitutions, to the end that all controversies may be judicially
 “settled without a war.

“These articles have the approbation of the Lacedæmo-
 “nians and their allies. But, if any thing more honourable
 “or more just occurs to you, you are to repair to Lacedæ-
 “mon, and propose it there. For whatever points you may
 “demonstrate to be just, will in no degree whatever be re-
 “jected, neither by the Lacedæmonians nor by their allies :
 “Provided the persons charged with these new commissions
 “be sent with full powers to put to them the finishing hand,
 “in the same manner as you require the same conditions
 “from us.

“This truce shall be in force for a year.”

Ratified by the People.

The Acamantine Tribe presided. Phanippus was the
 Notary public. Niciades was in the chair. Laches pro-
 nounced—“Be it for the welfare and prosperity of the Athe-
 “nians, that a suspension of arms is granted upon the terms
 “offered by the Lacedæmonians and allies.”

Agreed in the public assembly of the people,

“That this suspension shall continue for a year.

“That it shall take place this very day, being the four-
 “teenth day of the month Elaphebolion.

“That during this interval, ambassadors and heralds shall

“pass between them, to adjust the terms upon which the war should be definitively concluded.

“That the generals of the *State* and the presidents in course shall first at Athens convene an assembly of the *people*, to adjust the terms upon which their embassy should be empowered to put an end to the war. And

“That the ambassadors, who were now present in the assembly, shall give a solemn ratification that they will punctually abide by this truce for a year.”

The Lacedæmonians and their allies agreed to these articles, and pledged their oath for the observation of them to the Athenians and their allies at Lacedæmon, on the twelfth day of the month Gerastius.

The persons who settled the articles and assisted at the sacrifice were,

For the Lacedæmonians—Taurus the son of Echetimidæ, Athenæus the son of Periclidæ, Philocharidæ the son of Eryxidaïdæ. For the Corinthians—Æneas the son of Ocytus, Euphamidæ the son of Aristonymus. For the Sicyonians—Damotimus the son of Naucrates, Onasimus the son of Megacles. For the Megaréans—Nicasus the son of Cecalus, Menecrates the son of Amphidorus. For the Epidaurians—Amphias the son of Eupæïdæ. For the Athenians—Nicostratus the son of Diotrophes, Nicias the son of Niceratus, Autocles the son of Tolmæus, Generals of the *State*.

In this manner was a suspension of arms concluded, during which they continued without interruption to hold conferences with one another, about settling the terms of a firm and lasting peace.

During the interval these matters were thus in agitation, Scione a city in the Pellene revolted from the Athenians to Brasidas. The Scionéans indeed in the Pellene give out that they are of Peloponnesus; that their ancestors who settled in these other seats were driven there originally by a storm, which in their return from Troy dispersed the Achæans.

When they had notified their revolt to him, Brasidas passed over to Scione by night. A party of his friends sailed before him in a trireme, and he followed at some distance in a fly-boat, to the end that if he should fall in with any vessel larger than this boat, the trireme might make head against her ; but if another trireme of equal strength should come up to them, he judged she would neglect his smaller boat, and would attack the ship, which would give him time to complete his passage in security.

When he was safe landed, and had convened an assembly of the Scionéans, he harangued them as had done before at Acanthus and Torone. But he added farther that “they
“were a people most deserving of applause, since though
“the communication with the Pallene, as being an isthmus,
“was cut off by the Athenians who were masters of Poti-
“dæa, and they were by this means become islanders to all
“intents and purposes, yet they had, without prior sollicita-
“tion, advanced boldly towards liberty, nor could bear to
“lie in cowardly inactivity till necessity forced them to
“such measures as tended to their manifest welfare. This
“was ample proof that they were ready to undergo any
“other the greatest perils, to obtain the wished-for settle-
“ment of their *State*. He therefore regarded them, as in
“truth the most gallant friends of the Lacedæmonians, and
“would in all respects do proper honour to their worth.”

The Scionéans were elevated by these handsome commendations. All of them became full of spirits, not even those excepted to whom the prior steps had been by no means agreeable. They chearfully determined to sustain all future war, and in every shape gave Brasidas honourable entertainment. By public vote they placed upon his head a golden crown as the deliverer of Greece, whilst every single Scionéan was busy in adorning him with ribands, and caressing him like a victor in the solemn games. His stay at present was short ; he only placed a small party in

the town to secure it, and then repassed to Torone. But soon after he transported thither the greater part of his force, designing with the aid of the Scionéans to make attempts upon Mende and Potidæa. He concluded however that the Athenians would lose no time in throwing in a succour as into an island, and so he endeavoured to be beforehand with them.

He had already formed an intelligence to the prejudice of those cities to get them betrayed: and he was now intent on executing his schemes against them. But during this pause, Aristonymus dispatched by the Athenians, and Athenæus by the Lacedæmonians to circulate the news, arrive in a trireme, and notify to him the suspension of arms. His forces were then transported back to Torone.

The persons employed communicated the articles of the truce to Brasidas, and all the Lacedæmonian confederates in Thrace declared their acquiescence in what had been done. Aristonymus was well satisfied in other respects, but finding, by computing the days, that the revolt of the Scionéans was too late in point of time, he protested against their being intitled to the benefit of the truce. Brasidas on the other hand urged many arguments to prove it prior in time, and refuseth to restore that city. When therefore Aristonymus had reported this affair at Athens, the Athenians in an instant were ready to take up arms again for the reduction of Scione. But the Lacedæmonians, by an embassy purposely dispatched, remonstrated that "they should regard such a proceeding as a breach of the truce," and asserted "their right to the city as they reposed entire credit on Brasidas; however, they were ready to refer the dispute to a fair arbitration." The others refused to abide by so hazardous a decision, but would recover it as soon as possible by force of arms. They were irritated at the thought, that persons seated as it were upon an island should presume to revolt from them, and place such confidence in the unprofitable land power of the Lacedæmonians. There

was farther more truth in the date of the revolt than at present the Athenians could evince: For, in fact, the Scionéans revolted two days too late. But at the instigation of Cleon they immediately passed a decree, that "the Scionéans" should be reduced by force, and then put to the sword." And their attention was recalled from all other points, to expedite the needful preparations for the execution of this.

In the mean time, Mende also a city in the Pellene, and a colony of Eretrians, revolted from them. Brasidas received them into his protection, thinking himself justified, as they had openly come over to him in the time of truce. Besides, he had himself some reasons to recriminate upon the Athenians, as violaters of the articles. Upon this account the Mendeans were more encouraged to the step, as they saw Brasidas was determined to support them; and were convinced, by the affair of Scione, that he would not abandon them. The design farther had been originally set on foot by the *few*; who, though they delayed it for a time, were resolved to push it into execution: for they apprehended that a discovery might prove fatal to themselves; and so forced the bulk of the *people* to act against their inclination. But the Athenians, who had a quick intelligence of it, were now exasperated much more than before, and redoubled their preparations against both those places.

Brasidas, who soon expected the arrival of their armament, conveyed away the wives and children of the Scionéans and Mendéans to Olynthus of Chalcidica, and had them escorted thither by five hundred heavy-armed Peloponnesians and three hundred Chalcidic targeteers: the commander of the whole escort was Polydamidas. Those left behind, expecting soon to be visited by the Athenians, united their endeavours to get things in good order for their reception.

In the interval, Brasidas and Perdiccas march together

a second time into Lynceus against Arribæus. They commanded their separate bodies; one, the forces of the Macedonians subject to himself, and the heavy-armed Grecians who dwelled amongst them: the other, the remainder of his own Peloponnesians reinforced by Chalcideans and Acanthians, and quotas from other cities such as they were able to furnish. The number of heavy-armed Grecians computed together amounted to about three thousand: The cavalry that attended, both of Macedonians and Chalcideans, was upon the whole little less than a thousand: And the remaining crowd of Barbarians was great.

Breaking thus into the territory of Arribæus, and finding the Lyncestians already in the field to oppose them, they also sat down and faced them. The infantry on each side were posted on an eminence, and a plain lay between them. This yielding room for the excursions of the horse, the cavalry of both began a skirmish first. But then Brasidas and Perdiccas, so soon as the Lyncestian heavy-armed were moving first from the eminence to the aid of their cavalry and were ready to engage, marched also down into the plain to oppose them, where they charged and routed the Lyncestians. A large number of the latter were slain, the rest fled for preservation to the eminences, and there stood quiet.

The victors after this, having erected a trophy, continued for two or three days in the same post, waiting for the Illyrians who were coming up to join Perdiccas for a stipulated pay. And then Perdiccas intended to advance farther against the villages of Arribæus, and sit no longer inactive. Mende however was still uppermost in the care of Brasidas:—That place must be lost, should the Athenians arrive before it in the interval:—The Illyrians besides were not yet come up. He relished not the project, and was more inclined to go back. This engendered some disputes between them, in the midst of which the news was brought that the Illyrians had deserted Perdiccas, and joined them-

selves with Arribæus. Upon which it was soon resolved between them to retire, as there was reason to dread the accession of men so renowned for military valour. Yet the disagreement between them prevented their fixing on any certain time for filing off. Night came on, in which the Macedonians and the crowd of Barbarians being struck with a sudden panic (as numerous armies are apt to be, without any certain cause), and imagining that much larger numbers were coming against them than in fact was true, and that they were only not near enough to attack them, they instantly took to their heels and hurried homewards. Perdiccas for a time knew nothing of the matter, and when informed of it, was compelled, by the flying troops, to dislodge in their company, without being able to get a sight of Brasidas. For they were encamped at a distance from each other.

At the dawn of day, Brasidas perceived that the Macedonians had dislodged, and that the Illyrians and Arribæus were approaching to attack him. He therefore drew his forces together, forming a square with his heavy-armed, in the centre of which he disposed all the crowd of light-armed; and in this form he intended to retreat. He appointed the youngest men to sally out, in case the enemy any where attacked them: And he himself, with a picked body of three hundred, determined to bring up the rear in person, in order to sustain and make good their retreat against the van of the enemy who should press upon their rear. And before the enemy came near, as well as the hurry would admit, he animated his soldiers thus:

“ DID I not suspect, ye men of Peloponnesus, that thus
“ abandoned as you are and ready to be attacked by Barba-
“ rians, and those numerous too, you were in some conster-
“ nation, I should judge it needless to instruct or to encou-
“ rage you. But now, against this desertion of our friends,
“ and this multitude of our enemies, I shall endeavour, by a
“ short admonition and exhortation, to raise within you the

“full grandeur of your souls. Upon you it is incumbent to
“behave with gallantry in every martial scene, upon the ac-
“count, not merely of acting in the open field in the presence
“of so many confederates, but of your own hereditary valour.
“Your souls ought not to be dismayed at a multitude of
“foes, since you were not born under governments where the
“*many* control the *few*, but where the *few* command the
“*many*. And the only means by which you acquired this
“noble privilege, was victorious perseverance in the fields of
“battle. Yet of these Barbarians, your fears of whom are
“the result of your ignorance, you ought to be informed,
“from what you have learned yourselves in former conflicts
“against them with the Macedonians, as well as from what
“I conjecture, and what I depend upon from the accounts of
“others, that in action they will be by no means terrible.
“For when a hostile force, though in reality weak, carrieth
“with it the appearance of strength, a true discovery of its
“state is no sooner obtained, than it redoubleth the courage
“of their opponents. But men, in whom valour is firmly im-
“planted, none can assault with extraordinary spirit but such
“as know them not. These enemies of yours are dreadful
“for a while, merely till brought to trial. Their multitude
“rendereth them terrible to the sight; the loudness of their
“shouts is insupportable to the ear. Their weapons, bran-
“dished about and clashing in the air, have a frightful and
“menacing look. But their spirit will not answer their shew,
“when charging against such as will sustain their shock.
“They are not drawn up with skill, nor will they blush
“when compelled to quit their ground. To fly from or to
“fly after an enemy is equally a matter of glory to them:
“By such things is their valour established and rescued
“from reproach. For a battle, where every combatant is
“his own commander, leaveth a specious and handsome
“opportunity to each of providing for his safety. They this
“moment judge it more safe to intimidate us at a distance

“ than to run to the charge : for otherwise, before this they
“ had attacked us. And you plainly see, that all the terror
“ which now runs before them, will vanish at the onset, as
“ terrible only to sight and hearing. When therefore they
“ advance to the charge, sustain it and repulse them ; and
“ when opportunity serveth, fall back into your ranks again
“ with regularity and order. You shall thus the sooner se-
“ cure your retreat, and be convinced for the time to come,
“ that such rabbles, to men who can stand the first fury of
“ their onset, have only made, at a distance and by their
“ pausing, a vain and menacing parade of valour ; but such
“ as will give ground and fly before them, they pursue
“ with eagerness ; and are excellently brave, when there is no
“ resistance.

After this exhortation, Brasidas caused his army to file leisurely off. The Barbarians perceiving it pressed forward with great noise and clamour, supposing that he fled, and that they might intercept and cut him off. But when the appointed parties sallied out from all quarters to receive them, and Brasidas himself with his picked body sustained their charge, they repulsed them at their first assault, to the great surprize of the enemy. Afterwards, receiving every repeated attack, they beat them off continually ; and then during the intervals of pause retreated in good order ; till at length, the bulk of the Barbarians discontinued their efforts in the plain against the Greeks under Brasidas, and leaving only a part of their body to follow and annoy them in their retreat, the rest wheeled speedily off to pursue the flying Macedonians, and such as they overtook they slaughtered. To the narrow pass farther between two hills which was the entrance into the territories of Arribæus, they hurried before in order to secure it, knowing it to be the only rout by which Brasidas could retreat. He was now drawing near it, and in the most difficult part of the passage they were spreading themselves circularly to encompass him on all sides. But Brasidas perceiving their design, ordered the three hundred.

that marched with him to advance full speed up that hill which he thought was most practicable and possess themselves of it, and this with the utmost expedition, each as he was able without regarding form, and endeavour to drive the Barbarians thence, who were already posting themselves upon it, before they were joined by larger numbers and could invest him on all sides. They did so, attacked, and made themselves masters of the hill, which enabled the main body of the Grecians to march up without obstruction. For now the Barbarians were thrown into consternation, when their detachment had in this manner been beat off from the eminence. And here they discontinued the pursuit, imagining the enemy had already passed the frontier, and secured their retreat.

Brasidas, when once he was master of the eminences, marched on without molestation; and the very same day reached Arnissa, the first place within the dominions of Perdiccas. His soldiers indeed, who were exasperated against the Macedonians for having thus precipitately abandoned them, whatever yokes of oxen they met with on their route, or whatever baggage lay dropped upon the ground, (as such things it was likely should happen in a retreat by night and confused by fear), the former they unyoked and cut to pieces, and secreted the latter as lawful plunder. Here, Perdiccas first began to regard Brasidas as his enemy, and ever after forced himself against his inclinations to hate the Peloponnesians; not indeed in his judgment preferring the Athenians, but prevailed upon by the exigencies of his own affairs, he cast about for the means of being again reconciled to the latter, and disentangling himself from the former.

Brasidas, having retreated through Macedonia to Torone, findeth the Athenians already in possession of Mendé. Judging it impossible now to pass over into the Pallene and drive out the enemy, he chose to remain there and securely to garrison Torone. For, during the time of the expedition into Lyncus, the Athenians had put to sea against Mendé and

Scioné with the armament they had provided, consisting of fifty ships, ten of which were Chian, of a thousand heavy-armed of their own citizens, six hundred archers, a thousand mercenary Thracians, and a body of targeteers furnished by their adjacent dependents : Nicias the son of Niceratus and Nicostratus the son of Diotrepes had the command of the whole. They weighed from Potidæa, and landing at the temple of Neptune marched directly for Mendé. The Mendéans, with their own force and three hundred Scionéans who were come to their succour, and the Peloponnesian auxiliaries, in all seven hundred heavy-armed under the command of Polydamidas, were encamped without the city upon a strong eminence. Nicias taking with him a hundred and twenty light-armed Methoneans and sixty picked men of the heavy-armed Athenians, and all the archers, attempted to mount by a path that led up the eminence ; but, being galled by the enemy, was not able to force the ascent. Nicostratus, with all the rest of the force, having fetched a compass about, in order to mount in a remote quarter, where the ascent was impracticable, was quite thrown into disorder ; and thus the whole Athenian army narrowly escaped a total defeat. As therefore the Mendéans and allies maintained their post the whole day, the Athenians drew off and encamped. And, when night came on, the Mendéans withdrew into the city.

The next day, the Athenians sailing round to the Scioné-side possessed themselves of the suburbs, and spent the whole day in ravaging the country, as not a soul sallied out to obstruct them : For some bustles now were on foot in the city inclining to a sedition. The three hundred Scionéans departed also in the succeeding night to their own home : And the day following Nicias, advancing with a moiety of the force within their frontier, ravaged the district of the Scionéans ; whilst Nicostratus, with the remainder, sat down before the upper gates of Mendé, from whence the road leadeth to Potidæa. But Polydamidas, as the Mendéans

and the auxiliaries had chanced to ground their arms in this quarter within the wall, drew them up in order of battle, and exhorted the Mendéans to sally out. It was replied in a seditious manner by one of the popular faction, that “they would not sally, and would have nothing to do with “the war.” At such a refusal Polydamidas having laid hands upon the person, a tumult at once ensued, in which the *people* ran immediately to arms, and, furious with anger, made towards the Peloponnesians, and all those of the opposite faction who sided with them. They fell upon and routed them in an instant, terrified as they were at this sudden assault; and the gates were thrown open at the same time to the Athenians. They supposed this insurrection had been made against them in consequence of some previous combination; and as many as escaped out of the scuffle with life, fled away to the citadel, which was before in their possession.

But the Athenians (for Nicias was now returned before the city) bursting into Mendé, for it was not opened by composition, with their whole united force, plundered it as though taken by storm; nay, the generals had some difficulty to restrain their soldiers from putting the inhabitants to the sword. And after this they issued their commands to the Mendéans to continue their government in the usual form, and to proceed judicially against those of their body whom they esteemed the principal authors of the revolt. Those in the citadel they shut up with a wall extending on both sides to the sea, and posted a guard to secure the blockade.

When in this manner they had possessed themselves of Mendé, they marched against Scioné. The inhabitants, with the Peloponnesian aids, coming out to receive them, posted themselves on a strong eminence before the city; which, unless the enemy could take it, would infallibly prevent their walling them about. But the Athenians stormed the post, and after an engagement forced them to dislodge, they formed

their camp, and having erected a trophy, got every thing in readiness for the circumvallation. And no long time after, whilst they were busied in this work, the auxiliaries blocked up in the citadel at Mendé, having forced the guard posted near the sea, get away by night; and the major part of them, escaping privily through the Athenian camp before Scioné, got safe into that town.

When the circumvallation of Scioné was in hand, Perdiccas, having dispatched a herald for the purpose to the Athenian generals, strikes up a new treaty with the Athenians. He took this step out of pure enmity to Brasidas, arising from the retreat out of Lyncus; and had begun from that time to act in their favour. For it happened, that at this very juncture of time Ischagoras the Lacedæmonian was bringing up by land a reinforcement to Brasidas. But Perdiccas, as well to oblige Nicias, who, as he had renewed his alliance, commanded him to give some conspicuous proof of his attachment to the Athenians, as to gratify his own resentment in refusing the Peloponnesians a passage through his dominions, had gained the concurrence of his Thessalian friends, since with the chief persons of that country he had ever been closely united by the hospitable ties, and so stopped the reinforcement and their convoy that they durst not attempt to pass through Thessaly. Ischagoras however, and Aminias and Aristeus reached Brasidas in person, being commissioned by the Lacedæmonians to inspect the posture of their affairs, and brought with them some young men of Sparta, though contrary to their laws, who were to take upon them the government of the cities which were no longer to be trusted to their former managers. In effect, Clearidas the son of Cleonymus they place as governor in Amphipolis, and Epitelidas the son of Hegesander in Torone.

This same summer, the Thebans demolished the walls of the Thespiensians, alleging as the reason, that they were

practising with the Athenians. This demolition had ever been intended, but its execution was now become more easy, as the flower of their youth had perished in the late battle fought against the Athenians.

This summer also, the temple of Juno at Argos was destroyed by fire. Chrysis the priestess had placed a burning torch too near the garlands, and unawares fell fast asleep. The flames broke out and were raging all around before they were perceived. Chrysis indeed instantly, for fear of the Argives, flies away by night to Phlius. They, according to the law enacted for that purpose, appointed another priestess in her room, whose name was Phacinis. Eight years of this war were elapsed, and it was the middle of the ninth when Chrysis fled.

The circumvallation of Scioné also was compleated about the close of this summer ; and the Athenians, leaving behind a sufficient body to guard it, drew off the rest of their army.

In the ensuing winter, things were quiet between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians, because of the suspension of arms. But the Mantinéans, and Tegeatæ, and the confederates on both sides, engaged at Laodicéa of Orestis: But the victory was doubtful. Each party routed a wing of their opponents, and both sides erected trophies, and sent the spoils to Delphi. Many however were slain on both sides, and the battle was drawn, the night putting an end to the contest. The Tegeatæ indeed passed the night upon the field, and immediately erected a trophy. But the Mantinéans withdrew to Bucolion, and afterwards erected their trophy in opposition.


In the close of this winter, and when the spring was already approaching, Brasidas farther made an attempt upon Potidæa. For having approached it in the night, and applied his ladders, so far he proceeded without causing an alarm. For the bell being passed by, during that interval, before he that carried it forwards could return, the moment

was seized for applying them*. However the alarm was taken before he could possibly scale, upon which he drew off his army without loss of time, not caring to wait for the return of day. And thus ended the winter; and with it the ninth year of this war, of which Thucydides hath compiled the History.


* The officers regularly went their rounds to see that all the centinels were at their posts. When they approached any of them, a little bell was rung to which the centinel was to answer, in proof that he was at his post and awake. The interval between the rounds was so considerable, and the vigilance of the centinel, as the bell was just gone by, might be so relaxed, that Brasidas hoped he might execute his scheme.

END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.





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